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The dissertation investigates the role of mobility in the interactions of people, technology, 
and nature in Gonarezhou National Park in southeastern Zimbabwe for the last 150 years. 
It concentrates on the movement of three specific actors. First, it examines the movement 
of people such as state administrators, hunters or poachers, human traffickers, insurgents 
(bandits and nationalist guerrillas), and illegal immigrants to South Africa. Second, it 
explores technologies like indigenous hunting technologies, western-made guns, 
veterinary disease control, and indigenous and western conservation. Thirdly, it looks at 
the movement of  nature, specifically wild animals, plants, water, minerals, and the 
weather.  
By paying close attention to the role of mobility, the dissertation attempts to bring 
together people, nature, and technology in one narrative. Scholars who write about 
mobility have often normalized or naturalized it in such a way that we do not see how 
movement itself works to produce history or social behavior. Mobility is taken as more 
of a premise but is rarely problematized. This dissertation argues that mobility itself 





notion of the mobile workshop to talk about the artifacts, skills and socio-technical 
relations that surround these border-crossing people, nature, and technology as they move 
through time and space. These artifacts, skills and socio-technical relations are the very 
same ones scholars have used to define a workshop (be it an engineering plant or 
laboratory). Mobility renders the workshop portable and capable of operating on the 
move or being shifted from place to place. 
This dissertation tells how villagers around Gonarezhou forest have formed 
alliances with these itinerant outsiders, animals, insects and technologies to transgress 
state monopoly over wildlife. At no point in the 150 years examined here did the human 
element (much less the state, whether precolonial, colonial or postcolonial) 
completely control the stage where technology and nature interacted. In principle, various 
incarnations of the state defined right and wrong forms of mobility; in practice, the 
wrong mobilities of human and nonhuman subjects ruled these various forms of the 
state, which in turn resorted to treating human subjects in the same ways as they did 




















This dissertation investigates the role of mobility in the interactions of people, 
technology, and nature. It examines these interfaces in the history of Gonarezhou 
National Park, a game reserve situated in southeastern Zimbabwe bordering 
Mozambique, over the past 150 years. This 5,053 km² piece of land is the second largest 
national park in Zimbabwe after Hwange and is famous for its pristine wilderness 
teeming with big elephant tuskers. A railway dissects the reserve into two, the 
northeastern side being the Chipinda Pools sub-region, the southern part Mabalauta. A 
game fence demarcates the parks common boundary with the surrounding villages of 
Shilothlela, Malipati, Chikombedzi, and Mahenye. 
It was the location of this fence between the villagers and the park that first drew 
my attention to Gonarezhou in 2000. I had followed press reports that the game reserve 
was about to become part of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park. The fence separating 
the park from adjacent parts of Kruger National Park in South Africa (with Shilothlelas 
people in between) and the other separating Zimbabwe from Mozambique were going to 
be torn down so that animals could move freely between the three sanctuaries. Overseas 
tourists would flock in, and local peoples lives would be significantly improved. It 





Upon arrival, questions began to churn in my mind as I stood at the fence 
separating the villages from the animals. Who put it there? Was it there to keep things out 
or in? Bad or good things? What did bad or good mean, to whom, in what circumstances? 
Gazing east into the park, further questions emerged. How did these animals end up on 
their side of the fence? What did they do to deserve a fence putting them where they were 
now? At that point, a third set of questions. Was the fence established to keep the animals 
away from the lives of the villagers? Or, perhaps, to keep the people out of the park?  
These questions lie at the heart of the conservation and meaning of African 
wildlife. Generally known in conservation circles as the fences and fines or fortress 
approach, this separation of nature and culture derives from a colonial philosophy 
whereby villagers were seen as the arch-destroyers of nature and the fence as a first line 
of defense against them.  
There is perhaps now as much literature blaming European colonists for 
endangering wildlife through excessive hunting as there is scholarship on African 
destructiveness before the European rescue arrived. While the epistemological fence 
between the two approaches is slowly being torn down, its resilience cannot be 
underestimated.1 The debate has overwhelmingly privileged the social: it is still a 
discussion of the tug-of-war between outsiders (colonial settlers and conservationists) and 
local communities. Nature comes into the analysis as ecology or the acted-upon; it has 
no agency. Technology also comes in as an extension of human intentionality, its 
                                                
1 William Beinart and JoAnn McGregor, Introduction, in Beinart and McGregor (eds.), Social History 
and African Environments (Oxford: James Currey, 2003); Jane Carruthers, Africa: Histories, Ecologies 
and Societies, Environment and History 10, 4 (2004); Helge Kjekshus, Ecology, Control and Economic 
Development in East African History (London: James Currey, 1977); Tom Griffiths and Libby Robin 






material presence and effect assumed, but not seriously considered. While the tide is 
shifting towards a deeper engagement of human-nature interactions,2 the approaches still 
compartmentalize temporality into pre-colonial, colonial, and postcolonial 
categories that are biased towards key political and social events. Most of the 
environmental history of Africa focuses on the 20th century.  
By focusing too much on the colonial period, African environmental historians 
reinforce the notion of the European arrival as the big bang and high drama that fast-
tracked Africans from nature into human beings before they were ready.3 The usual 
environmental history of Africa is a story of how the colonial state grouped chiefdoms 
and kingdoms into one large political entity, and introduced conservation methods 
derived from western science. What often passes off as African environmental history is 
how this was done. As Alfred Crosby says, Africa seemed to have participated in tandem 
with other continents in the Old World Iron Age.4 However, as Jared Diamond would 
say, the continent seemed to lose the plot afterwards and was isolated as technology 
spread from Europe to Asia.5 Diamonds formulation prepares the ground for Europes 
belated alarm clock to Africa: colonialism. 
The pre-colonial is either a brief prelude to the discussion on the colonial, or 
merely one way to compare western versus indigenous knowledge. Pre-colonial 
societies are weighed on a scale and designated small-scale societies. They are cast as 
                                                
2 An example of this shift is the conference entitled Science, Disease and Livestock Economies, held at 
St. Antonys College, Oxford in June 2005, five of which papers have been published in a special issue of 
the South African Historical Journal 58 (2007). 
3 This was the typical Native Commissioners depiction of his African subjects in mid-20th century 
Rhodesia, see R.C. Haw, Impact of Civilization on the African, Native Affairs Department Annual 
(hereafter NADA) 26 (1949): 31-3. 
4 Alfred W. Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: the Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986). 





being on their way to evolving into large-scale or modern states, a process that then 
happens abruptly thanks to the civilizing power of colonization. At which point the 
question is posed: Were small-scale societies capable of (deliberate) conservation? No, 
say the conservation experts, many of them with no background or interest in history. 
Conservation is a by-product; voluntary conservation is rare.6 In these accounts, what 
constitutes conservationpurpose, design, deliverablesis measured using the sliding 
scale of western science. No wonder some scholars have cautioned that unless we 
democratize the store of environmental knowledge, we risk misreading the African 
landscape and indeed those before European colonization globally.7  
Beyond environmental history, there has been a much more sustained Africanist 
critique of the tendency to see Africa in isolation from the world. Using the continents 
20th century economic dependency on the North as an example, Jean François Bayart has 
noted that Africa has always been in conversation with the world, for better or worse.8 
Focusing on the movement of people, tastes, and the changing face of Johannesburg and 
Accra respectively, Achille Mbembe and Ato Quayson have argued that it is possible to 
see in the street traces of Africas place in the world and the worlds place in Africa. 
They conclude: Africa is on the move.9 Retreating to the village in the West African 
                                                
6 Eric A. Smith and Mark Wishnie, Conservation and Subsistence in Small-Scale Societies, Annual 
Review of Anthropology 29 (2000): 493-524. 
7 For a robust critique, see James Fairhead and Melissa Leach, Misreading the African Landscape 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); see also Terence Ranger, Voices from the Rocks: Nature, 
Culture, and History in the Matopos Hills of Zimbabwe (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999). 
8 Jean François Bayart, Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion, African Affairs 99, 395 (2000): 
217-67. 
9 Achille Mbembe, At the Edge of the World: Boundaries, Territoriality and Sovereignty in Africa, 






countryside, Charles Piot found a place in motion.10 Meanwhile, Mamadou Diouf 
followed the Murid diaspora in the world in order to demonstrate how Africans stretched 
their locally generated repertoires to position themselves prosperously in the world.11  
I add to this exciting conversation a focus on technology and an examination of 
what the mobility itself is doing. I am interested in reading the body-in-motion across 
places as a body-at-work, mapping or drawing lines of traversal between departure and 
destination.12 I would like to operationalize Jessica Dubows framing of the map, which 
she called a place found by way of the body.13 I feel that this useful framing need not 
be limited to the maps only human bodies draw, but also traces technology leaves as the 
body moves through place.  
I would like to include a host of nonhuman things critical to the mutual shaping of 
historical events. There are significant risks I take in doing this, not least because other 
scholars have already traveled this route.14 Like Bruno Latour and Michel Callon, I may 
be accused of giving nature and technology intentionality. Indeed, the two scholars have 
been heavily criticized for implying that humans and nonhumans have agency. In 
                                                
10 Charles Piot, Remotely Global: Village Modernity in West Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1999). 
11 Mamadou Diouf, The Senegalese Murid Trade Diaspora and the Making of a Vernacular 
Cosmopolitanism, Public Culture  12 (Oct 2000). 
12 Veronica Strang, Uncommon GroundCultural Landscapes and Environmental Values (New York, 
Berg): 217; B. Harley, Deconstructing the Map, in Trevor Barnes and James S. Duncan (eds.), Writing 
Worlds: Discourse, Text and Metaphor in the Representation of Landscape (London: Routledge, 1992): 
232-3. 
13 Jessica Dubow, From a View on the World to a Point of View in it: Rethinking Sight, Space and the 
Colonial Subject, Interventions 2, 1 (2000): 89,90, 92. 
14 Bruno Latour, Science in Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986); Michel Callon, 
Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: domestication of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St. 
Brieuc Bay, in John Law (ed.), Power, Action and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge (London: 





particular, agency has been slated as too strong a word to use to describe the behavior 
of things upon which humans impose their own language and classificatory devices.15  
The discussion on human and nonhuman agency has been bogged down over 
whether agency means intention. Rather than Latour and Callons rather abstract framing 
of nature, I find Timothy Mitchells chapter, Can the Mosquito Speak?, to resonate 
more with my reference to tsetse fly and wildlife in general. My framing is concerned 
with Mitchells argument that human agency appears less as a calculating intelligence 
directing social outcomes and more as the product of a series of alliances in which the 
human element is never wholly in control.16 While I agree that the human element is 
never in full control, I argue for a far more radical exploration of intentionality than 
Mitchell is prepared to concede.  
Mitchells framing is opaque and insufficient because it lumps nonhuman things 
together that do not share material valuestechnology, disease, hydraulics, war, nature, 
chemistry and so forth. It is impossible to define the agency of technology in the same 
way as we define that of nature. Within nature itself, it does not make sense to define the 
agency of vegetative matter the same as that of animals that move about with real intent. 
Hence, a tree cannot get out of the path of a fire, yet a fly and an elephant can. Unlike 
trees, animals have brainpower; their actions represent a brainnot just nervesin 
action. What is that if it cannot be called intention (to live)? As such, if we go that far 
(which I cannot do yet), what are the modalities of a serious reading of animal intentions? 
This is not the same as phototropism in plants, which one might equate to a steel road 
                                                
15 Harry M. Collins and Steven Yearley, Epistemological Chicken, in Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as 
Practice and Culture (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992). 
16 Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley: University of 





bending depending on which side is exposed to extreme heat. Technology is an outcome 
of intentionality, the product or instrument of a brain-in-motion. 
As I see it, Mitchells mosquito could speak even louder, its agency leaning more 
towards intentions. Its deliberate action to fill its stomach and get to swampy areas where 
it can get its food is merely reduced to affecting and coinciding with human 
intention. Yet it is a hunter of blood. What one reads is how human technology enabled 
the mosquito to jump barriers; it benefits from human intention, threatening people 
themselves.17 The mosquito triggers global health discourses and the formation of 
institutions. If this is how the mosquito speaks, then the tsetse fly in this dissertation is 
screaming.  
The questions Mitchell raisesthe basis of my ownoffer new nonwestern 
insights into a story about co-production (mutual shaping) that has often been confined to 
scientific practice in the western (built laboratory) and engineering plant.18 My 
contribution is from a nonwestern but westernized research area and does not sit easily 
with the conventional categories of science and technology. I am pursuing three 
stories simultaneously. First is how technology equips people to interact with nature; 
second, how nature determines the technology people use to relate with it, and third, how 
people determine both purposes for nature and instruments with which to relate to it.  
                                                
17 Ibid.: 23-4. 
18 The defining science and technology studies on this topic are Nelly Oudshoorn and Trevor Pinch (eds.), 
How Users Matter: The Co-Construction of Users. and Technology, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005); 
Donald Mackenzie and Judy Wajcman (eds.), The Social Shaping of Technology (London: Open University 
Press, 1985); Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World 
War II (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998); Mary Nolan, Visions of Modernity:  American Business and 
the Modernization of Germany (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). For Asia, see Itty 
Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb (London: Zed Books, 1998) and Gyan Prakash, Another 
Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1999). For 
Africa, see Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2002). For the South American littoral, see Peter Redfield, Space in the Tropics: From 





Nowhere is this triumvirate of factors clearer than in one specific scholarly 
workEdmund Russells War and Naturewhich goes well beyond the usual 
environmental history narrative of conservation and wilderness. Russell contests that 
scholars have often treated warfare and human control over nature separately and as if 
unrelated. In arguing for a co-evolution of the two, Russell says that the control of 
nature expanded the scale of war, and war expanded the scale on which people controlled 
nature 19  
Russell raises the intellectual stakes of considering even further what happens 
when the weapons meant for controlling problem animals and noxious plants are 
deployed against problem people and weeds. In the colonial context in 20th century 
Africa, the punishment of people in a manner and with instruments befitting animals, of 
making other people things, is what Aime Césaire called thingification. By it he meant 
the absolute removal of the self-esteem of the African, what he calls the présence 
Africaine.20  
There are three problems with Césaires formulation. The first is to particularize 
thingification as a behavior of the colonial state or something the postcolonial inherits 
from it. For some scholars, the problem is precisely that even the most radical critiques of 
colonialism are doing so from where they ought not to be standing to begin with,21 
namely the colonial moment (instead of before it) and its libraries.22 I suggest that the 
genealogy is too shallow and unconvincing.  
                                                
19 Edmund Russell, War and Nature: Fighting Humans and Insects with Chemicals from World War I to 
Silent Spring (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001: 2. 
20 Aime Cesaire, Discourse on Colonialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000): 42. 
21 See Ato Quayson, Obverse Denominations: Africa? Public Culture 14, 3 (2002): 586-8.  





The second problem is Césaires readiness to damn the colonizer in a manner that 
bludgeons the colonized into a non-agent. While it accomplishes Césaires thesis of 
showing how colonizers turned Africans into things, it overlooks myriad other agencies 
that suggest the persistence of self-esteem because and in spite of being things.  
Which brings us to the third problem with Césairehe grossly underestimated the 
agency of things. As one of the founding fathers of African scholarship, especially on 
nationalism, Césaire set the tone for histories that contradicted their project of exposing 
the colonial subject as a thing designed by the state. He overlooked materiality of the 
nonhuman thing in a bid to expose the discursive view of it. Where was technology in 
this story, considering that the states rationale for making Africans things stemmed from 
the need to civilize the native, who, as Hegel had declared in 1837, had no history23?  
Then there is the question of things as nature. If the state treated people as 
animals, how exactly did it treat the animals themselves? This is an important question to 
ponder given that thingification is predicated on understanding the materiality of the 
thing and the states prevailing and emergent treatment of it. What did the thing itself do 
to deserve such treatment? We must know this because chemical methods of controlling 
nature were located within a constellation of other technologies of controlling the 
mobility of deadly thingsfences, laws, patrols, defined pathways and ports, guns, etc.
to save (certain) human lives. 
Russells study of chemical warfare encourages more ambition towards bringing 
together in one narrative the materiality of things (nature), the (in)human(e) treatment of 
nature, and the thingification of people. While his account falls short on the role of nature 
                                                






and technology themselves, as opposed to peoples design and use of both, we should 
maximize the opportunities he offers us to see the forest and the elephant in the context of 
the village and the village in the forest. This is precisely why the biggest weakness of 
Russells account is that it underestimates the role of mobility in not only making good 
things bad, but also turning humans into deadly things. To be a state (sovereignty), 
therefore, is to be lord of all mobilities, to decide what may move when, where, and how. 
Framed in Russells materialistic terms, Césaires notion of thingification shares 
three elements of Mitchells argument: people, nature, and technology. All these are 
bodies or systems, be they respiratory, digestive, neurological, cardiovascular, social 
systems, ecosystems, and sociotechnical systems. They are also entities in space, a space 
in motion. Never mind where the force is coming from, technology, nature and people are 
not immune to the temporal and spatial motions of their time. Each is at work, the action 
self-driven or caused by other entities.  
I call such a space or mode of power and agency where nature, technology, and 
bodies come together and form alliances, a mobile workshop. Bodies (of people, animals, 
inanimate things, and places) become members of a community, and as such, interact, 
break through, and affect members of another through the means. Mobile workshops are 
means through which humans extend (or try to extend) their agency (through technology, 
or technological work, or by making alliances with animals, insects, other humans, and so 
on). In that space, intentionalities get configured and reconfigured. The mobile workshop 
is a way of referencing the mobilities of bodies across (against) conventional boundaries.  
 






Chapter 1 The Mobile Workshop 
In calling the village a mobile workshop, I am referring to the homesteads role as a 
nerve-center from which the body traversed to multiple spaces of work, not least of 
which was the forest. I elaborate on Piots concept of place-in-motion, and seeing such 
movement as only possible through the material application of technology. First, I trace 
the migration of Shona, Hlengwe, and Shangane people into and around Gonarezhou 
forest between 1500 and 1840, on the basis of which they now claim indigeneity. I start 
there to show how technology enabled these people to be mobile and to settle down to 
make villages and designate the forest as a usable resource. Once they had settled down, 
technology enabled them to render the forest a useful part of village life.  
Next I discuss the emerging philosophy of co-existence in which people saw 
themselves and forest resources, both living and non-living, as parts of the same social 
bodythe society of nature. When I talk about conservation before the European 
colonial partition and continuing African senses of it during the colonial period, I am 
referring to this holistic approach in contrast to the narrow scientific approach of state 
officials. In this highly spiritualized space, nature was not only a source of and a medium 
through which critical lessons of life could be taught. Nature was a spiritual space, with 
God at the top, the spirits of departed ancestors somewhere in the middle, and the people 
at the very bottom. Wild animals, trees, pools, and mountains were bodies through which 
the ancestors or God communicated with mortals. In some instances, the boundaries 
between animal and human, between nature and culture, collapsed. In others, nature and 





I then  show how the forest became an arena of human and technological action as 
much as an actor in its own right. Appreciating the sight of its teeming herds of game, 
villagers were forced into innovating spears, bows and arrows, pitfalls and other devices 
that enabled them to kill and eat venison. By its materiality, this technology became a 
role-player determining who could hunt in the forest: only those who had the skill and 
endurance to use the instruments effectively could hunt. Such human access to the forest 
also depended on societal rules and regulations over who could get in.  
The forest became an extension of the village, each individual homestead a 
gendered space from which other social spaces were mapped: fields, hunting grounds, 
pastures, cemeteries, religious shrinesthe list is endless. The chapter pays attention to 
the technologies that demarcated and defined the homestead, the practices that one 
could call indicators of everyday life, and those defining real men, real women, and 
well-cultured children. It draws up an activity profile, and then follows peoples 
mobilities from the homesteads to sites beyond it, where credentials of real womanhood, 
manhood, and cultured childhood were earned through work. Paying attention to 
movement, I see people, animals, and technology as network-builders.  
Because of work, the forest was consumed in the village. It became a second 
granary, the first being located in the homestead and containing the harvest from the 
fields. The forest was not just a granary; it was a sacred space that gave food to those 
who respected its taboos and refused to give those who did not keep its body clean. The 
taboos were human-made, but those who had crafted such rules to standardize practice 






I then discuss the classification of the forest according to its consumptive value in 
the village. It was a source of firewood, timber, and raw materials for multiple 
technologies. It was primarily a hunting ground where game animals were to be found in 
specific habitats. By its material possessions, the forest en-gendered practices within it: 
men chased and trapped big game, women and girls fished and picked mushrooms, 
vegetables, fruits, grains, and firewood, while boys trapped smaller game. 
As a source of meat, it was a sacred butchery. Gonarezhou was first and foremost 
a tsetse-fly infested place. The pest killed livestock, so game stepped into the vacuum, 
supplying meat, skins and other products, for direct use in the villages, and trade between 
local people and overseas clients. In this sense, the forest put local people in touch with 
overseas individuals, technologies, and places. This is the focus of Chapter 2. 
 
Chapter 2 The Technological Junction 
This chapter focuses on how nature and technology mediated the encounter between the 
village and incoming European hunters in the late-19th century. It follows the itineraries 
of six big game hunters along two key corridors leading into Gonarezhou and its locale. 
The purpose of the itinerants (to access nature and extract products from it) shaped how 
they imagined their destination as a hunting ground. By contrast, locals saw these 
itinerants within their own template: as people they could trade with. On the one hand, 
the journeys are the mediums through which western technology, people, and nature 





how to use them efficaciously against intended prey; they deferred to the genius of the 
place24local inhabitants.  
Next I turn to the routes. I show that nature was not a mute observer of this human 
encounter. Good nature afforded prey and a chance to kill or paint, while bad nature 
like tsetse fly and mosquitoes killed transport animals and itinerants themselves, thereby 
determining human-technological interactions. Hence European travelers used routes and 
transport systems that tsetse had forced local inhabitants to follow. There were only two 
choices after disembarking ship. One route started from the Indian Ocean seaboard of 
Lourenco Marques and Inhambane to the Gaza domains of Gonarezhou, the other from 
the southwestern littoral of the Cape along the Kalahari deserts eastern fringes to the 
Tswana, Ngwato, and Ndebele kingdoms. Tsetse fly ensured only foot transport could be 
used on the former, while its absence on the latter allowed the use of ox- and horse-
wagon transport. Africans tapped into these employment opportunities as porters and ox-
wagon drivers. 
The pathway was the junction between the local and global; the encounter took 
place in the village. Here I deploy Dubows notion of a place found by way of the body 
to examine the encounter between itinerant and villager. The routes led through the 
villages of African inhabitants, especially the headman, chief, or king's homesteads. The 
approaching wagon or caravan of porters signaled the beginning of trade. The European 
was always at a disadvantage among people who were at home, employing every 
delaying mechanism to make sure they got the choicest deals on guns, gunpowder, 
clothing, beads, and other commodities he brought.  
                                                





Then came the penultimate encounter with nature. After all is said and done, the 
European was on an expedition to acquire ivory and other trophies from the chase. He 
might exchange his wares to purchase grain , labor, or information, but all these services 
went towards the objective of hunting. The foremost reason why African rulers 
entertained and promoted their stay was to trade. For a fee these hunters were allocated 
specific quotas of off-take in the forests and were to respect the laws that also bound 
African hunters. While they were not expected to observe every spiritual taboo, they were 
supposed to abide by the non-spiritual ones at the very least. I evaluate the place of nature 
and technology in conjuring the mobilities associated with the hunt and the joint work 
that Europeans and Africans put into the production of a carcass. I close the chapter with 
a discussion of the itineraries of a carcass in its multiple afterlivesas meat, horns, hides, 
blood, fat, art, science, political power, and so on. It is important to remember that the six 
narratives became maps with which European chartered companies and governments 
opened up the transLimpopo into colonies. How did this happen? 
 
Chapter 3 Weapons Of Mass Acquisition 
The work of Roger Wagner has demonstrated that 1848-67 was the high point of ivory 
trade, beyond which an active hunt for minerals gathered momentum, culminating in the 
discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand (the Rand) in 1886.25 Three things contributed 
to this twist of events. First, the discovery of diamonds at Kimberley near the Cape in 
1866, which turned attention to mineral possibilities in the interior. Second, a revolt 
among the Venda people along the Limpopo, who blocked the access not only of the 
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Boers but all white men to the Gonarezhou except from an eastern approach. And thirdly, 
the vicissitudes of the western-driven market, as the Industrial Revolution in Europe 
increasingly demanded raw materials to feed its industries. 
This chapter is a classic case of the mutual shaping of politics, nature, and 
commerce in the 1880s-90s, the story of how concessionary companies competed with 
European states to acquire colonies. Technically, the concession (mvumo, or permission 
to) was a piece of paper bearing an African rulers signature basically agreeing to let the 
European concession-seeker extract whatever natural resources he wanted for a limited 
time. In practice, it became a deceptive weapon of mass acquisition which, unbeknown to 
its granter, authorized the concessionaire to use force if the agreement was arbitrarily 
rescinded. It was a double-edged weapon capable of being used as much against Africans 
as against Europeans themselves. While lesser chiefs were busy granting bogus 
concessions without the authority or knowledge of their superiors, European individuals 
were going around conning African rulers who had no reading knowledge to tell if the 
written version was a true copy of their verbal agreement.  
The chapter puts these events in the wider context of the Berlin colonial 
conference of 1884-5, when European statesmen agreed that any power wishing to claim 
spheres of influence in Africa had to show written proof of consent by the people so-
colonized. At the very least, it had to show enough evidence of effective occupation of 
any such lands. While rival European claimants had the privilege to settle in court, 
Africans did not.  
Despite the violence that followed in the early 1890s, concession-seeking itself 





Guns became commodities in buying concessions from African rulers. At the same time, 
Africans used concessions to purchase gunsamong other western commoditiesfor 
self-defense against increasingly imperialistic European neighbors along the coastline. 
This picture of African initiative belies a suicidal failure of these same kingsprincipally 
Lobengula and Ngungunyaneto realize fundamental changes in Euro-African 
interactions. The European was no longer a visitor of short duration prepared to submit to 
local authority but was here to stayto replace Africans as the new rulers.  
It happened fairly quickly. In 1889, the British South Africa (BSA) Company 
obtained a rather fraudulent concession from Lobengula, secured a charter from 
Buckingham Palace to occupy, and marched into the lands of the Shona. Three years later 
they defeated the Ndebele, killing Lobengula. Then in 1895 the Portuguese conquered the 
Gaza, captured Ngungunyane, and shipped him into exile. The post-pacification 
resistance was spirited but futile: the indigenous weaponry, antiquated muskets, and 
trickles of breech-loading rifles did not measure up to the machine-gun power of the 
Maxim and the Gatling. In the aftermath, the Portuguese Government and the BSA 
Company divided Gonarezhou between themselves, drawing a straight line border right 
through the villages, interfering in the local peoples relationship with the forest. 
Ngungunyanes erstwhile subjects became commodities of exchange between Portuguese 
proprietors and the South African gold mining industry. 
 
Chapter 4 Transgressing Temporal And Spatial Boundaries 
So what happened to the mobile workshops and technological junctions in the age of 





and the colonial, between those insisting on the boundaries and those convinced they 
were a surmountable nuisance. The discussion focuses on poachers of men who 
recruited and abducted African men and sold them to the gold mines of South Africas 
Witwatersrand.  
The first part of the chapter traces the origins of black ivory back to Boer slave 
raiding in the transLimpopo basin since the 1850s, the captives being mainly young boys 
and girls for domestic and farm labor in the Transvaal. It then discusses the way mining 
concessions, first at Kimberley (diamonds) in 1866, and then the Rand (gold) in 1886, 
shifted labor traffic and trafficking. The decisive major transformation was the colonial 
partition of the transLimpopo into Portuguese, British, and BSA Company (Rhodesian) 
territory in the 1890s. The point of this discussion is to show that the colonial border did 
not stop the voluntary and forced mobility north to south for purposes of paid labor. This 
is one of the niches that attracted many people of Bvekenyas ilk to the border region in 
1910; the other was elephant hunting. 
The second part of the chapter is a discussion of how the three colonial states 
sought to regulate these resilient mobilities through licensed recruiting and game hunting. 
The Rhodesian and Portuguese authorities insisted that all Europeans wishing to recruit 
and hunt must be licensed so that they could pay tax and follow state laws. In essence the 
license was a new form of concession which entitled the hunter to take a certain quota 
of human and animal bodies. The recruits and game products would be registered and tax 
deducted from their income and selling price respectively were sold for taxed. Men like 
Cecil Bvekenya Barnard did not do this. Instead they opened up opportunities for local 





sold were not subject to tax. These recruiters became bandits in the eyes of the Rhodesian 
state.  
The third aspect returns to the theme of a technological junction and questions the 
state label of bandits. The account suggests that his boundary-crossing was, with 
adaptations, a continuation of the sort of technological junctions discussed in Chapter 2. 
This tendency of rogue elements like Bvekenya to usurp state power and turn subjects on 
the frontier into instruments for advancing their own causes dovetailed into villagers 
readiness to align themselves with these pests-unto-the-state to settle their own scores 
with the state. In so-doing, Bvekenya set the tone for Gonarezhous 20th century history 
as one of boundary-crossing. As a marker of colonial time and space, the international 
border elicited no respect from local inhabitants precisely because the state was too far 
away to be seen or felt. Only when the three states made their presence felt and seen 
could the boundaries become legible. 
 
Chapter 5 Poachers Of Game  
In stripping the state to its bare bones, I am not necessarily interested in what the various 
departments and individual officials were doing, but why they acted the way they did. 
The finger points squarely at nature itself. The existing scholarship does not account for 
the role pests like tsetse fly, mosquitoes, and veterinary disease pathogens such as 
rinderpest, foot and mouth disease, and African Coast Fever have played in the 
protection of wild animals. This is perhaps because of the cultural landscape26 and 
social and political perspective scholars have generally taken, which has limited the 
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circle of actors investigated. Technology and nature have been left out despite being the 
central targets of social actors and the instruments for realizing the human footprint on 
the environment. Nature divided the departments of state because it had the propensity to 
be both an asset and a danger to different constituencies. 
To cut through the various disagreements over land usage, I will examine the 
state-in-motion so that we can see the different departments haggling over jurisdiction. It 
is important to read the arguments as reflections not just of people doing their public 
service, but also as outcome of natures push.  
Hence while the department of commerce and tourism was determined to get 
Gonarezhou declared a game reserve and satisfy the hoteliers and travel agencies, the 
encouragement came from the existence of sufficient numbers of game to sustain such an 
enterprise. The department of agriculture and the cattle ranching interests protested 
vehemently; declaring Gonarezhou a game reserve was tantamount to creating a reservoir 
of veterinary disease pathogens on their doorstep.  
They were watching closely developments on the Rhodesia-Portuguese border, 
where tsetse was advancing steadily and then rapidly into Chipinda sub-region. The 
government of South Africa and the warden of Kruger hoped to annex Gonarezhou and 
the coutadas as an extension of the already vast national park, but the ranching interest 
stopped them dead in their tracks. More than once Gonarezhou was proclaimed a game 
reserve, only to be de-proclaimed again.  
These debates raged on until 1958 when a hyper-conservationist District 
Commissioner (DC)who claims all credit for the establishment of Gonarezhou as a 





onset that he had to enforce separate spheres between the people he administered and the 
animals in parts of Gonarezhou that fell within his district. To do so he needed to go 
beyond erratic patrols and statutory instruments if such boundaries were to be effective 
and conservation accomplished. Wright therefore established an administrative structure 
with which to  impose state authority upon nature and Africans.27 This structure was a 
technopolitical regime28 in every senseit was both a political structure that did 
technical work and a technical structure that did political work. It was a regime because it 
was the eyes, ears, mouth, and hands of the District Commissioner, supervising a network 
of village-based informers. To ensure mobility of information and rapid response to the 
administration of both people and game, Wright assembled an elaborate infrastructure 
comprising sub-offices, roads, automobiles, bicycles, and shortwave radios. Add this 
technology to his Chevrolet van Genevieve and Wrights vision of mobile administration 
was complete. In reading the records of the Department of National parks and Wild Life 
Management, however, one finds that Allan Wright was not as influential in the 
establishment of Gonarezhou as he claims he was. 
After examining the historical processes that led to Gonarezhous establishment 
as a game reserve, I then examine the spatial relationship between the park and 
surrounding villages, demonstrating that local poachers did not respect or recognize the 
arbitrary boundary fence as the limit of their forays. In this discussion, I also examine the 
paraphernalia of weapons these poachers used. I do this to demonstrate the continuing use 
of pre-colonial weaponry and developing patterns of change.  
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From 1976 to 1980, Gonarezhou was a war zone as Robert Mugabes ZANLA 
guerrillas infiltrated via the national park to reach the villages beyond the park fence. At 
that point normal park management was virtually suspended. I defer a discussion of this 
war to Chapter 7, confining the narrative on that period to one ivory poacher named 
Shadreck, a Portuguese African whom the Rhodesian Security Forces allowed in and 
out of the park in return for spying on ZANLA rear base positions in Mozambique. The 
quid pro quo was a resounding failure because unbeknown to the Rhodesians, Shadreck 
was also spying on them and reporting to ZANLA. I argue that Shadreck epitomizes the 
tradition of boundary-crossing infrastructures we saw in the case of Bvekenya: through a 
delicate balancing act, he ended up being able to move back and forth across the border. I 
follow Shadreck to his death in 1982two years after Zimbabwe gained political 
independence from Britain. He had just done time in jail for poaching. 
Shadreck represents a temporal bridge-crossing infrastructure for the 
interpretation of local history: through him, I am able to argue that the change of 
government did nothing to alter the stranglehold of the state in Gonarezhou. The 
boundaries the Rhodesian state had established, the new African nationalist government 
maintained. The rest of the chapter deals with three things: first, the grievances 
underlying the poaching; second, the modus operandi of the poachers; and third, the 
difficulty in the state attempts to police the boundaries between the villages and nature. I 
demonstrate, and argue, that the poaching arises from the failure of the state to 
differentiate itself from the colonial state in the eyes of the people. This carrot of 
philanthropic difference was the bait ZANLA guerrillas dangled to entice local people to 





Gonarezhou and Zimbabwe at large are asking: Masiyana papi? (Where are you 
different from the Rhodesians?) 
 
Chapter 6 Tsetse Allies 
Somewhere in the background, the voice of the tsetse fly was growing louder and louder. 
At no time is this voice more shrill and insistent than 1945-60. Chapter 6 is devoted to the 
extraordinary ways in which the insects actions mobilized people and technology and 
redefined terms of engagement between human and nonhumans in this period. The 
concern here is the insect mobilities that make people or experts classify nature as good 
or bad, to the point of creating separate spheres between wildlife and humans.  
In its belly, this insect carried the trypanosome, harmless to game but deadly to 
livestock. I will first discuss the nature of this small beast in order to understand how it 
caused problems to the state and forced specific behavior. Tsetse fed on game blood and 
traveled on an animals back, or just about anything bigger than it, including Wrights 
favored patrol technology, the automobile. Until the use of poison chemicals like 
Dichloro-Diphenyl-Trichloroethane (DDT) in 1959, there was no weapon potent enough 
to destroy the tsetse directly en masse. The prevailing strategy was to shoot the game 
animals in order to starve the tsetse as well as creating a corridor between infected and 
uninfected space. The first game fence in Gonarezhou was in essence an anti-tsetse fly 
measure which from the onset was designed to create barriers between infested and clean 
areas.  
Next I place tsetse between the state and the village and analyze how it created 





between people and insects. I examine specifically how tsetse forced the Rhodesian 
stateshort on European manpowerto employ local African men as hunters to kill the 
pests game vectors and blood food-source and as fly-catchers to apprehend and take the 
insect to the laboratory for scientific experiment. In turn these men took this opportunity 
to receive state pay for hunting meat for their villages and poach in their spare time 
outside the designated game-free corridors.  
 
Chapter 7 Pest Unto The State 
This chapter retraces 118 years of the states war on nature and citizens. I do this in order 
to show how the methods that Rhodesia had for eighty years developed and deployed 
piecemeal against animals and insect pests were unleashed on the nationalist guerrillas of 
Robert Mugabe. When he came to power, he adopted this machinery first to deal with 
veterinary pests, then against political opposition, and now against citizens who do not 
vote properly (for him). To oppose the state in Zimbabwe today is to legislate oneself 
into a pest, with all the pesticides it invites. The penultimate argument I make is that state 
powerthe fence or boundary being a metaphor of ithas throughout Zimbabwean 
history been maintained through pest control. The rationale is that once the state succeeds 
in freezing mobility across its arbitrary boundaries, total power is achieved. This desire to 
control, what Michel Foucault likened to the all-seeing panopticon in Discipline and 
Punish,29 has proven to be an expensive undertaking. Its success has always ended in 
jarring failure because it turns the entire country into a prison. Pests have always fought 
back: against Cecil John Rhodes, founder of Rhodesia, and now Robert Mugabe, founder 
of Zimbabwe. 
                                                





I want to synthesize this closing argument about the desire for total control by 
focusing specifically on the use of pesticides to, in the first instance control, and in the 
second eradicate pests. Looking specifically at substances or methods that multiplied the 
force exerted on the pest (force multipliers), such as poison where guns were inadequate, 
I show that ultimately, and in a bid to retain power, the Rhodesian state was prepared to 
reduce Africansespecially nationalist insurgentsto pests. But the pest (Mugabes 
nationalist insurgents from Mozambique) was not only resilient but triumphant primarily 
because it had struck a technological junction with local villagers. In it the villagers saw 
the only opportunity not only to challenge the Rhodesian states control of Gonarezhou, 
but also to reclaim it completely for themselves.  
 
Conclusion: The State As A Pest In Peoples Lives 
Once black political independence was attained, however, the nationalists got drunk with 
power and forgot to own up to their promises. These promises have remained unresolved. 
Having run out of excuses, Mugabe has turned on his citizens. They have become pests 
unto him; he has become a pest to them. Therefore, when all the state can do is establish 
and police boundaries, and citizens do not see its positive legibility in their lives, the state 
tends to delete itself from the fond memories of citizens. At the very least it becomes 
irrelevant and is by-passed as people cross the borders to find opportunities outside which 
the state has failed to provide so that they can work for themselves. Indeed, as Uyilawa 
Usuanlele and Victor Edo have recently noted, the states subjects exercise their 
democratic options by migrating out of reach.30 Otherwise they confront it. 
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This dissertation is written primarily from published primary documents, with strategic 
use of fieldwork notes and interviews. I have been conducting the primary source 
research since 2000 at the National Archives of Zimbabwe in Harare, Mabalauta Field 
Station in Gonarezhou, Kruger National Park in South Africa, as well as the Wits 
University Cullen Library in Johannesburg. Between 2000 and 2003, I conducted 
extensive fieldwork in the Chibwedziva, Chikombedzi, Malipati, and Samu areas 
surrounding Gonarezhou, talking to villagers, visiting key historical sites referred to, and 
recording interviews and conversations. The then acting warden of Mabalauta Field 
Station, Senior Ranger Chikwanha, was generous enough to open the doors to official 
files at the station library. He also granted me interviews with his staff and permitted me 
to accompany them on anti-poaching patrols in 2001.  
In the last five years, my fieldwork and archival research has concentrated on the 
South African side of the transLimpopo basin. In this time I have been able to use video 
cameras to film key historical sites in order to play-back and visualize them more 
carefully during the write-up. The Stevenson-Hamilton Library staff at Skukuza offered 
me generous help with their collection of published 19th century travelogues. The 
archaeologists at Tulamela Ruins along the Limpopo valley conducted me on a highly 
informative tour of the pre-colonial archaeological site. Finally the Wits Cullen Library 
                                                                                                                                            






was a gold mine of sources like early colonial journals, newspapers, and other 
paraphernalia. 
The result was a multiplex archive for every chapter, arranged in a relay, each 
body of sources handing over the baton to the next so as to cover the 150-year period 
under consideration. Chapter 1 defers to a number of ethnographies recorded in the 20th 
century from people who were experiencing or had lived through events described in the 
narrative. Most of these are published in the Native Affairs Department Annual and 
include compilations of Native Commissioners in direct contact with African elders on a 
daily basis. Others are unpublished state reports, correspondences, and interview 
transcripts from the National Archives of Zimbabwe. Some accounts were written by 
Africans themselves without the literary mediation of European ethnologists; yet others 
were standard narratives that could not be distorted even if second or third party 
compilers tried. The latter include folklore and a variety of idioms, and relics of sculpture 
in photographic and artifact form. For purposes of verification, I used my own fieldwork 
notes, interviews and video recordings.  
These texts lay the groundwork for a discussion of the journeys of 19th century 
hunters through local villages (Chapter 2). For this chapter, I have selected six memoirs 
and diaries of the travelers themselves. I am not interested in these accounts as sources of 
historical evidence per se, but more importantly as outcomes of human mobility that took 
place in the village and because of nature. While such accounts have received bad press 
from scholars in search of an undiluted subaltern voice, a closer reading shows important 
instances of candid admissions about the mutual shaping of the encounter. I focus mainly 





From 1890 onwards the dissertation is spoiled for primary documents. I have built 
Chapter 3-4 around early colonial state reports, letters, telegrams, and media reports. 
Chapter 5 makes use of an exclusive archive acquired from Gonarezhou National Park 
and which is not yet in the National Archives of Zimbabwe. This database contains 
reports on mobile anti-poaching operations in the 1960s-90s. Chapter 6 is based on a rich 
state archive that helps me create a long chronology on how the tsetse mediated the 
relationship between the state, local villagers, wildlife, and technology. Most insightful 
are the patrol reports of the tsetse fly rangers and entomologists, as well as the role of 
African hunters and fly-catchers in fly work. The last chapter has a more varied base of 
evidence. The first part draws from the National Archives of Zimbabwe to discuss the 
engineering of wild animals into pests as the state sought to carve existing human-animal 
habitats into livable European space. The annual reports of the Director of National Parks 
allow me to reconstruct the 1958-75 period, setting the stage for the arrival of the 
nationalist insurgents in 1976. The last four years of colonial rule in Rhodesia, and the 
use of pesticides to combat the guerrillas, draws on the account of a former Rhodesian 
soldier to discuss the use of these chemical and biological weapons against the guerrillas; 
interviews and ethnographic fieldwork to discuss the experiences of villages; and 
newspaper reports to examine the encounters between the state and guerrillas. 
Together, these various fragments have helped me to transgress three temporal 
divisions in the regions history, in the same way as the mobilities I trace help my 
historical actors breach the epistemological divide between places, people, technology, 
and nature. Today as I write villagers have disregarded the state, crossed the boundary 





villagers that the state has betrayed them, that it is behaving like the colonial state. The 
lens through which the locals view the state is one of return to a time when the forest was 











Chapter 1 The Mobile Workshop 
 
For an area with so much rich history, it is mystifying that the forest of Gonarezhouthe 
land and its peoplehas no historical study devoted to it. The little written about it does 
not account fully for the role of nature in human actions. Of technology there is deafening 
silence. Until William Wolmers From Wilderness Vision to Farm Invasions in 2007, the 
only published history of the area was J.H. Bannermans article on the Hlengwe people in 
1981. Both scholars are not historians but developmentalists.  
Of the two, it is Bannermans work that raises important questions for this 
chapter. The first is temporal: he deals in some depth on the pre-colonial, whereas 
Wolmer is more concerned with the 20th century history of a much larger area. The 
second is Bannermans privileging of the Hlengwe at the expense of the Shangane and 
Shona, which distorts the history of an otherwise mixed population area. In essence, 
Bannerman narrows the social even further beyond just people to ethnicities within 
them, whereas I am arguing for the inclusion of nature and technology. Bannerman was 





which tended to compartmentalize and draw fictitious boundaries between people and 
environment where I am looking for boundary-crossing.  
Bannermans genre belonged to the antiquarian tradition of the Native Affairs 
Department Annual (NADA), the journal where white state officials shared their 
understanding of natives since the beginning of the 20th century.1 This tradition derived 
from the pursuit of ethnographic knowledge, with the state particularly curious to know 
Africans in order to govern them more effectively.2 Bannerman got acquainted with 
historians at the then University College of Rhodesia (University of Zimbabwe) who 
encouraged him to collect oral traditions about the Hlengwe and give these people a 
written history. His seminal piece, entitled Hlengweni, was essentially a product of the 
contemporary ecology of its writer. In areas contiguous to Gonarezhou, the land officer 
had the dual role of encouraging small scale farming and cattle ranching while also 
discouraging unlicensed hunting, snaring and trespassing in game reserves (poaching). 
Hlengweni makes it clear that agriculture was the mainstay of Hlengwe livelihoods, 
which is strange for such an arid environment where the most sensible thing to do would 
have been to hunt game and trade for grain.3 Bannermans division of the Hlengwe 
economy into branches of production disrupts the close connections between 
homestead, field, forest, and trade routes through the mobility of the human inhabitants.  
Historical actors did not pay that much attention to these analytical boundaries. 
Because they did not, it becomes important to examine how actor networks crisscrossed 
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these assumed categories. First, I will examine how all these people got to Gonarezhou, 
paying attention to the circumstances of departure as important factors in how they 
moved and settled in. Next, I discuss the ways in which the village was a nerve center of 
a mobile workshopa mosaic of interconnected realms of production and socialization 
possible only through the movement of bodies back and forth. This is the context of 
relevance I draw between homestead and forest, from material worlds to spiritualities that 
are the very fiber of such connections. I frame the forest in two ways: as a second granary 
and a sacred butchery. I then narrow down the discussion to hunting, examining the 
instruments and work needed to produce wildlife products for the village.  
The notion of the mobile workshop helps me to emphasize that none of these sites 
could contribute anything to the village without some sort of movement. At the same 
time, movement depended on the availability of objects or places that had potential to 
yield value. This dialogue between movement and resource availability is useful to 
describing the conversation between nature, mobility, and human claims to place .  
 
Mobility, Nature, and Gonarezhou Before the Colonial Partition 
Using lengthy genealogies and mentioning the most spectacular moments on the journey 
to becoming the tree stumps of a place, the eldersthe custodians of the communitys 
historical facts and artifactsduly declared: Nzvimbo ino ine vene. Tisu (This 
place has owners. Us.) Zvidza (single chidza) did not just mean a tree-stump (also called 
chigutswa) but also the ruins of a house, especially one reduced to the bare foundations. 
Late-comers could not claim to be zvidza, even if they could claim to be vene (owners).4  
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Both vene generally and zvidza specifically were bodies, minds, and cultures at 
work, manufacturing spaces of domicile and production. As immigrants, vene carried 
their portable knowledge traditions wherever they went, they applied them to navigate 
their pathways as well as to deal with contingencies of arrival. The most conspicuous 
way of illustrating how villages were engineered into being through mobility of ideas and 
people is the dzimbahwe (stone palaces of kings5)-type architecture of the Shona, the 
Tsonga-type rondavels with an all-round veranda, and the basket-like, dome-shaped huts 
of the Shangane. Through careful studies of the stone architecture, archaeologists have 
examined the ways families, emigrants and rebels branched out to found their own 
villages, diasporas and states.  
Migrationmobilitywas the work that went into making kinship a network 
builder. The work of mobility included crossing rivers, plains, and forests, passing wild 
animals, trees, and people. It involved mobility across time, from founding ancestor to 
ones fatherfor only patriarchs counted in the histories of the clanand then the 
incumbent. As the settlements dispersed from one village to different locations they 
stretched the kinship networks across space, creating a vast linguistic, commercial, 
religious, and political space. Those the newcomers found in this place, who did not 
belong on the basis of genealogy, were either annihilated, assimilated, or expelled. The 
newcomers became vene venzvimbo (owners of the place).  
I pick up my discussion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with a brief 
expose of the major Shona groups in the research area, north to south. Of the several 
Shona groups, the most important were the various Ndau chieftaincies of the Chipinge 
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highlands, and just south in the Gonarezhou/Gonakudzingwa area were the Musikavanhu, 
Gudo, Garahwa and Makoni dynasties, all of Rozvi descent.6 These dynasties had broken 
away from the Rozvi in the seventeenth century,7 as had the Duma to the west.8 Between 
the Runde and Bubi rivers were many small Pfumbi and Rembetu chieftaincies, and 
sprinklings of Venda, the bulk having been pushed south of the Limpopo and west 
towards Beitbridge. South of the Limpopo was the Singo state, another offshoot of the 
Rozvi-Changamire state near modern Bulawayo.9 I will elaborate more on the settlement 
patterns of these Shona groups in the context of their interaction with the Tsonga in the 
next paragraphs. 
In the 1750s and early 1800s, elements of the Tsonga, another Bantu people 
resident along the coast between Sofala and Nyaka (later Maputo), settled around what 
19th century travelers called the Thirstland. The Tsonga groups found the lands aridity, 
tsetse fly, and fever unbearable and called it hlengwe (an unbearable place). In turn, 
people of other lands referred to these specific Tsonga as the people of that unbearable 
place (Hlengwe). In time, what the Karanga had called gona rezhou, the Hlengwe called 
hlengweni (land of the Hlengwe people).10 
The aridity of Gonarezhou, particularly in the winter months, explains why 
practically all human settlements were located along the perennial riversthe Limpopo, 
Mwenezi, Bubi, Luvuvhu, Runde, and Save. Where mountains or hills could be found, 
                                                
6 J.K. Rennie, From Zimbabwe to a Colonial Chieftaincy: Four Transformations of the Musikavanhu 
Territorial Cult in Rhodesia, J.M. Schoffeleers (ed.), Guardians of the Land: Essays on Central African 
Territorial Cults (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1999): 257-285. 
7 J.K. Rennie, Christianity, Colonialism and the Origins of Nationalism amongst the Ndau of Southern 
Rhodesia, 1890-1935 (Chicago: University of Chicago, unpublished Ph.D thesis, 1973). 
8 R.G. Mtetwa, The Political and Economic History of the Duma People of South-Eastern Rhodesia from 
the Early Eighteenth Century to 1945 (Salisbury: University of Rhodesia, unpublished D. Phil. Thesis, 
1976). 
9 Bannerman, Hlengweni: 9. 





most of the settlements were sited there for defensive purposes. The hydrological factor 
explains why none of the groups permanently settled inside Gonarezhou itself.11 Even 
those groups settling on hilly country did so in order to tap into the higher relief rainfall.12 
It is also because the Hlengwe did not cultivate much land but lived mainly by hunting 
and fishing.13 
Starting out as a family of one man, Tsanza Chawani, the Tsonga-speaking people 
who became Hlengwe would in less than 200 years become the most dominant 
population in and around Gonarezhou. Most genealogies of the Hlengwe nevertheless 
start with his descendant Chinyori Chahumba, whose son Matsena had settled in a place 
the Hlengwe called svikundo (the place of small shrubs) between the Galupo and Chitolo 
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rivers in about 1750. Matsenas two sons expanded their settlements in two directions. 
The first, Mangule, crossed the Galupo (about 1770) to settle between the Chepfu and 
Dadache Rivers. Mangules son Zhari would cross the Dadache and Lichangalime and 
settle along the source of the Mauge in about 1830. Around the same time, one of Zharis 
sons, Mavhuwe, settled just south of the Save-Runde junction, straddling the Marumbini 
area of Gonarezhou. The other son, Mhingo, crossed the Runde at its junction with the 
Pombadzi and settled on the Chivonja and Makamandima hills  in about 1830. Mhingos 
sons Chitsa and Banga (Mahenye) would subsequently found their own dynasties 
between and east of the Save-Runde junction respectively in 1850-70. A third of Zharis 
offspring, Tsovani, would cross the Gonarezhou and settle at the Runde-Chiredzi junction 
in about 1840.14  
Meanwhile, as Mangule and his offspring expanded northwards, Shigombe was 
settling in the west of the Zebechua-Chitolo confluence. From their fathers late-18th 
century settlement between the Mwenezi and Zebechua, Shigombes sons Shikovele and 
Shingwanza moved their homesteads just slightly northwest in about 1824 and 1845 
respectively. One of Shikoveles two sons, Chikwarakwara, settled on the south of his 
grandfather Shigombes domains, straddling the Mwenezi; it is from there that his own 
son Sengwe moved west along the Limpopo to set up his own village between the Bubi 
and Mwenezi in about 1850.15  
The second of Shikoveles sons was Hokwanye, whose son Mateke would cross 
the Mwenezi and settle on the hills at the source of the Babumba and Marakanga streams 
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in the Mateke hills. His two sons, Vurumele and Gezani, would move west and south to 
the Bubi and Malibangwe hills respectively to found their own villages. 
Shikoveles brother, Shingwanza had two sons whose descendants would move 
furthest to the north. The first, Ngwena, crossed the great Thirstland and settled at the 
watershed from which the Chikombedzi, Chizivani, Muchingwidzi, and Guluene Rivers 
drain. Ngwena had two sons. The first, Mpapa, settled just south of the Chivumburu hills, 
on the source of the Makambi and Batarengwe rivers. The second, Ndalega, had a son 
Chitanga, who went further beyond Chivumburu to settle at the Mukume-Runde junction. 
Shingwanzas second son, Magudu, also crossed the great Thirstland, to settle just east 
of Chitanga, on the eastern bank of the Runde, at its confluence with the Tokwe.  
All these mobilities must be seen as encounters, as the traction of mobile bodies 
upon existing territorialities. The most intriguing aspect of the encounter is its disruption 
of existing totem-based settlements and its consequences for totem-based human-animal 
interactions. The soko of Chikovere co-existed with Sengwe and Gezanis people 
between the Bubi, Limpopo and Mwenezi. Zvipakures dziva shared the same locale with 
Vurumele and Mateke around Mateke hills. Three nzou (zhou)-totem groups, Malipati, 
Mapokole and Mugoyana, lived on the eastern fringe of Gonarezhou between the 
Chizivani River and the sources of the Zebechua and Guluene. Far north, when Mhingos 
son Mahenye settled at the Save-Honde junction in Chipinga after moving across the 
Runde from the Marumbini area, he claims to have conquered the Garahwa and Makoni 





of land to settle on.16 The moyo, soko, and dziva between the Honde and Chiredzi rivers, 
and the Duma of the upper Runde and Save in all likelihood did the same thing.17 This is 
why there was so much elephant along the Mwenezi (where the nzou people lived). The 
Shona and Hlengwe did not eat lion because it was associated with ancestral spirits, but 
for the moyo people specifically, the lion was the clan taboo. The same with monkeys and 
baboons, which the soko (or bveni) tabooed but which the entire population generally did 
not eat. 
The ruling class was the Chauke clan of nzilo (fire) or humba (snail) totem, all 
Tsonga-speaking. The second-class were the Hlungwana or Sono of the tihlanga/tsanga 
(reeds) totem, also Tsonga-speakers through their conquest and assimilation under the 
Chauke. The Banyai (Shona and Pfumbi) and Baloyi who tabooed shoko 
(monkey/baboon) were third class despite speaking Tsonga in addition to their Shona 
language. Both subaltern classes paid tribute in beer, animal skins, iron, and so on; the 
Chauke could take Banyai or Baloyi girls as wives without paying roora (bride wealth).18  
While Bannermans Hlengwe informants led him to say that their ancestors 
conquered resident groups, the very short distances most of these groups migrated 
before settling makes this very doubtful. Ethnographic evidence suggests that when a 
father had many sons, to diffuse the pressure on his own homestead, he allocated them 
land in areas beyond his fields. Only the youngest son remained on the homestead when 
the patriarch died, and inherited his fathers domains. If the patriarch had many sons and 
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the land was limited, he negotiated peacefully with his neighbors for more, with force 
being exercised as a last resort.19  
According to Shangane oral traditions, Manukusa Soshangane, the founder of the 
Gaza state and Shangane nation (following) was one of Shakas greatest generals 
(izinduna). In the 1820s, tired of the Zulu kings dictatorship, he decided to migrate out 
of reach and settled at Biyeni among the vaChopi people on the lower Limpopo, far 
away from Shakas harm.20 At Biyeni Manukusa fathered two sons, Mzila and Mawewe. 
Fifteen years later he was on the move again, heading north so that he could sit on the 
veins and hunting grounds of ivory in Gonarezhou. In 1836 Manukusa settled in the 
Chipinga-Chipungumbira (The Spinney of Rock-Rabbits) highlands on the Busi River, 
north of Gonarezhou. 21 He renamed it Mandlakazi (powers of women) to signify his 
capitulation to his wife Yoziyiyo, who had insisted on settling at this picturesque site.22 
Two years later he returned to Biyeni, thanks to the ravages of the anopheles mosquitoes, 
which made every summer a malaria nightmare.23  
Only in 1862 would Mzila return to his fathers old home to settle in Chibavava. 
Mzila easily subdued the local Ndau of Chief Mzunye, owner of many cattle, and 
husband to many wives. One of the reasons why Mzila ordered Mzunyes execution was 
that he was loyal to Mawewe, to whom he paid tribute in ivory from Gonarezhou. 
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Mzunye tried to switch allegiance, sending many tusks to mollify Mzila. He was put to 
death and his son Muzwembiri installed as chief in his place. The sojourn at Chibavava 
did not last: it is said Mzila began to dislike the place, and so he moved with his 
peoplehis shield and instruments of expansionto Ngungunyana Farm. There he 
established two villages. One was known as Mandlakazi, the other Tshametshame, both 
named after Soshanganes original homes in Natal.24  
Mzilas arrival produced new territorialities. Ndau men were now reorganized 
into regiments, each according to their ages, and were taught how to fight [in the Nguni 
way] and to use [Nguni] weapons. The trainer was Magigwana, the leader of all Mzilas 
armies.25 Ngwaqazi was one of those who served in Mzilas amangonde regiment. A 
member of the Ndau chief Mapungwanas family, Ngwaqazi was born on what later 
became Ngungunyana Farm when Mudirwa was the reigning Ndau chief, well before 
the arrival of Mzila in 1862. When Mudirwa died, his son Muzunye took over; it was in 
his reign that Mzila arrived. Ngwaqazi remembered very well the time when Mzila had 
Mzunye killed and replaced by Muzwembiri.  
The Shanganes return installed a cattle-keeping regime in place of hunting, 
seriously transforming pre-existing forms of self-sustenance. First, Mzila decreed that 
strict boundaries were to be maintained between villages and cattle on one side, wildlife 
and thick forest on the other. He ordered his Shangane subjects and all those directly 
under him to sondela enkosini (draw near to the king). An immense compulsory 
movement of the population took place [that] the bush simply disappeared and the 
country became bare, except for the numberless native villages and a continuity of native 
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gardens.26 This left certain areas unsettled as game reserves, in particular a rectangular 
area between the Sitatonga hills and the Busi River. The king allowed hunting to take 
place anywhere but this area. The measure was effective until his son Ngungunyane 
decided to retire to the lower Biyeni in 1889. Whereupon the wooding was let loose and 
soon reestablished itself throughout the previously settled country.27 
The second measure has much more to do with how Mzila enforced this 
segregation and how his Ndau subjects received his order. He decreed all the pitfalls the 
hunters had used for trapping game to be closed because his cattle were now falling into 
them. Henceforth only bows and arrows, spears and guns could be used; otherwise people 
were free to continue the method of following predators like lions and leopards so that 
when these predators killed, they chased them away and took the meat.28 After losing 
some cattle to these traps, Mzila decreed that those who did not comply with this order be 
put to death. Some Ndau hunters fled for their lives; others were not so lucky and were 
either killed or surrendered their children to be divided up among great men as slaves, 
mostly the kings indunas (chiefs) or royal family. One slave of Magigwana, Mzilas top 
commander, says he suffered untold hardships for the misdeeds of other people. My 
record of happy boyhood was very brief. Upon becoming adults, other childrenmostly 
captured during raids into Shona territorywere brought in to replace them, and they 
were then freed. By then so much time would have passed that they could not even 
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recognize their own parents, who were now too old. The returnees were then drafted into 
the Gaza regiments to raid for slaves, cattle, women, and natural resources.29  
After a time, however, Mzila was on the move again, this time to a place called 
Buchanibude (Tall Grass), some 14 miles south of Mount Chirinda (sentry) forest. 
Chirinda referred to the hill to the north-western edge of the forest [which] had a 
precipitous approach and wide views over the surrounding country. There the inhabitants 
used to wait for (ku-rinda) the advance of the hordes of Mzila, Ngungunyana and the 
like.30 The Shangane would call it Silinda (same meaning), but by substituting one letter 
and calling it Selinda, the British completely distorted the name into a meaningless word. 
Mzilas move to Buchanibude was a purely agro-technological decision: He 
believed that kaffir-corn would do well in that part of the country. But Buchanibude 
turned out to be strategic for another reason besides the agricultural one: From this place 
armies were sent out to kill and to plunder the neighbouring tribesthe Mashonas. They 
went as far and wide as Chief Mutoko, Svosve, and Munyararis domains in the far 
north.31  
Buchanibude did not live up to expectations, and the king was on the move again, 
this time settling at Moyamuhle (Pleasant Breeze), just a few miles east of what later 
became Zamchiya School. It would be Mzilas last resettlement: he died there in 1882. 
Ngungunyane succeeded his father at Moyamuhle under heavy 24-hour security. 
Here was a king inheriting a large army of 15 regiments. Like his father, the new king 
was constantly on the move, fashioning new settlements and expanding territory. After 
living at Moyamuhle for only a year, he moved to Chinguno or Musapa, not far from 
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Buchanibude, the place of his growing-up. From there he sent out his regiments in 
different directions, in patrols that were often experienced as raids of plunder and 
bloodletting.32 The encounter between the Shangane and vene venzvimbo was an exercise 
in adjustment from both sides.  
For those Ndau inhabitants of lands where the Shangane directly settled, the loss 
of sovereignty over resources was total. Those who resisted were killed; the remainder 
were turned into virtual slaves, distributed for service among Shangane households.33 
Many of Mahenye and Chitsas people removed their crops and villages away from the 
main rivers to keep a safe distance from the Shangane. Those Tsonga near the lower 
Limpopo, especially the Bila, were incorporated into Soshanganes state and became 
mabundela (scouts), who deployed their tracking skills to guide their new masters in 
their military expeditions to maintain or expand territoriality.  
The Shangane use of local resourcesor living off the landin migrating and 
settling in Gonarezhou went beyond just deploying Tsonga scouts to manipulating local 
terrain to accomplish political, military, and economic dominance. The most marked but 
often ignored asset was the local environment itself, specifically elevated terrain like 
mountains. The Shangane chose to settle on higher ground north of the Limpopo because 
the management of altitude could be the difference between security and vulnerability, 
between wealth and poverty. The mountains were critical vantage points not just for 
defensive settlement and shrines but also resource control. In the mid-1950s, the 
antiquarian labor-recruiter James Blake-Thompsons house at Marumbini was within 
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sight of Musapa, the home of Mzila. Masapa or masvingo (ruins, also called 
marumbini) also referred to other stone-walled sites in Chipungumbira, Chimanimani, 
and Masekesa. These sites had been tax-collecting places [for] ivory, skins and slaves 
for the local Shona trading with the Swahili between A.D. 900 and 1500. The Portuguese 
took over and improved upon these fortifications from 1498 to the 18th century when the 
Rozvi defeated them. The positions were also located in such a way as to provide vantage 
sentry positions, looking outward to the eastthe direction the Swahili and Portuguese 
might come from. The musapa at Honde gorge, at the point where the Rupembi stream 
breaks through the hills and turns south to join the Save River, was a main route down 
the north side of the Save to the sea and so to Sofala. The Chimanimani masapa (south 
ruins) were located in the lands of the Mhlanga, a Ndau group, just north of 
Chipungumbira and the headwaters of the Busi River, on the south bank. This was the old 
Sofala trade route passing through Chibavava.34  
While the builders of the ruins were without doubt the Ndau of the moyo totem 
whom the Shangane colonized and assimilated, those south of the Save-Runde junction 
were built during the Shangane migration. The major ones were found in Nyamutongwe 
Hills, at the headwaters of the Nyamasikana River as it careens away towards the Runde 
just below Chipinda Pools. Nyamutongwe was strategically located on the route from 
Great Zimbabwe to Cheluana; its trade purposes are obvious. Nyamutongwe is clearly a 
Shona name meaning the one who must be judged/ruled, possibly in reference to its 
purpose as a sight of execution or the name of a person who lived on it. The hill has a 
                                                






precipitous side overhanging a perennial pool which is filled by the up-welling of the 
underground waters (artesian spring) which the elephants use and is never dry.35 
The importance of Nyamutongwe to resource control comes clearly in the clash 
between two groups fleeing from Shaka Zulu in the 1830s in what historians have called 
the mfecane (wars of the dispersal). Traditions say the quarrel between Manukusa and the 
Ngoni leader Zwang-indaba started over a dog, which chiefs considered as bodyguards 
often regarding them as more trustworthy than their personal bodyguards. Conquered 
people were also called dogs (inja), a reflection of the canine loyalty demanded of 
them. Whether it is a real dog (in which case we know dogs were used for hunting) or 
defeated people (and their control over wildlife),36 the battle confirmed the importance of 
high altitude to ivory trade control.  
Yet even with the most vantage hills, the Shangane king relied ultimately on the 
ibutho (army) which sent out regular manga (patrols), which used portable, highly mobile 
fighting equipment and methods carried from the southern African seaboard during the 
flight from Shaka. The short stabbing spear revolutionized warfare, in that one did not 
have to throw (away) his spear at the enemy and render oneself unarmed, but would 
retain it and engage in hand-to-hand combat. Here the shield was key; with the right hand 
the warrior thrust and twisted, and with the shield he parried away the adversary.  
The Nguni warrior wore light cow or game hide sandals in battle, promoting slick 
movement while guarding his feet from thorns, stones, and other elementsa distinct 
advantage compared to the barefooted local fighting. Finally, the Nguni groups used an 
order-of-battle called the cow-horn formation, with two outflanking units to cause 
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deception, and cutting off enemy avenues of escape, allowing the main frontage to 
engage in close combat.37 
The Shangane manga also deployed a sizeable quantity of rifles. 
Overwhelmingly, the army fought with assegais, but by the mid-19th century Mzila was 
investing in gunpower. In 1872, one European traveler passing through Gaza observed 50 
out of 2,000 troops to have guns, the rest being armed with assegais. Each of the 
musketeers was issued with six rounds [each], and Umzila told them not to waste their 
ammunition on game.38 The army was there not just for security but was also a hunting 
machine at the kings orders. It was a tax-collecting machine, invested with equipment to 
transform itself into suppressing revolt or destroying those that refused to or delayed in 
paying tribute.39  
The Gaza pre-dated the British and Portuguese as a colonial state among the local 
Ndau, Karanga, and Hlengwe villagers whom it forcefully ruled, who experienced the 
state through its pestilence in their everyday lives. Like the Ndebele, Gaza became 
known as the madzviti (raiders).40 Their hegemony over the Hlengwe enabled them to 
decide who entered the Gonarezhou, especially with respect to the merchants based at the 
Cheluana, Inhambane, Loureno Marques, and Delagoa Bay outlets. This notoriety 
marked a critical moment in the contests between local inhabitants and the state over 
Gonarezhou or Hlengwe. The Gaza decided what was good mobility across space and 
what was transgressive.  
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The wealth from ivory and meat from hunting supported a vast kingdom in two 
ways. First, the Shangane subjected the whole of southern Mozambique between 
Loureno Marques and the Zambezi, later even extracting some kind of tribute from 
two of the smaller Portuguese settlements neighbouring their territory, Sofala and 
Sena.41 The coastal white settlements lived at the mercy of the Shangane for much of the 
19th century, far too weak in numbers or fighting ability to offer the feeblest of challenges 
despite having guns.  
Second, ivory wealth enabled the Shangane to perpetuate a hierarchy of patronage 
that solidified their hold on subject populations. One major reason for this was 
intermarriage and the payment of ilobolo/roora (bride wealth) between the Shangane and 
various subject families. Through intermarriage or the need to escape the status of being 
minorities, these peoples ended up Shangane.42 Rather than being coerced to adopt 
Shangane custom through threats of death, the Hlengwe appear to have done so very 
willingly for two reasons.43  
First, totems (animals tabooed) were enclosures of kinship; to marry within the 
same totem was incest. Insiders could only marry outsiders belonging to a different totem 
or linguistic group.  
Second, there was an incentive in being a Shangane or having marriage ties with 
one. It came with protection from raids, movement from the status of servitude, and even 
a share in the wealth of the state.  
Distance from the Gaza court was also a factor, but it is important to note that the 
tsetse fly and mosquito dissuaded the Shangane even more. Foot patrols were permissible 
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in winter when the grass was dry and the foliage less dense, tedious in the summer 
rainsthe malaria season. Expeditions on horseback were completely out of the 
question; as the manga descended the Chipinga highlands heading south, it was in the 
domain of tsetse species deadly to any livestock. 
Now that I have laid out the process from departure, migration, and settlement, I 
will now discuss the relationship between the villagers and spaces around them. I will 
start at the homestead. 
 
The Homestead as Nerve Center of Production Arenas Linked through Mobility 
It is important to re-emphasize that, whether it was a Shona, Tsonga, or Shangane village, 
the village was a mobile workshop and it functioned in similar ways. In Shona, the 
homestead was called musha, which is also the name for village. The kitchen was the 
center of the homestead as a social space. It was where the family brought in resources 
from different arenas of production to provide energy for their bodies.44 Crops from the 
fields, meat, fruits, herbs, and firewood from the forests, water from the valley wellsall 
these elements went into food preparation by women, which is why the kitchen was the 
womans property. If she died, was divorced, or the husband became polygamous, he 
would have to build the new wife a new kitchen because the spirits of the women were 
not related and potentially antagonistic.  
Mukadzi (woman) was the food manager, not men. Besides the kitchen, usually at 
the back, was chirariro (bedroom), which served as a space for reproduction, 
lovemaking, and the secrets of the household. There were no cushion beds, so the couple 
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slept on bonde (reed-mat), resting their heads on mutsago (wooden headrests). The 
decent name for copulation became pabonde (to be on the reed-mat). Boys slept in gota 
(bachelors quarters), while girls were accommodated in nhanga (spinsters quarters). 
Depending on the gender, the boys or girls vacated their quarters and slept in the kitchen 
as a sign of respect to the male or female visitor. The guest could also be accommodated 
in the goats nhanga (pen), which like the human shelters had a roof and either bare or 
mud-covered pole walls. Alternatively the boys slept in the hozi (granary), the familys 
grain silo. Dura (grain bin) was where grain was stored. The conventional granary was a 
compartment in the hozi (barn), one of the most important buildings in the homestead. 
Hozi belonged to the woman. Whereas it was conventional among the Shona to built a 
granary in a standing building, the Tsonga usually stored their grain in matura (pl. grain 
bins) under the cattle pen. Food management was the essence of housewifery.45 
All these houses were built inside ruvanze (yard), which the girls and woman of 
the house woke up to sweep with tsvairo (outdoor brooms) at the crack of dawn as the 
owls departed back to the forests after their nocturnal witching and rat-hunting missions. 
On the edges of the ruvanze was bakwa (wood-stack), where the women and girls of the 
homestead head-ported firewood from the forest. It was deemed a failure of wifehood to 
allow bakwa to run out; the mothers status came at the expense of many trips to and 
from the forests.46  
Musha (homestead, village) was the center of coordination for the forest, field, 
yard, and indoor forms of production and consumption. In Shona, Tsonga, and Shangane 
culture, hospitality [was] never refused to a traveler, no matter who he may be. The 
                                                
45 A detailed discussion of womens food management role is R. Howman, The Native Labourer and His 
Food (A Study of the Institution of Eating under One Phase of Culture Contact), NADA (1942): 9-10. 





traveler appeared before the headman to explain where he was coming from and going, 
he was fed, and given a sleeping hut and a karosse (blanket). At night the hosts 
entertained him by the bonfire around the musha, questioning, yarning, and comparing 
experiences with goodwill and cheeriness.47 St. Vincent Erskine was Mzilas guest in 
1872 and describes vividly his experience of Shangane hospitality. Every guest presented 
himself to the kings vassalsusually Hlengwe or other Tsonga chiefsat the gates of 
the kings headquarters. With permission granted, the visitor approached the royal 
palisade and halted within 500 yards of the Kings kraal. After stating ones purpose, 
he was then welcomed into the royal presence.48  
The Shona coined the proverb musha mukadzi (the homestead or village is a 
woman) to summarize the important and indispensable role of a woman in building and 
keeping together these two institutions. To talk about the African homestead is to draw 
the map of woman. The house itself was a gendered enclosure of production and 
consumption. Women and girls were the housekeepers, deploying a panoply of 
technologies. Inter alia, the floor maintenance technology called kopolathe smearing of 
floors with a mixture of cow-dung and/or clay. This mixture dissolved the dust and 
vermin as it dried into a fine greenish coat lasting over a week. Upon its expiry, a fresh 
coat was smeared. Women were not just family cooks but also food processors. They 
stamped grain in mortars with pestles and ground it with stone, singing songs to allay 
tiredness, and afterward prepared the meals.49  
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The womans body was a mobile workshop connecting hearth and forest. She 
fetched firewood from the forests for energyto cook, to warm the bodies in the house, 
to give a semblance of life in the home. In time, the loose tufts of grass hanging down 
from the underside of the kitchens thatch roof became coated with chinai (soot)a sign 
of hupenyu (life), proof that a marriage that began in jittery circumstances had become a 
success. Here was testimony to the role of the forest as a reservoir of renewable energy, 
the women its connectors to the kitchen hearth, the site of energy consumption.50 The 
hearth was the combustion engine of the homestead, but it could only retain that role 
through the combustion engine of the womans bodythe mother of the house. Through 
her mobility on her two feet, with axe in hand, the woman went into the forests to fetch 
deadwood, and on her head she balanced the svinga (bundle) of wood and carried it back 
to the village. Woman was the network-builder connecting forest and hearth.  
The map of woman also connected river and hearth. Fishing was a unisexual 
activity of all ages differentiated only according to types of fish, the technology used, and 
the pools fished in. The main fishing methods were the saila, a mobile barrier of reeds 
across a river, into which the fish were driven; the muvasa or sole (fish traps) and 
chiranga in the case of women; the njungwa (fish spear), the nkumbi (dugout canoes), 
and nets. Fish could also be captured in the shallows simply by driving them to the edges 
and scooping them out with hands or tree branches. Finally, the fish could also be killed 
with poison from indigenous bushes of which the names of bombge, mukonde, cheretese 






and jero come to mind.51 All fishers had to obey one cardinal rule: If anyone caught a 
tiger fish he had to present it to the hosi (ruler).52  
It was the womans body that connected hearth and field through mobile work. 
She, not the husband, managed and worked to make the fields and wetland gardens 
productive. She rose at sunrise, prepared svusvuro (breakfast), and after eating led out the 
children to the fields, hoe on shoulder, tswanda (conical baskets) on head, baby on her 
back.53  
The villagers were expected to work communally the chiefs large fields to build 
up zunde ramambo (the chiefs granary), which not only served as his personal reserve, 
but also the communitys grain silo.54 Ordinary families had much smaller fields, the 
bigger portion of which belonged to the father/husband. It was the familys strategic silo. 
Women were expected to work it (with the children) in addition to their smaller plots of 
specialized crops (e.g. groundnuts, pumpkins, etc.).55  
No meal was complete without the staple sadza (thick corn meal porridge), but in 
usavi (relish) was to be found the highest art of the housewife. Usavi was all about 
variety; it came from the environment. Usavi was as important as the mealie-meal itself, 
as one colonial official noted in NADA in 1942: If our grain bins were full and we had 
no usavi we would be hungry.56 Hence the Shona adage kutsi kwesadza kune usavi 
(behind every good starch dish is relish). The deep Shona word for meat (nyama) is 
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usavi or muriwo. Nyama was special not just for the pieces of meat (nhindi) themselves 
but muto (gravy). Together, nhindi and muto were signifiers of patriarchal hierarchy.57  
Cooking sadza well was one of many markers of a real woman. It was 
considered a sign of laziness to serve a husband sadza cooked with gritty meal (upfu 
hwakamwazhika) or an undercooked meal (mbodza), that is, one cooked below the 
standard of thickness required. Good wivesand women generallywhitened the meal 
by first pounding with mutswi (pestle) in the duri (mortar) to remove the skin off the 
grain before grinding the meal thoroughly on the guyo (grinding stone) with huyo 
(smaller stone grinder). 
To share food generally, and sadza and usavi specifically, was no occasion for 
gratitude or hospitality but the natural thing to do. The sign of a complete home was a 
square meal; and the only evidence of a square meal was a full stomach. Later, under 
colonial rule, Africans would explain: Why the white man keeps so much food and eats 
so often is because he eats so littlewe would need all his food at one meal. The reason 
why men in particular ate so much at one go was simple: they ate foods which keep in 
the stomach which were favoured for long journeys or special hard work.58  
Generally speaking, localsparticularly menpreferred meat to vegetables on 
account of their proximity to wildlife. For the Shangane of the lower Runde who lived in 
perpetually arid environments, starchy foods like potatoes ensured security against 
famine. Their method of growing this food-crop was to plant cuttings in the sandy river 
bed and leave them for the entire winter (June-September) so that they threw down roots 
to the water table below. Come October the roots would have swelled out to form 
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finger-like potatoes. In summer they shifted the crop to their wetland gardens as the 
rivers flooded again.59 Such starch mattered; it filled the stomach. That is, energy could 
only be felt if there was physical evidence that the stomach was full.  
Overall, the food security of the homestead was synchronized according to the 
seasons. When the flamingoes flew westward locals that the dry season was ending, the 
rains were coming. After all, who knew the seasons of the year more than the flamingo, a 
bird that could detect rainfall 500 miles away, if only for its insatiable taste for algae and 
animal life in newly flooded mini-lakes? If the birds flew off and returned, then the 
distant rains would have been insufficient. If they did not, the rains were good.60  
Flamingos were to seasons what specific crops, wild animals, and fruits were to 
the calculation of months. Each time of year had its own food prospects. Hoho (the time 
of laughter and festivity/January) was the month when the marula fruit ripened. 
Mhlanga (the time of the young grain/February) was when the young crops shone like 
reeds  tall and green and waving in the winds. Jubamsoko (the time of the cutting 
down/March) was when/if rains came and turned the forests green and dense, the path 
overgrown with grass that needed to be cut down to enable passage. Mkwekwezi (the 
time to eat of the crops/April) was when green crops started ripening. Sandwela (the 
time of reaping/May) was harvest time. Sheremela (the time of hoeing/June) marked 
the starting of a new season of backbreaking chores of the women. Konyane (the time 
of the ripe and dry corn/July) was when all the maize was harvested. It seems that this 
month came with the Portuguese introduction of maize into the transLimpopo after 1500. 
Komkulu (the time of the winds/August) was when the first magical signs of spring broke 
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through. Sekanwane (September) marked the onset of the flowering of the marula trees. 
Kanamkulu (October) was the period when these fruits were big enough for the villagers 
to judge how much beer they would produce. Mpala (antelope/November) was the month 
when the antelopes drop their young, and the bush seems alive with the perky little 
fawns and their anxious mothers. And come Nkokoni (blue wildebeest/December), the 
blue wildebeest followed suit. When that happened, the Shangane knew that a whole year 
had passed and a new one was nigh. One more moon and Hoho would be upon them 
again.61 
 
The Forest as a Spiritual Extension of the Village 
Having established the place of the homestead as a nerve-center of production, I will now 
limit this discussion to the villages relationship with the forest. For purposes of 
organization, this section examines the role of the forest in the spiritual life of villagers. 
First, it was the burial place of vengeful spirits of dead enemies whose blood new 
occupiers had spilled to establish their own settlements. Everybody who went in was 
expected to respecteven fearburial sites and ruins of former inhabitants of the land. 
All local inhabitants believed that the spirits of the dead stayed on the land and must be 
placated to prevent misfortune overtaking later occupiers. Burial and other places 
previously occupied or revered were looked upon as taboo, and could only be used for 
burial in the event that the incoming foreigners married into these families. But in 
general the taboo still applied; desecration of such spots was believed to be followed by 
a curse on the desecrator by the local spirit. The ruins were so tabooed to the point 
where locals could not dare mention them by name, lest they awaken the dead spirits, 
                                                





who would be itching for revenge against the new settlers on their land. In place of real 
names, the places could only be referred to using antonyms, other languages, or reversing 
the original word. This coded language of reverence was called hlonipa (contrition).62  
Secondly, it was the domain of God and the ancestral spirits, the protectors of the 
village and its inhabitants. The Tsonga, Shona and Shangane locals believed that 
Shikwembu (God) lived on the hilltop and will send a whirlwind to take up good people 
(Elijah-style) or cast them down if they are bad and kill them or send them back without 
memory and insane.63 Spirits were also believed to reside in deep, sacred pools, where 
witches or the bodies of enemies were thrown. Caves were the burial places of royal 
families, although it was normal during wartime to bury loved ones in the crevices of 
rocks because of lack of time for a proper burial. Spirits of deceased adult relatives 
(midzimu) were purified (kuchenurwa) so that they could anchor in mortals (spirit 
mediums or svikiro) and protect their living relatives. The individual through whom a 
spirit was trying to come out (kusvikira) was then purified in a beer ceremony, and the 
mudzimu invited to speak and reveal itself. The svikiro was not a nanga, and he did not 
necessarily perform the sort of healing we saw earlier; only if the dead person was a 
healer could his/her spirit medium become a nanga.64  
The upward mobility of the body from a mortal to a spiritual state elevated 
ordinary places where the body was buried into sacred spaces, thereby automatically 
demanding their deliberate conservation. Ordinary villagers were banned from entering, 
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gathering fuel, cutting trees, or letting in bush fires into the ntimu (cemeteries) of clans, 
particularly royal ones. Only the mutameli wa ntimu (guardian of the cemetery) could 
enter these sacred woods to consult with the departed. People stayed away from such 
places not just because they were sacred; they were too scared to go into them because so 
many mysterious happenings were rumored to happen there. Few wanted to actually 
find out.65  
It was through these spirits that people communicated with God, usually at 
elevated places, such as mountains, prominent rocks and big trees. Only the elders went 
up the hill to communicate with the ancestors. If one went up such hills, it is said they 
would never return. Few people ever tried to find out.66 There were many trees 
designated for this purpose in the forest, but the muhacha or muchakata tree was the most 
widely-used spirit tree (muti wevadzimu). Around it, villagers erected rushanga 
(enclosure or shrine) where they made offerings to the ancestral spirits of meat, beer, and 
meal. There the svikiro (spirit medium) call[ed] down blessings on the seed before 
distributing it to the people. This grain [was] then taken home and mixed with the seed 
they [we]re about to plant, thus ensuring bountiful crops.67   
Rushanga was also a rainmaking site where people went to consult the gombwe 
(rainmaker) before the rains or if the rains came late and drought loomed. Rainmaking
what the ethnographer, Rev. Burbridge called weathercraftwas the province of 
gombwe, not the nanga or midzimu. This is what one nanga told Burbridge: My 
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divining stones (sic) cannot see what is going on behind the clouds. Rain is no concern 
of the ancestral spirits. It is not possible to compel the heavens by magic.68  
Wildlife mediated this intricate connection between the skies above and the 
fertility of the land and its people. At the rushanga the rainmaker burnt the droppings of 
the crested hornbill (magoto), which acted as a form of fumigant to purify the grain 
before planting. With cowry (nyengeredzi) shells and pangolin (haka) scales, the 
rainmaker conjured medicine for mothers to use in birthing and infant health. The shells 
and scales were also mixed with the claws of the great ant-eater (gwiba) to cure seed 
grain so as to awaken the dormant forces of fertilization.69 The scales were also burnt 
and pounded as medicine to stop nose-bleeding.70 It meant that trees like the muhacha 
and game species like the pangolin were also sacred; the penalty for destroying them was 
severe.71  
Each tree had its purpose. Among the Shangane, only spiritual healers could use 
the ntjopha (wild custard apple) tree for firewood. It was considered highly dangerous 
for the common man to do so.72 Among the Karanga and Ndau, the musosawafa, 
meaning a thorny shrub with white leaves and rough bark, was reserved for covering the 
deceaseds fresh grave. It could not be firewood under any circumstance.73 The mkono 
tree could not be firewood lest one invites lightning. The reasoning stemmed from its 
tendency to emit showers of sparks when burning, akin to lightning. Other trees were 
believed to cause hail and drought bad for crops. Yet other trees were reserved for 
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sorcery. Any ordinary people using these trees for any purpose would become 
suspectwhat else would they be using such highly toxic trees like the umdlebe tree for 
if not to harm others?74  
The Tsonga shared believed that the world of animals and humans was one. When 
the hunter (indeed any human being) went into the bush, he became a thing of the bush. 
They believed that animals communicate to people and each other through signs. 
Enchanted animals could even speak, hyenas, owls, and snakes were messengers of 
witches, while a bird or an antelope could stop travelers and warn them of danger. The 
highly-deceptive honey-guide might lead the hunter to a beehive bursting with honey or a 
black mamba seething with venom.75 Humans had to know how to strategically create 
alliances with certain animals, birds, and insects.  
The animals of the forest were therefore not strangers or things of the forest but 
actors in the village. The hunters attitude to them derived from their everyday meaning 
and work in peoples everyday village lives. Take owl and hyena for example, the witchs 
sentry and horse respectively. At night the owls hoot and a hyenas laugh induced dread 
among the sleeping but awake bodies inside the house. In the afternoon, when the hunter 
went into the forest, the nocturnal creatures rested. Inevitably, no hunter would kill an 
owl or hyena lest he incur the wrath of the witch.76 
The second level related to folkloreeducation and ecological knowledge that 
masqueraded as fictitious entertainment. There were four main types of tales: 
mythological tales, animal tales, tales about human beings, and tales about superhuman 
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or supernatural beings. Mythological tales dealt with creation and death, and the origins 
of the behavior of species. Animal tales took the form of animals that had spiritual 
attributes transcending their animal status and becoming humans. Other animals were just 
normal characters with no supernatural powers. In this dramaturgic encounter, such were 
the blurred boundaries between human and nonhuman that the avians spoke their own 
language just like us. Animals too had moral codes, culture, and, indeed, technology.77 
Animals of the forest were not depicted as wildlife outside the human domain. 
Human and animal lived in one world; they spoke the same languages and socialized the 
same spaces. This human-animaland spiritworld was located on the land surface 
(nyika), underwater (pasi pemvura), or in underground worlds (ninga). Animals were not 
at the mercy of human hunters; rather, the humans were as much victims as they were 
friends and relatives. The wild became domesticates. Love affairs could develop 
between a girl and a zebra; upon discovering it the villagers killed the zebra, and when 
the young paramour comes calling, her partner did not answer. She became sullen, but 
society had extracted its lesson: there were limits to the conflation of human-animal 
boundaries. 
Interestingly, in most of the stories, the categories of human or animal are not 
even fixed: animals turn into people, people into animals or even trees and stones, for 
purposes of deliberate camouflage or as a result of a curse. The categories of forest and 
village close as well, especially as humans (mostly men) turn into lions once in the 
forest and hunt for their families in the village. Soon after making a kill, they return to 
human form, and go back home with fat carcasses. This power to move back and forth 
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depends upon the keeping of specific taboos, usually as the healers or ancestral spirits 
stipulate. It might be words to be or not to be said, a hidden potion which must not be 
seen by anybody other than the hunter himself, or a song to be or never to be sung during 
his absence. A code of secrecy that was usually out of bounds for women, through sexual 
intercourse, or proximity to one having a monthly period.78  
If the taboos were broken, usually by family members in his absence, the hunter 
lost the power to move back and forth between human and superhuman/nonhuman 
boundaries. The hunter either failed to become a lion (in which case he failed to acquire 
the power of mobility, the carnivorous instinct, and therefore lethality to produce meat 
for his family and even village). Or he failed to shed his feline form and become human 
again, whereupon the family lost its breadwinner.  
As I see it, the friction derived from a belief in the power of the forest to act upon 
humans and turn them into animals. So, did forest have agency, therefore? Yes, 
according to Shona and Shangane elders. Here the best evidence comes from a third 
source: idioms. Sango rinoyera (the forest is sacred), they say. Sacredness is an agency 
that people do not just give to a forest, but which controls them. The forest is generous, 
especially for those who persevere in the hunt, hence the Shona proverb: Sango rinopa 
waneta (the forest rewards the one who is tired). However, if taboos are not kept, sango 
rinotsama (the forest gets angry). If its laws are violated the forest exacts instant justice 
for itself on the offender: it takes away his sense of direction, engulfing him with mist 
                                                





and fog from nowhere. Old semi-human figures (madzimudzangara) appear from 
nowhere. The offender becomes insane and may never come home.79 
 
A Second Granary 
The forest was also important in material ways; here, again for purposes of organization, 
I discuss local peoples perceptions of the forest as a second granary. In an arid climate, 
fields alone were not enough to fill the stomach. The important thing about the forest was 
not only that it was a place that gave, but that also refused to give, hence the adage nhasi 
masango matema (today the forests are black/dark). The forest was also a deadly, hideous 
thicket where walking alone was not advisable, hence the adage sango rakada vaviri 
navana (the forest required two or four companions). Hence it was appropriately called 
jiri (wilderness). A place like that, deliberately conserved as such, usually had wild 
animals that people came to hunt for food, horns, and ivory. They called it rimuka 
(wilderness infested with dangerous wild animals).80 These mappings of the forest 
according to its relationship to the human body illustrate the capacity of villagers to 
design not just the uses of nature, but also technologies of using it. That is how nature 
became culture: trees were not just plants; they were social institutions. 
Of all the inhabitants of Gonarezhou, the Tsonga were most outstanding for 
categorizing each part of the forest according to the dominant vegetation species and the 
terrain it grew in. Each of the tree species was linked to a specific activity or 
infrastructure in the homestead around doors, roofs, fences, pens, silos, and so on. There 
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was the umtonto, a deciduous thornless tree 20 ft. high which grew tall in hilly terrain and 
was mere shrub in dry lowlands. The umtonto was a leguminous tree, its bark used for 
constructing grain silos and canoes. The hilly umtonto also provided timber for house 
construction.81 
The etsengi was a dense, thorny scrub with grass that grew on the moist vleis 
which made excellent thatch grass. The musimbiti grew upon the etsengis red soils as 
woods and forests, but never in mountains. It is one of the hardest woods in Africa, which 
is why Europeans called it the ironwood. Not only was it known to provide good 
firewood for charcoal, poles for construction, and strong hoe handles; its wood was so 
hard that it was used for making ploughs, hoes, and other digging instruments. In 
addition, its juices made the most potent of poisons for hunting, pest control, and 
bewitching enemies. The honey that bees made from its juices was toxicwhich meant it 
could be used as a deceptive poison.82  
The open grass country, with its hard soils, limestone outcrops and waterholes, 
was known as monjo and it was much frequented by game, especially in the early 
morning. Some of the trees found in it, like the mutomboti, muganu, and murula trees, 
provided many edible fruits. It is possible to draw maps connecting monjo to hunting, 
given its abundant game; to wine and beer making, considering the prevalence of edible 
fruits; and relish and nutrition from mushrooms and fruits.83 As a result, it attracted men, 
women, and children alike, each transforming fruit and mushroom-picking and hunting 
into a time for socialization. The women took this time to counsel adolescent girls in the 
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etiquette of womanhood, while the men counseled the boys on impending manhood, 
husbandry, and patriarchy. Away from the village, mtonto was a safe place to engage in 
rumor, gossip, and prayer to the ancestors. 
The mugwasha was a dense, thornless scrub-bush interlaced with lianas and 
climbers that grew on the dry red soils of the higher plains. It had many anthills that 
swarmed with ants, especially near the foothills of mountains. The maruka was also ant-
hill country, the anthills often as large as summer-houses, the clay providing islands of 
bush around themselves.84 At the onset of the summer rains, from around 9 am on a 
sunny day after the previous day or nights rains, tusvosve (tiny ants) yellow in color and 
about 1 mm long burrowed holes about 1 cm wide all around the top of the sodden 
anthill. Like bridesmaids they mingled around in their millions along the carven and on 
the surface. In no time, around 10 am, tsambarafuta (black flying ants with thick, oil-
filled abdomens) emerged from the holes, shaking off the ants and then flying off. These 
edible ants made delicious relish when roasted and salted. 
Around sunset the anthill became a crawling mass of majuru (termites), 
burrowing their own muddy and well-manicured holes to the surface. With their 
rhapsodic, vice-grip like jaws, they cleared the way for ishwa (white ants), the protein-
rich and fatty insect named more for its white wings than its brown, elongated abdomen 
and head. Kubata ishwa (catching white ants) was a popular activity as the planting 
season began, because it diversified an otherwise monotonous relish of vegetables. Like 
tsambarafuta, ishwa was roasted in salt and dried, and could be stored for over six 
months in that state and traded for other products.  
                                                





The imbaleni was open country full of grass and water-pools almost synonymous 
with mapani (pool-country). In tsetse-free country, this forest land was perfect for cattle 
production (grazing). In places where tsetse was dominant, imbaleni was a popular 
hunting spot for antelopes like the bushbuck and reedbuck, zvikwari (francolins), and 
tsuro (hares). 
The umsagari was white sandy country of low bush whose most dominant trees 
were the makwakwa (strychnine) and matamba (African orange)-like fruits. Makwakwa 
was particularly important as poison and was used for pest control, not only to kill 
problem animals but also to bewitch human rivals through poisoning. I discuss it more 
fully below. Matamba came in two types: manono, with harder and thicker shell which 
yellowed and then browned as the fruit ripened and fermented inside, the contents 
producing a sugary taste, and the mazhumwi, softer and thinner shell and becoming 
yellower and brighter as they ripened, and producing a creamier, chocolate-like taste. 
Only the meat around the coin-like seeds as well as the juice were edible, the seed being 
too big and difficult to pass out as stool. In addition to matamba, bees made honey from 
the flowers and fruits of these trees; people harvested it to feed themselves.85 
In the vicinity of the pans was a cherry-like fruit called ximwebi (Tsonga) or 
imbongwa (Shangane). This delicious fruit grows on a creeper, with a light-brown, rough, 
lumpy bark, the stem as thick as a mans arm, with leaves only at the very end of the 
branches. It is orange-sized, and when ripe its skin turns yellow, the shell being easy to 
break with ones thumbnail, exposing numerous flattish seeds imbedded in a small 
quantity of acid pulp, saturated with sweet juice. When squeezed out, watered, and put 
                                                





in the sun to mature, the seeds are fermented into a very inebriating brew.86 Ximwebi 
attracts elephants and people. As one travel-writer observed in 1878, locals look upon 
the trees in the light of a granary during a couple of months or so, when they are golden 
with the crop. That was in mid-January, when the fruit was crushed, fermented and 
brewed into a very pleasant wine, decidedly the best drink prepared by the natives.87  
The makwakwa or umfooma was a very highly-prized Tsonga food-luxury 
prepared from the large calabash-like fruit of a deciduous shrub of the strychnine family. 
People loved it, and so too did the elephants. The fruitcovered with a thick, glutinous 
coat when ripewas filled with bright orange-colored seeds the size of coins. These 
seeds were dried on a wickerwork frame over a fire to acquire a smoke flavor and dark-
brown color. When roasted, the seed-coat was stripped off the seed and pounded up in 
wooden mortars to an oat-cake-like texture and pressed into drums made out of the 
umtonto bark. The seed might be pounded dry with honey to significantly reduce its 
pervading bitter taste. Alternatively the seeds were prepared green (shukutsu) by soaking 
them in a succession of quantities of water to extract their bitter flavour before 
stamping them. Shukutsu was the equivalent of olive oil. After stamping the residue was 
placed into drums and suspended in the air, a dark-coloured oil dripping out of the mature 
pulp. So precious and rare was the product in the 1870s that it was not to be bought.88 
Local women were also experts at brewing nkanyi or marula beer and mlala palm 
wine.89 The marula fruit ripened in January/February into a tantalizing orange color, and 
the locals gathered it in baskets, cooked and sieved the residue into huge pots and left it 
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to ferment into sweet wine. They also drained the sap of mahanga (ilala palm) to 
manufacture njemani or chemwa, another highly intoxicating wine.90 The nkhuwa (fig 
trees) offered a delicious fruit.  
The shimuwu (baobab) tree lifted its bloated trunk and tentacle branches to the 
heavens, like a grim old god of an ancient world summoning his vegetable followers to 
worship.91 It was the mighty monarch of the forest.92 From the branches fell fruits 
delicious to elephants, monkeys and people alike.93 In the lean seasons, the dry fruitthe 
size of a big mango with a hard crustwas split to reveal seed coated with creamy, 
powdery substances, which, when collected in large quantities, were pounded into 
mealie-meal. By tapping the base of the baobabs stem, locals acquired pure water in 
large quantities. The hollow trunk made a nice sleeping quarters, provided a gaboon 
viper, python, or cobrathe major snakes in the areadid not greet the human occupant 
first. Only the evergreen mthoma (ebony) tree could shelter a passer-by or hunter in the 
forest from sun and rain with such completeness.94 No wonder that when militarily-
minded European travelers passed through, they called the baobab the quartermaster 
tree. It was one of those trees that attract animals.95 
No wonder plant extracts were used as instruments for harvesting animals from 
the forest. For instance, the umtsuli, a seed of the plant of the strophanthus family 
produced a strychnine-type poison for anointing arrows and assegais lethal enough to kill 
a human within three hours and small buck instantly. The plant, a runner, produced 
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yellow flowers with curiously-tailed petals, and a seed the shape of a huge military frog-
button, with 9-inch lobes. To rescue a person or animal shot with an umtsuli-poisoned 
arrow, one would have to carefully cut the flesh to get the arrow out and wash the wound 
with water and treat it with herbs.96 
Trees were also sources of construction timber and food. The mupani was without 
doubt the finest and most commonly available and used timber. The tree has distinct 
butter-fly shaped leaves that open and close like a book, its stems usually growing to 40 
ft. tall and 2 ft. wide.97 Most locals in Gonarezhou harvested the mupani for constructing 
hut walls, roofing, making livestock pens, and various woodworking purposes like 
making cooking sticks. In summer, the tree branches and leaves were the breeding place 
of the mupani worm (madora/amaximbi), a local delicacy.  
Ultimately, all food required salt (munyu)another product of the forest. 
Gonarezhou and its locale was home to many salt pans that supplied the inhabitants with 
iodine. Locals had long noticed animals licking the edges of these pans. Upon tasting it, 
one of them discovered it contained mineral salt. From that timelong, long ago
people started collecting the earth and dissolving it in water. From that stage, the methods 
of purification were similar to those used to extract salt from organic sources, most 
notably the mushangidze, a fairly common small shrub. Its twigs were burnt and the ashes 
collected and boiled in water which was then evaporated. The remaining water 
concentrate was poured into a small pot (called surudzo or sieve) with two or three small 
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holes at the bottom. The residue remained in the top pot, the liquid salt (munyu) 
percolating at the collection point below and used in that state.98 
 
A Sacred Butchery 
Hunting Etiquette. For all its importance as a source of plant resources, the Gonarezhou 
was primarily a hunting ground. Upon studying the regulation of forest off-take, it is 
possible to stretch back and complicate the notion of conservation, which has often been 
predicated on colonial practices. As I see it, the question is not even whether these 
African inhabitants of the transLimpopo deliberately conserved forests, but what drove 
such conservation. To limit the objectives and conduct of conservation to deliberate 
actions targeted at mere serving or sustainable use of species is to trivialize the objectives 
of a much broader mosaic. It is also to place western-derived philanthropic, aesthetic and 
eco-feministic version of conservation to a pedestal it does not deserve and which has no 
pride of place in most African and other nonwestern societies. Conservation was not, 
should not be, seen as a benign saving (and serving) of nature for its own sake; there is 
always a So What? question. 
Take the concept of royal game that colonial governments introduced to 
conserve species like elephant and buffalo for example, which turns out to have been 
there in local society. However, whereas the colonial version was more to do with an 
aesthetic vision, the African version arose more from a desire of African rulers to obtain 
personal gain from the efforts of their subjectsthe huntersand to impress upon them 
that [they] were their rulers.99 What follows is a discussion of some of these 
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conventions, the effect of which was to standardize off-take. I will only sample specific 
animals with the objective of illustrating the mutual shaping of politics, technology, and 
nature. 
Take for example the pangolin (hambakubvu or haka), the uniformly grey-brown 
colored, armor-plated ant-eater.100 If the hunter found it, he was to surrender it alive to 
the chief, who rewarded the bringer with a goat. The pangolin was placed in an enclosure 
where anybody wishing to see it had to pay a kind of entrance fee. The chief would 
then sing to it the song Hambakubvu, tamba! (Pangolin, play!), whereupon the captive 
animal walked around on two legs, as it would in any case do. It would roll itself up in 
its scaly skin, often dozing off in that position, amusing the paying audience. When the 
animals entertainment value dwindled, the chief slew it for usavi. The meat was reserved 
only for himself and his senior wife (vahosi), its scales being taken to the nanga to make 
medicines to ensure bumper crops. They were also used to make a concoction for 
bathing the small, soft, throbbing spot on an infants head to make it strong.101 
The porcupine (nungu or jenje) enjoyed similar royal privileges, albeit 
posthumously. Whenever anybody killed this animal, they were to take it whole to the 
chief. Only in his presence could the quills be removed and the body degutted; the entire 
carcass was then surrendered to him. The hunters reward was a fowl or something of 
more or less like value, depending on the generosity of the particular chief. If however 
the hunter regularly bagged porcupine, there were exemptions to the requirement of 
bringing it complete with quills and innards.102 
                                                
100 U. Rahm, The pangolins of West and Central Africa, African Wild Life 14, 4 (1960): 271-5. 
101 Jackson, Native Hunting Customs: 39. 





Leopards (mbada or ingwe) and lions (shumba or mhondoro) were not regularly 
killed but on the occasions that they were, the hunter must hurry and fetch his ruler so 
that the animal may be viewed where it has died. The chief then removed the chiombo 
ballthe part of the lions throat where the hairs of its countless victims accumulated. 
Locals believed this part enabled the lion to roar (kuomba). Chiefs wanted to possess this 
partalong with the head and skinto give them a roar (power) over their subjects; 
when they passed judgment at court, their sentence was often described as heavy like the 
lions roar. The hunter who presented a lion or leopard before the ruler had much beer 
brewed in his honor, was given one head of cattle, to kill at the party or take home. It is 
not clear what equivalent he received supposing that he or the chief lived in the fly belt, 
but he drank as much as his stomach allowed, then gave the rest to the women (the men 
who had yet to kill a lion or leopard).103 
In the event that the hunter killed an eland (mhofu), in no circumstance may 
[he] skin it in the absence of the chief. Should the distance to the chiefs be prohibitive, 
and the ruler could not walk to the carcass site, he sent his ambassador. In all cases, he 
got the heart and the surrounding fat, as well as the shoulder and ribs on the side lying 
on his nyika (territory). He also surrendered to the ruler the skin in the elands forehead, 
which was an important ingredient in the making of the medicines of chieftainship (miti 
youshe). The logic was that just as the eland was a big buck, the chief would become big 
in the eyes of his people.  
When the hunter killed an elephant, he was to surrender to the ruler of the land the 
tusk (nyanga) and trunk that hit the ground first as the elephant fell to its death. It was a 
simple law of property rights: the king owned the land. He was to also take the elephants 






feet because they had trodden his soil (vhu rashe). In either case the hunters reward was 
a head of cattle.104 
 
Specific parts of the ostrich (mhou), hippopotamus (ngwindi or mvuu), and genet 
cat  (tsimba or nyongo) were also reserved for the chief. If one killed the hippopotamus, 
again they were to alert the chief. Its teeth and feet were the rulers property, although it 
is not clear what he used them for. In the case of an ostrich, he was to let the chief know. 
In all cases the meat could be taken but the feathers and any eggs found are not the 
hunters propertyeven if the egg has not yet been laid. The hunter would be rewarded 
with a goat. The skin of a genet cat, the beautiful spotted cat more often and erroneously 
referred to as the civet cat, went to the local headman, who took it as tribute to the 
highest authority in the land. In all cases, the hunters reward was a fowl.105 The skins 
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were used mostly for the kilts (mutsha or nhembe) and head-dress of military regiments, 
with the tails being tied to the sporran of the kilt.106 
The crocodile (ngwena, garwe, or gambinga) had much more complex spiritual 
meaning and material uses. Hunters generally stirred clear of killing it lest they provoke 
the anger of the witch who owned it. In the event that one had to be killed, however, it 
was not skinned until the chiefs arrival for two reasons. First, its bile was a deadly 
poison. It was roasted, powdered, and mixed with beer or other drink, especially at the 
village beer party. Death follows in a few hours, with pain and abdominal distension.107 
Second, in some societies if killed, the crocodile had to be thrown back into the pool 
otherwise the rain would not fall. Third, there was believed to be a stone in its stomach 
near the nduru (gall bladder), which was a revered charm (ndarama). If one swallowed it, 
long life was assured. The chief therefore made sure he was the one to swallow it; when 
he had lived so long and was about to die, every attempt was made to make him vomit it 
so that his successor might swallow it and have a long life also. In succession disputes, 
the swallower of the stone was proclaimed into office.108 
 
Spiritual Weaponry. Because of the presence of tsetse fly, there was a more or less total 
absence of cattle in the immediate periphery of Gonarezhou until the rinderpest 
epizootic of 1896-7. Tsovanis people say the first cattle they ever owned as a clan were 
those they seized forcefully from Makonis Ndau-speaking people to the north of 
Mahenye. The Hlengwe had no cattleonly goatswhen they arrived. Even the goats 
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quickly succumbed to tsetse fly.109 While John Ford put a definite boundary on the 
location of the tsetse-free belt between the Save and Mwenezi extending along the Chefu, 
the evidence supports Bannermans position that the precolonial fly belt was not static. 
The problem was not so much the presence of fly but how to manage and co-exist with it.  
Because the tsetse prevented villagers from keeping livestock, wild animals 
became the villagers livestock, especially as sources of meat and skins. In Shona culture, 
hunters were called vavhimi or vadzimba; in Tsonga, they fell into two types. There were 
those who established guilds, hiring themselves out to the banyan (coastal-based 
European merchants); they were the maphisa (professional hunters). Then there were 
ordinary or occasional hunters in search of the odd carcass; they were the bahloti (small-
time hunters). The most conspicuous maphisa were Tsonga men based at Loureno 
Marques and Delagoa Bay who undertook expeditions to Gonarezhou where elephant 
was still abundant. Throughout the 19th century the maphisa contracted themselves to 
Portuguese merchants, who supplied them with guns, powder, and lead.110  
Hunting required a number of weapons, prime among which was spiritual 
armament or muti (medicine). The hunter strongly believed that in and of themselves, 
spears, bows and arrows, snares or guns were useless. Lethality could only come from the 
ancestral spirits. Consequently, the hunters did not just grab their weapons and head 
straight to the forest. The forest was a sacred space; to approach it one had to first appear 
before a nanga/gagao (healer) to be purified. The nanga used a panoply of hakata 
(bones or astragali, sing. astragalus) to forecast the prospects of the hunter in the forest. 
The nanga was an important person in society, capable of hurting or saving people from 
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harm. Indeed, in 1875 Erskine observed after staying for months in the Shangane 
domains that Mzilas influence among his African vassals and enemies was mainly 
dependent upon a reputation he possesses of having some powerful wizards in his 
service, who fight with disease and the elements [lightning], instead of with arms.111 The 
hold of the spirits in standardizing the conduct of human relations in the Shangane 
kingdom could not go higher than that. 
In the hands of the spiritual healers, animal bones became texts encoding the 
hidden signs of the ancestral spirits to their mortal children. The most common astragali 
were that of goats. The he-goat denoted the father or the family or village head, the she-
goat the mother. The astragalus of a goat that has given birth once represented a young 
mother, while bones from the male and female kids denoted boys and girls. The astragali 
of sheep denoted the royal family since sheep were more valuable and less common than 
goats.112  
First, the bones needed more treatment to enhance their seeing powers (masimba 
ekuona). The nanga chewed up a mixture of dried twigs known as gomarara and spit it 
on to the bones (kufurira hakata). Gomarara is a parasitic plant which birds deposit on 
certain trees and which then grows to dominate the branch structure, often eventually 
killing the tree itself over time. In addition, the pieces were smeared with a preparation 
known as matoto, the excreta of hungwe (lark or Zimbabwe bird) usually dropped on 
stones in the midst of rivers. The droppings were then ground into powder, stored in the 
leg bone of a gora (vulture) or bonga (wild cat) to attract clients because of the animals 
keen sense of sight and smell. After being smeared with matoto and undergone kufurira, 
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the bones were then placed on the pathway to the ash-pit (durunuru) after sunset but 
before dark and left overnight (kuradzira hakata). The ancestral spirits would put seeing 
power into the bones in the night; come morning they would be ready for use, subject to 
another dose of kufurira. The belief was that the colour white attracts, while black 
repels, so the white of the new moon would combine with the white-smeared bones and 
the ash-heap to lure clients. Like women coming to throw ashes on the ash-heap, so too 
would the steady stream of clients.113 
So on the eve before his departure for the forests, the hunter appeared before the 
nanga and his hakata for purification. These variously coded pieces revealed whether 
he would see anything, kill, and bring home something, or whether he was going to 
experience masango matema (dark forests), that is, return empty-handed. The revelations 
of the bones had the status of truth; the nanga could not be questioned. To enhance luck, 
the hunter was purified in several ways. He could be given a bracelet of charms on his 
wrist or bathed with concoctions of herbs to remove the bad luck. Or some substance 
might be placed on top of embers smoldering in a potshard, and the hunter would be told 
to stoop over it. The nanga then covered him with a blanket and ordered him to inhale 
the smoke to chase away his ill luck or bad spirits blocking his way.114 
Every hunter worth his salt regarded purification as a potent spiritual antibiotic, 
but which worked so long as he respected the prescriptions the nanga give him. Yet even 
if the hunter took the full course of the doses given, the muti (medicine) could only be 
effective if he respected the miko (spiritual taboos) of the forest. All else being equal, the 
elephants were made more vulnerable: the medicine led them into killing grounds to 
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meet their fate. Every exceptionally successful hunter was believed to possess some 
sort of muti which draws the elephants into their toils, and makes them powerless 
against the bullets, arrows, or snares. Incense from India was seen as the most potent 
elephant medicine, while in some parts of the Gaza kingdom pieces of coal were 
deemed as by no means inefficient substitutes.115 
The reverence of hunters towards muti gave Gaza rulers the easiest of institutions 
to control hunting activities and ensure sustainable yields. In the 1860s-70s, the Pahla 
Umhamba (purification) was carried out under Umzilas authorization before any 
hunter, African or European, could proceed to Gonarezhou. A subordinate chief called 
Sibomo was in charge of the procedure, and he only attended to the first batch of hunters 
to arrive at his homestead on the day of purification, the latecomers being turned away 
amidst much disquiet. Together, these pre-expedition ceremonies, along with the litany of 
taboos that came with them, were designed to protect the hunters from the spirits of the 
forest, but they also worked to conserve forests.  
 
Physical Weaponry. For all their power, neither purification nor ancestral spirits 
functioned outside the material properties of the hunters weapons. The job of arming the 
hunter with physical weapons fell to the metallurgist (maisiri or mhizha). I would like to 
examine the rational and natural116 processes involved, specifically the relationship 
between the design, use, and intended user of the technology. While the nanga provided 
spiritual antibiotics for the hunter, such medicine only did not kill prey. While the hunter 
might make some weapons himself, he relied on the metallurgist for most of them  
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The assegai (pfumo, pl. mapfumo) was the hunters hand-held killing instrument 
of choice. Technically, it came in two types. There was the baru or manga, the largest 
size deployed primarily for big game. It was heavy, the blade (banga, manda or chese) 
measuring about 18 inches long. The haft was comparatively short for the length of the 
blade. Then there was the pfumo, a medium-sized assegai which most men preferred and 
took whenever away from home for protection, as wild animals may be encountered, 
and many a Native has saved his own life with his assegai. In place of the nyenza (metal 
binding), the metallurgist used a piece of antelope skin bound round the haft while still 
fresh and wet, then sewed it up with sinew (runda) to protect the end of the haft. The 
metallurgist designed the small blunt metal blade (rwiriko or nzope) fitted into the spears 
rear in such a way that the user may drive it into the ground, blade up, and rest. In that 
position, he could pluck it out and through in quick time in case of emergency.117 
The second important killing instrument was a set of bow (uta) and arrows 
(miseve).118 As Patrick Malone has demonstrated in his study of the development of 
native American weaponry, so too with the transLimpopo: bow and arrow emerged out of 
a desire to throw missiles accurately at considerable distance.119 Such a technological 
trajectory stemmed as much from security concerns as hunting. Bows came in two sizes 
ranging between 3 and 5 ft., namely the dati or small bow and the uta (large bow) 
respectively. The size of the prey determined the size of the bow. Both were made from 
the wood of the mutarara, mutswati, mutesa, chiruwari, and mutohwe trees because of 
their appropriate tension and elasticity. The bow tapered at either end, this being called 
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sholi, to promote elasticity and arrow speed, while the thicker middle stabilized the 
trajectory of the missile. 
The string (musungo/mukosi) was derived from the hunt. Here the act of using the 
end product of design became also a way of reproducing material for the construction of 
the weapon. The string was made from the skin of a kudu, hartebeest, or bushbuck. To 
prepare it, the skin was cut into strips then tied to a heavy stone. The other end of the 
strips were then tied to the branch of a tree. A pole was then driven in horizontally 
between the strips, then wound round and round and let go, pulling the rope tight, loose, 
then tight again, oil being applied all the time. After it had shed its toughness (kubva 
hutongo) and become thoroughly moist and soft, the rope was then stretched out to dry. 
It was then cut into string as appropriate.120  
By its materiality, the arrow brought together three different domains of nature 
and expertise: the arrow head or museve (metal, mining and metallurgy), the shaft/hand 
or rwikiro (reeds, basketry), and the talons that tied it (skin, hunting). The arrow shaft 
varied in length (12 inches-2 ft.), the tail being fitted with feathers (manhenga) of an 
eagle or other large bird to balance the arrow and incline it to fly true. The head was 
eased into the shaft using a process called kupisira, which involved heating the hollowed 
arrow head stem (runje) into the reed and then binding it with sinew. To finish, the 
binding on the arrow head and tail was enameled with using reddish gum from the roots 
of an unspecified tree. Together, the bow and its arrows were called utati. A quiver for 
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putting arrows was called homwe yemiseve or mukutu; when filled with arrows, homwe 
became goba or nhava (sling bag).121 
That left only one other detail: poisoning. The arrow head was made with back-
flung barbs (mandyangowe), its body being anointed with poison made from the seeds of 
the strophantus kombe or utsulu tree, which grew liberally in the northern parts of 
Gonarezhou. The hunter made his own poison by simply stamping and steeping the pulp 
in water. In order to protect the poisoned arrows until required for use, the heads were 
wrapped in leaves, or latterly in cloth. The rationale for using deadly organic poison to 
kill for meat was simple. The priority was to achieve a fatal shot almost instantaneously 
and certainly. According to this logic, only meat at the missiles entry point was poisoned 
beyond consumption and therefore thrown away. The shot was aimed at the spot where 
lethality was rapid, giving the blood no time to travel around through tsinga (veins) to 
infect the rest of the body. Later, western physicians would insist that if the wound was 
poisoned and the animal died from it, so too the rest of its body. Locals rejected the 
premise: How come they had eaten the meat and survived?122 It is plausible to argue, 
pending clinical examination of the poison, that position struck the nervous system, 
paralyzing and killing the animal, and triggering blood clotting long before the blood 
system absorbed the poison. That is why the hunter would move in swiftly to cut the 
poisoned part and throw it to burn in the fire to protect his dogs, then proceed at a more 
leisurely pace to skin the rest of the carcass.  
For skinning the carcass, the metallurgistand the hunter himself, often one and 
the same personhad two kinds of knives. There was the large sheath knife (bakatwa), 
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carried on the person, secured with a piece of cloth, string or reim (rope). Its blade 
(banga) was hand-beaten while the sheath (hara) was generally carved using a pocket 
knife. The sheath was in the form of two pieces of leather, each slightly gouged in such a 
way that when placed together, they left room for the blade in between. The knife had a 
twin-edged, sword-like blade. Then there was the bakatwa (small sheath knife), an 8-inch 
single edge blade usually secured on the person with a string or reim.123  
The third set of hunting technologies were what one might call remote weapons, 
that is, methods that did not require the hunters presence. I defer that discussion to the 
actual hunt. For now, since I have laid out the instruments at the hunters disposal, let us 
see the hunter getting into the forest.  
 
Hunting. The forest was therefore a highly regulated workplace with specific instruments 
and targets. Value (meat, ivory, skins) was produced because of movement, whether of 
the hunter towards a stationery or moving quarry, or the prey itself towards a snare. This 
section closes the discussion with a few examples.  
First, the hunt was mobile work involving tracking the spoor (kuronda gwara). 
Tracking was a skill, the apprenticeship starting in early boyhood. By age 10 every boy 
would have gone beyond being able to identify every villager by their footprints. By the 
time they became adolescents they could read game footprints like the palm of their own 
hand. Starting off early in the morning, they relied on the spoor to lead them to game, 
hence the importance of starting off before the dew had dried. If the animals footprint 
was dark in color with dew on it, the hunter knew the animal had passed in the night. If 
the edges were sharply cut, the animal had passed in the morning. If the edges were 
                                                





irregular or crumbled down, then the animal had passed at noon when sand was dry and 
loose.124   
Earlier I discussed the instruments at the hunters disposal and omitted the pitfall. 
I will now discuss it here as an illustration of the mobile work that went into producing 
not only the device but the resultant carcasses. The pitfall was the ultimate hunting 
weapon of mass production. An alternative reading of this might be to say the pitfall was 
a hunting weapon of mass destruction through production, depending on whether the 
focus is on the animals or the work involved. My focus is more on the mobile work 
involve and guides the description. 
It took a lot of work to dig the pitfall (hunza or marindji, a large pit at the bottom 
of which they drove sharp stakes made from ntjenga (hardwood) tree, a sort of mimosa 
shrub. These stakes were then laced with utsulu or umtsuli poison. The hunza was well 
camouflaged with grass or branches and a fence was constructed for about 500 meters in 
a Y-shape leading to it. Along the fence at open intervals, more marindji were 
constructed to decongest the large pit. At each opening the maphisa smeared a powder 
made from a human placenta, which usually came from the hunters own wife, who was 
                                                





usually fined heavily if she did not dry and preserve her placenta after giving birth. It is 
critical to consider here the connections between the reproduction of the body linking 
through the placenta to the reproductive body of the hunza as a uterus that would bear a 
lot of offspring (carcasses). The fence was the womb, pregnant with stampeding 
animals. The hunters were the source of convulsions, through their chase driving the 
fetuses (animals) out towards the vaginal openingsthe marindji. 
To return to the hunzathe process of preparing the fence was like an act of 
sexual intercourse, the hunters being the man, the fence itself being the woman. It was a 
secretive affair where women themselves were forbidden, lest they give the hunters 
munyama (bad luck). Once the enclosure was complete, in the afternoon the maphisa 
assembled and prepared torches which they lit in the evening to demarcate the boundary 
of the fence. Then at night they chased game through the fence into the pits, following 
and finishing them off with spears and knobkerries.125 Only after the kill could the 
women be called to help in taking away the meat skinned and cut into pieces. Labor for 
digging the pits was communal, but for men only. It often took from three to six months 
to dig it. 200 to 300 animals would fall into the pit.126 
The pitfall belonged in the category of remote technologies of killing. These 
contrivances were set and left in one place and depended on the mobility of the prey 
which triggered them into action upon contact. Common to all such weapons was 
deception and camouflage. In the case of the pitfall, the animal moved along its tracks 
without suspicion. While this mechanism relied on the weigh of the falling animal for 
maximum velocity at the contact point with poisoned stacks, another instrument, the gin-
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trap (dhibhura), yanked its victim into their, suffocating it to death. It was made out of a 
sturdy sapling bent over and attached to a snare, which was pinned flat on the ground by 
means of wooden sticks. A bait was then placed enticingly at a point of strike. When the 
animal came for dinner, it was yanked by the leg or neck a few feet above the ground.127 
People were not exempt.128 
As we saw with the pit-fall, however, missile, hand, and remote instruments 
worked in combination. Tsonga hunters killed elephants by making holes the size of 
their feet, with a stake loosely fixed at the bottom, which runs into the wretched animals 
foot and remains there, preventing his moving, until they shoot him with poisoned 
arrows.129 Among Chief Mapungwanas Ndau people, it was a custom to dig holes 
as snares for elephants, buffalo and other animals.130 The Venda killed elephant by 
hamstringing. The hunters crept up unnoticed to the animal, then sprang and hacked its 
Achilles tendons with sharp axes and spears, instantly immobilizing it.131 Elephant and 
other game could also be killed by hanging up heavy spikes of poisoned wood which 
fall on them. An elephant goes about 10, a giraffe 5, an eland 3 miles after being struck 
before falling to its death.132 Dogs complemented these contrivances by driving prey to 
the traps or out of its lair, while arrows were poisoned with herbs and snake toxins for big 
game hunting.133  
Missile weapons could be set as remote devices. Rifles were turned temporarily 
into trap guns kill to lions, the trigger being tied to a rope set in the path of the intended 
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prey, on which was trained the gun barrel. So long as the animal tripped the rope, it was 
inviting a bullet right through its heart. It shot itself.  
 
Conclusion: Villagers Connecting via the Forest 
The products of the forest fed into commerce. Scholars of trade in precolonial Africa tend 
to focus on the routes while failing to spend more time on the work done by way of 
mobility.134 But as Diouf noted recently, these mobilities or processes of diaspora 
(movements back and forth) act as entry points into the global.135 Take hawkingthe 
way traders move from village to village, homestead to homestead and region to region, 
along footpaths, across mountains and forests, deserts and rivers, selling their wares. 
Expeditions involving exertion and exhaustion carrying baggage, pausing here and 
unloading to sell there, and tying up the bundles again and hoisting them on the head or 
shoulders to the next village until all the merchandise was sold. These were the 
mechanics of making exchange value, a process of network-building through the 
shuffling of the feet for tens and hundreds, sometimes thousands of miles. This is a 
narrative of network-building through the materiality of forest, mine, river, and field 
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products, with the same village actors as well as regional and overseas traders whom we 
shall meet shortly in the next chapter.  
Practically every facet of village life extended to the forest. The products of the 
forest included items for direct culinary consumption, such as meat, skins for making 
clothing, horns for carving artifacts, and whole carcasses for sacrifice to the ancestral 
spirits. The carcass also yielded ivory for sale to incoming overseas merchants. The forest 
was also the source of a toolkit enabling the nanga to do complex work that has often 
been reduced to therapy in the authoritative literature in African history.136 Finally, the 
forest also yielded certain grains, roots, berries, and leaves that alleviated hunger in times 
of grain scarcity. Building on the villages relationship with the forest, I want to show the 
agency of mobility and technology in linking local environments and actors with global 
ones. 
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Chapter 2 The Technological Junction 
 
In the preceding chapter, I mapped the pre-colonial village as the coordinating center of 
interconnected realms of production that sustained rural lives. These realms included 
agricultural fields for crop production; rivers and valleys, where people drew water, 
bathed, and fished; forests, the source of wood, venison, clothing, medicines, and 
minerals; and markets on the Indian Ocean coastline and from village to village. The 
production extended to grave sites, where the dead were interred and their souls elevated 
to ancestral spirits believed to return and prosper the living. Through the death of an 
(adult) person, an ancestral spirit was produced. 
I have singled out the forests and traced how successive generations of villagers 
have reproduced, renovated, and deployed specific knowledges of hunting to negotiate 
technological challenges from outside actors for over a century. Together, the village and 
its multiple sites of production formed what I called the mobile workshopa mosaic of 
purposes, organization, work, and instruments that enable communities of practice to 
produce usable value through moving about. The space, time, and place where one 





The notion of a technological junction helps me to cast the spotlight on the 
question of agency. What exactly does discovery, exploration, and bagging a trophy 
mean where the men who wrote about and claimed such feats were shown around places 
and prey by African guides, trackers, interpreters, porters, wagon drivers, and outriders? 
Just as we have examined European technology in African cultural landscapes, we should 
symmetrically examine the role of African technology in the Europeans mobile 
workshop. Here, I will examine the role of the men the Europeans employed as 
productive factors in the mobile workshop. I argue that the stopover in the village 
enabled the European to rejuvenate his mobile workshops momentum through recruiting 
fresh manpower, purchasing cereal, and getting directions.  
The travelogues value to the reader of African history is paradoxical. On one 
hand, it is full of racial innuendo: the African carriers, guides, hunters and villagers are 
negatively portrayed as gluttonous turn-tails, lazybones, and knowledge-less 
primitives. The standard of measure is decidedly Eurocentric. On the other hand, even 
amidst such bigotry the European travel-writers make surprising admissions that without 
African knowledge, European exploration and big game hunting were doomed. The 
ambition of this chapter is not necessarily to look for the subaltern voice in a genre 
which appears to silence it.1 That is much easier to do.  
Rather, it is suggest that the notion of subaltern is in negation of the clear role of 
Africans, technological instruments, and nature in co-constructing the itinerary of the 
European. There is one point that African Studies and STS could agree to collectively 
differ with Subaltern Studies: that the subaltern condition is not a priori and static but 
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open to renegotiation, reconfiguration, and escape.2 It is not just a question of the 
dominant inventing (or thingifying) the subaltern (for which Rangers original thesis was 
heavily criticized)3 but more importantly the possibility of the dominated to escape its 
condition through its own initiatives. Hence the salience of mobility: to escape death, 
dictatorship, famine, low social status, and so on, people could migrate beyond the range 
of the menacingly outstretched arms of the state.  
Well beyond the subaltern of the Asian-inspired Subaltern Studies, the chapter 
explores the limits of this category, focusing not just on human subalterns, but also 
nonhuman ones. Africanists have long doubted the relevance of the subaltern concept 
to African Studies, preferring instead, and then rigorously critiquing the one that Terence 
Ranger proposed: the invention of tradition.4 However, STS scholars of co-construction 
can effectively assist Africanists to further strength their case by expanding the field of 
invention beyond just people to nonhuman actors like technology and nature. I still 
think, however, that only by paying attention to the way movement makes invention or 
co-production possible through enabling actors to meet in a specific space and time is it 
possible to render inadequate the analytical efficacy of subaltern. Otherwise, there is no 
compelling reason to underestimate and take for granted the subalternity of the subaltern. 
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To make this argument, the chapter initiates a theme that will carry through to the 
end of the thesis: the ways in which Africans deployed and adjusted these elastic 
traditions to intercept Europeans coming into the transLimpopo basin to hunt, explore, 
and trade. Their objective was to acquire Western technology and meat when these 
European hunters killed big game. Just like the village, I treat European big game hunting 
as a mobile workshop because it is purposive and productive movement. Where the two 
meet, a technological junction is formed as follows: 
 
While Europeans had been in southern Africa since 1500, I will pick on six late-
19th century expeditions to frame history as a journey full of technological junctions. 
Together these narratives reveal the European expedition as a series of technological 
junctions with villages where fleeting sites and moments of production, exchange, and 
consumption are created and exploited.  
The first expedition was that of Fernandes das Neves, a Portuguese ivory 
merchant (banyan) based at the Indian Ocean port city of Lourenco Marques in the 





(known as maphisa) and carriers (mpfhumba), Neves left the coastal settlement on 3 
September 1860 primarily in search of ivory in Gonarezhou, the forest we discussed in 
the last chapter as falling under the Tsonga chief Chikwarakwara, a vassal of Mawewe, 
King of the Gaza. The banyan was supposed to return in time before his customers sailed 
for India in September 1861.5 Second is the German explorer Karl Mauchs journeys in 
1865-73 from Natal to the Bubi-Limpopo area and its northern hinterland. Mauchs 
narrative shows careful attention to geographic data and experience detail such as 
altitude, latitude and longitude, geological formations, vegetation and people.6  
The third account is that of William Finaughty, who is reputed to have shot more 
elephant than any other British hunter of his generation. Born at Grahamstown, South 
Africa, Finaughty trekked to the Ngwato Kingdom in 1864 and hunted in the Shashe-
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Limpopo river junction until he retired to set up a trading store at the Ngwato capital 
Shoshong in 1870.7  
Finaughtys career ended at just the time when that of Frederick Courtney 
Selousthe fourth accountwas beginning. The 19-year-old Englishman had sailed 
from Britain via the Atlantic to Port Elizabeth, before setting offon 4 September 
1871for the hunting grounds.8 For the next two decades, he hunted in the Ngwato, 
Tswana, Ndebele and Shona kingdoms on the fringes of the Kalahari Desert, acquiring 
geographic knowledge that positioned him to guide the British in colonizing the Shona 
area in 1890.  
This is the time Parker Gillmore sailed from the Natal port of Durban to Lourenco 
Marques, from where he proceeded to hunt along the southeastern fringes of Gonarezhou. 
After a few months, he struck out towards the Zambezi in search of gold.9  
The last journey occurred as Selous led the British to colonize the Ndebele 
kingdom to the west, while the Portuguese prepared to attack the Gaza to the east, with 
Gonarezhou in the middle. In 1893, the Englishman John Guille Millais sailed from 
Britain via the Atlantic Ocean to Cape Town, before taking the newly-established train 
service to the burgeoning city of Johannesburg. There he contracted an experienced 48 
year-old Boer hunter, Roelef van Staden, to take him to Gonarezhou to see and paint the 
rhinoceros.10  
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In Finaughtys account, African rulers are treating European big game hunting as 
mobile foreign investment and hosting the hunters and traders lavishly as a strategy to 
entice them into trading their services and imports. Using the indigenous traditions of 
kinship and kingship, local rulers and their peoples manage to domesticate11 and 
provincialize12 the Europeans mobile workshop. The European travelers are 
simultaneously doing the same to Africans. Gillmores journey enables a tracing of the 
game spoor as one example of a fleeting site of production. Through their labor, African 
trackers deploy their hunting traditions to enable the white man to kill game with guns, so 
that they reap venison. In Mauchs narrative, they deploy their traditions to enable the 
explorer to produce maps. Finally in Millaiss account, the Boers tap into these African 
hunting traditions to found a safari tour-guiding tradition that survives to the present.  
The story of technological junctions will be told in four steps: 1) by setting up a 
theoretical framework for discussing technology and the (southern) African region where 
the technological junctions were located 2) mapping the pathways on which European 
mobile workshops traveled, thereby encountering village mobile workshops 3) framing 
the politics, cultures, and societies that inhere in the pathways, and 4) the role of village 
in the European itinerary. 
 
When Western Technology Travels to Non-Western Spaces 
These European travelers set off for the interior of southern Africa filled with confidence 
in the power of their instrumentsas engineers had designed themto surmount any 
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problem their mobile workshops encountered. We need to understand these pre-
conceived ideas before we can start examining how they mediated the encounter between 
the travelers and the pathways they traversed. 
Early on, Karl Mauch thought he had made the perfect preparation for exploration 
before leaving Europe: extensive geological and medical studies in Germany, Austria and 
England, a panoply of navigational, physical fitness, and acclimatization exercises, and 
buying all-leather wear for the thorny savannah. This excerpt also underlines Mauchs 
early belief that his guns would be the center of his exploratory universe:  
The demands on a gun are manifest; I must be able to kill an elephant as 
well as a rabbit, to shoot an ostrich as well as a partridge. [The guns] 
barrels must not suffer extensively if necessity compels me to load glass 
beads or quartz grains instead of the soft lead bullet or chopped lead. The 
locks have to combine the utmost accuracy and durability with great 
simplicity, so that damage is not likely to occur or so that I would at least 
be able to repair such again.13  
Having more than one firearm increased the range of options if one misfired, developed 
hung fire, or refused to fire.14 Gillmores battery included British-designed muzzle-
loaders and 12-bore shotgun with a 50-yard range but too light for heavy charges. He also 
had a two-grooved rifle, accurate with a light powder charge of 10 lb. (3-4½ drachms), 
but less accurate and ineffective against elephant with anything less.15  
Yet even with the best of weapons, the European hunter in Africa soon 
experienced another contingent technical problem that had not been originally designed 
into the manufacture of the gun itself. How would one fire a weapon designed for killing 
human targets to take out a charging buffalo or elephant, for example? In order to fire the 
musket, the gunmen had to first push a ramrod down the gun barrel to make sure the 
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bullets were home, the nipples had to have fresh caps, and the powder had to be dry. 
When firing, the distance, the aim, and targets behavior must be synchronized into the 
trigger pull, and during the firing, the gun bearer would be reloading, passing on the 
replenished firearm to the shooter. The bandied bullets might obstinately resist being 
rammed home as the hunter stared in horror into a charging elephant bull. Not 
surprisingly, most European travelers were fond of drawing a buffalo, elephant, rhino or 
lion in a chronic state of charge as in Selouss self depiction here. The thicker skin of the 
animal absorbed most of the bullets force, so that larger bored guns and much heavier 
charges of power were required. Gillmore trusted the 8-bore to be the most desirable 
weapon for shooting the mammoths of creation, despite its violent recoil.16  
British hunters soon abandoned their state-of-the-art guns for older but locally 
tried, tested, and resilient ones. The best example is that of the large-bore elephant gun 
called the roer, the universal gun of the professional Dutch and native elephant-
                                                





hunters. Selous eventually bought two of these very unprepossessing-looking 
weaponssmooth-bore duck guns taking four ounces, the guns themselves weighing 
only 12 ½ lbs. Originally manufactured by Isaac Hollis of Birmingham, the guns had 
traveled a circuitous journey from one user to the next before they landed in Selouss 
hands. The man who sold them to hima Mr. Williamshad carted them on an ox-
wagon from Cape Town over 600 miles along the Hunters Road for £6 apiece. These two 
guns killed 77 elephants in three hunting seasons on foot. They fired common trade 
powder that European hawkers normally sold to Africans in 5 lb. bags. Later Selous 
would go on to shoot with very expensive large-bore breech-loaders and Curtis and 
Harveys best powder, but he never used or [had] seen used a rifle which drove better 
than these common-made old muzzle-loaders. The roers only problem was the recoil: 
light and hand-loaded from a leather bag of powder slung at my side, they kicked 
most frightfully. This kick-back affected Selouss nerves to such an extent as to have 
materially influenced my shooting ever since.17 The roers had thrived on inferior quality 
powder, and when high quality powder manufactured by Curtis & Harvey and Pigou & 
Wilks arrived in the 1880s, most of them blew up due to overcharge.18 The reason was 
that users failed to adjust the charge according to the quality of the new explosives. 
From 1870 onwards, the British increasingly tightened laws banning the transfer 
of guns, ammunition and lead to Africans in the interior. The move was disastrous for 
European traders, as Selous lamented in 1880: 
Owing to the enforcement of this act, trade, the great medium of 
civilization, is rapidly coming to a standstill in the interior; the Cape 
Colony has lost a large source of revenue both in import and export dues; 
English enterprise in South Central Africa has been entirely put a stop to; 
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and soon the Portuguese slave-traders, who labour under no disadvantage 
from laws forbidding the import of ammunition, will once more reign 
supreme upon the fields from which they were whilom driven by British 
enterprise.19 
Without powder even for his own shooting, Selouss dreams of extended exploration 
east towards Portuguese territory were rudely ended.20  
For the explorer, the gun was an ancillary instrument to the core toolkit of his 
mobile workshop: astronomical and meteorological equipment. (And by contrast, the 
astronomical and meteorological instrument was ancillary to the gun in a mobile 
workshop primarily intended for hunting). Mauch carried prismatic and pocket 
compasses for minor observations; the pocket watch to measure time; an aneroid-
barometer and a thermometer to measure the elements; and a magnifying glass for 
geological exploration. In his backpack he carried reference booksan almanac, 
logarithms, botanic and geological science booksand blank books and an inkpot for 
drawing and painting specimens, maps and landscapes. And in a tin toolbox, some 
holding files, a sewing kit, whetstone, awl, and pincers for repairs, and anotheralways 
lockedmedicine tin box. With each device Mauch wore many hats: now astronomer, 
then washerwoman; now botanist, then tailor; now geologist; then cobbler; now doctor, 
then cook, etc.21  
Modes of transport, technologies of killing or measuring, and even where and 
when such instruments could be used depended on the wildlife itself. We need to 
distinguish between bad nature (pests) and good nature (prey). The first refers to those 
animals of the forest that caused harm to the mobile workshop, principally tsetse fly, 
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mosquitoes, and predators. The second refers to animals that facilitated and yielded a 
good experience. 
Tsetse fly was bad nature. The bite from the Southern African varieties of this 
small fly (which looks like a house fly in all but color) was lethal in livestock, but not 
human beings or game animals.22 Many travelers between 1870 and 1890 located tsetse 
fly on the Chobe-Zambezi River confluence, stretching south to the fringes of the 
Kalahari Desert. Further south, Finaughty learnt from Africans that tsetse had bred 
readily in and emerged from buffalo dung.23  
The locals protected their dogs and other animals by making them eat some of 
those flies so that when these insects bit them next time, they would have immunity. 
They also fed them with dead snakes, even though it is unclear if this did not result in 
more deaths than saved lives. Finaughty does not elaborate, fascinated more with the idea 
than the outcomes of the practice which he clearly dismissed as fantasy.24 These practices 
survived so long as the fly was around. I in 1875-7, a sustained Boer hunting trek wiped 
out the herdsand the tsetse with it as most game retreated further and further into 
places where few Europeans dared to hunt: in the tsetse fly belts of Gonarezhou and the 
Zambezi valley.25  
For a very long time until the extermination of buffalo between the Lebombo 
mountain range and the sea, tsetse had restricted European hunters to traveling from 
Lourenco Marques to the Transvaal on foot. Only by employing African (Tsonga) 
professional carriers (mpfhumba) and elephant hunters (maphisa) could they access the 
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far-away hunting grounds of Vhezha (Venda) and Gonarezhou.26 The boundaries of tsetse 
fly in the lower Limpopo are illustrated on the map.  
Good nature presented the mobile workshop with arenas for production. Hunters 
went and guns killed where fauna was, and human activities followed the habits and 
habitats of animals. Some bird species like the khoorhan always preferred to be near 
water, presenting easy prey since the hunters seldom camped away from rivers. Antelope 
enjoyed open grasslands, attracting the hunter on horseback. Kudus habitat was normally 
in wait-a-bit (hooked-thorn bush) country. When the cruel shrub lacerated into a 
galloping horse, the hunter was forced to look for prey elsewhere.27 With no disturbance, 
kudu watered regularly at the same spot about the same time in the evening, i.e. about an 
hour before sundown, making it very predictable prey for the hunter.28  
And one reason for the near extinction of rhinoceroses in the 1870s-80s was that 
they were easy to shoot and fetched big money. In 1874, Selous had seen plenty 
rhino on the Chobe; in 1877, he could see only spoor; in 1879, even the spoor was gone. 
In 1872-3 he had encountered almost daily one or more prehensile-lipped (black) 
rhinoceros west of Gwai and in Shona country. In 1878 and 1880, he witnessed only a 
fair number in Shona country between the Munyati and Hunyani rivers.29 This journey 
through time exposes the co-production of environmental change through the interaction 
of technology and nature. 
Yet good nature did not succumb meekly to the gun. Elephants migrated, and 
with them the hunting-grounds, thereby shifting sites of hunting work. In areas of 
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constant hunting, the springbuck exercised its extraordinary powers of scent and 
observation and escaped even before the hunter could think of a shot, yet where not 
constantly persecuted, the animal was comparatively tame. Only when migrating as a 
herd, in the comfort of numbers, did the springbuck manifest anything like indifference 
to danger. At which point the Boers rode up to the front of the herd and shot as many as 
they required.30 Wounded animals always left the herd, often carrying the hunters 
bullets, the pain making them bad tempered and ready to charge on unsuspecting hunters. 
To avoid being the prey, hunters knew they must place their shot carefully or fire several 
bullets to effect a kill and avoid wounding and bringing danger upon themselves.31  
One game species often determined the presence and fate of another, enabling 
shooting opportunities for the rifle. The lions call was a good sign for the hunter: it 
meant game was available in numbers to support the felines appetite for meat. The 
hunter too would get his share. The rhinoceros birds were so-named because they fed on 
ticks engorged in the animals skin, but did not necessarily die with the near extinction of 
their benefactor, since they also fed on buffalo, sable, and warthog. When the traveler 
outspanned these birds descended on his oxen to help out with the ticks; they became 
ox-peckers.32  
Where, when, if, how, and why technology was used might ultimately depend not 
even on the user or the instrument but its intended task. Most game animals had an early 
warning system, thereby stifling the well-contrived evil intentions of the hunter and 
sending the shot horribly wide. The ostrich used its height to warn unsuspecting 
springbuck of an approaching hunter, the buck passing on the message to other animals 
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with their snorts and dartings-about. But baboons and quay birds always posted sentries, 
whether atop a hill, anthill, or tree, and as Millais records, the naturalist would seldom 
have an opportunity of seeing them without being detected himself. Quay birds were 
first arrivals at the morning pool alongside mouse birds, bush doves, francolins, and 
glossy starlings. Dutch hunters unanimously declared this objectionable bird as a most 
inveterate disturber of game. Millais agreed that this bird will commence to utter its 
tiresome call whenever it detects the presence of man. Other animals interpreted the 
birds call as a signal to run for their lives.33  
Ultimately, social and cultural re-/production was critical, for, living for 
millennia, one generation upon another, Africans gathered a massive archive on natures 
defensive stratagems. Even the animals had grown accustomed to human offensive and 
defense strategies. This is why some European travelers were often surprised that certain 
animals were oblivious to guns yet deliberately avoided pit traps, snares, and getting too 
close to people. When the Europeans passed through the African landscapes, they 
engaged men who could decode natures signs. We must first locate the European hunter 
with his guns in space, moving through places full of such knowledges and such good 
and bad nature.  
 
African Territorialities, Technological Pathways 
Maps. Upon following the European travelers mobile workshop, we encounter another 
mobile workshop that is the rural African village. Where they meet I find a technological 
junction, the one Western, the other indigenous. Jessica Dubows definition of a map as 
                                                





a place found by way of the body34 is useful for describing how the junction occurs, not 
merely as physical location but a meeting of people and nature full of agency. That way, 
we can say that the European itinerant found and acted uponand was himself acted 
upon by people going through its own dialectics of everyday life.35 My concern here is 
how as the traveler passed through, he encountered and consulted what René Dubos 
called the genius of the place.36  
Dubows characterization of the map as an intersection of body and place begs an 
important question regarding the mobile workshop. Namely, why did the itineraries of 
these men follow the specific pathways they did? Did the travelers follow such routes 
because of a premeditated endeavor to meet local actors and to be in a specific place 
where their instrumentsand their specific technical attributestook them or could be 
used? Or was this itinerary a predetermined outcome of the political, social, and cultural 
realities in these places? I argue that the imperatives of the Europeans journey across 
space and the journeys of locals through everyday life co-produced the itineraries of the 
European. In this way I seek to complicate the extent to which the Europeans 
instruments not only encountered limits, but also how in the face of local village mobile 
workshops they also acquired uses neither the European designers nor the hunters had 
bargained for. 
Whereas we have seen how the European mobile workshop prioritized the 
materiality of guns to produce through mobilitythereby tapping into local biological re-
/production (good nature)this section examines how the workshop encountered and 
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responded to local political re-/productions. Here I examine how the European 
encountered elastic traditions into which African rulers and their people were adopting 
guns to constitute a multiple repertoire for exercising alter-/native modernities. The 
term refers to modernities alternative to the assumed western one; they are native to their 
local environments. Mamadou Diouf calls it vernacular cosmopolitanism, by which he 
refers to the process of globalization and the multiplicity of individual temporalities and 
local rationalities that are inserted into it. Diouf identifies localism as the only point of 
intervention against the hegemonic, universalising thrust of globalisation. He shows 
that Africans have historically shown a capacity to galvanize their constantly remodelled 
traditions and to conjure their own economic scenario to anticipate a future saturated 
with projects of an indisputable modernity.37 
While Diouf traced the Senegalese Murid diasporas journeys out of Africa where 
they used their localism to make sense of new European and American environments, I 
am tracing the way Europeans came into the transLimpopo and the multiple local 
elements of nature, culture, and technology that shaped the experiences of these visitors. 
This enables me to examine the ways in which residents inserted themselves into the 
itineraries of these Europeans and vice versa. The locals identified the pathways as the 
arteries through which guns, gunpowder, lead, cloth, beads, and other products from 
Europe and Asia came through from the coast into the hinterland and strategized 
accordingly. Here we shall focus on two main corridors of this traffic and the political 
pathways they passed through to set up the space of interaction for locals and itinerants. 
 
                                                





Corridors: Lower Limpopo. Nowhere is the agency of tsetse fly more apparent than on 
this route to the hunting grounds: because of it, European itinerants were forced to travel 
on foot, thereby becoming vulnerable to manipulation by local actors.  
The long-distance transport technology of the dayshipsexplains why the 
ports of arrival in southern Africa were on the Cape, Port Elizabeth, Natal and Lourenco 
Marques (LM) littorals. In the 19th century, there was only one mode of long-distance 
transport. All these port cities grew out of the sea route linking the Atlantic, Pacific, and 
Indian Oceans.38 The interior-bound traveler from Delagoa Bay or LM often met the fly 
as he crossed the Lebombo mountain range. Ox-wagon transport to Johannesburg in the 
1880s was discontinued after very heavy losses in cattle. Donkeys were thought to be 
more resistant to the pest, but they too succumbed. However, as hunters exterminated 
buffalo herds between the Lebombo mountain range and the sea, tsetse gradually 
diminished in numbers.39  
Four of the six travelers I trace converged on the towns of the Boer republic of 
Transvaal for logistical and marketing reasons. In their heyday Schoemansdal (1848-67), 
Potchefstroom (1868-86), and Johannesburg (from 1886) were the leading commodity 
markets of Southern Africa. Each winter these towns welcomed European traders coming 
from the Cape, Natal, Inhambane and Lourenco Marques to buy ivory from the Boers and 
Africans of the transLimpopo. Schoemansdal was a cosmopolitan place where 
Englishmen, Scots, Irishmen, Dutchmen, Belgians, Germans, Portuguese, and Africans 
from all over southern Africa converged to eke out different livelihoods and social 
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statuses. Among other vocations, they contracted themselves as wagon-drivers, carriers, 
guides and trackers to European itinerants going into the hinterland. 
From 1867 onwards, this description applied more to Potchefstroom than 
Schoemansdal, whose star was waning because of the Vendas revolt against the Boers, 
which resulted in them barring all white hunters from any access to the hunting grounds 
in the north. When Mauch was forced to abort the Schoemansdal route and go via 
Potchefstroom in 1868, he found a vibrant auction in firewood, corn, flour, oranges, 
brandy, vegetables, oats, [leather] soles, tanned or raw hides, ostrich feathers, wool, 
tobacco and rarely ivory in progress.40 An average 1.000 whites (Boer, English, German 
and French) and blacks (Sotho, Zulu, Nama, and Griquas) frequented the auction each 
day.41 
The major wagon trails and footpaths dedicated to trade on the lower Limpopo 
and from Natal converged on Potchefstroom until 1886, when gold was discovered on the 
Witwatersrand. From that moment on, most European pathways to the interior shifted 
accordingly, attracted by the city lights, tramways, music halls, fine hotels, and nightlife. 
The City of Gold (hence the Zulu name eGoli) became the primary logistic base for 
trekkers going into the interior.42 The travelers imagination of Johannesburg as a stop-
over on the journey to the interior offering the comforts of home (Europe) in Dark 
Africa. 
From Schoemansdal, Potchefstroom, or Johannesburg, the pathway to the hunting 
grounds might take several directions and diversions. At that point, the logistic 
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imperatives assumed a different character: the white settler regimes gave way to African 
territorialities.  
So how did the European traveler exercise sovereignty over his objectives, staff, 
and itinerary when he had to submit to the sovereignties of African rulers and their 
people over the place traveled through and hunted in? How did Europeans react to 
African political sovereignty over places through which they sought to make pathways? 
Here it should not be assumed that these men pioneered all the paths they traversed: in 
fact for much of the time they followed footpaths furrowed by Africans, thereby setting 
themselves up to pass through the places the creators of such roads intended. Moreover, 
none of these European journeys followed the beaten track from start to finish; 
circumstances forced them to divert from the established pathways and furrow their own 
paths even through forests, paths nobody else might use, and which left no mark on the 
ground.  
Here, the encounter between the Europeans mobile workshop (as a production 
unit) and local protocols governing the pathway is an important site for considering how 
technology and politics co-constructed one another (what Hecht calls technopolitics).43 
However, I would argue the necessity to keep technology and politics without ruling out 
their mutual shaping, as opposed to a conflation into technopolitics.44 In other words, I 
am interested in instances where technology and politics interact without becoming 
technopolitics, for example, when already-made technology passes through a political 
space. 
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In that case, politics affects the use of already-designed technologies. Reading 
Nevess diary, one finds that the process of furrowing the path could in some cases 
involve using Western technology (guns) to effect regime change in order to install 
African rulers sympathetic to ones safer passage in future. This is the case with Nevess 
itinerary from Schoemansdal to Mzilas kraal in 1860, when the banyan used his hunting 
expedition to the Gonarezhou chief Chikwarakwara as a cover for a more sinister plot: to 
assure Mzila of the guns, manpower, and financial support to wrest the Gaza throne from 
his brother, Mawewe. Once Mzila was in power, he would reward the Portuguese 
merchants at Lourenco Marques with unlimited ivory hunting concessions in the Gaza 
domains, including Gonarezhou. Chikwarakwara was a vassal of Mawewe, and upon 
discovering the plot to eliminate his superior, deliberately delayed the trade transaction 
with Neves while alerting Mawewe to send forces to capture or assassinate the banyan. 
Neves escaped through the skin of his teeth.45 
Karl Mauchs itinerary in 1871 in a sense illustrates the conflation of technology, 
politics, and culture,46 how ways of doing geographic exploration that were native to 
Europeor the Northwere carried into, encountered and either gelled with, displaced 
or collapsed in the face of local technologies, cultures, politics, and physical 
environments. To explore places, Mauch often had to move away from the established 
pathways. In the transLimpopo, however, local protocol dictated that every person with 
good intentions walked on the well-beaten pathway, not so maar durn veld (across 
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country) as Mauch did.47 His luck ran out as he crossed the Limpopo into the Ndebele 
kingdom, which controlled the western fringes of Gonarezhou. He approached from a 
direction from which no European had ever approached it before, carrying things 
(meteorological instruments) that looked funny to local inhabitants. Add that to his guns 
and the locals concluded Mauch ought to be a Boer spy! The German also assumed that 
no hunting laws existed here, everyone who wants to can get his supply of meat where 
and when he wishes. These assumptions were dangerous in a time of internecine war 
following the death of the Ndebele king, Mzilikazi. A Ndebele patrol promptly arrested 
him for espionage and led him as a captive to Mzilikazis successor, Lobengula. After 
much interrogation Mauch was deported from the kingdom.48 
Millais found in 1893 that it was up to the local rulers to allow or deny travelers 
access to the hunting grounds. To site one example, since 1867, Ramabulana and other 
Venda chiefs had sealed off the hunting grounds north of the Zoutpansberg to any white-
man using rifles and muskets they had acquired in exchange for backbreaking labor on 
the Boer farms in the Transvaal and British farms and mines in Natal (the hinterland of 
Durban) and Kimberley respectively. Whereas on those white settlements they had been 
subalterns in order to acquire these hunting instruments, now the tables had turned and 
they were using the guns to assert political control over trade routes and hunting grounds. 
Any northbound white traveler had to satisfy the Vendas main request for powder 
and lead for heavy guns, from which they fire iron or lead balls of ½ lb. weight.49 From 
1883 to the time Millais passed through in 1893, Ramabulanas successor Makado was 
maintaining a 2,000-strong guard that literally sat on the crossing points and turned 
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back every white traveler who did not play by his demands. He had even created a game 
reserve where he only permitted selected white hunters and which his armed guard 
patrolled as a precaution.50  
The travelers pathway did not just pass through places of centralized and 
powerful government but also contested sovereignty where marauding highwaymen 
lurked, using both guns acquired from previous European mobile workshops and self-
designed artifacts like spears, bows and arrows, poisons, or snares. Mauch attributes 
Baroka banditry to the survival imperative of different ethnic groups displaced by war 
and hemmed-in between the borders of four powerful neighborsthe Boers, the Gaza, 
the Shona, and the Ndebele. Unlike later colonial boundaries, the pre-colonial borders 
were actually larger strips of no mans lands.  
Mauch encountered this no mans land on the Limpopo thickets somewhere 
between its confluences with the Bubi and Mwenezi. The Baroka lived in scattered 
individual huts, feeding on fishes, tortoises and game taken from lions kills, berries and 
other wild fruit, although they also cultivate[d] small quantities of millet and pumpkins. 
They were forced to either roam in the bush without any shelter or to seek a living place 
in thick bush, following the vultures or sustaining themselves with roots or wild fruit.51 
To them, travelers of any sort were a kind of prey, the drifts across the Limpopo no more 
than convenient ambush points especially in months when the tide was high and fords 
limited. The Baroka illustrate the dangers Europeans encountered on pathways through 
places of weak sovereignty.  
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All told, it was better to pass through strong but orderly states than weak and 
anarchic ones. Nowhere is the indispensable role of strong African rulers to the regulated 
passage of the itinerant clearer than Mauchs encounter with Gaza hunting protocols in 
Gonarezhou under the reign of Mzila: 
Occasional elephant hunters, whether white or black in colour, receive the 
permission to hunt some of these animals only by considerable presence of 
guns, and of the trophies of the slain animals the tusk which touches the 
ground always belongs to the chief, whilst the other might be bought at a 
price set by the chief. When the hunt ended, he was to receive another 
present. Usually he forgets to ask immediately for this or that object which 
has attracted his eye, therefore he sends a numerous horde after the 
departed hunter to get hold of the forgotten object either by kindness or by 
force. He shows a particular crave for the garments which one wears at the 
time, even should these be the only ones in ones possession.52 
Here we are beginning to see a different sense of technopolitics: the political insistence 
by Mzila that all hunters must prove they had the technology to execute the kill and, in 
the case of whites, to surrender a security deposit before extracting resources. In essence, 
Mzila was not only using his political power to authorize or reject the use of Western 
technology in his domains. He was also putting a value and naming the price for his 
natural resource wealth. Cumulatively, Mzila was using the presence of the hunters as a 
mechanism to help himself to their prized Western possessions. In the next chapter, we 
will see that the progressive deterioration of this power under Mzilas son Ngungunyane 
was the major reason for the colonial partition of Gaza. 
 
Corridors: Hunters Road. Whereas the presence of tsetse in the transLimpopo kept out 
draught animals and restricted Europeans to foot travel, the Hunters Road was closer to 
the fringes of the Kalahari Desert. Because game was sparse to almost extinct along 
much of the way, the tsetse could not get a sustainable diet, and was therefore almost 
                                                





non-existent. Consequently, hunters were able to use ox-wagons and to ride horses. The 
material presented here would permit one to argue that the local-outsider interactions 
were not merely results of human motives and instruments. Rather, nature and technology 
enabled the encounter of Africans and Europeans and the production of what Diouf calls 
vernacular cosmopolitanism.  
Let me set the stage for that discussion. Finaughty and Selous took the Hunters 
Road because they wanted to hunt on the upper Limpopo and the upper Zambezi river 
basins. This route had two tracks starting at Cape Town and Port Elizabeth, which 
merged at Kimberley Diamond Fields. From there it wound through the Tswana, Ngwato, 
and Ndebele kingdoms on its way to the Zambezi. Originally Africans and later 19th 
century British hunters had chosen this route because it was generally free from the tsetse 
fly. By 1864 when Finaughty undertook his own trek, the route was called the Hunters 
Road, having proven popular with Europeans going into the interior on horseback and ox-
wagon. In addition the route became popular with traders who purchased guns at Cape 
Town to sell to the peoples of the interior.53 As William Storey has shown, by the 
beginning of the century colonial settlers at the Cape had hinterland under European 
control, ending the livelihood importance of the hunt. Many settlers turned to cereal 
agriculture, wineries and livestock production. Othersmost notably the Boers and 
Africanscould not stand second-class citizenship and trekked into the interior to 
exchange firearms, gunpowder, and clothes for cattle, ivory, and minerals.54 African 
rulers intercepted this spillover of Cape society and bought new guns that enabled them 
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to strengthen their control on the stretches of the Hunters Road passing through their 
domains. 
This then is the pathway Finaughty and Selous passed through countless times to 
hunt in the upper transLimpopo and sell or buy supplies at the coast. The Tswana, 
Ngwato and Ndebele went a step further in enhancing their benefits from these routes: 
they provided infrastructure to encourage white settlement in their domains, not as 
colonists, but as foreign investors subject to the laws of the land. The Tswana had even 
allowed the London Missionary Society to build a mission at Kuruman in 1816, which 
became a node for tapping into travelers to acquire instruments for producing and 
expressing new social and political status.  
The rewards of this investment policy were obvious in 1871 when Selous passed 
through the house of the incumbent Tswana king, Sechele, who had become a celebrity 
amongst the chiefs of the interior. Sechele certainly lived the part: in a large well-
built, four-dimensional English house, complete with a spacious dining room. Above the 
mantelpiece was hung a handsome good-sized mirror, above the doorway a large clock, 
and in his bedroom a fine iron bedstead. When he invited Selous for tea, Sechele was 
surprisingly served in a silver tea-pot and a handsome set of china tea-things. The 
Englishman found the monarch quite a diligent student of the Old Testament in its 
Setswana translation, indeed a good and sound Christian. In fact, Sechele was anxious 
about Queen Victorias health, and seemed much concerned to hear of the recent illness 





visible signs, old Secheli appeared to me to be the most completely civilized Kafir that I 
had yet seen.55  
However, why would Sechele be so well informed about global affairs? Here the 
key lies in the very detailed description by the Belgian Superior of the Zambezi Mission, 
the Jesuit priest Father Henry Depelchin on 28 February 1880. Once every fortnight the 
Union Castle Mail Ship docked at Cape Town. A troop of African mail carriers then took 
the mailincluding the latest newspapersfrom Cape Town to Bulawayo via 
Shoshong.56 No wonder Sechele was so well read! 
While Sechele obviously consumed Western clothing, household utensils, news, 
and religion, Selous and Finaughty encountered further along the way a kingdom that 
deployed guns to assert its credentials as a civilized state. After 1867, the Ngwato 
capital Shoshong replaced Schoemansdal as the foremost ivory (and cattle) market and 
the best armed town in the interior.57 Khama was the king when both Finaughty and 
Selous passed through and sojourned frequently at the capital where, in contrast to 
Schoemansdal, the African ruler was in total political control and received countless 
European hunters at his own pleasure. Like Sechele he encouraged investment especially 
among traders with a view to exchanging ivory and cattle for guns to consolidate his 
stranglehold on the kingdom and its wealth.  
From Shoshong the wagons hurtled towards the borders of the Ndebele kingdom 
and thence to its capital Bulawayo. From Kwesinyana border post, the road wound to 
Mangwe Pass. Here, on this plateau, lived one of the characters of the frontier, an 
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Englishman named Lee, who had earned his riches raising sheep on his fine farm. 
Lees role as a network-builder is captured well in Depelchins diary of the 30th: 
Travelers usually pitch their tents in front of Lees Castle [as the explorer 
Thomas Baines called it] and stop for the day. Mr. Lee resembles the 
Boers of the Transvaal. While still a young man, he came into this country 
in the train of Mosilikatsi [Mzilikazi]. 
He became a close friend of the conqueror and obtained the land 
which he cultivates on the banks of the Mangwe. He speaks Zulu fluently, 
knowing so much about the ways and customs of the country.58  
Depelchin only arrived at Lobengulas headquarters at about 3 pm on the 2nd of 
September and pitched his partys tent at Ishoshani or Amatje Amthlopi (White Rocks). 
19th century travelers widely regarded the Ndebele king, Mzilikazi, as a shrewd 
businessperson and political leader who kept tight control over ivory sales, immigration 
and hunting laws through levying tolls on all European and African hunters and traders. 
Like Sechele at Kuruman he had allowed the construction of a LMS church station at 
Inyati, where Europeans could now rendezvousand barter with him their Western 
technologies in return for ivory and other local products. Unlike Sechele, however, the 
wily old king maintained a friendship and trust with Moffat while steadfastly refusing the 
nuisance of spiritual conversion of himself or his subjects.59 The strategic location of 
both Bulawayo and Inyati along the Hunters Road enabled the king to tweeze out the sort 
of Western technologies he wanted, not through brute force, but providing a market for 
local products. The Europeans wanted ivory, cattle, and passage north to the Zambezi 
valley; they had guns, gunpowder, medicines, and other products Mzilikazi did not have. 
There was a junction of interests there. 
                                                
58 Ibid.: 13. 





Finaughtys description of Mzilikazis wildlife policy suggests that the monarchy 
had in place an anti-poaching mechanism or an economic intelligence unit, at the very 
least:  
Mzilikazi would not permit any prospecting in the country. He knew just 
enough to know that there was in the ground that which, if discovered, 
would cause an influx of white men. He did not mind a few traders or 
hunters, for they brought him things from civilization which were 
desirable, but beyond that he did not mean to go, and to ensure this the 
artful old man put a guide at every white mans disposal from the moment 
he entered the country till the time he left. He was a guide it was true, but 
he was also a spy, and ones every action was faithfully reported to the 
chief. And knowing what Mzilikazi was, very few ventured to defy his 
explicit instructions with regard to looking for forbidden things.60 
The spies also ensured that hunters did not poach sacred species like crocodiles, 
predators, rare and endangered species like pangolins, or exceed their quota.61  
The Ndebele kings control over the Hunters Road was firm but fair. As 
Finaughty found on the road to Bulawayo, no hunters could proceed to the hunting 
grounds without state permission which was obtained at the border post at Kwesinyana. 
Selous says the permission was obtained at Marka (Mangwe) Pass,62 but this is not so.  
The itinerants were supposed to stay on the roada very deliberate lineated 
system to canalize the hunters and ensure scrutiny of their every action. Yet Mzilikazi 
and Lobengula also exercised an amazing degree of public relations designed to lure 
foreign investors in the cattle wealth that was two Ndebele kings window to 
technologies unavailable locally. The former would often send the hunters and traders 
beer and meat almost every day, if only as a cover to spy on any violations of the terms 
of their verbally agreed permits. It was a guarded friendship, always tampered by a 
suspicion that those who professed to be English or German might well be Boer spies. 
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This suspicion had been there since Mzilikazi had been forced to flee the Rustenburg area 
to establish his capital at Bulawayo in December 1837. Finaughty observed that despite 
our denials,  [Mzilikazi] would frequently bring the conversation round to the point, 
and ingeniously ask us if after all we were sure we were not Boers?63 After having 
suffered politically from the power of Boer guns, Mzilikazi never quite brought himself 
to trust white men who were armed, since there was no telling if the lone hunter was what 
he said he was and not some spy. 
There is enough to suggest that Lobengula had his fathers touch. For when 
Selous arrived in Bulawayo in 1871, three years after Mzilikazis death, he found the 
young and affable king continuing his fathers policies.64 Like in Secheles case at 
Kuruman, the role of Western clothing in Ndebele kingly practices of alter-/native 
modernity spoke for itself: Lobengula was wearing a greasy shirt and dirty pair of 
trousers. Yet expressions and symbols of modernity were not cast in stone and European 
observers could in fact misread them unless they took off their rigid lenses. No wonder 
that in the 1880s-90s when Lobengula discarded European clothing and moved to his 
native attire, Selous dismissed him as a savage: Now [he] always appears in his own 
native dress, in which he looks what he isthe chief of a savage and barbarous 
people.65 The hunter missed the point: faced with increasing British, Portuguese and 
Boer imperialist expansion, Lobengula put on the garb of resistance, invoking indigenous 
traditions to assert his right and ancestral authority to rule his people and his lands. 
There is a second thread to Selouss first encounter with Lobengula that is seldom 
captured in these European travelogues: the relationship of age to the ease or difficulty 
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with which European travelers negotiated the pathway. Selouss 19-year old boyish face 
was not lost to Lobengula, who duly enquired: What brings you here? Elephants, 
Selous had answered confidently. Whereupon the African monarch burst out laughing: 
Was it not steinbucks that you came to hunt? Why, youre only a boy. The king retired 
without granting Selous permission the hunt befitting an adult. The youth tried again the 
next day. This time Lobengula advised: Oh! They will soon drive you out of the 
country, but you may go and see what you can do. Whereupon the king gave him carte 
blanche to hunt anywhere he pleased. After all, he was just a boy. When the elephants did 
not chase him away, the king said: Why, youre a man; when are going to take a wife? 
When Selous answered in the affirmative and asked for one, the king chuckled: Oh! You 
must combeesa (court one) yourself; there are lots of them.66 Selous stayed in the 
kingdom until the next winter when the hunting season opened. This time, when he asked 
the kings permission to hunt in mid-April, he was advised to wait until the hunting 
season openedin mid-June. Even then, he would not let us go to the Mashuna [Shona] 
country, but told us we must hunt to the westward of the river Gwai.67 The carte blanche 
was over; adults obeyed rules. 
In the evening, the English trader James Fairbairna Bulawayo resident in good 
standing with Lobengulastopped by to welcome or entertain European guests. Again 
Depelchins account is insightful. At 10 am Fairbairn took the missionaries over to meet 
the king and offer him gifts, comprising a fine Martini rifle, which we had bought in 
London, a music-box, two fine blankets and some trinkets. These they placed in front of 
the royal hut, and were thrilled at seeing Lo Bengula looking with satisfaction at all 







these brilliant objects spread out in front of him. This famous king, of muscular build, 
did not even speak to them until September 5th when Fairbairn once again took them to 
him to explain the letters of introduction which we had received from Sir Bartle Frere, 
High-Commissioner for Her Britannic Majesty, and from Mr. Bailie, Surveyor-general at 
Kimberley, a close acquaintance of the king.68 
The meetings with such visitors normally took place in the kotla (chiefs hut or 
royal palace), a round cabin 20 ft. in diameter, the roof supported by a tall pole placed in 
the middle. It had no windows and only received light through the cracks in the walls 
and through the low entrance about 80 centimetres high and 80 centimetres across. To 
enter, one had to crawl on all fours. Visitors sat near the entrance, facing the King on the 
far side. According to custom, the king [would be] seated nonchalantly on the ground in 
front of him, and was obviously highly pleased with this fine gift [a brand new Martini 
Henry rifle]. He handled it as lightly as though it were a pen. It is said that he is an 
excellent shot.69 
Depelchin presented Sir Bartle Freres letter; Fairbairn translated while the king 
listened with close attention. The Jesuits wanted to live as missionaries and to establish 
a mission at Bulawayo and another at Tati. Like Khama of the Bamangwato, Lobengula 
said he had had enough abafundisi (teachers and missionaries), that for more than twenty 
years the Protestant missionaries had worked in his country without success: They have 
attained nothing, he said. Absolutely nothing: the children dont want to learn and the 
grown-ups are quite happy to be as they are. Says Depelchin: Lo Bengula continually 
reproached us with drinking so little, whilst, faithfully adhering to the etiquette of the 
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court, we made valiant efforts to empty the great urn of tyawala which was passed from 
mouth to mouth. Depelchin and his partys arrival coincided with celebrations 
accompanying Lobengulas marriage to Gaza king Mzilas daughter.70 
From the royal family down to the commonest of commoners, the Ndebele were 
renowned to pester the traveler: Tousa! Tousa!... A small gift, please, a small gift! 
First, the kings brother. Next the queens came to Depelchins campsite, asking for a 
handkerchief, some coffee, trinkets, calico, etc. All day long we are besieged by beggars; 
you could not guess how they try our patience. After each small purchase: Tousa, 
tousa! a present! You meet a man or a woman: they greet you Tousa, tousa! Limbo 
(cotton, linen) is the favourite gift; but anything is received with eagerness.71  
It was Fairbairns role to woo the European visitors to stay so that they became 
nodes of western technology transfer and diffusion into Lobengulas kingdom. His plea 
to the king on Depelchins behalf to let the missionaries stay shows this: Would it not be 
pleasant. when your rifle is out of order, when your waggon has broken down, to find 
among your own people men who would be able to fix them? Well! the new missionaries 
will teach these trades to your Matabele.72  
Indeed, Lobengula was not slow in receiving his rewarda royal chariot 
(wagon) in 1879and duly paraded it before the public. One of Depelchins own staff, 
Brother Hedley, had made the canvas tent, while Father Croonenberghs had painted and 
decorated it complete with the kings coat-of-arms on the front of the waggonan 
assegai and a Kerrie, crossed, and surmounted by a magnificent sable crown. Depelchin 
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and his team had just innovated their way to strong friendship status in the kings eyes. 
They were not done yet:  
Lately, Brother Nigg also had a great success with Lo Bengula. Learning 
that the Brother had a sewing machine, the king asked him to come to the 
palace to show the court how one uses this ingenious mechanism. Brother 
Nigg set off, carrying his machine: he was taken into the royal drawing 
room, and placed his machine in the middle of the apartment. The king 
was seated majestically in an armchair; around him were several indunas 
and some Europeans; the new queen Kwalila [eldest daughter of Mzila] 
was also there. Brother Nigg was to sew, in a few minutes, three large 
satchels of leather for holding [gun]powder. Our skilful worker did his 
best. Lo Bengula watched him attentively, following and imitating all the 
movements of his hands and feet. When the task was finished, the Brother 
presented him with three satchels beautifully made: the king, full of 
admiration, cried out in Zulu: Ah! these English, these English!that is 
the name which he gives to all white peoplehow clever and intelligent 
they are, and yet they must die just like other people!73 
Such goodwill from European investors lasted only so long as the returns were good. 
It is clear from Depelchins diary of 16 November 1879 that hunting investment 
was on the wane in the Ndebele kingdom. Large-scale commerce had greatly lessened 
for some time now. In 1875, the Ndebele kingdom had yielded over 80,000 pounds of 
elephant tusks, valued here at 6 or 7 shillings a pound. A  large quantity of ostrich 
feathers was also exported. However, in 1879 Depelchin confessed the environmental 
effects of increased hunting investments: 
At the present time it is doubtful if the hunters succeed in collecting 
20,000 lbs. of ivory. The elephants are moving further away; the ostriches 
too; besides the breeding of these birds on farms in the Cape gives heavy 
competition to the hunters. Fearing, and not without reason, that both 
elephants and ostriches may disappear entirely, Lo Bengula is thinking of 
restricting hunting permits: a project which would show quite good 
administrative powers and which would find its place in the realm of 
political economy.74 
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There is no doubt that increasingly, more and more of these localalbeit temporary
residents saw their future in another natural resource: gold. This is why so many of them 
became agents in the intensified search for mineral concessions in the 1880s. 
European men that African kings had trusted as friends and investors turned into 
point-men to secure concessions for European firms and governments, leading armies 
of conquest on the pathways they had traveled in search of ivory. Later, in the 1890s, 
Selous would place two decades of hunting and exploratory knowledge and experience of 
the Ndebele and Shona domains and terrain to lead the reconnaissance patrols of the 
British colonizing force, the Pioneer Column. Millais undertook his journey at a time 
when Frederick Courtney Selous had just betrayed the king who had tolerated and 
mentored him into an adult. This episodethe early 1890sleaves us at the threshold of 
the next chapter when hunting instruments and prey changed, so that Europeans who had 
sought ivory with guns now sought prey of a different sort with a new set of 
instruments.75  
 
Western Technology in African Cultural Spaces 
Inscribing. The story of European mobile workshops cannot (however one pays 
meticulous attention to detail) be fully accounted for as a story of foreigners and their 
encounter with rulers. This is one of the major problems of compartmentalized Marxist 
historiographies of pre-colonial Africa: it is as if when one takes away the state there is 
no history. The fixation with the state reduces the Marxist historiography of the 1970s-
80s, the most important secondary literature on pre-colonial Africa, to narratives of 
                                                





powerful people. If ordinary people do not matter much in such accounts, what more the 
materiality of technology and nature! 
Because it passed through both places inhabited by the powerful and powerless, 
the villages and the forests, the pathway forces us to come to terms the presence of not 
only kings and commoners, but also animals and vegetation. The intermediate spaces 
between capitals were full of ordinary villagers without whose presence the European 
journeys were doomed. The travelers pathway was a journey of Western technology 
through diverse African cultures which inscribed not only their own subjectivities on the 
traveler. Because the existence of a footpath or wagon track did not guarantee the traveler 
a safe journey, what people thought of the itinerants presence, purpose, and possessions 
determined their interaction with him. Hence to get to their destinations, the hunters had 
to tap into the material benefits of such inscriptions. Yet such inscriptions were anything 
but one-sided. 
A co-inscription was taking place. Suddenly the guns in the European travelers 
hand could no longer be hermetically sealed in his intentions, let alone the Western 
cultures that had produced both the weapon and its handler. Even as the rifle or musket 
was in the white mans hand, it was now open to interpretation, those along the pathway 
taking it upon them to assign tasks to it.  
Never mind what he imagined his presence and significance to be, the European 
stranger with wagons or porters laden with goods suddenly became an entity at large
subject to inscriptions. Throughout a region exposed for over a millennium to trade with 





British newcomers,76 all white men were presumed traders until they proved themselves 
to be Boers. They were provided hospitality in order to soften their demeanor in 
impending transactions and to politely but emphatically detain them in order to 
monopolize the products they brought.  
So what were the inscriptions? This question matters because the European could 
in fact be stopped, as local residents plucked from it technologies that advanced their 
specific social and cultural purposes. The relevance of the traveler depended on the 
cultural maps locals inscribed upon the technological objects he brought. Without such 
goods the traveler was just a wanderer few Africans had any interest in hosting.  
An examination of the literature shows that villagers in fact put in place 
hospitality structures to tap into the mobile workshop. A classic example is Fernandes das 
Nevess arrival with his 253-strong retinue of maphisa (professional Tsonga hunters) and 
mpfhumba (professional porters) at the home of  Mawewes powerful 85-year old vassal, 
Chief Shiluvani, who lived on the Letaba River, not far from Schoemansdal. The Chiefs 
wives and daughters wasted no time assigning huts for the chiefs guests. Once settled, he 
sent Neves and his men a young goat and enough meal to prepare their own food for the 
night, given their large number. As a trader who knew the custom of reciprocal gift 
exchange, Neves sent the chief eight pieces of blue cloth, six capelanas (a piece of 
fabric), six bunches of missanga (beads), and fifteen strings of blue beads, to the tune of 
17.500 reis (£4).77 These objects were priceless as the Chiefs regalia of office, as tribute 
to the Gaza paramount, and as bride-wealth should the chief and men of the village wish 
                                                
76 See Vansina, Long-Distance Trade-Routes. For early Chinese contacts with south-east Africa, see Li 
Anshan, The History of Chinese Overseas in Africa (Beijing: Chinese Overseas Publishing House, 2000). 





to take a wife. In time, these clothing items became the decent dress of women of the 
chiefdom.  
Shiluvani knew the character of a trader well. The amount of gifts Neves sent 
him was a signal for more where these few came from and an invitation to more serious 
exchange. Therefore, the patriarch sent a female elephants tooth (tusk). As a seasoned 
trader Neves also knew that the omens were good. In the morning, the two men met at the 
chiefs house. Neves loosened the tongue with a bottle of brandy (compliments of some 
of the best wine-makers in Portugal), which Shiluvani handed back to Nevess second-in-
command Manova (a Tsonga like himself) to dispense with the usual custom of 
chumbotou (tasting the liquor first) to remove witchcraft.78 
The bottle of brandy was more than just an intoxicating liquid; rather, it was a 
signal to the possibility of doing business, an ice-breaker. Perhaps Neves hoped to make 
the chief tipsy and gain a negotiating advantage. It did not work. Shiluvani presented a 60 
lb. tusk for exchange, but the hard bargaining lasted two hours. As Neves remarked, the 
blacks [had] a custom of asking six or eight times the value of ivory, and negotiating on 
terms favorable to themselves. On this occasion the merchant shed thirty pieces of blue 
cloth, five pieces of carlagani (Indian cloth), ten capelanas, thirty bunches of missanga, 
and fifteen rows of blue beads. The total price of the tusk was 66.000 reis (£15); it would 
fetch him 86.700 reis (£19)a gross profit of £4, good return but not as much as he had 
intended. Meanwhile, information had spread through kinship networks that a white 
trader was at the chiefs court buying ivory.79   
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Through kinship networks, word about the white man and his wares traveled 
miles, one village of kin linked to the next, and the next. The hunting season (winter from 
June to October) coincided with a time when locals were performing rituals to cleanse 
and deliver the spirits of the dead to the afterlife so that they would in their immortality 
return as ancestral spirits to look after the living. A full month of ngoma (drum) dancing 
and singing involving the youth preceded the actual ceremony.80  
Africans increasingly began to deploy multiple repertoires of enticement like 
ngoma dance as part of the instruments of providing hospitality for the tourist to loosen 
the talons on the parcels of trade goods. Neves was treated to a dance at Shiluvanis 
which his own men joined in. But the most intricate description of this function of the 
drum, dance, and song is that of Millais in 1893 at the kraal of the Shangane chief, Ndali, 
along the Lundi River. A group of about forty young men and boys arranged themselves 
in three long lines, the smallest boys in front. To each foot of the dancers was suspended 
gourd-shakers with seed inside, which rattled pleasantly as the feet stamped.  
And what a dance it was! No hurry about it, no attempt on anybodys part 
to outshine a fellow-dancer, no music whatever except the voices of the 
dancers, singing as they went along a monotonous but not unpleasant 
chant, the burden of which was Wa-sing-in-da, the Shangaan word for  
dance, I am told. For over an hour did these men and boys keep on 
advancing and retiring, with whirls and twirls innumerable, in the full 
blaze of the African sun. It was quite a relief when at last they ceased for 
refreshment, and took it in the shape of snuff, carried by the majority in an 
empty Martini cartridge case in the left ear, and da-ha, the African 
substitute for opium.81  
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Such dances functioned as delaying mechanisms to detain the stranger in the village and 
bargain with him.  
Travelers who stayed around in summer saw a countryside full of industrious 
people with many acres of ground under cultivation. While seeing the wearing of 
European clothing as the outward signs of civilization, Selous found Africans on the 
upper Limpopo to have large herds of cows and goats. He observed too that while 
they will not give a stranger a drop of milk until he pays for it, they still expected him 
to give them coffee, tobacco, and, indeed, everything in his wagon, gratis.82 Those who 
lived in game-rich areas could not allow a white man to harvest in their granary (that is, 
to shoot game in the forests) until he exchanged something for it. Agriculturalists did the 
same with crops: they made sure the European hunter traded venison, elephant lard, 
sugar, salt, beads, cloth, guns, gunpowder, lead, and so on for their sweet potatoes, cereal, 
or meal.  
                                                





The literature suggests that the shrewdness of transLimpopo villagers at 
bargaining was particularly marked among women, the workers and producers of cereals 
and other products most critical to the Europeans mobile workshop. This is so because 
they bore the brunt of the labor of sowing, weeding and harvesting. Men usually did not 
go beyond clearing fields. Millais remarked about the African womans bargaining 
prowess: If a native woman goes away swearing at you and your injustice, you may be 
sure you have made a fair and honest deal with her, but if she leaves quickly without 
resorting to strong language, you may be equally sure she has done you.83  
 
Human Compasses 
African technology was itself not immune to inscription by European travelers. As he 
traversed through the lands of the Shona in 1866, Karl Mauch passed several pits dug 
into quartz and suspected that the former inhabitants of the country had dug for metal 
there. Upon going to the place, he discovered gold!84 The news caused a big 
sensation in Natal, the Transvaal, and Cape Colony. Whites of all nationalities scurried 
for picks, shovels and wagons, and rushed to stake mineral concessions.  
One of the most conspicuous moments of African powerlessness and 
subalternitieschores they did when the party encamped for the nightalso turns out to 
be performances of agency. Indeed, Mauch was not alone in calling his African staff 
servants, and then expressing frustrations at his powerlessness over their unauthorized 
actions when their presence and labor mattered to him, but not to them. While they 
served him lunch, supper and tea on trek, and scour[ed] the used vessels and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replace[d] them in their proper place in the wagon,85 but only in so far as they were 
honoring their unwritten contract in exchange for pay.  
Apart from tapping into the Europeans mobile workshop through their political 
sovereignty over the land and the pathways, Africans also deployed their elastic wildlife-
related knowledges and instruments to prosper from the itinerants guns. Africans had 
long been exposed to paid labor. By the eighteenth century, the Tsonga had already 
become reliable carriers and commercial hunters in their own right. After the Gaza had 
displaced them from southern Mozambique, the Tsonga began contracting themselves as 
maphisa and mpfhumba to Portuguese banyan.86 In order to perform the hunt Neves had 
contracted them to do, the maphisa first and foremost went before a gagao (spiritual 
healer) to seek ancestral spiritual therapy, protection, and guidance on the pathways. 
After throwing his bones, he anointed the hunters so as to purify and cure them of any 
illnesses or misfortunes (bafo), meanwhile intoning the mens ancestors to protect them 
in their wanderings. The gagao then handed down a set of taboos they were to follow, 
otherwise their gun-barrels would be closed.87 We can see how these men performed 
Nevess assignment through their own cultural ethics, even as they took commands from 
their employer. To these hunters, European technology per se was virtually useless unless 
it had spiritual blessings from the deadthe custodians of the forests and the users of 
technology.  
As a phenomenon, however, the maphisa-mpfhumba tradition of entrepreneurship 
was not generic to Lourenco Marques. Griqua slaves did the same on the Hunters Road 
when the English displaced them from the Cape littoral in the 1820s-30s. When their 
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European masters sent them to raid African neighbors, some rode off to freedom on 
horseback with their guns. Once on the upper Limpopo they harassed Mzilikazi at 
will.88 The Venda swart skuts (black shots) went further: they rode off from their Boer 
slavers and once with their people, shut the Boers off from the elephant hunting grounds 
north of the Limpopo.89  
In hunting terms, Selous was a nobody when he arrived in the Ndebele 
kingdom, and owed his mentorship in elephant hunting to a Nama-speaking hunter 
named Cigar.90 This man was an independent hunter employing his own 2-man African 
staff, who carried their own guns and a supply of ammunition. Cigarwho could 
well have received that name from Europeans remarking on his smoking befitting a 
modern Africanarmed himself with a heavy old six-bore muzzle-loader. Selouss 
respect of Cigar as a professional is total: For foot hunting in the fly country, one 
could not wish for a more skilful or a kinder preceptor. I have never since seen his 
equal as a foot hunter.91  
Parker Gillmores mobile workshop owed its success to skilful Zulu and Pedi 
hunters who were such acute observers of animal life that they do not hesitate to 
pronounce what state of mind a beast may be in.92 This is not an exaggeration. Writing 
in NADA in 1948, D.C.H. Parkhurst chronicled the Shona beliefs about elephants as 
follows: 
There are two kinds of bull elephant, the tusker (goronga) and the tuskless 
(muvi), but the tusker comes off second best in an argument with the 
tuskless one which is stronger, speedier, with a quick temper and plenty of 
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courage. He is a cantankerous fellow and will belabour the tusker with his 
trunk (chitamba, murowo), or with sapling or log. He leads the herd and 
sires the cows although the tusker will try to lure a cow from the herd 
during mating time. 
No one doubts the intuitive powers of the elephant for, instead of 
having wisdom teeth, it possesses four wisdom sticks (mingano), each 
about half the size of a matchstick, which are located in pairs on either 
side of the temple under the skin. The youngsters have a single stick in 
either temple. These wisdom sticks enable them to perceive by intuition 
the time of their death. The sticks are coveted by hunters who upon killing 
an elephant must butt its temple with the gun otherwise the sticks have a 
knack of disappearing. Power to forecast the results of future elephant 
hunts lies in these sticks. They should be ground to powder, boiled with 
certain herbs and lion fat and swallowed. This induces dreams of elephant. 
If the hunter dreams that he has killed an elephant he will set out in a day 
or two confident of success. 
Why does it so often happen that the large tusker is found alone? 
Because it has been driven from the herd knowing full well that its fatal 
day draws near; but for this it would remain with the main herd with some 
degree of safety, concealing its head in the intense vegetation lest its 
coveted tusks be seen by the hunter. If a bull is to be shot in the main herd 
the herd knows who the victim will be for they realize intuitively that they 
are being followed and they will kick up the earth to divine which of them 
must lose its life. 
If on the spoor of a wounded elephant the hunter comes to a hole 
having a log across it, he will wisely stop tracking, for this is the 
elephants warning. 
A hunter who sets out on a hunt with grief in his heart will wound 
but not kill. If he meets an elephant with trunk curled about its head he 
will know that some tragedy has befallen his family since he left home. 
Should he see an elephant flinging earth over its back he will know that 
his wife is bathing which she is not supposed to do during her husbands 
absence on a hunt for elephant. 
The tuskless elephant and the cows with calves will charge and kill 
those guilty of adultery unless they immediately confess their guilt to the 
elephant. No hunter will allow companions to accompany him without 
first ascertaining whether any has been guilty of adulterous behaviour. The 
hunter alone must announce to the elephant the guilty persons presence 
and name before he fires.93 
What the European hunter saw, therefore, was the observance of these beliefs and 
practices in action; he became a beneficiary of such knowledge. 
                                                





Nowhere in these accounts is the African sovereignty over the knowledge of the 
spoor acknowledged in such minute detail as Gillmore offers: the tracker found the 
animals tracks, kept them alive, and produced targets for his white employer to shoot at. 
One experienced Pedi hunter Gillmore engaged led the way, and at such a pace that it 
seemed a marvel how he could so rapidly get over the ground and yet correctly follow the 
trail without breaking speed. When Gillmore order[ed] a halt to get some air and drink 
water, the tracker was busy searching for spoor. When the animals went through dense, 
thorny bush, the tracker followed through it or close enough near the point of entry, lest 
he lost the spoor. When pricked by thorns the tracker would take it as a matter of course. 
Is this not stoicism worthy of a Spartan? Gillmore wondered, more out of admiration of 
the skills than the obedience to his commands.94  
In acknowledging the role of African hunting traditions in his own mobile 
workshop to collect samples in the heart of Gonarezhou in 1893, Millais rejected the then 
popular notion of the noble art of spooring. He called it a science better left to the 
black companion who possessed the practical knowledge.95 Gillmores 
characterization points in a similar direction. He refused to agree that the true measure 
of African hunting skills was shooting straight as Selous had suggested, but producing 
the shooting opportunity to begin with. Selous had been astounded at what bad shooting 
[African hunters] made; their bullets kept continually striking up the ground all round the 
elephants, sometimes in front of their trunks.96 Yet Gillmore observed that most black 
hunters never fired at a beast at a distance of over ten or twelve yards, and accordingly 
made sure of [their] shot every time. Hlengwe hunters told Millais as much in 1893: 
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hunting on their own, they used their bravery, endurance, and stealthy encroachment 
skills to creep close enough to make every shot count. But now the white employer 
always ordered them to shoot from afar. They missed. It was his fault, not theirs.97  
The sovereignty over the spoor that Africans exhibit in Gillmores account, and 
the lack thereof during the actual shooting in Selouss, says something about the chase as 
a space where gun use was (re)designed. Why so? The answer lies in the long exposure 
of African societies to guns before and during the encounters we are following. Men in 
societies riparian to the Limpopo from its source to its mouth had in the 1840s-60s 
trekked south to the Natal sugar plantations and Kimberley diamond fields respectively to 
work in exchange for payment in muskets. Patriarchal imperatives of village life drove 
men to these temporary chores. Guns increasingly substituted for the tsvimbo 
(knobkerrie) a deceased father left for his eldest son to take over the duties of heading the 
family. They were also an alternative to cattle as bride-wealth.98  
In the course of trying to enhance a technologys efficacy, and as some guns 
broke or ran out of scarce spares and ammunition, some re-innovation and renovation of 
the technological artifacts themselves occurred.99 In her article in 1981, Candice Goucher 
argued that the influx of firearms in West Africa and problems associated with them was 
an occasion for ironsmiths to expand their indigenous repertoire to gun-repairing and 
bullet-making.100 In the Zambezi valley, T.I. Matthews showed how Shona and Tonga 
ironsmiths mixed the niter they mined locally with the ash of a sulfurous tree to make 
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unga (gunpowder). They also produced flints and reworked hoe and axe blades into nyere 
(iron bullets) which were re-usable. In going beyond repairing to actually attempting to 
manufacture pfuti (guns) with varying degrees of success,101 one could argue that 
indigenous metallurgists turned the corner from ironsmiths to gunsmiths.102  
Gunpowder-making was a rather widespread practice among Shona ironsmiths 
that had started as a result of exposure to European firearms. According to oral traditions 
that C.S. Davies collected and recorded in NADA, the formula for gunpowder-making 
was as follows: 
Collect earth from the rocky caves where the rock-rabbits [dassies] live. 
The earth must be taken from the sites where the rain does not penetrate. 
The white substance deposited on the rocks where the rock-rabbits urinate 
can also be scrapped off. This earth is now dissolved in water and the 
water boiled until most of it has evaporated. The remaining liquid is now 
strained as in the making of salt and the residue of earth is left in the upper 
pot. The lower receptacles are set aside until the water evaporates and 
leaves white crystals. Charcoal is now made by burning the wood of the 
mindura tree, and is ground up fine. The saltpetre is now mixed with this 
and water into a stiff paste and the resulting mixture is gunpowder. 
As much as can be held in the palm of the hand is sufficient charge 
for a muzzle loader. The usual charge is four fingers, which is the 
additional length which the ramrod now protrudes. The bullet is tramped 
down with chewed bark or rags. 
Another source of saltpetre is to dig the earth from the bare patches 
in the veld where no grass grows. These places are called gokora. The 
earth is dissolved in water and treated as in the method described.103 
The important question is: how do we explain the African logic of making gunpowder 
from dassie droppings? M.G. Nearn, former chief geologist to the Ookiep Copper Co. Ltd 
in Namaqualand, noted in 1949: 
Dassie colonies are apparently in the habit of selecting a particular spot 
to which all or most of the members repair for the purpose of urinating. 
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The dassie, especially in this very arid area, appears to be able 
survive with very little moisture, and has adapted itself to discharge only a 
minimum amount of highly concentrated urine. The result is the formation 
at the selected spots of deposits of a dark-brown, gluey substance. It is, 
by reason of its content of herbal extracts, supposed to be of some 
medicinal value.104 
These gunpowder stories illustrate not only the indigenous capacities to make explosives, 
but also how the influx of western products stimulated the innovative capacities of local 
inhabitants.  
This interlocking of gun technology brought together one innovative system (local 
ironsmiths) with the products of the distant other (overseas foundries). At the point where 
the European stopped over in the village or hunted with villagers, his workshopits 
instrumentsbecame vulnerable to inscription by local designer environments. 
Simultaneously, the European also inscribed meanings and uses into locally-designed 
technologies to augment his toolkit. Selouss lively description of a particularly novel 
way of killing an elephant among the Shona is very clear on this: 
A cool and skilful man, armed with a very broad-bladed axe, made for the 
purpose, with a sharp rough edge, creeps up behind a sleeping elephant 
and delivers a blow with all his force on the back of the hind foot, about a 
foot above the ground, endeavoring to sever the tendon Achilles. If this is 
accomplished the poor animal remains where he stands, almost incapable 
of movement, a touching illustration of the triumph of mind over 
matter.105 (my emphasis) 
Alternatively, they stabbed the elephant from trees using purpose-designed heavy spears 
with blades 2 ½ ft. long by 2 ½ ft. broad, which had short but heavy 2-3 inch thick shafts. 
Instead of drawing blood with spears and hand-power, they also delegated the killing to 
10 ft. deep pits dug along riverbanks, with spikes at the bottom laced with herbal or snake 
poisons. When Africans revealed this technology to Selous, he adopted it into his hunting 
toolkit. With it, he could kill simultaneously and remotely by delegating killing power to 
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locally available and renewable resources, allowing him to continue on a spoor 
somewhere else with a rifle.106 He could now killand as a hunter bein multiple 
places at once because of the materiality of the technology itself. 
In an African Wild Life article in 1970, A.D. Thomas and F.F. Kolbe went so far 
as to call the trap or snare the first automatic device. It was a well-planned, diligently 
applied contrivance to kill, disable or catch an animal by automatic action when there 
is nobody around.107 While the gun delegated killing power to the bullet through the 
trigger-pull, the firer would still have to be present to set the chain reaction with his 
finger. By contrast, the African hunter delegated killing instructions to the snare and once 
he set it in a killing position, he could move on to hunt other prey. We saw in Chapter 1 
the transformation of guns into snares that could kill by remote control. 
Africans exercised sovereignty not only over killing devices but the hunting 
techniques appropriate to the landscape. We have already outlined the general routes into 
the interior and showed how tsetse fly determined where Europeans could go and the 
modes of transport they could use. The European traveler had no choice but to adopt and 
adapt indigenous transport technology to even start off for the interior and back. The 
European became the user of technologies and services Africans designed, even if he then 
employed these same Africans in subaltern roles on the mobile workshop. In short, while 
the European exercised sovereignty over the journey, Africans exercised sovereignty over 
knowledge critical to rendering this journey mobile or immobile, productive or barren. 
Between 1870 and 1895, trains from Cape Town or Natal went only up to Johannesburg. 
From there, the traveler to the hunting grounds of the far interior walked, rode a horse, or 
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hitched a wagon. On the Hunters Road, a hunter normally used a tent-wagon for sleeping 
and storage, and a buck wagon for carting carcasses, ivory, and heavy loads of 6.000 lb. 
plus. A dozen oxen pulled each tent wagon, but the buck wagon needed sixteen, all 
moving at a speed of 3 miles an hour or less.108 In the sweltering heat, no European could 
travel from Cape Town to Bulawayo shouting himself hoarse and crackling the whip at 
the trudging draught oxen. Here, African men dug their fingers into their indigenous 
animal-handling skills and their endurance at walking long distances and emerged with 
new paid work for themselves as wagon-drivers, outriders, and carriers. 
Nature was kind to African initiative. A good, well-trained horse was 
indispensable for the sportsman, but useless in the tsetse- or horse-sickness prone areas 
unless saltedthat is, exposed to the bug to gain natural immunity. For tsetse country, 
donkeys were the only draught animals with any chance of survival. But as Millais 
noticed, when towing a wagon they were a real nightmare for drivers:  
In a team a bad moke is worse than useless, for he gives all the work to 
some good beast that would pull itself to death rather than be beaten, and 
in a bad country where you are always getting hung up, even a good 
donkey fastened to a wagon is almost as great a nuisance; for when your 
fore-wheel catches the stem of a tree the good donkey, instead of stopping, 
as a lazy one would, begins to pull like mad, to the imminent danger of 
your wagon, and this entails no end of work on your part to avoid a smash, 
for, unlike oxen and horses, donkeys are not readily trained to stop at a 
word of command.109 
No matter how good a horse or ox wagons one had, it required a good driver to work 
them. 
If Africans were not driving the oxen or guiding them to carry the white mans 
burden, they were the beasts of burden themselves. Yet as Mauch found out, Africans 
exercised their prerogative to be paid beasts of burden or to refuse to be so, and if the 
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remuneration was not to their liking, they used all sorts of resistance until they got their 
way: 
The one [carrier] had not yet prepared his snuff, another had first to 
consult his prophetic woods, bones, shells, and roots . The third had to 
hand over for the duration of his absence the care of his wealth, which 
consisted of one solitary goat, to his half-brother who lived nearby; a 
fourth one had begun a love-affair and wanted to present some beads to 
his beautiful one, as a farewell gift for which, naturally, he had to take 
recourse to me; my interpreter had promised a lump of lead of a certain 
size to his friend but had forgotten it at home; furthermore, all of them had 
not yet eaten or drunk. In these circumstances one has to exert ones 
patience so as not to assume on ones face the wrong expression and to 
hold ones hand fully open so as to hand out presents. The people know 
that I have need of them, that they are indispensable to me.110 
At long last, with the wage paid in cloth, beads, or gunpowder and left deposited with a 
wife, a headman, or chief, the carriers left on the caravan. The European walked in the 
rear to keep a watchful eye on anyone who, perhaps, would like to escape. Desertions 
due to tiredness or ill-treatment by the employer were common. African men usually 
smoked igwayi (tobacco and marijuana) to give them energy and bute (snuff) for 
ancestral protection. Along the way, they made the point of stopping among relatives to 
smoke and to snuff, drink ubutywala (fermented beer), or eat mangai (boiled maize 
grain), mutakura (beans) or sadza (thick porridge). Through these kinship socializations, 
African carriers opened up opportunities for their employer to trade.111  
For Parker Gillmore, Africans of giant stature became chastening rods for 
disciplining troublesome natives as well as a personal bodyguard. The Englishman 
employed three Zulu men, Sunday, Jim and Umpiqua as bouncers in addition to 
their tracking duties. He did this because in fighting and hunting [the Zulu could] not be 
equaled by any race on the African continent. At exactly the time that Napoleon was 
                                                






conquering Europe to create a giant French empire using guns, Shaka was carving out the 
Zulu empire and subduing weaker states around him to create it. Hence many Eurocentric 
observers called him a Black Napoleon (to which African commentators reply that 
Napoleon was a European Shaka).112 The late-19th century Zulu ruler Cetshwayo had 
maintained this imperial tradition when routing the British on 22 January 1879 at the 
Battle of Isandlwana. Through these Zulu traditions of themselves and European 
remembrance of them as the martial race, Sunday, Jim and Umpiqua created a 
curriculum vitae for remunerated service to Gillmore. The English hunter also admired 
something else. In the wake of their final defeat and assimilation into the British colonial 
culture at Natal, however, the Zulu had shown their willingness to convert to the 
civilized way of life, unlike the Native American:  
Zulus can be and are elevated by association with the better classes of 
Anglo-Saxons. The Zulu when properly treated will become a faithful, 
reliable, and happy servant, the red man [Native American] never. The one 
willingly accepts the superiority of the European, the Indian never does 
so.113  
We must adjourn Gillmores narrative to the last section since it constitutes an important 
discussion on the ultimate goal of the mobile workshop: to produce a carcass with all its 
multiple trophies.  
 
Conclusion: Upon Skinning the Carcass. Many Trophies 
In the end, the success or failure of the hunt was measured according whether it produced 
a carcass or not. Earlier we saw the ways in which nature itself determined whether a gun 
was fired and struck its target or not. We mapped two hunting routes into the interior and 
saw how Africans became important factors in giving the European expedition is 
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momentum, on the one hand, and how African villagers stopped the European in order to 
harvest from him commodities useful to them, on the other. We further saw African 
hunters deploying their indigenous repertoires to facilitate the production of the carcass 
through tracking. All these were prenuptials to a coup de grace: the falling carcass. This 
is where this Chapter must end. Here there are two sites to focus on. 
First, camps could be made where and when the carcass fell. The camp in the 
forests was not just the ultimate fulfillment of the hunt but also a fuel station providing  
energy for the journey ahead. Upon refueling, white travelers expected their human 
machine (African carriers, wagon-drivers, and hunters) to perform their tasks with 
renewed energy.114 On the Hunters Road, the campers usually comprised the hunter, his 
drivers, and outriders. In the tsetse-infested Limpopo corridor, it was often the banyan, 
the maphisa, and/or the mpfhumba. 
The Boer camp was different: a man hunted with his wife and entire family. 
Children were born, grew up, engaged in courtship, and even died and were buried  on 
the trek: the Boer trek was a mobile homestead. In Millaiss depictions of the camp we 
see Roelefs infant son trying to make sense of the forest through the toys he played with. 
Young Cornelius van Staden was a charming illustration of the funny little ways of 
Dutch child life on trek, and of the development even at this early age of his fathers 
passion for sport: 
One of his favourite amusements was to collect the dead khoorhans and 
partridges together in the shade beneath the wagon and play with them by 
the hour together, harnessing them with strings in the form of a span of 
oxen, and himself sitting on a big stone in place of a wagon, he would 
drive with his hippopotamus whip. His language on such occasions was 
rather in advance of his age, for, in imitation of the [Nama] and Zulu boys, 
he swore vigorously at his oxen, calling each of them by name, and 
                                                





belabouring mercilessly the hindmost one because it was called, of course, 
Englishman. This entertainment he varied at times by a pantomimic 
performance of his fathers escape from the buffalo bull, with its 
surrounding incidents. Little Cornelius still makes the point of paying 
me a visit at the mid-day outspan, generally bringing with him some dead 
creature, more or less decomposed, which he hugs affectionately under his 
arm.115 
The narrative brings to life the performance of fatherhood, motherhood, husband-
hood and wife-hood on the march. When the men returned from the hunt, Tante 
(Aunty, as Millais called Roelefs wife) got some of her delicious coffee ready, and 
prepared supper and bedding for the men. Trekking during the Anglo-Ndebele war, 
Roelef and Millais would leave Tante at a stand place (base camp), and Millais remarks 
that she was typical of Boer women who on thousands of occasions have bravely 
followed the fortunes of their husbands. As Millais admitted, among these people 
particularly the women, there has always been that indomitable spirit of self-reliance 
which calls for the admiration of the world.116  
The second site is the carcass, the measure of a mobile workshops failure or 
success. Normally when an animal was felled, an overnight camp was established in the 
vicinity, attracting local inhabitants, and engorging the forest and village mobile 
workshops into each other. The villagers used the passing killing machine (armed 
passers-by) as mechanisms for harvesting forest resources more easily and quicker. The 
travelers guns were swifter extractive tools for acquiring meat than arrows; villagers 
knew where game was. Exchange was possible.117  
Even when hunting alone out in the dark forests, the gunshot betrayed the hunters 
whereabouts to all sorts of uninvited guests. By the time the shooter arrived at the 
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carcass, he found the villagers busy skinning, cutting, and claiming ownership over the 
meat.118 At the site of the carcass, two more uninvited guests rarely failed to turn up. One 
was the vulture. Writing in Allan Quatermain, H. Rider Haggard marveled at the 
extraordinary speed with which these great and repulsive birds beat the hunter to his 
own kill. They spent hours in space, each responsible for and monitoring its own space, 
and upon locating suspicious movement, each flew down to take a closer look, the 
othersobserving the descending sentryfollowing suit. In this way the vultures for 
twenty miles round can be summoned to the feast in a few minutes.119 Another of the 
gatecrashers was the hyena, the undertaker who often came rather late to the party and 
had the onus of cleaning the dishes, wiping the bones of all flesh before breaking some.  
Meat was just one product of the carcass; often it was just a by-product in the 
extraction of ivory and hides. Boer trekkers made a variety of leather products like shoes, 
washers for wagon axles, and thongs (tambo) for spanning oxen. Hide-making kept 
wagon-work alive. The hide was cut into strips and hung onto a strong tree branch with a 
heavy weight tied to the bottom. Using a stick, the strips were twisted round and round 
tightly. Then the stick was pulled out suddenly, and the strips unwound with great speed. 
As the strips were almost stopping the stick was twisted in again, and wound up. The 
process went on for three days, grease being applied until a strip of hide as strong as 
wire rope and as soft and supple as a piece of velvet was produced.120 This knowledge, 
locals claim, was initially imparted to Boer hunters by African hunters and villagers 
during late-19th and 20th century encounters. Many such hunters had been mentored by 
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Africansmen like Roelef van Staden. This is how Afrikaners acquired the mastery over 
nature they exhibit to the present at the exclusion of African villagers.121 
In some societies, the villagers used blood for spiritual cleansing and thanksgiving 
to ancestors, especially if the carcass was the first big kill of the season. Bathing in blood 
was also believed to give warriors and huntersmen generallybravery, just as rubbing 
ones body with python lard was believed to draw fear from those one interacted with.122 
The role of women in cleaning and sewing the skins was well known in many African 
societies.123 They secured large quantities of lard, particularly from elephant (which was 
more or less white, ever-soft, and manageable like that of sheep-tail) for cooking oil, 
butter, and lotion.124 
Just as the trophy might be a (product of a) carcass, it was also what was painted, 
drawn, or written of the carcass, the live animals, and the wildlife habitat (landscape). 
Usually, after the hunt or on an off-day at the campsite, the hunter would sketch, skin, 
and preserve an animals head. Millais found taking a trophy with pencil and paper a far 
less agreeable task different from sitting in the studio with pencil or brush in hand. 
Drawing the scene of a lion mauling a wildebeest or an elephant charging was not just 
about making a nice picture at the expense of truth. It was for him much more than the 
theatrical, sensational, and conventional pictures of lions, buffaloes, and 
elephants in a chronic state of charge.125 The drawing had to encapsulate the knowledge 
produced at the interstices of co-production, a knowledge that was usable beyond 
himself. 
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As the next chapter illustrates, it was the knowledge acquired through the camp 
and the carcass that would form the basis for the colonization, first of nature (as Boers 
did during mobile workshops and at technological junctions), and then of political 
sovereignty itself. Mauchs maps would form the basis of concessions European states 
and chartered companies came to negotiate in the 1880s in order to monopolize the 
exploitation of the new ivory: gold. Fernandes das Nevess journey would achieve its 
purpose of installing Mzila as Gaza king, paving the way for an ascendancy of banyan 
power that would result in the Portuguese conquest of Gaza domains. Using the wealth of 
information and knowledge Selous had gathered in his wanderings, and led by him, the 
British would spring an invasion from the west in 1890 and converge with the Portuguese 
on the hunting grounds of Gonarezhou. One could say that the colonization of the 
transLimpopo region was a direct, if unintended consequence of the European mobile 












Chapter 3 Weapons of Mass Acquisition 
 
In the last chapter, I examined the role of mobility and technology in enabling the 
interactions between European hunters and villagers in the transLimpopo environment in 
the 1850s-80s. As we saw, the success of the itinerants workshop depended on his ability 
to negotiate with the mobile workshop of the villageinclusive of forests, fields, 
pastures, and so on. In turn, villagers intercepted, tapped into, and facilitated these 
journeys to address their own needs. This is not to say there were no outright winners and 
losers, but to point to the negotiation of two kinds of power. One was African sovereignty 
over the land in which the wildlife resources that the European hunters and traders sought 
were located. The other was the European mobile workshops possession of guns which 
imbued their users with the power to decide what may live and what should die.1 I refer 
to such technologies of killing or sparing life as necrotechnology as a way of calling 
attention to the material properties of the killing instruments themselves, not just people 
who use them.  
Sovereignty was not just political. In Chapter 1 we saw the sovereignty of the 
ancestral spirits over the forest, safeguarded through miko or taboos (specifically things 
                                                





that could not be done or that must be done)2; in Chapter 2 we saw how these taboos 
policed the latitudes within which African trackers in the European mobile workshop 
could enable or undermine production-on-the-move. Sovereignty also meant the self-
confidence to innovate, including the ability to tap into the European mobile workshops 
for new repertoires and superlatives of modernity. 
So what happened when these forms of sovereignty were lost? When a 
technological junction did not take place in ways that benefited both European hunters 
and African villagers as we saw in Chapter 2, when situations of disjunction rather than 
conjunction occurred? When the European mobile workshop came not to exchange but to 
take over the sovereignty of Africans over their land? What happened when instead of 
hunting on the land, they came to hunt the land and the people who owned the land? 
When partners became pests and people the ivory itself? 
This chapter considers this transformation of the hunt from looking for white 
ivory (elephant tusks) to black ivory (black slaves and later cheap, often forced labor). 
The story does not end merely with being transformed into commodities and forced labor 
but also how enslaved or sold bodies extended the knowledge traditions they had used to 
hunt in the forest not merely to survive the harsh treatment of slavery (physical and 
psychological assault) but also to make the best of, and even move out of, or invert their 
subaltern status into self-emancipation. This in no way trivializes the excruciating pain of 
being a slave, but I insist that we should not underestimate the sense of initiative either. 
At the same time, the European hunters that we saw traveling along and away 
from the pathways of the southern African savannah, with its protocols borne of nature 
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and human discipline are apprehended in this chapter in the act of overturning such 
African power. How this happened becomes my starting point, the main attention being 
on the Anglo-Portuguese assault on Ngungunyanes domains. Gold being rather 
minuscule, the evidence suggests that the Portuguese in particular were more interested in 
parceling out his lands to mine another profitable commodity: black ivory. The king, his 
family, his people, and lands became the new prey, a commodity to satisfy the appetite of 
the Rand gold mines.  
The new hunt demanded new weapons. The ground rules for the new hunt, the 
new sportsmanship, had been agreed when the major hunters of colonies had met at the 
Berlin Colonial Conference in 1884-5. Thereafter any power that wished to colonize a 
piece of land in Africa, never mind how little, would have to present evidence of the 
natives agreeing to the European presence. There was only one admissible form of 
evidence: the treaty or concession with signatures of the African rulers concerned. If the 
natives later dishonored their word and signature, they deserved to be removed through 
force of arms.3 
The concession became an important weapon for hunting and securing the land 
itself. 1886 was a defining moment. White prospectors discovered gold in Gauteng (the 
Boers called it Witwatersrand), triggering a ferocious gold rush from all over the world. 
Just standing on the reef, and retracing to that year, the historian is able to draw a map of 
the world, watching the prospectors arriving on ox-wagons from the ports of Delagoa 
Bay, Durban, and Cape Town, having disembarked from ships coming from lands afar. 
The concession acquired a golden touch; it was the weapon with which European powers 
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imagined a French, Portuguese, German, and Belgian Rand as within the realms of 
possibility. Like any other portable weapon (such as firearms) it could be traded as a 
commodity. While guns secured the carcass through spilling blood, the concession killed 
African sovereignty through carefully chosen and legalistic words. It was an unorthodox 
weapon that meant different things to its European and African signatories; it killed 
African sovereignty through subterfuge.  
That is precisely why kings signed the concessions without any clue of the intent 
of those asking for them. Thinking that they were still in the days of Mzilikazi and Old 
Sechele when the European came as an occasional visitor and an investor of immediate 
return, African kings put an X to paper that took away their power. Oblivious to the 
rising caprices of Europeans after 1886, the African kings deployed the concession as 
they had always done with verbal permits to European hunters: to let the temporary 
investor exploit land resources for a period and then leave. That meant the same hunting 
grounds could be leased to many successive hunters, not just one permanent 
concessionaire.  
Erstwhile guests, who came as partners and operating under African 
sovereignties, now subjected these same rulers to subalternityif they even spared their 
lives at all. This chapter will get us on the threshold of the question: What happened to 
their former subjects, human and nonhuman?  
 
The Hunt for Concessions 
While African men were journeying southward towards the coast in search of work, 





black ivory, gold, and then concessions from African rulers. These reverse hunting 
grounds represent a complex interaction between the mine and the village. In the last 
chapter we followed European individuals going into the interior in search of ivory, 
converts, and geographic knowledge. These explorations alerted Europeans to the 
possibilities of the interior as new sites of production. Unlike the Boers who hunted black 
and white ivory in equal measure, the British and Portuguese busied themselves with 
securing land for gold and labor to work it.  
By 1870, British exploration of the potentialities of the Limpopo as a navigable 
international trade highway was well advanced more through the work of individual 
Britons acting in their own capacity or that of companies than the state. In 1868-9, St. 
Vincent Erskine had undertaken a personal journey of exploration along the Limpopo 
from its middle basin to the Indian Ocean. He found its mouth difficult of entry, its 
navigable stretch being just 60 miles. A tug-steamer could sail back and forth, taking the 
wool and mineral ore from the Transvaal to Lourenco Marques. The British navy had all 
the while patrolled the Mozambique coastline but showed no interest in the Limpopo.4 
The survey of navigable rivers involved arduous traversal on foot to produce 
maps useful for future river commerce and gunboat patrols to stamp colonial sovereignty. 
In August 1870, the British military officer Captain Frederick Elton followed the 
Limpopo from source to mouth and found it quite practicable to use  as a way of 
water communication, [the] cargoes being towed in flats by steamers with a light draught 
of water. Elton followed the banks and bed of the river for almost the entire distance, 
and did not observe any obstacles, neither [was] the main channel interrupted by 
shallows. The only problem was that the river had a tendency to veer occasionally from 
                                                





one bank to the next, the bends and headlands diverting the main body of water in a new 
direction at each turn. The south bank of the Limpopo presented possibilities for cutting a 
road leading from a future agricultural and mining enterprise north of the river. Between 
the Pafuri and Lephalale, wild cotton grew luxuriantly, large timber bordered the river, 
and village crops yielded abundantly from the rich alluvium.5  
Elton was seeing the terrain like a future colonial state;6 which was exactly his 
mission as an army officer. The transLimpopo basin would, if colonized by Europeans, 
rapidly become a fertile and important centre, monopolizing a considerable trade with the 
interior. Elton concluded that such a step would enable the British to monopolize the  
ivory traffic with Mzila. Furthermore, the Transvaal would be linked to the sea and Gaza 
territory via two routesone through Pafuri and Zoutpansberg, another via the 
Lephalale.7  
The land was good, but bad nature was in the way. Elton remarked that the 
fertile and potentially mineral-rich areas of the transLimpopo were not in healthy land 
where Europeans might live permanently unless they controlled or eradicated the pests. 
Mosquito- and tsetse fly-infested spaces were deemed not worthy of white occupation. 
Fever (malaria) discouraged any sustained settlement or expedition within the Lowveld in 
summer when it attacked a person as frequently as every fifteen days. Antidotes like 
Calomel, Dovers powder, emetics and quinine did nothing to persuade many Europeans 
to take the risk.8 
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Just like the Limpopo, European explorers saw the Save valley as a land primed 
for commerce. It was a fertile country full of potential for growing sugar and coffee for 
export via the port of Cheluana. Entertained by Mzila as a guest, investor and ally in 
1872-5, Erskine was busy conjuring pyramid schemes for conquering the land, pegging 
away in his minds eye huge land grants for his fellow Europeans. Crossing the Save, the 
land was a dead level, no more than 300 ft. above sea level, bushy in places, and 
magnificent forests of timber for large tracts ahead. From a village called Mazimbe on 
the headwaters of the Chepfu all the way to the Limpopo, forest gave way to enormous 
crops which testified to the richness of the soil. So long as the rains were good, hunger 
was not an issue; in a poor season no country could be more barren. The ocean, the ports, 
the rivers, the footpathsall would offer different modes of transport to turn occupation 
into finance capital.9  
In the 1880s, two more Englishmen concluded exploratory activities along the 
Save and Limpopo. In 1881, Captain T.L. Phipson-Wybrants, surveyed the Save using a 
steamer, but found the river to be too shallow, sandy, and unnavigable even with a light 
craft.10 He did not see what Erskine had imagined. Three years later, Captain George 
Albert Chaddock traversed the length of the Limpopo and concluded that the river was 
navigable and capable of supporting a vibrant commercial enterprise. In 1890 he handed 
this information to the BSA Company in the hope that it might prefer sailing rather than 
marching to conquer the Shona and render him a useful paid agent. Chaddock suggested 
that the BSA Company and the Transvaal Republic establish a joint shipping venture on 
the Limpopo. Rhodes seemed keen, but the Transvaal was not interested. The Company 
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took up the matter actively and determinedly, dispatching his envoy, Dr. Aurel Schulz 
(MD) to establish relations of some kind with Ngungunyane, since this was Gaza 
territory.11  
The whole matter crumbled because of the Limpopos navigability problems. 
Schulz was representing not just the Company but the British Government. He returned 
with an appetizing offer for the Gaza king: guns and money. On 4 October 1890, he 
secured a verbal concession (treaty of friendship) to be ratified only after the delivery of 
1,000 rifles, 20,000 cartridges and an annual subsidy of £500.12 The BSA Company had 
already conducted a similar initiative in Lobengulas Ndebele kingdom, resulting in the 
concession to Charles Rudd on 13 October 1888.13  
 
Concession as Weaponry 
In a dangerous era, Ngungunyane hunted around for guns. The king needed the British 
and their guns as his weapons against the Portuguese, who commanded unlimited access 
to the coast (and guns) and cut him off from maritime markets. This Portuguese power 
was segmented however. Lisbon concentrated its presence at Lourenco Marques, while 
three chartered companiesCompanhia da Niassa, Companhia da Zambesia and the 
Companhia da Moçambiquegunned for the north. In 1881 Mzila had declined the 
Companhia da Moçambiques envoy Captain Paiva de Andrada a concession in Manica 
and Sofala. In 1884, the Portuguese crown went ahead anyway to create its own colonial 
maps including Manica in its sphere of influence. 
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Meanwhile, Wybrants and Chaddock were very busy surveying the Save and 
Limpopo respectively for British occupation. A year later the Portuguese monarch 
dispatched an envoy named José Casaleiro dAlegria Rodriguesa former soldier-cum-
traderto persuade Ngungunyane to send two embassies to Portugal to sign an Act of 
Vassalage. This at a time when political leaders of Europe were busy at table in Berlin 
cobbling together ground rules for fairplay in the game of slitting a continent apart.  
Ngungunyane only understood much later that the treaty of vassalage obligated 
him to obey the Governor-General of Mozambiques laws and orders, to fly the 
Portuguese flag at his headquarters, to grant concessions to Portuguese citizens only, and 
to let in Jesuit missionaries. In return Lisbon made him an honorary colonel. In 1886, 
Ngungunyanes new superiors in Lisbon duly posted José dAlmeida as residente to 
Mandlakazi; he became the point man in the Portuguese hunt for their own Second 
Rand in the Gaza kingdom. What better place to start that project than the gold mines of 
Ngungunyanes Manyika vassals located at Masekesa.  
The Portuguese celebrated too soon. When the residente impressed upon 
Ngungunyane his obligations of vassalage, the king laughed: The paper [treaty] is good 
only for fishing for lands.14 On the ground, however, there was nothing to laugh about. 
His preoccupation with the Portuguese distracted him from his southern domains just as 
the vultures were circling in. In 1887, his Tsonga and Chopi vassals rose in rebellion, the 
latter with massive arms from Joao Laforte, a French merchant doing business at 
Cheluana. 
This Portuguese-backed rebellion forced Ngungunyane to migrate from 
Mandlakazi to the lower Limpopo. First, the king dispatched his regiments to help drive 
                                                





all people to Biyeni, for there were some among the vaNdau people who did not want to 
go with him.15 So serious was the insurrection in the south that the king marshaled 
40,000-100,000 subjects to march to the lower Limpopo, the reconnaissance parties 
leaving in April, and the king himself on 15 June 1889. Says one oral source: This was a 
great event. Men, and even women with babies on their backs, trekked to the South 
without the slightest knowledge of how long it would take them to reach the destination 
of their journey.16 
Ngungunyane was worried about being encircled by his enemiesapart from the 
rebellion in the south, Portuguese power in Manica was growing under Andradas 
second-in-command Manuel Antonio de Sousa (Gouveia). In the southwest, the British 
were making preparations to march on the lands of the Shona to the north. So the King 
marched through the Chopi lands to establish his new headquarters at Mandlakazi 
anticipating little resistance. He was dead wrongthe rebels proved to be stubborn, even 
routing the Kings men on Baul Island in January 1890. Ngungunyane had hoped to kill 
or capture the rebel chief Spelanyana (Chiperenyana) and decapitate the resistance. 
Wrong again. The rebel chief escaped north into Inhambane under Portuguese protection. 
There he would gang up with Laforte in 1895 in the Portuguese conquest of 
Ngungunyane, hoping to gain independence from Gaza rule, yet succeeding only in 
exchanging one master for another. But, we are getting far ahead of our story.  
 
Weapons of Subterfuge/Subterfuge as Weaponry 
                                                






Increasingly, companies used the weapon of money to elbow out those individuals who 
had hunted with rifles for decades. For most European governments, chartered companies 
were the cheapest indirect means of securing colonies. These corporations employed 
commercial and legal experts to represent them against African kings. Language became 
a potent weapon: the concession document was drafted in legalistic language that 
bestowed ownership of land upon Europeans in watertight terms. Africans thought these 
were mere treaties of friendship without any obligation to cede their lands to anyone.  
Even then, the concession could be a weapon of subterfuge for both sides. Some 
European individuals resuscitated old concessions concluded with Ngungunyanes ageing 
father, Mzila. The so-called Agnew Concession is a case in point. In May 1874, Mzila 
had allegedly granted an individual named John Agnew a concession to explore and 
open up for mining purposes certain territories in Gazaland. The new proprietor of the 
claim, Albert Brodrick, claimed later that Ngungunyane himself had endorsed the claim 
on 19 May 1889. Then, on 10 December 1891 the claimant hired solicitors, Robbins, 
Billing & Co., who argued in London courts that their client had subsequently acquired 
rights to the concession from Agnew himself.17 The BSA Company, in whose sphere of 
influence the concession fell, rejected the claim out of hand. The alleged concession was 
bigger than the Gaza kingdom itself and extended into areas where Ngungunyanes 
authority was unheard of. The King would say afterwards that no such concession  
had ever been granted either by himself or his father and grandfather.18 It only turned 
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out later that some of Ngungunyanes vassals were agreeing concessions without his 
authority or permission and conning the concession-seekers while at it.19 
A second case of fraudulent claims was the Addendorf Concession allegedly 
signed on 6 August 1890. A group of Zoutpansberg Boer farmers led by Louis Addendorf 
claimed to have signed with two Shona chiefs, Sebasha and Ulozoba a Deed of 
Cessation to certain territory situated between the Limpopo and the Zambezi rivers. 
As the group presented its case, it would appear as though the chiefs were inviting the 
Boers to come and colonize them and overthrow the Gaza. However, the document itself 
revealed that the chiefs were merely seeking allies to stave off Ngungunyanes 
occupation of their lands. An extract of the concession read:  
And here we appeal anew and very earnestly for the help counsel of the 
Government and burghers of the South African Republic, reiterating our 
desire that the burghers of the South African Republic shall come and 
reside in our land and territory and to form a bulwark between our people 
and the rapacious great tribes of Ummixela [Mzila] and the Matabele 
[Ndebele] who nearly half a century ago came from Eastern Zululand to 
this neighbourhood and have even made raids on the inland people here, 
but have no right of conquest over land or our people. Therefore, it is 
that we hereby  commit the continued existence of our independent 
people, directly and indirectly, to the burghers of the South African 
Republic  to make it known to Her Majesty the Queen of the mighty and 
free English nation and in order to obtain the necessary help and assistance 
to lay it if need be before the Powers and States of Europe asking their 
intervention of our good right.20 
The burghers did not come to the chiefs timely aid and the BSA Company duly 
occupied their lands. Much later, in June 1891, the Addendorfs organized a commando of 
settlers to occupy the concession not in the interests of the chiefs but themselves. The 
Company dispatched a force to intercept the party on the Limpopo. Fearing a bloodbath, 
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the Boers capitulated and subsequently sought court arbitration, with each party to the 
dispute nominating its own judge.21 
The Addendorfs lost the case on three grounds. First, under Article 10 of the 
Swaziland Convention (1890), the  Transvaallet alone its individual citizenrywas 
forbidden from acquiring territory or entering into treaties with Africans north and 
northwest of its boundaries. Secondly, Article VII of the Anglo-Portuguese Convention 
(1891) did not allow a third partyin this case the Boersto acquire territory between 
the Limpopo and Zambezi. And thirdly, under the provisions of Berlin, allowing the 
group to occupy such land amounted to an inability by a major European power to 
maintain its sphere of influence.22 
The judges found the document to confer no legal rights in the nature of a grant 
of land which could be recognized or enforced by any Court of Justice in a civilized 
state. Not a single word in the so-called concession suggested, however remotely, that 
the chiefs intended it as an alienation of their land. This was merely an appeal for 
helparmed intervention if necessaryagainst an anticipated absorption of the country 
and threatened loss of independence. All that the Boers were being asked to do was to 
mobilize the conscience of Europe to protect the powerless. At the very least, the Boers 
were to act as messengers, not conquerors, at most to be military allies against someone 
the powerless regarded as an aggressor and a tyrant, rather than asking for his 
replacement by the Boers. Hence the invitation to the burghers to come and reside in our 
land and territory to form a bulwark  between our people and the rapacious great tribes 
                                                
21 NAZ CT1/5/1 Boer Trek to Banyailand: High Commissioner 1891: Johns. Van Soelen, J.A. Stofberg, 
F.P.J. Senekal, Lady Brand, Protest to His Excellency Sir Henry B. Loch, KGCM, KCB, Her majestys 
High Commissioner, 18th August 1891; Johns. Van Soelen, Bloemfontein, Chairman Trekkers Committee, 
to the Hon. C.J. Rhodes, Managing Director, BSA Company Cape Town, 21st September 1891. 





etc. referred to a specific number, not all of the Transvaal. The quantity of land each 
burgher would receive was unspecified, neither was the number, so that: 
The very object of the appeal is the preservation and retention of the 
country but unlimited alienation to an unlimited number of people of land 
which belongs according to the usual custom to the whole tribe in 
common is inconsistent with the idea of continued independence and 
retention of the land. The document is quite capable of the interpretation 
that the burghers should merely be quartered as it were among the people 
they were to assist for temporary purposes only.23 
As such, the document was declared not to be a concession at all.24 The process of 
exposing the Addendorf concession as an attempted fraud was also the BSA Companys 
hands-off statement to any competitors.  
I have already pointed out that the Portuguese coastal settlements lived on Gaza 
sufferance and actually paid tribute. Yet in 1891, they claimed quite the opposite. The 
Norwegian physician Oscar Sommershield, a resident at Delagoa Bay since 1887, 
exposed these Portuguese lies in a long letter dated 2 April 1891: 
Gungunhanas country which includes nearly everything claimed by the 
Portuguese South of the Zambesi, with the exception of some land round 
Inhambane, has never been occupied by the Portuguese; nothing has been 
done by them to develop it, nor have they ever, until just lately at the 
Kings Kraal, even been represented in the country. The Limpopo, and all 
the coast around the mouth of it, and its banks dont belong to the 
Portuguese but, to the King Gungunhana, who distinctly repudiates their 
pretensions. The Portuguese have no more claim to Customs duties to 
impose fines, to take possession of the Countess, to haul down or order 
the British flag to be hauled down, than I have to do such things and take 
such unwarranted liberties. They have been for years keeping their 
weak hold on certain places on the coast by the force of lying; they have 
told the [Africans] everywhere what great and powerful people they are; 
how they assisted the English in Zululand and everywhere else; how the 
English would have been defeated, but for them, and their powerful 
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support, that the English cannot fight but must always come to the 
Portuguese for help and get them to do the fighting. The Kaffirs, who have 
no means to judging believe these and other stories and even Gungunhana 
believes them and is, to a certain extent, afraid of the Portuguese. 25 
Under the provisions of Berlin, every European colonial power had to prove its right to a 
sphere of influence on paper, with the signatures of the African chiefs acknowledging 
defeat, vassalage, or acceptance of protection. The Portuguese had no such evidence. This 
is quite reminiscent of the local practice of the chiefs right to the ground tusk or the 
hunter laying firm claim to a carcass by cutting its tail. By contrast, those Europeans who 
had verbal or written concessions and were trusted as allies used guns, gunboats and 
ammunition as gifts to curry favor with African rulers. This is what the BSA Company 
did towards Ngungunyane, Lobengula, and Khama in 1888-9. As the last chapter has 
shown, before we credit it to imperial diplomacy, it is important to recall that this practice 
had a much longer local genealogy.  
By the end of 1890, the Company was indeed cashing years of individual 
exploration into actual voyages. It used the tug steamer, the Countess of Carnarvon, as 
transport from Durban to Ngungunyanes residence for purposes of re-negotiating the 
verbal concession granted to Schulz to pave way for occupation. In January of that year, 
the Countess delivered the 1,000 rifles, 20,000 rounds of ammunition, and money agreed 
to under the Schulz agreement to Ngungunyane as a sweetener. As the steamer attempted 
yet another landing on 8 March 1891ostensibly to pick up its officials at the kings 
courtthe Portuguese seized and escorted it to Delagoa Bay, triggering a diplomatic 
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furor.26 The incident sent a wrong message to the Gaza, who were banking on British 
military aid against the Portuguese.  
The aura of British invincibility was already in question after the Zulu routed 
them at Isandhlwana in 1878. Now it was in even more serious jeopardy. Who would fear 
the British now? There would be no better comeback than to dispatch and station a 
garrison at Ngungunyanes capital immediately andaccording to Somershieldto 
give him the necessary strength and to preserve what you have gained! With a force at 
his back, the Gaza king would order the Portuguese to clear from his country and the 
Portuguese would flee. As the good doctor diagnosed, the Portuguese had no stomach 
for fighting. He pleaded: You must have a strong man at Gungunhana and you must not 
leave him to himself. It is possible perhaps to reclaim him from liquor. I shall only add 
Limpopo was first found by Englishmen, first navigated by them.27 
 
Concession Diplomacy 
Somershield was urging the British to take Ngungunyanes domains by false pretenses. 
His caricature of the king as a feeble, incomplete minor abusing European liquor was a 
clarion call for a strong British hand, both to discipline and protect him. In real terms, 
what the British required, and Somershield was suggesting, was a piece of paper where 
Ngungunyane would append a signature authorizing the British as his protectors. The 
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BSA Company secretary, Rutherfoord Harris, agreed with Somershields assessments.28 
Yet as Douglas Wheeler has shown, Ngungunyane was no ones baby.29 
I showed in Chapter 2 how African rulers had long used ivory diplomacy. They 
granted European actors licenses to hunt elephant and extract ivory for sale for a 
stipulated period, after which they had to get out. In the aftermath of Berlin and the Rand 
gold rush, as European excursions into the hinterland increased and assumed the nature of 
incursions, Ngungunyane used ivory as a token of friendship to facilitate diplomacy, 
especially with European rulers. This way, he hoped he could persuade the governments 
to force their subjects to stick to the rules. Again, we have already seen this use of ivory 
to soften the tongue in transactions between Chief Shiluvani and Fernandes das Neves.  
Ngungunyane entered regional resource politics as a player rather than a victim. 
He ended up a victim rather than a player. As the BSA Company and the Portuguese 
jostled for concessions, the king sent his emissaries, Nkulunkulu and Chengetshwa, to 
Englandladen with a tusk of ivory as a token of friendshipto lobby Queen Victorias 
support against the Portuguese. They sailed to London aboard the Narlech Castle on 15 
August 1891 and returned in November. Indeed, whereas European political leaders 
exchanged flags and embassies, it seemed only appropriate that the king should use an 
elephant tusk as a symbol of the kingdom.  
This diplomatic exchange presented a dilemma for the British Foreign Office. To 
prevent the Kings ambassadors from meeting the Queen in person would make 
Ngungunyane feel disappointed and insulted and turn against the BSA Company. What 
could then prevent him from revoking the verbal concession to Schulz? If the Queen 
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received the kings messengers, the Portuguese would conclude that London had refused 
to acknowledge Lisbons authority over its vassal, Ngungunyane.30  
To the king himself, ivory diplomacy was part of a strategy to acquire leverage 
over the Portuguese and to enrich him. Ngungunyane was not just a king; at a personal 
level he was a young man in his 20s (or at most 30s) and a compulsive drinker of 
overseas beverages. As his relations with the Portuguese deteriorated, the BSA Company 
appeared to offer the King reliable political partners and investors. The Company would, 
moreover, speak well of him to the Queen if his emissaries and the piece of ivory were 
not enough. Ngungunyane resorted to divide and rule. First, in 1891 he granted a verbal 
concession to the Companhia de Moçambique over Manica and Sofala to the total 
exclusion of the Portuguese Government. But Lisbon was wary that nothing had been 
signed, and Ngungunyane might yet change his mind. He had to be completely 
defeated.31 Secondly, in November 1891, upon receiving a favorable reply from the 
Queen, Ngungunyane granted the BSA Company a concession in his northern domains 
abutting Manica and Sofala.  
On Friday the 6th that year, the king summoned all his vassal chiefs, the 
Portuguese of Inhambane and Lourenco Marques, and other Europeans resident in his 
domains. He wanted them to hear for themselves the reply his emissaries, Nkulunkulu 
and Chengetshwa, had brought back from Her Majesty the Queen Victoria of England, 
regarding his complaint to her on the conduct of the Portuguese. In attendance were 
Denis Doyle, W.M. Longden, and W.V. Harrison, representing the BSA Company, which 
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Queen Victoria had granted a royal charter to occupy the lands of the Shona. Also in 
attendance, by order of the Gaza King, was Dr. Manuel Joaquim Martiens, Intendente 
Geral de Gaza (District Administrator of Gaza); Ignacio de Paiva Rapozo, Intendente de 
Biyeni; Captain Jose Pingoto do Amaral, representing the Governor of Lourenco 
Marques; Captain Vicente Guithermo Garibaldi do Miranda, representing the Governor 
of Inhambane; Lieutenant Sanches de Miranda, the Military Commandant of Limpopo; 
and Lieutenant Moreira Guadros, the Intendente Gerals  aide-de-camp. Finally, there 
were two white resident friends of the royal family, identified only as Mr. and Mrs. Fels 
who acted in a similar position to Fairbairns at Bulawayo.32 When everyone was 
gathered, at length, The Lion of Gaza33 delivered a very commanding speech: 
White men. You have heard what my Indunas have said, - it is true what 
they have said  I did send them to the Queen. It is quite true that an 
alliance was entered into, that a friendship did exist between my 
Grandfather, my Father, and the Portuguese but did they treat them as they 
are endeavouring to treat me? What have I done that my people should be 
turned against me, my lands taken away from me and my people robbed of 
their women? Time after time I have explained to you how my subject 
tribes were killing my people, time after time you said wait. Day by day 
my people were being killed until one day I could stand it no longer. I 
turned out my armies and completely destroyed the people who had been 
harassing me so long. Again you Portuguese complained that some of my 
tributary tribes were annoying you. I sent an impi for the purpose of 
punishing them and what did you do? You warned them of the approach 
of my impi and when my army reached there they had fled. 
I have frequently demanded the return of tracts of my country now 
occupied by you. Moon after moon has passed, promises after promises 
have been made, you always say that we will give it back, Oh King, but 
you never do so, am I a woman that I shall be treated thus? And now today 
what have you done, you are building a Fort in my territory. I will not 
have that Fort there. Pull it down and fill in the hole that you have made. If 
you do not, I will send an army to fill in the hole that you have made and I 
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will see who will fire the first shot. It is not true that your King tells you to 
do what you are doing here, it is not true that he knows what you do. 
Why do you Portuguese object to my making friends with the 
English? You did not object to Umzila doing so, you did not object to my 
Grandfather doing so. Oh Portuguese there must be a day of reckoning. If 
I were to haul down that flag that stands as a token of friendship between 
my people and your people and hoist the English flag, who will prevent 
me? When I wish to hand over my people to the English I will do so in the 
daylight with the sun shining. Are not my people the people of Gaza, of 
whom are they afraid?.... Now I say pull down the fort and let my people 
and my Fathers lands be returned and give back the boats that you stole 
the other day on the Limpopo. The women of the Gaza are the wives of 
the Gaza nation. It may be that you Portuguese think it proper to take other 
mens wives, but the people of the Gaza say that every mans wife belongs 
to himself. 34 
Ngungunyanes speech helps us to set up three immediate conversations. First, to alert 
the reader to a tone of victimhood in the king vis-à-vis his relations with the Portuguese 
while also flagging an alternative view of him as a colonizer or occupation force over 
other Africans. Second, to alert us to the countervailing sense of initiative in the youthful 
king. Thirdly, a head of state trading the lands upon which the common people lived 
without consulting them for a few pieces of sovereigns per year and some gin. These 
three points form the basis for a reassessment of the fin-de-siècle generation of African 
leaders as not merely heroic resisters of colonialism let down by backward weaponry. At 
issue is whether late-19th century African rulers knowingly and arbitrarily sold Africa to 
European colonizers without their peoples knowledge or approval, or whether in fact 
they were victims of subterfuge. 
It seems that the youthful king failed to realize that the hunt had changed, its 
weapons, quarry, and hunting grounds having mutated from faunal to human targets and 
their landed wealth. The period 1865 to 1915 experienced multiple shifts from hunting 
ivory to hunting minerals, from concessions to colonies. What had been an empty and 
                                                





unoccupied African landscape in European travelers eyes now became a landscape 
beckoning for European occupation. Rather than temporary itinerant workspaces through 
it, a new vision took over of permanent settlement for purposes of exploiting the natural 
and human resources. The itinerant workspace of the hunt that had derived its momentum  
from working in alliance with powerful African rulers and ordinary villagers now gave 
way to a regime of thinking that saw powerful African kings as obstacles to the project of 
colonization. They had to be eliminated by any means necessary.35  
Far from being just driven from the capitals of Europe and the imperatives of 
capital (i.e. the Industrial Revolution), the urge to colonize was in its materiality a direct 
outcome of the hunt. After all, was it not in the course of hunting ivory in the seemingly 
unoccupied hunting grounds of the Ndebele kingdom that Karl Mauch discovered gold 
in the 1860s-70s? From that moment onwards, the hunting grounds north of the Limpopo 
also became known as the Matabele goldfields thereby redefining European ways of 
looking at the forests. From the late-1870s, attention increasingly shifted from hunting 
ivory to hunting concessions and labor. The hunters shifted from individuals to 
companies, the most prominent hunters being employed as military guides on conquest 
expeditions. The colonization of Rhodesia and Mozambique was no grand plan of 
Empire; on the ground we see very little of the British Government and much more of the 
local European actors, busy rupturing the networks (villages, forests) into concessions 
that were then turned into colonies.  
Let us return to Ngungunyanes speech. After such an inspired display of bravado 
against his Portuguese nemeses, there was only one piece of sensible business left for 
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Ngungunyane to cement his friendship with the BSA Company. Doyle handed him the 
proposed agreement ceding to the Company the absolute right and control over all 
waste and unoccupied lands in his territory (my emphasis). The Company would pay to 
Ngungunyane certain sums of money annually as compensation. Doyle coaxed the 
King into agreeing that in the event of gold development, a large influx of Europeans 
would result that would require the cultivation of the land and the building of houses. 
Towns would spring up that could only prosper under the efficient administration of the 
BSA Company. Therefore, Doyle argued, it was urgent that the control of that specific 
land to be in Company hands. Ngungunyane capitulated and thrashed out the details of a 
payment plan£500 per annum. In the wake of his impressive speech, the King 
unwittingly signed away his kingdom to the British for a few pieces of sovereigns.36  
On 18 February 1892, the Portuguese Consul, Eduardo Ade Carvacho, protested 
the Doyle Concession for giving the Company complete control over Gazaland, without 
any attention being paid to the rights that Portugal has over that country. Specifically, he 
cited Article 8 of the Anglo-Portuguese Convention of 1890, which stipulated that:  
The two Powers engage that neither will interfere with any sphere of 
influence assigned to the other by Article I to VI. One power will not, in 
the sphere of the other, make acquisitions, conclude treaties, or accept 
sovereign rights or protectorates. It is understood that no companies or 
individuals subject to one power can exercise sovereign rights in a sphere 
assigned to the other, except with the assent of the other.37  
The only problem was that the Portuguese had neglected to have the African rulers whom 
they claimed vassalage over to sign on the dotted line.  
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Carvacho gave a spirited argument that Ngungunyanes cession  of the sole and 
absolute power and control over all waste and unoccupied lands of Gazaland to the 
Company was a gross violation tantamount to an encouragement to Native Chiefs to 
revolt against the Sovereignty of Portugal.38 Yet the archival evidence suggests that in 
an age when the only recognized technology for claiming a sphere of influence was a 
concession, the Portuguese had none. The subsequent capitulation of the British 
Government, and the pressure on the BSA Company to back off, was at best a charitable 
gesture to the Anglo-Portuguese Convention. If London had persisted and taken the 
matter to Berlin, the Portuguese would have had no case to contest.  
At some point, the Portuguese woke up to the realization that unless 
Ngungunyane was militarily broken, there was no legal basis upon which they could 
claim Gazaland if the matter came to arbitration. Ngungunyane had to be defeated 
through the barrel of the gun.  
Not that the Gaza king had no grounds to be on the offensive himself! Nothing in 
the archival record suggests the Portuguese backed down from constructing the fort at 
Cusine. So in June 1892 and in keeping with his word, Ngungunyane dispatched his 
envoys to the British Consul at Lourenco Marques, E.W. Smith Delacour, to inform him 
of an impending war he would declare on the Portuguese in August. The king insisted 
that unless the Portuguese immediately renounced violence and released his sons, 
brothers and uncles post-haste, they would receive blows intended for the gods. The king 
was breathing fire. The Portuguese were also stealing his women and his cattle, and 
were also build[ing] fortresses and prevent[ing] the English from developing his 
country. Ngungunyane was only waiting for his order of one thousand horses for his 






regiments of cavalry to arrive from King Moshoeshoe of the Basotho as well as 
assurance from Delacour that the British would help the Portuguese against him. To 
which the envoy replied: The British are your friends.39  
The Lion of Gaza rubbed his hands in readiness for a full and final assault on the 
Portuguese. But when it came to the crunch, the BSA Company backed down from the 
Doyle Concession under British government pressure.40 Instead, the Company formed a 
joint Boundary Delimitation Commission with the Portuguese to slice the frontier 
between the two parties, which completed its work in December 1892.  On 25 January 
1893, London acceded to Company sovereignty on the part of the Doyle Concession 
lying west of this border.41 The British Government advised Ngungunyane not to expose 
himself and his people to the risks and horrors of war, offered to mediate in the dispute, 
and left him hanging out to dry.42 If any war broke out east of the border between the 
Portuguese and Ngungunyane, it would be a domestic issue over which the Company was 
bound by the terms of the royal charter to remain neutral.43  
Ngungunyane continued to exercise jurisdiction on the Doyle Concession in the 
British sphere under a technicality wholly to do with Berlin rather than the Anglo-
Portuguese Convention. The Portuguese had long suspected the Company to be 
instigating the recent native troubles at Lourenco Marques. The Company refuted the 
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charge: it was merely sending small expeditions to Ngungunyane to honor the annual 
subsidy due to the King as the Doyle Concession required. The British Government 
washed its hands over this private company matter since the concession had not been 
made to it. London in fact expected the Company to pay the subsidy as a basis upon 
which to exercise our rights over the territory contained in the British sphere. The 
Portuguese did not agree: Ngungunyanes residence was within the Portuguese sphere, 
and so he was their subject.  
Ngungunyane did not agree: since when had he been vassal to the Portuguese who 
had by and large lived because he spared their settlements in return for tribute? No, the 
Portuguese were as much his subjects as the Tsonga, Chopi or Manyika.  
Rhodes offered to withdraw the subsidy from Ngungunyane and pay it to the 
Portuguese for onward transmission to the Gaza king. What he objected to, however, was 
for the Portuguese to pay the whole subsidy to Ngungunyane because the Company 
would then be in no position to claim title over the Doyle Concession in the British 
sphere. In any case, the Company could not overreach on bilateral government matters44; 
that was Bismarcks job. 
Yet another British betrayal was not long in coming. The BSA Company decided 
to compromise, since it stood to lose more than far away London, as a company that 
owned land on the neighborhood of territory over which the Portuguese and Gaza were in 
dispute. Rhodes pledged to pay the full subsidy of £500 per annum that Ngungunyane 
had stipulated in the concession through the Portuguese Government, thus avoiding 
                                                
44 NAZ S1428/17/5 Concessions Granted by Ngungunhana, 1890-5: Enclosure in No. 2: C.J. Rhodes, 





direct intercourse with the chief.45 With that, the rest of the material benefits to 
Ngungunyane ended: technically the Company was now extracting value from Gazaland 
illegally.   
At that point, one would expect that Ngungunyane would see the folly of 
appealing to European legal codes of conduct to get redress. But that is exactly what he 
did: he engaged a lawyer to make his case in London, very likely at the advice of the 
Fels! On 12 August 1895 he sent Nkulunkulu and Chengetshwa (again with an elephant 
tusk in hand) to see the Governor of Pietermaritzburg to get permission to proceed to 
London and deliver a letter to Queen Victoria.  
At Durban, the messengers consulted with a solicitor, J.W. Livingstonwho 
appeared to be representing the kings interestto facilitate the issuing of traveling 
passes from the magistrate. Subsequently, writing the Governor, the Magistrate 
cautioned: They say they wish to return home by sea, but I suspect that they intend to go 
to England.46 The Governor refused to accept a tusk from Ngungunyane as a token of 
diplomatic conversation or its passage to England, but the kings messenger insisted that 
such refusal was out of character with the conduct of the Queen.47  
 
As If A Trophy 
For a man who had thundered so confidently on that afternoon on 15 November exactly 
four years earlier, Ngungunyanes demise happened far too quickly. The Portuguese 
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disposed of The Lion of Gaza in just three months. In August 1895, the Governor of 
Lourenco Marques mastered his forces towards the tough-talking Kings headquarters. 
By November the capital had fallen and the crestfallen king was in flight. What happened 
thereafter was well-captured by the British weekly, The African Review, on the occasion 
of the African kings departure into exile aboard The Africa on 29 January: 
Gungunhana was captured towards the end of December by Captain 
Albuquerque, who has been made Governor of Gazaland for his courage 
and bravery. The ex-King is accompanied by his son Godidi, his uncle, 
Chief Matijanna, seven wives, and a number of other prisoners of note. 
Gungunhana, as will be seen by his portrait by Mr. Max Sterling, of 
Delagoa Bay, is not much over thirty years of age. He is a round, stout, 
sturdy man of medium height. He has a bulky physique, and reminds one 
of old Lobengula; his colour is far from black, being light copper in shade. 
When he left Cape Town he had little in the way of clothing save a rough 
necklace of bones, some charms, and a blanket. Doubtless he will feel the 
need of warmer raiment as he nears Europe. He seemed to regret not 
having brought a larger number of wives with him, and told our 
correspondent at Cape Town (who conversed with the chief through a 
coloured interpreter) that he had a large number of wives in Gazaland. The 
ladies of Gungunhanas household on board The Africa wear large brass 
rings and massive coiffures, and adorn their forms with clothing made of 
brightly coloured material. The white towel around the chiefs head is to 
hide the broken crown, which came to grief during his attempt to escape. 
The chief looks upon this breakage as the greatest misfortune that could 
have befallen him. Gungunhana is now being conveyed to Lisbon in a 
troopship, accompanied by his wives. It is understood that he will be 
confined in a Portuguese fortress. Several other prisoners of war, amongst 
whom are the chief Chichaxa and his wives, are to be kept at the Cape 
Verde Islands.48  
This picture of a once-powerful king leaving in a cowered state does not articulate with 
the Shanganes official version of their kings departure.  
Here is Mgwaqazis account, which does not start with the king being shipped off 
but his heroic skirmishes with the Portuguese and his errant subjects: 
At Biyeni Ngungunyana fought and defeated Chiperenyana. He then 
settled there and ruled over the country. Matibwana, a Muchopi chief, 
fought with the Portuguese. Matibwanas resistance became so weak that 
                                                





he and his army surrendered to Ngungunyana. He thought he would be 
safe under the protection of Ngungunyanas powerful army. Prior to this 
the Portuguese had fought with Ngungunyana and were defeated. When 
Ngungunyana received Matibwana, the once defeated Portuguese became 
so angry that they arranged another battle against Ngungunyana. The 
Portuguese, with the assistance of a few Englishmen to whom they 
appealed for help, were successful in capturing Ngungunyanas sons, 
Buyisonto, Petu and Godide. This was a great discouragement and as a 
result Ngungunyana gave up fighting and was captured and taken to the 
estuary of Miti (Limpopo River). They put him into a ship ready to sail for 
an unknown destination. It is said that in spite of strenuous efforts to make 
the ship go, it stood motionless. When the Portuguese were about to give 
up in despair, Ngungunyana sang his song, which was sung on special 
occasions when performing ceremonial rites. 
Wambona ukhowanyana azuya pezuyu [sic, pezulu]./The hawk, 
you saw hovering in the sky, 
Ka Makainge wanyamayaya [sic, wanyamalala]./It disappeared at 
Makainge. 
Uthe kwa Mfanyana wasumbuyuka [sic, wasumbuluka]/At 
Mfanyana he got up again, 
Ubuthongo obuhle ngowezihlahla,/And ate up, even men, 
Ozwezindhlu kubangeya amayukuyuku [sic, kubangela 
amalukuluku]/Sound sleep can be had in the bush, To sleep in a hut only 
means sleeplessness night. 
The boat then moved, and moved on into the heart of the sea until 
it was out of sight. Ngungunyana was then sent into exile on an island. It 
is not known whether he is still alive or dead.49 
This spiritualized departure served as a point of inspiration, rallying subjects to arms to 
resist the Portuguese. In May 1897 the Daily Mail reported that the Portuguese were in 
an extremely perilous position. The natives, it said, in a number of small engagements 
have worsted the Portuguese troops, who are now unable to check their victorious 
advance. The situation was so bad that the Governor of Delagoa Bay requested Lisbon 
to dispatch detachments of infantry and cavalry, which were expected to arrive in July.50  
These particular pests (the Shangane word is abatakati, meaning witches) were a 
result of failed control. Magigwane Khosa, a vassal of the deposed king whom traditions 
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say was a warlike person and more ferocious than Ngungunyana himself,51 marshaled a 
rebel force  to bring back the king. The resistances slogan was Mbuyiseni! (Bring Him 
Back!) or Hosi u Mmbuyise! (May The King Be Brought Back!).52 Members of the Gaza 
aristocracy did not join in because of uncertainty on the motives of the rebellion. 
However, Liesegang is positive it was a loyalist (as opposed to royalist) rising. The very 
lax if not total absence of Portuguese controlbarring a few itinerant tax collectors and 
threadbare garrisonsemboldened the resistance.  
Details of this new hunt, in which the Portuguese tortured anyone remotely 
connected to the royal family, are contained in a Gold Fields News article in July 1897: 
From a perfectly reliable source we have received details regarding the 
origin of the native rising in Gazaland, and other interesting particulars. It 
appears that after Gungunhanas capture, when the Portuguese soldiery 
practically held the country, every effort was made, but without avail, to 
locate the whereabouts of the Kings cache of gold, ivory, and diamonds. 
No native knew of  that is, none could be made to tell  the whereabouts 
of the treasure, which is estimated to be worth at least £40 000; and, 
notwithstanding the use of tortures, in which the Portuguese are adept, 
nobody could be made to speak. The favourite form of torture practiced 
by the Portuguese is, after making the suspects fast, to beat the open palms 
of the hands with a piece of flat wood, the result being that, when the hand 
is continually bastinadoed for some time, it swells, circulation is stopped, 
the blood spurts out, and the unfortunate suspect undergoes great agony. If 
the secret which the suspect is supposed to hold is not given up by the 
time one hand is dealt with, the other undergoes the same operation. This 
cruel torture was, it is said, practiced on many of Gungunhanas people 
who might be presumed to know the whereabouts of the exiled Chiefs 
treasure, but all to no purpose.53  
When the Portuguese failed to get Ngungunyanes wealth from his subjects, they 
turned on Mr. and Mrs. Fels, promising to release them from jail if they revealed where 
the treasure was. The woman stepped forward and averred that she knew where the gold 
was. Under guard, she and her husband led the Portuguese on the treasure-hunting trip. 
                                                
51 Mhlanga, The History of the Amatshangana: 73. 
52 Liesegang, Aspects of Gaza Nguni History: 12, citing Gaza informants. 





However, sources close to the affair told the Gold Fields News the woman knew 
nothing. When no gold was found, the couple was thrown back into detention, where 
Mrs. Fels died soon afterwards, just like Mbuyiseni.  
The rebellion began in earnest towards the end of March 1897 with a frontal 
assault on the Portuguese fort of Balule. A month later the rebels captured Chaimite, the 
burial place of Manukusa. The insurgents were within sniffing distance of the district 
capital Chibuto when on 21 July 1897 they engaged the Portuguese in the plain close to 
Macontene, between Chibuto and Chaimite. They were routed. Three days later, their 
leader Magigwane was killed. Oral sources go further: When the Portuguese defeated 
him, he was captured and beheaded. In order to convince the Portuguese Commandant 
that Magigwana was really dead, his head was carried to the Commandant at Chimhutsu, 
by Machimbira, Magigwanas mother.54 The resistance collapsed.  
 
The Portuguese State and Its Commodities  
With Ngungunyane out of the way and Gaza state power broken, the Portuguese turned 
his former subjects into commodities of exchange. I must make clear that by the late 
1870s, the Portuguese were already selling their African subjects along the seaboard to 
the Boers of the Transvaal for labor purposes. Following the annexation of the Transvaal 
in 1877, two principal routes were cut through Tsonga lands around Lourenco Marques. 
One route led from the lowest drift on the Tembe River via Swaziland into the Transvaal. 
In 1878-9, Portuguese engineers selected this route as a likely corridor for the projected 
railway line to Pretoria. Another route led from Delagoa Bay through the Lebombo 
mountain range at the Matala pass (Matalapoort), down into the Nkomati valley, where it 
                                                





followed that river course to within a days journey of Barberton. In 1886, railroad 
construction to cater for labor imports to and gold exports from the Rand began in 
earnest.55  
As the mining industry grew, recruitment became more standardized. In 
September 1889, the Portuguese Government issued a decree that only agents of the 
Transvaal Chamber of Mines would receive recruiting licenses in its territory. The 
decision was a blow to the Chamber. The recruits from across the Limpopo were 
priceless because, unlike Cape Colony natives, [they] were more willing to work 
underground.56 Barely a year after Ngungunyanes ouster, the authorities invited 
authorized recruiters to the Province of Mozambique (under the Companhia de 
Moçambique) to get labor for the Transvaal industries. The recruiter would get a yearly 
license at the cost of 450,000 reis in gold, valid for a specific district of Mozambique 
Province only. The license was not transferable to a second party or district, but was 
renewable upon expiry subject to a surety deposit of 450,000 reis.57 
Recruiting agents, routes, and depots became conveyor belts for the movement of 
bodies across colonial district boundaries. This was in a time when concessionaire 
companies and the state had parceled out what had once been the Gaza state into 
plantations, cattle ranches, and state land. Africans had been forcibly removed from their 
chosen lands and restricted to native reserves, where they were banned from leaving 
except in possession of a pass and only for purposes of working for Europeans.  
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Long before Ngungunyane was deposed, the Portuguese had already zoned his 
lands abutting the Pafuri-Lephalale stretch of the Limpopo for labor export. In the Diario 
do Governo of 26 December 1893, the King of Portugal decreed the areas 
administration and exploitation for labor recruitment, but without providing the 
instruments to do so.58 Looking forward to a future when Ngungunyane was out of the 
way, in 1894 the Transvaal Government established stations along the main route from 
the populous Zoutpansberg and Waterberg districts to Johannesburg.59 Even at that stage, 
Ngungunyanes subjects were already enlisting for mine work with or without their far 
away kings consent. 
The war between Ngungunyane and the Portuguese ground labor recruitment to 
a complete halt for two reasons. First, the Portuguese authorities in Gaza were now 
refusing to issue passes to enter the Transvaal. Second, Shangane men were fighting for 
or against the Portuguese, or protecting their families. In May 1895 when the Portuguese 
started making military gains against Ngungunyane, Shangane men on the mine downed 
their tools and rushed home to defend their king and kindred. The Chamber 
acknowledged that the consequent disturbance of the country was the direct cause of the 
departure of so large a number of men to the east. This was a death-blow to the mining 
industry because this class of labour consisting of Shangaans, Nyambaans, and 
Matshopis, constitute[d] the best available labour for underground purposes.60  The 
Transvaal Chamber would not have worried if the Shangane were not the most 
acceptable and best class of natives for underground work (authors emphasis). This 
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would happen again during the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 when the Portuguese 
reversed the earlier arrangement on account of the abuses which had been found to 
spring up under it.61 
The scarcity of labor prompted the Chamber to widen its recruitment networks 
beyond southern Africa. In December 1900, management disclosed details of a plan to 
recruit labor from Southern Rhodesia, especially in North and East Mashonaland, to be 
delivered at Melsetter (formerly Chipinga).62 Hugh Marshall Hole, the BSA Company 
administrator of Southern Rhodesia, proposed a Witwatersrand Native Labor Association 
(WENELA) recruiting monopoly in the Province of Mozambique north of the Save for 
both the Rand and Rhodesia. The recruits would be collected at a convenient spot near 
the border on the Portuguese side for counting, vaccination, and visas. Hole also 
suggested recruiting in the Spelonken District of the Northern Transvaal and delivering 
the recruits at the Rhodesian border. The Transvaal Chamber ratified the agreement on 10 
February 1902.63  
Supply and demand was a potent network-builder. Four months passed with not a 
single recruit delivered. Africans preferred to go south, not north; there the wage was 
smaller.64 The signatories had hoped the Companhia de Moçambique would allow 
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WENELA to recruit east of Melsetter. It flatly refused. WENELA had hoped to enlist 
Lafortenow Portuguese Commandantas a recruiter since he had great influence on 
Africans. Only to discover that Laforte had lost all his influence owing to his action in 
having recruited 300 natives for the Masekesa gold mines on the pretext that he was 
taking them to Johannesburg. Local Africans resisted being taken north and they turned 
against him. Both parties had anticipated a glut of migrant labor owing to the massive 
crop failures in the countryside. It never happened. Rhodesia now refocused its 
recruitment through its own Labour Bureau, now recapitalized with £20,000.65 
Next the Transvaal Chamber turned to the entire southern African region, by then 
already parceled out into business estate. Three chartered CompaniesCompanhia da 
Niassa, Companhia da Zambesia and Companhia da Moçambiqueowned vast swathes 
of territory between the Limpopo and Zambezi. In September and October 1903, 
WENELA opened talks with the Companhia da Zambesia and Companhia da Niassa 
respectively to recruit in their territories. But the Companhia da Moçambique stoutly 
refused. The Chamber noted the disadvantage of the Niassa and Zambesia natives: they 
were as yet unaccustomed to labour and therefore a huge gamble and cost. Following 
successful negotiations with the Companhia da Niassa and Companhia da Zambesia, 
WENELA entered British Central Africa. Early in 1903, it recruited 931 out of a quota of 
1,000 laborers in Nyasaland.66 They were a drop in the ocean of its total requirements.  
WENELAs audacious attempt to redraw the map of Africa as a feeder of labor to 
the Rand met with little success. The Chamber went as far as Angola, Nigeria, and 
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Liberia but was turned away. Recruitment from German West Africa (Namibia) yielded 
just under 1,000 men a year, who were not very good at the hard underground work the 
Shangane, Tsonga, and Shona could do.67 
In the end, the state controlled administrative districts of Lourenco Marques, 
Gaza, and Inhambane turned out to be the Chambers most fertile recruitment areas. Over 
half of the 50,000 square mile area was uninhabited, its barren and waterless stretch 
between latitude 25° 50` and 22° hardly able to support a scanty population and 
perfectly useless for WENELAs recruitment purposes. By contrast, only 25,000 
square miles of the district was inhabited, and the population was thick100,000 in 
Lourenco Marques, 180,000 in Gaza, and 360,000 in Inhambane, or 640,000 in all. 68 In 
total, the recruiting agency  had divided its hunting grounds into four districts. In its 
demarcations, WENELA transformed the countryside into an apparatus of human 
trafficking to the mines. 
Here is a vivid description of the composition of individual recruiting districts and 
the human resources involved:  
In the first district there are three permanent European camps, 21 receiving 
camps or rest houses, 7 permanent European employees, and 225 native 
employees. In the second district, there are two permanent European 
camps, 5 receiving camps or rest houses, 5 permanent European 
employees, and 276 native employees. In the third district, there are two 
permanent European camps, 8 receiving or rest houses, 4 permanent 
European employees, and 296 native employees. In the fourth district, 
there are five permanent European camps, 37 receiving camps or rest 
houses, 8 permanent European employees, and 653 native employees. 
This makes a total in the four districts of 12 European camps and 71 
receiving camps or rest houses, or 83 stations in all; 24 permanent 
European employees, and 1,450 native employees. There are, of course, 
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changes in the staff from time to time, but the above figures are correct for 
the middle  of the present year. Besides these, there are three or four extra 
European employees who have no permanent stations, but are employed to 
relieve others, or in any district where extra temporary assistance is 
required.69  
The 83 stations catered for 25,000 sq. miles or one for every 300 sq. miles, each 
placed in the most convenient spots, having regard to the thickness of the population and 
the usual routes of travel. WENELAs permanent staff consisted entirely of European 
men prepared to live continuously on the East Coast, usually only those too desperate for 
a living or adventure, the country outside Lourenco Marques being fever-infested. The 
stations also enlisted native employees from their locality as camp and rest house 
cleaners, guides, and runners all under license from the Portuguese district authorities.70 
In 1906, WENELAs total recruits from the districts of Gazaland, Inhambane, and 
Lourenco Marqueswhere it enjoyed a monopolytotaled 36,401, some 20,309 of them 
old mine boys. In that year, 34,409 had been repatriated through Ressano Garcia. In the 
12-months to June 1906 alone, the Portuguese issued 239 recruiting licenses, 66 to 
WENELAs recruiters alone, and the balance to its competitors. WENELAs recruitment 
arc therefore extended from the Natal border to Latitude 22, to the north of which was 
Companhia da Moçambique territory, out of bounds under the Anglo-Portuguese modus 
vivendi of 1890.71 On 31 December 1906, some 53,135 Africans from these districts were 
employed on mines and public works, compared to 56,161 at the same time in 1905. At 
that point, WENELAs monopoly on recruiting in Lourenco Marques was under siege 
from agents of the newly licensed J.B. Robinson group. In April, another group, the 
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Transvaal Mines Labour Company, also claimed to have obtained Portuguese permission 
to recruit. Competition was heating up.72  
 
Conclusion: The Ultimate Test of the Hunt 
What I have just described is an example of the effects of the concessionaire partition of 
the subcontinent at the turn of the century. This power to mass acquire, backed up by 
the firepower of the machinegun, lends itself to a trajectory in weapons of mass 
acquisition from bows and arrows, to muskets, to rifles like the Martini Henry, to the 
Maxim. It also points to a transformation in the commodity map from ivory to gold to 
humans. It is this last element that I tried to imply when talking about Ngungunyanes 
capture and exile as if a trophy. In the next chapter I would like to bring human 
trafficking into the discussion not so much as a predecessor or successor to ivory and 
gold, but as something sharing the same temporality with themand a hunt in its own 
right. 
In ending this chapter by seeing concessions as African initiative gone horribly 
and irreversibly wrong (that is, resulting in colonialism), it is worth recalling Jean-
François Bayarts controversial argument about the role of Africans in their own 
problems. Bayart begins by saying that Africans have not been insulated from the worlds 
beyond the boundaries of their communities. As such, he says, Africans have been 
active agents in the mise en dépendance of their own societies, contrary to a view of 
such dependence as an unpopular imposition. Bayart concludes, therefore, that strategies 
                                                
72 Transvaal Chamber of Mines Annual Report for the Year Ended 1907: Report of Executive Committee 





of extraversion form a constant thread throughout the history of the world  that 
subjection can constitute a form of action73. 
He is right. This is exactly what happened to Ngungunyane. He had sought to play 
his European enemies against each other through awarding conflicting concessions over 
the same lands. He lost. In his situation there is an empirical possibility of writing a genre 
of African history that is self-reflexive, to move beyond worshipping black initiative and 
acknowledging its nadir. A story like that calls for a widening of repertoires, a search for 
new tropes that can unify discourses that the fetish of genre has artificially separated. 
Only then can we understand how a king used to granting hunting concessions ended up 
being a trophy himself, his lands hunting grounds, and his people the game.  
 
                                                










Chapter 4 Transgressing Temporal and Spatial Boundaries 
 
In the last two chapters I discussed ways in which transLimpopo inhabitants used their 
elastic hunting traditions to intercept European big game hunters, concessionaires, and 
mining capitalism. I had begun to examine how the mobile workshop of the village and 
the mobile workshops of incoming European forces created different technological 
junctions.  
A pattern is emerging in the relationship between networks and boundaries, 
portables and mobiles, between villagers and incoming (European) actors. These 
junctions were all mediated by portable technologies: junctions between hunters and 
villagers through guns, between European imperialistic interests and African rulers 
through the concession, and between mine and village through money. It is clear from the 
last chapter that the changing weaponry and trophy were in response to emerging 
commodity supply and demand mapsfrom ivory to gold, to labor needed to produce the 
gold.  
This chapter addresses the question: What happened to the villages and European 
big game hunters in the colonial period? What did colonial partition change and what 





that did not stop the precolonial movements of nature, technology and people. Like all 
categories, borders are only effective so far as those that draw them can police them. This 
is my point of connection between human trafficking and poaching: both were boundary-
crossings, with the same individuals poaching game also poaching labor, such that they 
killed game in order to recruit, and recruited in order to kill game. In the rest of the 
chapter I discuss the tug-of-war between the state and these border bandits, who had 
become as much a scourge to the state as game animals.  
 
Human Trafficking 
Black ivory was a code the Boers used to camouflage the trafficking of African children 
as slaves abducted from the transLimpopo basin to the Transvaal (South African) 
Republic prior to 1881. Later the term would be extended to the trafficking of adult men 
in general. As soon as the black ivory reached the Transvaal, it was further camouflaged 
as apprenticeship. When the Venda chief Makado blocked the path to the elephant 
hunting grounds (Chapter 2), he forced the Boer farmers to find an alternative 
commodity: slaves. The farmers were also pushed to desperation following the discovery 
of diamonds in 1866, when thousands of African men trekked to Cape Colony where they 
were paid in guns.1  
While the extent to which the whole of the Transvaal was involved in or benefited 
from black ivory is not easy to ascertain, there is sufficient evidence to argue that those 
Boers living in the extreme northern fringes of the Zoutpansberg were involved in the 
                                                





actual raiding. They passed on black ivory to the Transvaals Highveld farmers, who 
turned them into slaves.2  
Following the escalation of British efforts to ban the slave trade in the Transvaal 
after the Sand River Convention of 1852, the Boers camouflaged slavery as a kind of 
apprenticeship. They portrayed themselves as master artisans or families employing 
children in return for training in multiple skills, such as hunting, farming, domestic work, 
and so forth. Like all modes of apprenticeship, the Boers insisted that theirs was paid 
traineeship. In reality, however, the apprentice was a slave in all but name. When the 
British annexed the Transvaal in 1877, the Boers vociferously insisted they had 
apprentices but definitely no slaves. Meanwhile philanthropic organizations like the 
Aborigines Protection Society and the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society insisted 
that hundreds, if not thousands of Africanskidnapped in their youthworked on the 
Transvaal farms in conditions of slavery.3  
The Boers other hunted black ivory themselves and made use of African proxies. 
They would usually seize control of all the fountains, so that the natives lived in the 
country only on sufferance. All that the Boers needed to do was to manage African 
movement and the labor would literally come running on their own two legs. In return for 
the privilege of drawing water, the African chiefs were forced to provide as much free 
labour as [the Boers] requireda true system of slavery. Boers also harvested the bulk 
of the black ivory. Usually they compelled Africans to join them into battle and placed 
[them] in the forefront as human shields, so that if the enemy was too powerful the 
Africans died first. The Boerssafe in the rear and armed to the teeth with gunsthen 
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finished off the enemy and made off with children, cattle, goats, and any other stock.4 In 
other times the Boers also struck alliances with African chiefs whom they armed to do 
the hunting for them.5 
When David Livingstone publicized this Boer slavery, a philanthropic outrage 
torched Europe. Missionaries seeking to raise the down-trodden natives from the 
darkness of Paganism into the light of the Gospel of Christ saw this as a slap in the face 
of civilization. By contrast the Boers saw missionaries like Livingstone as obstacles to 
wealth. How else were they to compensate for the demise of elephant ivory if they were 
now also being asked to abandon raids to acquire black ivory? The Boers presented 
Europe with a moral dilemma. If white men who were supposed to be civilized and 
Christian were the slavers, what more the native heathens who knew not the Book?6  
These missionaries grossly underestimated the agency of Africans in the face of 
Boer slave-raiding. In 1971, the historian David Norman Beach pinned the influx of guns 
to an incurably defense-minded mentality throughout the transLimpopo sub-region. 
Much later, Gerald Mazarire went even further: in the late-19th century, he says, defense 
consciousness became a way of life.7 Contrary to existing scholarship, this way of life 
was not so much a refuge traditionas both coin itbut much more about making 
nature a weapon. To talk of such settlements as refuge implies that these people lived 
like refugees. The evidence does not suggest so.  
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How did nature become a weapon? In the majority of cases, Africans in the 
transLimpopo frontier with the Boers resorted to building their housesand villageson 
hilltops, high ground, or thorn-surrounded areas as extra insurance against surprise attack. 
The Venda and other Shona groups along the Limpopo realized that they could not beat 
the Boers at their own (gun) game, and had to therefore come up with a cheap but lethal 
defense system. So they settled and built their homesteads on hilltops, transforming these 
precipices into weapons. Commoners armed with spears, bows and poisoned arrows, 
clubs and shields guarded their settlements on the leeward side and created an 
impregnable bulwark against attack. The enemy was forced to climb up the precipice, 
whereupon the villagers hurled rocks downhill, crushing the intruders to death.8 Many 
such hills in the transLimpopo between Shashe and Pafuri had caves, where women, 
children, the old, and livestock were sent away and guarded, the able-bodied warriors 
engaging the enemy through a sophisticated system of surprise, ambush, and speed.9 
Those boys who were captured and apprenticed in the Zoutpansberg were often 
trained in the use of guns and became slave soldiers who distinguished themselves as 
swart skut (black shots). In time they became indispensable to the Boer master, and in so 
doing acquired influence. Sent into the hunting grounds to hunt both black and white 
ivory, some swart skuts deserted and rejoined their societies, bringing with them guns 
that stiffened local resistance against raiders. This could be said of many Venda hunters 
and warriors, who after training and working as a swart skut turned their guns not only on 
their rivals in succession disputes, but the Boers themselves.10  
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By the time gold was discovered on the Witwatersrand (the Rand) in 1886, labor 
mobilization had already shifted from apprenticeship to a kind of forced wage labor on 
Boer farms. In 1881, the Anglo-Transvaal Convention had disavowed black ivory in 
very robust language, but perpetuated it in subtle, legalistic ways. While giving the 
natives the right to acquire land with one hand, the Convention took it away with the 
other by giving land title to the newly created Native Location Commission, a body that 
now held land in trust for such natives. The measure guaranteed Africans freedom of 
movement while simultaneously nullifying that right through a draconian law that said 
every native could only leave his/her location if in possession of a government pass. 
These passes could only be given for the purpose of seeking employment.11 The 
slavery of apprenticeship gave way to the servitude of the passbook. 
Such British assault on Boer property (apprenticeship) rights brought back 
memories of the Great Trek when the Boers had resisted British encroachment at the 
Cape by migrating out of reach in the 1830s. Boer independence was, after all, based on 
their insistence on the right to practice their own culturelanguage, politics, and 
economicsincluding the right to own the black body and do whatever they pleased with 
it. Besides the Convention, the British gun control regulations were an affront to the Boer 
right to trek and shoot. The switch from ivory and agricultural commodities to gold also 
created a new momentum towards paid labor. Finally, the British insistence against 
slavery created a leeway for the new commodity (wage labor) to speak for itself. 
As a tradethat is, both as exchange and professionillegal labor recruitment 
or illicit recruiting began with the Kimberley diamond rush of 1866 as a function of labor 
supply and demand. It fed on the ivory hunt and into it: men of the village rushing to the 
                                                





mine not to acquire diamonds but to offer their services in return for muskets with which 
to come back and hunt, to be men among others. Here is a description of Kimberley and 
the transition to the Rand according to Mahatche, a Shangane man born about 1850:  
When I first left home to go to work at Kimberley, Mzila was the chief of 
our tribe. In those days Kimberley was just starting up [1866], and when I 
went there first, all the diamonds were obtained by hand. For a long time 
there was no machinery, and later horse and mule power were introduced. 
I used to travel backwards and forwards constantly between my home and 
Kimberley. When the Rand was discovered [1886], I went there instead, as 
it was very much near my home. Just before the Rand was discovered, I 
married a wife, Muzhlopa [Mhlope].12  
The discovery of gold on the Rand took the demand for labor in new directions. The 
capitation fee the mines offered was as sweet to licensed recruiters as illicit ones: £7 per 
head for adults, £4 for youths, and £1 for boys. It was the wage the recruits themselves 
earned through hard labor on the mines. Nobody asked questions about where the recruits 
came from, and nobody volunteered that sort of information.13 
The acute supply and high demand could only mean one thing: intense 
competition for the few sources available, by hook or crook. The molestation of natives 
accelerated throughout the recruiting routes, the touts extorting money from natives, 
some masquerading as police officers to rob, assault, and abduct the migrants. The state 
was completely powerless to act against these poachers of men. Those returning from the 
mines were abducted on the pathways.14 
While railway development went a long way towards containing the molestation, 
trains serviced a tiny fraction of the major catchment areas. For example, in April 1899, 
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the Chamber was making arrangements with the Pretoria-Pietersburg Railway Company 
to transport African laborers from Pietersburg and Potgietersrus to the Rand. Such 
measures succeeded in containing molestation inside the Transvaal, but outside it, the 
highwayman was in business. Railway development had a short-term negative effect of 
tapping into construction labor from the same sources WENELA was recruiting, thereby 
escalating highway (pathway) robberies. The Chamber was in a fix: while it needed both 
the railroad and the recruits, it was not prepared to let railroad work force it to import 
from beyond Africa. Rather it proposed that government imports railway labor from 
outside the continent. The Chamber was only prepared to allow 10,000 natives of South 
Africa only to be recruited for construction work from outside the Transvaal and 
Portuguese territory.15 
Such was the competition between recruiters that African men going to or 
returning from the gold mines fell victim to touts and other highwaymen, who 
sometimes molested and robbed them. The Transvaal Government had instructed its 
Field-Cornets (district officials) and their assistants to guard against a repetition of such 
offences in 1892, but the highwaymen had simply brushed such presence aside. The 
harrying and robbing of migrants on the pathways continued, and many stayed home 
rather than attempting a journey attended with so much danger and difficulty. The 
Transvaal Chamber had continuously received complaints of natives stopped on the way 
and told they must work on the farms, who, rather than do this, returned to their homes. 
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Gangs of boys coming in to Johannesburg of their own accord were being abducted by 
touts who disposed of them at a premium of so much per head.16  
In 1893, the Chairman of the Chamber of Mines put out an advertisement aimed 
at liberating the natives coming to these Fields from the interference of touts. It read:  
Whereas many complaints have been received by me about some so-called 
Kafir Agents or Touts, that they unlawfully catch or detain Kafirs along 
the public roads, and deliver them to mining companies at so much a head, 
and also sometimes unlawfully induce Kafirs to leave their masters 
service. So, therefore, as a caution, the following extracts from articles of 
the Masters and Servants Law are published. Offenders will be severely 
dealt with according to law.17  
Ultimately, illicit recruiters could transform illicit labor into licit labor, and steal licit 
recruits and resell them elsewhere.  
 
Crooks Corner: The Capital of Poachers of Men and Game 
Following Ngungunyanes defeat in 1895, the locus of power shifted dramatically, 
ending existing centers of power and creating new ones. The new colonial boundaries the 
BSA Company hammered out with the Transvaal (1890-1) and the Portuguese (1892) 
further exacerbated the remoteness of the transLimpopo from the major seats of politico-
military power. Remoteness became relative not just to the state but also places of 
concentrated European settlement. To the local African residents, it was business as 
usual. 
The tsetse fly and mosquito inhibited the state and white settlers from establishing 
a presence. The former forced the Native Commissioners and police to patrol on foot; 
donkeys, horses and oxen usually perished as soon as they set foot into the forest. Later in 
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the 1920s-40s, automobiles offered potential to solve the transport problem, but the state 
never invested any significant resources in road construction. The mosquito discouraged 
such improvements: which white man, short of insanity, would permanently settle in this 
backwater of empire? Those temporarily resident in the area were compelled by duty or 
work: policemen, labor recruiters, cattle ranchers, and outlaws fleeing justice. They stuck 
religiously to their bottles of quinine to keep off malaria, to the point of constant 
overdose.  
Then the rinderpest came. In 1888-97, the rinderpest epizootic had swept down 
the continent from Somalia to the Cape, killing livestock and game bovines in its wake. It 
devastated Gonarezhou, and the few wild animals that remained retreated into the coastal 
seaboard of Portuguese East Africa. Without its more reliable food source and vector, the 
tsetse fly became virtually extinct south of the Save River right into its former habitats in 





European ranches to be established in areas west and north of Gonarezhou. On the 
negative side, the end of the fly was a boon for those white men who resented the 
strictures of colonial life, who yearned for an unrestricted freedom to hunt both people 
and game for profit. They could always rely on quinine to combat the mosquito. 
These illegal poachers of men left a mark on local history and defined the state. 
At the point where the Luvuvhu pours into the Limpopo, where the boundaries of 
Rhodesia, Portuguese East Africa, and the Union of South Africa met, was an island. By 
1910 this island was called Crooks Corner because it was to its inhabitants a sanctuary 
from civilization, whose solitary state was paradise to all whose deeds or inclinations 
made imperative a retreat to some last stronghold of the lawless.18 Very odd 
characters had come down the trail to the store, all of them hunters with different 
instruments for different prey.19  
The illicit recruiters capitalized on the confusion of the three colonial states as to 
the exact boundaries of their jurisdiction. As the incumbent Chief Makuleke (Joas 
Phahlela) explained in a recent tour to Pafuri, the recruiters would dash for the island 
whenever chased by any one of the colonial state patrols. The Rhodesians would think 
the fugitive had crossed the Limpopo to Makuleke, the Portuguese pursuing him from the 
east would think he was in Sengwe, while the South Africans would be convinced he was 
in Rhodesia or Portuguese territory. Meanwhile, he would be watching events from the 
thick bushes of the small island, emerging when the patrols had gone.20 
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Who were these men? Jack Fordan Australian and former Rhodesian 
policemanwas one of the very first of the illicit recruiters, coming just after the Anglo-
Boer War in 1899-1902. He arrived and purchased the store at Makuleke. The German 
Jacob Martin Diegel (whom the Shangane affectionately called Chari) came soon 
afterwards. Then John Dart, a Welshman; Wieder, a Hungarian; Colesen, a Swede; and 
many other strange characters. They spanned the whole gamut of professions: from 
magistrates to army officers to even game rangers.21 But the most well-known of them all 
was Cecil Stephanus Rutgers Barnard, an Afrikaner who arrived in 1910 after quitting the 
South African police to pursue a career of recruiting and ivory hunting. 
 
While Crooks Corner was a refuge in times of trouble, the poachers spent most of 
their time at the Makuleke Store, named after the local chief. The store was a service 
center that by virtue of its goods attracted customers across race and state boundaries. 
                                                





Bulpin describes it as a diminutive, nondescript little store named after the local 
Tsonga chief. In Barnards time the store was a bustling place with over a hundred 
Africans and over twenty European adventurers entering its doors every single day, 
exchanging ivory and the forests many products for food, clothes, strong liquor, and 
ammunition.22  
Alec Thompson and William Pye had built it in early 1910just a tiny, 
corrugated-iron shack, falling down almost from the time it was built, its veranda leaning 
over drunkenly, its guttering broken. Three rondavels were attached to the store, 
wherein at night Thompson lit oil lamps to plot his confined bearings. As storekeeper, he 
had the monopoly to yarn to a hostage audience wishing to be served gin and other 
necessities from behind the counter.23  
Makuleke was no mere place of domicile or shopping, but a place-in-motiona 
place full of comings and goings, the inhabitants persistently engaged in work in places 
invisible. Barnard found themand became a part ofa curious crowd whose 
whereabouts could not be easily ascertained. The store was also a re-supply base and a 
market. The route just outlined brought products of western and city manufacture to an 
otherwise remote and disconnected place. Here Barnard re-stocked on salt, sugar, 
coffee, and ammunition. It was also the market where illicit ivory and recruits turned into 
licit commodities.24 
The South African authorities found these poachers of men and game to be 
irritating subjects. In August 1913, the Sub-Native Commissioner for Sibasa District, 
L. Harris, noted that these characters had operated from Makuleke for many years and 
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that the facts thereof have repeatedly been reported upon. No tangible action had been 
taken to arrest them. Of the more than sixteen European recruiters operating around 
Makuleke, only four had licenses. The licit recruiters provided the illicit recruiter with 
the means of disposing of the Natives he has recruited or otherwise obtained possession 
of, in Rhodesia and also in Portuguese Territory. This is how it happened: 
The illegal recruiter returns with his gang of boys and sells them to the 
licenced holder, who passes them on as the result of his own labours. This 
is a pernicious practice and one giving rise to the baneful conditions that 
obtain at the present time, for the illegal man, who has now come to regard 
himself as being quite beyond the pale of any law, has no scruples as to 
the manner in which he gets his gangs together. Therefore, he stops short 
of nothing in the attainment of his object. I think these illegal men would 
be effectively checkmated if stringent measures were adopted to prevent 
the licensed man from buying from them.25 
While he was at Makuleke, Harries had met a Native Labor Contractor based at 
Pietersburg and protested about the practice of turning illicit into licit traffic.  
The contractor had replied: It is [the practice] that obtains from Makuleka to 
Pietersburg, therefore how are you going to stop it? Harries had suggested cancelling the 
purchasers license, but the contractor was pessimistic that any proof of the illegal status 
of the natives could be found. Harries conceded the difficulties from a prosecutors 
point of view, but insisted that if reasonable grounds for strong suspicion exist, the 
Director should feel quite justified in cancelling the licence of the one so suspected. He 
characterized the mode of recruitment across the borders as little short of highway 
robbery: 
A runner with a gang of boys is waylaid and the boys taken from him 
whether they are willing to go or not. Of course, the latter do not care who 
gets the capitation fee for them as long as they can get down to work. 
Many of the illegal men depend for their existence almost entirely upon 
                                                
25 NAZ A3/18/20/30/22 Recruiting Illicit 1915-18: Extract from Report Submitted to the Native 
Commissioner Pietersburg on the 13th August, 1913, No. 56/13/405: L. Harries, Labour Agents and 





what they are able to seize in this manner. Like master, like servant, the 
runners are also unscrupulous, and the bad influence of these men upon 
the natives in general at Makulekas was noticeable to me during my tour 
through that part. The Rhodesian and Portuguese police officials, 
provoked to a state of exasperation, have recently been exercising constant 
vigilance over the movements of these men, but until concerted and 
simultaneous action by the police authorities of the three territories, i.e. the 
two mentioned and the Transvaal, is taken, nothing of much effect can 
result; for as soon as they are harassed on one side these men flee to the 
other. 26 
The people of Makuleke generally saw these illicit recruiters as bandits, but Harries did 
not regard their banditry as too severe a one.27  
He pictured a once respectable member of society arriving at Makuleke trading 
store clad in a bit of cloth which was wound about his waist, bare-footed and wearing a 
cheap Kaffir shirt which hung loosely from his shoulders. There he purchased a pair of 
boots (the first he had seen for over six months) and putting them on with some 
admiration, he casually remarked, Ah the bush life is a fine life after all. These bandits 
were all at loggerheads one with the other, and, but for their cowardly attributes which 
undoubtedly have become accentuated by the lives they lead, violent disruptions would 
most assuredly occur.28 
Writing to the Secretary for Native Affairs (Pretoria) on 9 September 1913, the 
Director of Native Labor (Pretoria) deplored the unsavoury conditions which prevail 
North of Makulekas (around the store), which had long been known to this Office but 
which fell outside its jurisdiction. The Director threw his hands up in the air: Under 
present powers we cannot eradicate the evil, even if we can mitigate results. The 
Director was considering suggestions to make the issuing of Zoutpansberg and 








Pietersburg licenses conditional upon the holder not recruiting Natives who reside 
outside the Unionas had been done for Barberton.29 
The authorities could not control immigration into their country because they had 
no control or knowledge of the complex tapestry of pathways in Mozambique and 
Rhodesia that fed into Makuleke. To the north and east, a whole tapestry of paths led out 
from Makuleke across the Limpopo into Rhodesia and Mozambique. The paths of people 
and those of game interwove through the forests, the latter disjointed and erratic, 
stretching from the pastures to water-holes and saltpans. These man-made highways led 
north then northeast across the Limpopo in twists and turns towards the Indian Ocean 
port settlement of Sofala. The desperados at Crooks Corner used these pre-colonial paths 
to escape police in South Africa and Rhodesia, often having stolen golden fortunes, and 
sailing off to far-off lands to begin new lives.30 The way such paths connected this 
remote place to the rest of the world fits well within Piots notion of remotely 
global31 places, as well as Dioufs suggestion on the local being an entry-point into the 
global.32 
This is not to say that colonial state boundaries had no influence on human 
mobilities. The main path African men used to go to the Rand followed the borderline on 
the Portuguese side, where a police garrison served as an immigration post at 
Massangena on the south bank of Save River. They gave rand-bound Portuguese 
Africans visas to proceed to the Rand, many of them actual Rhodesian Africans the 
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illicit recruiters like Bvekenya brought through, along with a bribe. The policemen also 
took bribes from Europeans seeking licenses, even though Bvekenya was rather 
unfortunate.33  
In Chapter 2 I mentioned the Baroka and Hlengwe highwaymen who lived along 
the Limpopo. This phenomenon continued beyond the partition, with these criminals 
pouncing on African men returning from the mines. These highwaymen were also touts 
in the employ of illicit white recruiters discussed earlier. The state called these recruiters 
bandits because it considered them to be terrorizing local people into submission. In 
1915, a police patrol proposed a 3-man force to be stationed at the Save-Runde junction 
or thereabouts during the winter with good native Police and to patrol the path leading 
to the Crocodile [Limpopo]. Because there was only one path, these men would have to 
send their boys by that route. Sending one man patrols was unsafe.34 What the police 
would soon discover was that the poachers cut a parallel route. 
The poachers of men and game operated from camps inside the densely wooded 
landscape which offered good cover for the hunted, such that it was practically 
impossible to run these recruiters to earth. Good cover was not just vegetational but also 
human. In total, these bandits were about eighteen illicit recruiters operating between 
the Transvaal Border, Runde and Save Rivers, Portuguese Territory and Southern 
Rhodesia. The worst characters on the states list were Barnard, Diegel and Roux, who 
stood accused of terrorizing all the natives in the District by flogging them and 
threatening to shoot them. The people were afraid to stay in their villages, and police 
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patrols saw quite a number of villages deserted and the natives were living in the 
bush. The three men worked in partnership, each of the armed with a rifle and revolvers, 
promising to shoot the first policeman they happen to run into. In 1912, Barnard had a 
warrant of arrest on his head for shooting a Portuguese African because he had sold the 
trio to Portuguese Police. In that incident, the Portuguese surrounded the bandits and 
captured a lot of stuff from them.35  
Writing to his opposite number in Pretoria on 28 April 1915, Southern Rhodesias 
Chief Native Commissioner Herbert J. Taylor disclosed that one of the agents that the 
natives had identified as Maspitelli was in fact a certain Phillipson, who worked for a 
Mr. Erskine. Phillipson resided on the Transvaal side of Mlala Drift. The CNC was more 
concerned however with the repatriation to this Territory of these natives and would 
ensure that the recruiter (Erskine) should bear the cost of repatriation.36 Taylor attached 
a letter he had recently received from a European resident in the Melsetter District of 
Rhodesia, adding that if the facts were as alleged: 
The recruitment of these natives is in contravention of Act 22 of 1913 of 
the Union inasmuch as the field of operations lies to the North of Latitude 
22 degrees south, and you may deem it advisable to take steps with a view 
to putting a stop to these proceedings. As far as possible, this Government 
is endeavouring to detect and punish illegal recruiters for the Rand 
Mines.37  
Here we meet Buchanan (one of the recruiters) on 25 May 1915, as recipient of a letter 
from Harries, regretting that the 37-strong gang of Natives he had forwarded for 
transmission to the mines had been rejected on their own admission that they come from 
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the Sabi. They state that they were prompted by one Longone [Long One] who is in your 
employ to give false particulars to me of [their] domicile. The NC wanted to know what 
sort of runners permit this Native Longone holds, and forewarned him that rigid steps 
will be taken to stop the recruitment of Natives from North of Latitude 22º South.38 
Buchanan replied as follows:  
I have warned the runners in my employ against prompting the boys, as 
requested by you. If you find that any one of them has been doing this, I 
shall be glad if you will cancel his permit at once, and let me know. Re. 
Native Longone; this boy is not employed as a Runner by me. His work is 
in connection with the store and he has never recruited a native nor had 
charge of natives, bar those employed by me in connection with the store. 
The Runner M. Pagati will be able to tell you that I have warned him, and 
also all my runners. I do not believe the natives statement as to Longone. 
If these boys were prompted to give false particulars it must have been 
before they came here. Trusting that no further trouble in particular will 
occur.39 
In another letter dated 14 June 1915, Harries complained that the lawlessness of 
the gang of illicit recruiters operating beyond the borders of this province has for some 
time past engaged our careful attention, but any efforts to combat it had failed because 
his police officers had no jurisdiction over that area north or east of the beacon. Harries 
diagnosed the problem of illicit recruiting to his superior the Director as follows: 
When the provisions of section 5 of Act 22 of 1913 together with those of 
section 9 of Special Regulations Transvaal under Act 15 of 1911 became 
rigidly enforced with a view to preventing the recruitment of prohibited 
immigrants, hopes were entertained that the field of operation of the illicit 
man having thus been restricted he would find that it would not be worth 
his while to continue his nefarious occupation. But instead of the 
restrictions having this effect they have been favourable to the illicit man 
who made it evident to the tropical labourer that but through him he could 
not get to the Rand to work. Thus it was that our efforts to stop the 
recruitment of tropical Natives were neutralized through the prompting by 
the illicit man and his runners with the connivance of the licenced man to 
                                                
38 NAZ A3/18/20/30/22 Recruiting Illicit 1915-18: Sub-Native Commissioner, Sibasa, to D.T. Buchanan, 
Esq., Makuleka, 25th May 1915. 
39 NAZ A3/18/20/30/22 Recruiting Illicit 1915-18: D.T. Buchanan, Makuleka, to The Sub-Native 





whom the tropical gangs are sold of all natives coming from beyond above 
mentioned parallel.40  
For months the practice continued, until Harries decided that all gangs of 
Natives be brought before him for attestation. He subjected them to a rigid 
examination. He obtained information from Natives with a thorough knowledge of the 
localities from which the [recruits] alleged they came, and used it to perform a sort of 
lie detector test which many gangs failed and were returned to their villages north of the 
Limpopo. In the first week of June alone, Harries had rejected two gangs totaling 39 men 
who swore they came from areas south of Latitude 22° south but finally confessed that 
they had been told to say so whereas in truth some came from near Sofala Bay and others 
from Melsetter in Rhodesia. While he had been doing all he could to prevent tropical 
Natives being smuggled through in this manner, Harries had found it not always 
possible to disprove the false particulars they give as to the domicile. Many Rhodesian 
natives trafficked via Makuleke had been primed to disclose their place of residence 
give their place of residence as being some place south of latitude 22º in Portuguese 
Territory. Harries concluded the only solution was to prohibit the recruitment of Natives 
from outside the Union in the area north of a direct line running from the Messina Copper 
Mine to the northern beacon of Tongwes Location, and from thence to the northern 
beacon of Mhingas Location. That way, the licensed men would retire from Makuleke 
and set up new depots southwards close to the local police post, a considerable distance 
from the illicit men who operate beyond this province. This would not hamper the 
recruitment of legitimate labor. Harries felt it essential to show labor agents at Makuleke 
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that it is not worth while to risk departing in any way from the regulations under which 
licences are granted to them.41 
Buchanan rejected the claims that Longone had been prompting tropical Natives 
to give false particulars to this office, but Harries found it strange that two separate 
gangs should have made this statement. There could only be one explanation: It seems 
as if, in order that we should not be able to get at the runners, tropical Natives are brought 
to Buchanans store where they receive the necessary prompting from Longone a private 
servant.42 Harries had extracted two affidavits to prove this. One had the names of six 
natives: Manyatshe alias Xmas, Tshimbute alias Chisell, Maheleni alias Sukuzonke, 
Lambeni alias Viet, Manyaka alias Matibele, and Tokolilepi alias Tom. Each swore they 
had come from Chief Musikavanhus area in Melsetter in Rhodesia: 
We were recruited and taken to Kennene (Mr. Buchanan) of Makuleka. 
When we arrived at Makuleka Native Longone told us that we must give 
our correct residences if we wished to go to Johannesburg as the 
Government did not allow it. He told us to say we come from Chief 
Maboyi and Rangani and that we must say Gidjani because it is not far 
from the Transvaal border  said that if we said Melsetter we would be 
sent back as it is very far away.43 
The second affidavit was signed by Native Nkozieta alias Comenutja, who lived at 
Manyiso, in Chief Mosikabantu in Melsetter, Rhodesia:  
I was recruited and taken to Mr. Buchanans store at Makuleka. Native 
Longone who works for Mr. Buchanan told me in the presence of seven 
other natives who also came from Melsetter, that we must give our 
residence as Chief Maboyi and that we pay our tax at Gidjani and not 
Melsetter, as we would be returned home if we give our correct residence. 
We were then taken and sent by Mr. Buchanan to the Sub Native 
Commissioner, Sibasa, for passes.44 
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The third affidavit was signed by Native Tshimeni alias Fifteen, also of Chief 
Musikavanhu: 
I was recruited with others by Native runner Phillip and taken to Kennene 
(Mr. Buchanan) at Makuleka. On our arrival there Native Longone told us 
that we must not say that we come from Melsetter as we would be sent 
back but we must say we come from Chief Rangani and pay taxes at 
Gidjani. Longone told us as we come from far we would not be allowed to 
pass through and we must therefore quote a residence close to the 
Transvaal border.45 
After carefully studying a report the Native Department Officials of the Union 
had submitted to the Director of Native Labour on 13 September 1915, the Rhodesian 
Commissioner of Police and the CNC were convinced that the Union was anxious to 
assist in putting a stop to illicit recruiting of natives in Rhodesia. The Rhodesians 
referred to Harriess suggestion of prohibiting the recruitment of natives from outside 
the Union north of the 22°. The CNC could tell from Union correspondences that 
licensed agents received gangs of illicit recruiters at Makulekes location, the 
geographical position of which renders it somewhat easy for the illicit recruiter to evade 
the police. Therefore, if the licensed recruiters were removed from that locality, the 
illicit Recruiter would have no market for his natives.46  
The Native Commissioner at Pietersburg had recommended that licenses be 
withdrawn from those agents who received labor from illicit recruiters. The CNC and 
Police Commissioner urged the South Africans not to issue any licenses to recruiters in 
the locality of Makuleke as there would appear to be no real necessity for them. There 
were enough recruits in the Transvaal and many of the natives obtained by recruiters in 
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the North are without doubt residents of Rhodesia North of Latitude 22º South and 
consequently prohibited immigrants in Union Territory.47  
 
Putting Colonial Sovereignty in Local Villagers Hands  
Let us now turn to Rhodesia and examine the attempts of the state to establish law and 
order in the borderlands. I discuss how the state responded to these highly mobile illegal 
recruiters by means of patrols (mobility) as opposed to a permanent police station. I will 
do two things. First, I show that the state had no immovable (built) infrastructure to 
permanently station a force in the borderlands. Second, I will examine how the state 
deployed mobility as a technology of enforcing borders. 
By borders I mean two barriers to movement. The first is Rhodesias separate 
boundaries with Portuguese East Africa and the Union of South Africa, through which 
game products and black ivory slipped into the latter colony. The second is the states 
boundaries between Gonarezhou Crown Land (the Rhodesian part of Gonarezhou) and 
Native Reserves (to which Africans forcibly removed from Gonarezhou were resettled). I 
argue that the fragility of one affected the other. Whether internal or international, the 
border was a ball to be kicked around for lack of policing.  
The unalienated land became a safe haven for poachers of game and men. In the 
absence of a police station within the unalienated land, the state resorted to patrols. I call 
them mobile administration for two reasons. First, because they were seasonal: all the 
riversLimpopo, Mwenezi, Runde and Savewere usually in flood, while malaria was 
devastating in the summer months. This meant that patrols could only take place in the 






winter months (June-October). The second reason is to see the mobility of the patrolmen 
as work in the processbecauseof movement.  
As we saw in Chapter 2, Gonarezhou had been a periphery of the Gaza, Transvaal 
and Ndebele states before the BSA Company and Portuguese slit it into a frontier area. In 
other words, it continued as a periphery after and because of the partition. For this reason, 
local villagers played a crucial role in keeping the frontier under surveillance, and 
reporting to the authorities on the security situation. Locals were well suited to possess 
expert knowledge on the subject because of their movements to and from the mines and 
to visit kin across the Portuguese and Limpopo borders.48  
Hence villagers along either side of the border had played a crucial role in 
providing intelligence to the belligerents in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902. They 
were not anybodys stooges: sometimes they refused to be intelligence cells or to be used 
by one colonial force against another unless they could leverage such assistance to their 
own cause. On 1 November 1899, a party of natives crossed from the Transvaal via 
Malaba Drift and reported to Peter Forrestall that a 300-strong, all-white Boer commando 
was encamped near the drift, are patrolling down the Limpopo for some distance. The 
force had tried to get mobilize Mashowies people to act against the British. They 
refused on the grounds that the British annexation of the Transvaal had improved their 
lot. Whereupon the Boer shot dead six Africans. Another attempt by British shopkeepers 
or traders living along the Pafuri to get Makulekes people to rise against the Dutch had 
                                                





failed: the people refused because the traders were charging too high prices on their 
goods.49  
The Native Commissioners usually undertook patrols on the basis of what these 
local informants told them. For example, acting on the basis of the above information, 
Forrestall traveled to Gezani a week later, from where he reported on 17 November 1899 
that the Boers, who had in fact been at Makuleke just adjacent to Sengwe Reserve had 
left for their main camp further south near Masetene Mountain.50 They left only 30 men 
watching the drift at Sengwes, just in case the British in Rhodesia entertained ideas of 
attacking them from that direction. Forrestall determined that the Boers had no intention 
of crossing into Rhodesia, given their position of weakness: Natives returning from 
Johannesburg say that all the Boers have fled to Pretoria, having been driven back from 
Natal Border. 51 
It seems proper to suggest, therefore, that villagers were the medium through 
which the state administered frontier areas. Without them there was no state. On 23 
November, Forrestall sent yet another wire (telegraph) to the CNC, in which he cited 
native reports that a force from Tuli had crossed the Crocodile (Limpopo) River on the 
eve of the 13th and that heavy gunfire was heard towards Masetene on the 14th. The 
natives also reported that three weeks earlier, two white men dressed like BSA Police 
passed Marunguse (Matibi) and crossed the same river via Sengwes. The men were 
                                                
49 Ibid.; NAZ N3/14/2-4 Internal Security: Intelligence: N.S. Taberer, Chief Secretary to CNC, 15 
November 1899. 
50 NAZ N3/14/2-4 Internal Security: Intelligence: Peter Forrestall , Gezanes, to CNC, 17 Nov. 1899. 





mounted and had two mules. They told natives they were going to Portuguese 
territory.52 
Acting upon these reports, Forrestall dispatched his native messengers to the 
river via Marunguse, who reported back that the Boers were still at Hanamva as late as 2 
December. By the end of November, the messengers could report to Forrestall that Chief 
Makuleke [the documents call the chief Sewaas] had captured four Boer women prisoners 
in revenge for all his stock commandeered by Boers. The messenger went on to meet I. 
Whitfield James, the owner of a local store who had just returned from Spelonken who on 
the way had engaged eight of Chief Matibis subjects at £1 each and sent them to watch 
the drift east of Tuli. At that time both the Runde and the Tokwe were flooded and 
impassable, and the Mlala Drift was the only possible crossing point for any potential 
Boer attack.53 Forrestall would get word from the villagers stationed there once they 
detected any suspicious white movement. 
On 18 January 1900, the Native Commissioner dispatched yet another native 
messenger, this time to the Save-Runde junction. The envoy reported no Boer presence 
either at or near the confluence. However, locals told the messenger that ten Boers had 
crossed the Limpopo to Chikwarakwara, where they were met by the Portuguese, who 
asked them why they had left their women folks behind. Whereupon five of them 
returned to the Transvaal to fetch their women. That was towards the end of December 
1899. The messengers sent to the Limpopo to perform the duties of a de facto border 
guard could not verify the presence of Boers in Spelonken, but confirmed the report on 
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Boers going to Portuguese territory. Meanwhile, James had confided in Forrestall that 
several of the Zoutpansberg Boers had said that in case of defeat they were going to 
settle at the Dzinalwini Mountains on the Portuguese-Transvaal border about 20 miles 
south of the junction of the Pafuri and Crocodile Rivers.54  
The main justification for relying on village intelligence is summarized in 
Howmans annual report in 1906: The district is large and the number of Native 
correspondingly small. A native policeman is only able to visit their kraal perhaps once in 
six months.55 In Howmans opinion, Ndangas Africans were an under-policed 
population without adding the extra burden of being border guards; one day this 
overreliance on natives would backfire. 
Howmans prophesy became a reality in 1918. A Rhodesian patrol under Colonel 
Capell arrived at the Runde River on 12 August 1918, just two days after Barnards 
release. From the Runde it headed to the Nuanetsi Ranch homestead. Peter Forrestall 
dispatched native messengers to the Limpopo, expecting them back at the Nuanetsi 
Ranch homestead on 15 September. On the 14th, he had a conversation with the Headman 
Gezanis son who lived about 60 miles north of the Limpopo. He told the NC he had not 
heard of any Europeans being murdered, but that there is a rumour that a native stole a 
shotgun at the Makuleke store, was tied up and escaped. Otherwise everything was 
quiet. Gezani was a headman under Chief Vurumela and lived about two days journey 
from the Limpopo.56  
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The Shangane native who had spread the rumor of a Shangane uprising against 
Rhodesia was named other than Klass. In a sworn statement signed before Peter 
Forrestall, Klass said that in June he was employed by a party of six Europeans hailing 
from Pretoria. These men were going to the Northern Transvaals Splonken district to 
recruit natives for work. The party proceeded to the part of the Northern Transvaal at the 
Limpopo-Mwenezi river junction and encamped on the banks of the Luvuvhu. For three 
weeks they stayed in this camp, during which time Klass was dispatched into the country 
to recruit boys for labour in Johannesburg. He managed to enlist about 29, who were 
sent away to Johannesburg.57  
Two weeks had passed when, one day, a great number of Shangane men arrived 
at the camp. Nobody had recruited them: There were very many of then (number 
unknown). They came & said they would work. They were told by the whitemen that 
they would be fixed up. So the whitemen went to sleep. In the dead of night the 
Shanganes raided the camp, caught the whitemen, tied their hands together with string 
and cut their throats. Klass said he was fast asleep together with other natives, including 
a wagon driver named Joseph, a Musutu (Sotho) who lives at Proporosi near Pietersburg. 
The Shangane caught all the natives in this camp of ours and killed them whilst they 
slept, but I and Joseph were tied up.58  
Klass had managed to loosen the reims [talons] around my ankles and upon 
going to the whitemens camp he saw that they were being tied up, and I saw with my 
own eyes the Shangaans tying up the whitemen, and I saw the Shangaans cut their throats 
& also disembowel them. After bearing witness to this murder most fowl, Klass ran for 
                                                
57 NAZ N3/14/6 Internal Security: Intelligence: 11 September 1918, CNC to Dept of Admin: Alleged 






his life to Mapaya, a Portuguese police camp, and got there at sunset. He knocked the 
door and told the Portuguese policemen that a Shangaan impi was heading in their 
direction and and they would be killed. They dismissed his story and told him to go & 
sleep.59  
The next morning Klass and one Portuguese Native police boy retraced to about 
one mile from the scene of the Shangane atrocities. They encountered the Shangaan impi 
and ran away. Klass saw the impi go to the camp & tie up 3 white Portuguese police. 
The native Portuguese police joined with the Shangaan impi. Klass saw the police take 
the rifles, too late as the impi surrounded the camp, burst open the doors of the house & 
caught and tied up the white police. The impi demanded money from the White Police, 
too the keys from one of the European police and opened the safe. Klass did not see 
them take money from the safe, but I heard later that they had. Thereafter the impi took 
the white Portuguese outside the house, cut their throats and disemboweled them to get 
the fat from them. Klass saw with my own eyes (here the informer swears the oath) the 
whitemen murdered.60  
Klass ran away from the scene of the latest murder following the Mwenezi River 
until he reached the Nuanetsi Ranch and revealed what he had seen to the whitemen. 
He then headed towards the Ranchs Runde section en route to Chibi. Along the way he 
heard that two Europeans had been killed at Makuleke. He was also told that all the 
natives under Chiefs Chikundu, Chibasa, Maplani, Makoloko (the latter only a small 
chief) had risen. So too had the natives in Portuguese country. Klass was also told 
that a large Shangane impi was heading towards Musina. Indeed, it was common talk 
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among the Northern Transvaal Shanganes that several natives had come down from 
German East Africa and were saying that the Germans were very strong. The English 
were running away, & now was the opportunity for the Shangaans to rebel. However, 
the Shangane did not wish to side with either party, but wishes to become strong & 
independent as they were all along. As Klass had heard, it was common talk in the 
Northern Transvaal that the Masutu (the Sotho) were going to rebel at Christmas time 
this year. The Dutchmen were going about among the Masutu inciting them to 
rebel, and to time their rising for Christmas time. But now the Shangane atrocities had 
thrust the cat among the pigeons!61 
Klass disclosed that there seemed to be a campaign apparently by some native 
society who are sending letters & messengers to Northern Transvaal chiefs Maplani, 
Chibasa and Chikunda to coordinate this rebellion. The organizers had approached the 
Ndebele, but it was not know who exactly the messengers were. Klass had obtained this 
information from Shangane natives in Nn Transvaal, but along the Mwenezi he had 
seen enough signs of preparations for war. He saw no food in the kraals: 
Since the threshing this year all food has been taken & hidden in the hills, 
& also big grain pits have been dug in the bush, & the grain hidden there. 
At or near, or just below the junction of Nuanetsi and Limpopo Rivers 
there is an island, and a great quantity of food is being collected here.62  
In a telegram on the 7th September, Forrestall advised his superiors at Victoria: Natives 
here not heard anything except rumour spread by Blantyre native. Natives passed en route 
busy in gardens. Leaving for homestead section BSA Co. ranches at once.63 But on the 
9th, the CNC sent a telegram to the NC Chipinga warning: Urgent: Reported Shangaan 
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rising Nu Transvaal. Reported Europeans murdered at Makulekas near Crocodile 6 labour 
recruiters. Please make inquiry & cable confidentially. Possibly chief Mapungwana could 
give information of a reliable nature if sent for.64  
Forrestall was not taking Klasss report lightly, however. In liaison with the 
police, he resolved that Klass guide a patrol and show them spot where Europeans were 
killed. He told the District Superintendent of Police that from what he knew of the 
Shangane, it was quite probable that the report of a rising is correct & something should 
be done at once. The district police chief suggested that an armed mounted force of 
European police & native police be sent down at once to patrol the district. The force 
could headquarter at Nuanetsi Ranchowned by the BSA Companywhich could be 
accessed by motor patrol and the rest on horseback. The bush was rather thick, but the 
water supply good. A show of force would demonstrate once and for all to the Shangane 
that the state world brook no nonsense. It was easy for patrols to leave from Gwanda to 
the Nuanetsi Ranch. There was only one question that puzzled the regional police chief: 
Do not the Transvaal or Portuguese authorities know nothing of the alleged rising? This 
is quite possible as they are a distance from alleged scene of murders.65  
 
State Patrols against Border Banditry 
Let us follow through this discussion to see how local footpads like Klass sent the state 
into panic, triggering all sorts of mobilities. Acting on the Administrators instructions, 
Taylor telegraphed the Unions Director of Native Labour in Johannesburg to discussion 
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further the latters letter of 13 September 1915. He wanted to know whether the Director 
had followed through his promise to secure cooperation from employers of labor agents 
operating in North-eastern Transvaal. The Director replied that: 
Arrangements had been secured between recruiting interests concerned to 
limit agents who will work on a salary basis. The organization would pool 
capitation fees by agreement; labour agents would be debarred capitation 
fees in respect of natives from outside Transvaal. It was hoped these 
measures would obviate inducements of Sub-Agents to recruit properly.66 
Taylor acknowledged the good faith the Union Government was showing towards 
meeting Rhodesias requests, therefore it would be better to wait for the results before 
approaching the High Commissioner. In the meantime, Portuguese cooperation might be 
sought.67  
After consultations with the Commissioner of Police, Taylor advised that the 
approach be made to the Portuguese High Commissioner to secure cooperation for joint 
operations that would also involve the Union. The first step involved lots of information 
exchanges: Taylor suggested that a dispatch be sent to the High Commissioner giving 
full and complete data from the records in our possession. Files were exchanged that 
disclosed how each administrative, policing, and labor system function on the three sides 
of the borders in connection with the traffic in natives. In a memo dated 23 February 
1915, the Unions Director of Native Labour had told his counterpart Secretary for Native 
Affairs, Pretoria, that there was no law or regulation under which individual recruiters 
could be brought to book for engaging tropical natives already within the borders of the 
Union. Two months earlier, J.W. de Jager, the Inspector for Native Laborers in Dundee 
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(Natal) had asked the Director to find out how certain Southern Rhodesian natives were 
being recruited for the Hlobane Coal Mines in Natal. His letter read in part:  
The following batches were received on the Mine between the dates above 
given (23rd April-14th May, 1914): April 23rd 41; the 27th 31; May 2nd 38; 
the 9th 106; and on the 14th 41. I then called all the tropical natives 
together and had a general conversation with them; when it transpired that 
although they were all happy and satisfied with the treatment accorded 
them by the Mine authorities, some of them were much aggrieved at the 
manner in which their agreements to proceed to this mine had been 
obtained.68  
De Jager found the various complaints to come from a 19th batch of 106 recruits, and he 
took a statement from their Induna, and from one of their number.69 
Writing to the Administrator of Rhodesia on 12 November 1915, the Governor of 
the Mozambique Territory chronicled the extent of the illicit recruitment problem in his 
domains. He noted that in early July, a native named Ruchimba, who lived in the 
Spelonken area of the Transvaal, had paid a visit to the lands of Chief Mahenye 
(Mossurise District) to see his brother, Chinzini. While there he was murdered, and the 
Magistrates Court in the District was waiting to try three men arrested for committing 
this crime. In addition to the murder, these men had also allegedly set fire upon 
Chinzinis kraal and robbed him of £5 and one head of cattle. The three co-accused 
were Charles Diegel, a German national known among the natives as Charlie; Cecil 
Barnard, an Afrikander whom locals called Bvekenya; and Roux, a mixed race 
Transvaalian whom natives knew as Ruzh. All three were well known in the entire 
frontier from Melsetter to Limpopo as adventurers and illicit native recruiters, having 
certainly police record in the Territory. It was said they had fled Makuleke (Transvaal) 
                                                
68 NAZ A3/18/20/30/22 Recruiting Illicit 1915-18: Herbert Taylor, Chief Native Commissioner, Salisbury, 
to The Secretary, Department of Administrator, 27th January 1916: Illicit Recruiting of Native Labour: 






to unknown destinations, possibly into Rhodesia. The Governor was requesting the 
Administrator give your instructions to have them arrested, if they are found there, and 
sent to this Government, which will pay all the expenses incurred with their 
conveyance.70   
In sweeping the trouble spots, a patrol would head from Chibi Station first to 
replenish supplies before heading to a rendezvous with a second police detachment from 
Ndanga. The white officer(s) rode on mules, while the African police and porter details 
trundled on foot, driving pack donkeys laden with patrol supplies comprising folding 
beds (for white officers only) and mosquito nets, and quinine. They would rendezvous at 
T.W. Jamess Chitanga Native Store to buy fresh vegetables before proceeding to the 
designated rendezvous.71 From the concentration point the patrol would head for the 
homestead of a village informer to gather basic intelligence on the whereabouts of the 
bandits.72  
Patrols were over-reliant on villagers for intelligence. Before the expected day of 
arrival in a locality, the patrol would dispatch local informers into the village to hear what 
people were saying about the whereabouts of the bandits.73 Besides the deliberate 
misinformation from people working with or afraid of the consequences of antagonizing 
the bandits, the patrol was often led on a wild goose chase. The patrol often left to 
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investigate a murder, assault or ivory poaching case, only to discover on arrival that 
either nothing had happened, or it happened in Portuguese territory.74 
Village intelligence determined the objective and itinerary of the patrol. It was 
usually after village reports that the patrols were undertaken. Once in the area, locals 
were less likely to raise suspicion that the patrol, so they were sent to scout ahead. The 
information they brought determined where the patrol headed next. The state acted on 
what the people told it. Sometimes the police were sent on a wild goose chase into the 
Bendama area in Ndanga when Bvekenya was heading south across the Guluene to 
Makuleke. In which case the patrol would break camp, double their speed to catch up 
with the culprits, oblivious that it was actually increasing it. Only when the patrol reached 
other villages was it told the thugs were heading the other way.75  
It became clear that patrols alone were not enough. At the very least, a temporary 
post was necessary close to these mens camps. The recruiters were active only during 
the dry season, so that the post could be withdrawn when the rains commenced. 
Patrols of short duration were ineffective, the Portuguese border police impotent. Once 
a Rhodesian police post was in place, joint surveillance either side of the border would 
leave bandits fleeing from one territory with no refuge in the other.76 It would require 
stirring up the Portuguese to render effective aid.77  
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The state seized on the disturbances of the recruiters to assert its own paternalism 
vis-à-vis the position of Africans, taking them as victims of border banditry. In a letter to 
the South African High Commissioner on 16 February 1916, the Administrator of 
Southern Rhodesia cited Scallan and Pierces findings when pinpointing bandits theater 
of operations in the border areas of Ndanga, Chibi, and Melsetter. He also suggested that 
the desperadoes were bribing chiefs to supply labour, forcing natives to supply grain, 
and compelling or inducing natives who reside in villages, or who may be en route to the 
Transvaal, to accompany them. Sounding a paternalistic tone, the Administrator 
emphasized the necessary for the protection of the natives, who are gradually becoming 
terrorized owing to the lawless acts of these individuals.78 He noted that the unlicensed 
recruiter used one method of abduction, intercepting Africans either side of the Limpopo 
and sell[ing] them to the licensed recruiters in the Transvaal, who pass[ed] them on as 
the result of their own labour. To avoid identification, the recruits were identified as 
coming from south of the latitude 22º South. They lied under oath to get into the Union.79 
To cut out the unscrupulous middle figures, all three states agreed to limit the number of 
agents to those who will recruit on a salary basis, [the Transvaal Chamber] pooling 
capitation fees in respect of natives from outside the Transvaal.80  
Although Rhodesia saw the measures as no doubt a step in the right direction, it 
was erring on the side of caution because as long as the market for labor remained, the 
evil would continue. Only a combined and coordinated police action in April to 
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coincide with the commencement of the recruiting season could ensure that these 
bandits would be put out of circulation.81  
At that time, Rhodesia was discussing measures to allow hot pursuit operations 
into neighboring territory and assigning a mobile magistrate attached to the patrols so that 
he could try on the spot and convict while evidence was at hand (the recruits in his 
possession being live exhibits). From there the police would take the culprit straight to 
jail instead of escorting him 300 miles away to the nearest magistrate. The three 
governments had to move swiftly towards concerted and simultaneous action by the 
Police authorities of the territories concerned in hunting down these outlaws. The 
Commandant-General of Police advised the Administrator that every time police patrols 
tried to arrest the illicit recruiters, they immediately took refuge in Portuguese Territory, 
where we have ample evidence that they follow certain tracks and have supply depots and 
camps along such tracks. The Governor of Mozambique meanwhile confirmed that 
when chased by Portuguese Police, the persons referred to take refuge in Rhodesia.82  
The simplest way of driving these bandits out of business once and for all was 
to cooperate in joint border patrols during the coming cold weather. To do so, the first 
step was to come up with a mutual bilateral agreement with two major provisions: (a) 
That this Administration is prepared to provide a strong Police patrol composed of both 
European and Native police, and that it is suggested in order to render its action effective, 
it should be permitted by the Portuguese Government to enter the Territory of the 
Mozambique Company when in pursuit of these illicit recruiters. (b) That in order to 
avoid complications and ensure complete cooperation, including the power to arrest in 







Portuguese Territory, it is suggested that a Portuguese Officer or official and a qualified 
interpreter should be attached to and accompany this patrol throughout its operations.  
The Commandant proposed that under this agreement, Rhodesia would allow Portuguese 
patrols to enter its territory in pursuit of the Bandits. Portuguese and Rhodesian police 
would be mandated to cooperate within the framework of a reciprocal arrangement. A 
Rhodesian official and interpreter could then be attached to the Portuguese force, and 
vice-versa if a Rhodesian police force was getting into Portuguese territory.83 
Although it was not until August that the Governor of Mozambique gave his 
official go-ahead, the exchange of intelligence between the two authorities on the 
whereabouts of Barnard, Diegel, and Roux was already increasing. On the 4th, the 
Commissioner of the BSA Police supplied information to locate and arrest the men, 
Diegel, Barnard and Roux. On the 7th, the Administrators secretary sent his opposite 
number in Beira a copy of an anonymous letter received by the Commissioner of Police 
regarding testimony of the crime of murder by the three men named Diegel, Barnard and 
Roux in Portuguese Territory.84 On 9 May 1916, the Governor of the Mozambique 
Company Territory informed his counterpart in Salisbury that he was awaiting some 
details from our Commandant at Mossurise (Mandlakazi) which will facilitate completion 
of the study that is being proceeded with of the suggestion made by His Honour the 
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Administrator regarding intelligence on the three bandits.85 The governor acceded to 
the Rhodesian plan on 7th August. 
The archives are silent until a dispatch from Peter Forrestall on 13 January 1917, 
forwarding to the Superintendent of Natives (Victoria) a copy of an affidavit by native 
Gaba of Mupfichanis village regarding Diegels cross-border raid on his cattle and 
small stock. Forrestall noted that Diegel and a man named Barnard had been labor-
recruiting on the border for several years, and came into Gonarezhou to poach elephant, 
rhinoceros, hippopotamus and other royal game. Forrestall complained that Barnard 
had recently flogged two natives in his district because he gave information against 
him. Barnard had sternly warned some villagers that if he catches certain of 
[Forrestalls] Native Messengers on the border he will shoot them. While BSA Police 
had patrolled the area every year, Barnard and Diegel would be in Portuguese territory 
and out of reach. Forrestall acknowledged the disciplinary power of Barnards violence 
and asked that the state match it with its own, starting with joint patrols.86 
The net also seemed to be closing in on Barnard after the police received 
intelligence on the 6th March that he was relaxing at Makuleke. Rhodesia quickly relayed 
this information to the Assistant NC at Sibasa.87 On the 7th, the Administrator advised the 
Law Department: Perhaps it might be possible to take action direct. The accompanying 
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papers show that Barnard is one of a gang of outlaws.88 The Law Department 
recommended that South Africa be also involved in the pursuit, arrest and prosecution of 
Barnard.89 After all, had not the Administrator himself given Barnards address as 
Makuleke in Sibasa, a part of the Transvaal? 
While preparations were underway to move on Diegel and Barnard during the 
winter months commencing in May, nature intervened in favor of the three state 
authorities. On 7 April, BSA Police received information from their village intelligence 
sources that Diegel had been severely gored by a buffalo, and [was] lying at his camp in 
Portuguese territory, being nursed by Barnard. The camp was situated on the east bank 
of the Dhabgazi River, a small tributary of the Chepfu River, about 15 miles from the 
Anglo-Portuguese Boundary. Close by was the village of Headman Chibala, which in 
Bvekenyas biography is Shubela.90 The Administrator promptly alerted the 
Governor.91 
The archive is very patchy for the intervening period, but on 22 June, BSA Police 
reported to the Administrator the arrest of Charles Diegel in Portuguese Territory. The 
Governor would be informed also that Diegel was facing a charge of stock theft in 
Rhodesia. In the event of Diegels conviction for offenses in Portuguese Territory, the 
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Governor would be asked to inform Rhodesia of the sentence, in order that the matter of 
asking for Diegels surrender may be considered.92  
Again the record is thin until August when we learn of Barnards arrest. On the 7th 
a staff office broke the news that Barnard was now in custody at Victoria charged with 
stock theft and assault. However, the staff officer at BSA police Headquarters doubted if 
the case against Barnard would stick owing to the lapse of time since these offences 
were committed. Moreover, he went on, there would appear to be no extradition treaty 
with Portuguese East Africa, if this is so, the Commissioner is aware of no procedure 
which will admit of Barnard being handed over to the Portuguese authorities.93 He might 
have to be set free, the law officer warned. 
The prediction became a prophesy. A copy of a telegram dated 10 August 1918 
advised without much ceremony: Barnard fined £5 or 14 days contravening game laws. 
Charge of assault with intent discharged. He leaves Victoria for his old haunts today. 
Please wire if any further instructions.94 On the 12th the Law Department also confirmed 
the absence of any extradition treaty with Portuguese East Africa. As such, the Attorney 
General had directed that proceedings shall be taken as regards the offences committed 
in this Territory, which did not amount to much based on the available fresh evidence. 
In the meanwhile, the governments chief law officer concluded, the question of any 
possible action in the way of handing Barnard over will receive full consideration. Such 
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action seems very desirable if it can be legally carried out.95 Barnard was walking free 
again.  
The state concentrated on putting Barnard and his cohorts out of the recruiting 
business, but was much less interested in clamping down on game poaching. The reason 
is simple: apart from designating the Gonarezhou area unalienated land (land not yet 
assigned as European private property or Native Reserves), the state had no plans for 
wildlife conservation. Here the mosquito ruled: fever discouraged a permanent garrison 
and regular patrols. The insect virtually opened up the borders that the three governments 
had closed to illicit movements. I will turn to these movements with a view to showing 
that what the state called banditry ignores the agency of villagers designated as victims 
and their understandings of Barnard as an ally against the state. The states nemesis was a 
friend. 
 
Why Borders Failed: Barriers in Peoples Pathway to the Hunting Grounds  
In this section I discuss the ways in which Africans shaped and reacted to the states 
partition of their land into colonial states and in them European farms, mining 
concessions, and state land. I focus on the role of mobility in the search for new hunting 
grounds as well as resistance against the state-imposed boundaries denying them access 
to, among others, the Gonarezhou forest. First I show how the mine became the new 
forest, the mine-shaft laborer the new hunter, and the wage the new carcass. Both mine 
and farm can each be interpreted within a continuing African tradition of going out to 
look for instruments with which to deal with domestic challenges. As we saw in Chapter 
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1, Africans had long resorted to a second granary whenever food security was threatened. 
Chapter 2 demonstrated that local men were in the habit of going on temporary journeys 
to earn a wage in cash or king and returning home to their families.  
Pushed off the forests where they had hunted for to live, many men left to work in 
the mines of the Rand, with a few others to Rhodesia. In the eyes of the state, a good 
African was one who not only worked for the European enterprise, but who also paid 
taxes. One of the biggest problems the NC Ndanga, W.N. Moodie, identified in his 1901 
annual report was how to establish how many natives go to work as owing to these 
being no pass system, no check can be kept. In the first three months of 1901, he had 
issued four passes for individuals to go to work, but several thousand more of his African 
subjects went to the Rand unaccounted for. 96 
Because colonial ruleand a company colony for that matterdepended on 
taxing the native population to finance administration, the Rhodesian state had to be a 
biometric state.97 Taxation was all about the states ability to count and control the 
movement of its biological subjects. Therefore, much emphasis was put on statistics, 
especially measuring the population sizes of each district since only male adults could 
pay taxes. Ndangas was estimated at 52,000 divided among 641 kraals and living in 
13,768 huts. Moodie boasted about his native subjects: It is marvelous the good-
humoured docility with which 52,000 natives allow themselves to be ruled by a native 
commissioner and 10 messengers.98 By 1908 the population had risen to an estimated 
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68,000.99 In a subsequent report, Moodie commended the law-abiding character of the 
districts people.100 In 1906, Forrestall estimated the population of Chibi District at 
30,900an increase of 2,120 on the estimate of 1905 from 1904.101  
Statistics like these were necessary to project the amount of revenue to be 
collected. In 1906, £7,891 had been collected, and when added to the tax arrears worth 
£607 and to fees and fines totaling £14, the total rose to £8,512. In addition, there was 
still £473 tax outstanding, owned principally by natives living in the lower part of the 
district, who have been unable to pay owing to the flooded state of the rivers; the rest is 
owed by natives who are still away at work. Forrestalls opposite number Howman 
noted that the revenue for that year had exceeded my expectations except the most 
easterly portion of Ndanga comprising Jiri, Budzi, and Zikis countries. These chiefs 
were at such a distance from this station that it is very difficult to get at them.102  
The number of Africans proceeding to work in the Transvaal was, to Howmans 
own admission, much higher than those going to Rhodesian mines, farms, and towns. On 
top of the 2,360 he had issued with licenses, Howman noted that quite 1,500 others, and 
this I think is a very low estimate, went down without passes. However, the Assistant 
NC was rubbing his hands at the rewards of their undocumented emigration: 
The benefits to be acquiredboth to the government and the nativesby 
this exodus to the Rand were impossible to be overestimated. Firstly they 
are able to pay their tax without any trouble and secondly the broadening 
process which  their minds must undergo, by intercourse with the better 
class natives in the South will greatly help to make them more amenable 
to discipline in the future. The natives who go South have to enter a six-
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month contract; after that time expires, the contract is monthly. Large 
numbers of them work for a year before returning home. Discouraged 
from going north by poor pay and poor treatment.103 
For the 1907 figures, some 450 others went through the Labour Bureau Agent in Victoria, 
making a grand total of 3,192. Because the rains were good and the season started early, 
fewer African men left for the Transvaal.104 
By the 1920s, the word maricho (temporary chore in exchange for remuneration) 
was already being used to describe this work of short duration and included such jobs as 
porterage, wagon-driving, or spooring. The sojourn at the mine was a journey that could 
only be seen to have succeeded if it brought back dividends to the village. The workplace 
far away from the village was called the forest (sango); to be away in the mine was to 
be in the forest (musango). To work (kushanda) was to hunt (kuvhima or kushava). When 
the worker returned from mine or town laden with products of work, these were 
welcomed like a carcass, the hunter being praised with much poetry (nhetembo). 
With one pair of feet after another trudging on the same places leading out of the 
villages to the mines of the Rand, the local men established pathways. As a rule, Africans 
in the transLimpopo always marched in single file while also crossing their feet, so that 
the path was excessively narrow. One route span from the Sofala on the Indian Ocean 
coastline, following the Save to Pafuri and thence to the Rand. The other joined the 
Sofala footpath at the Saves junction with the Runde.105 Once in the Transvaal, the 
                                                
103 Ibid. 
104 NAZ N9/1/10 Annual Reports of CNC and all NCs in Mashonaland for Year Ended 31st December 
1907: Ndanga Yearly Report for Year Ending 31st December 1907. 
105 Major J.J. Leverson, Geographical Results of the Anglo-Portuguese Delimitation Commission in 
South-East Africa, 1892, Journal of the Royal Geographical Society 6, II (1893): 516; Zimbabwe 
Fieldwork: Personal Ethnographic Notes on Compiled at Swimuwimi Rest Camp, Inside the Gonarezhou 






itinerant walked through the thickets of Kruger to Johannesburg; later, after 1910 the 
route would go via Louis Trichardt as I outline in a separate section on Bvekenya.  
Let us followed the migrant to the mine and watch him arriving at Johannesburg 
(Park) Station aboard the train or on foot, to be greeted by an imposing Zulu boss-boy in 
a uniform. We have already seen how in the late-19th century the Zulus were being used 
as marshal instruments to bring discipline among the natives in the last chapter. The 
towering figure led the sheepish recruits out of the station through the clamor, light 
and movement of Eloff Street, past many streets to the mine.106 The arrival had to deal 
with the harsh of being (presence, self, and moving) in a new place.  
What could being at the mine mean? Like all hunts it was an absence from the 
village that those left therethe familyimagined as a journey, a continuous kufamba 
(mobility) that would only end with the appearance of the person in the village. By this I 
mean a worthy experience in anticipation of arrival, and staying or living in a place in 
anticipation of the arrival of a day of departure. It was a transitory state from a recruit or 
captive to a wage laborer, from quarry to hunter, and the mine from a strange capitalist 
monster to a familiar hunting ground. Journeying was earning wages, arrival was saving 
enough money to take back home, to the village. To those in the village, the absence from 
the village or awayness at the mine was a journeythat of workwhose only arrival 
was a fruitful return. Non-return was a state of lostness (kuchona), the non-arrival of the 
journey itself.107  
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These are the imperatives that drove mining: capitalist production was worked by 
men fired by the opium of the return, who saw their labors not necessarily as factors in 
production, but a kind of short-term, livelihood-driven, and patriarchal chore (maricho) 
performed as part of kusunza. This chore dovetailed with a capitalist contract that stifled 
permanent employment and domicile on the mine and a restrictive dormitory-style 
accommodation system. A short contract of 9-15 months made existence at the mine a 
temporary sojourn or a journey, to gather as much as possible to take to the village.108  
The presence of the mine in the village was felt through the absence of the 
patriarch at the mine. The absent self was experienced in the village in ways it had no 
control over. And not only the self as body, but as family, property, and even personal 
attributes, became identified with a sense of presence at the mine. This mapping of the 
self in absentia had consequences on how the person in body was experienced on the 
return. Unbeknown to the worker, his wages were already being allocated a value
perhaps even purposes, for example the family borrowing on the promise to pay back 
kana baba vauya (when father comes back).109 
A traveler to the Hlengwe countryside in 1906 found that in no single kraal did 
he find more than one or two men of working age who had never been to work at 
Johannesburg, and in many kraals there was no man at all who had not been on the 
mines.110 At that point, while the Transvaal Chamber might congratulate itself for 
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attracting these men, it rings even truer that the sojourn at the mine was based upon 
mundane threats to African manhood (hurume) and even adulthood and seniority 
(hukuru) in the villages. What would being a man (kuva murume) be if the patriarch 
could not hunt for his family? 
By default, the mine management enabled the hunters chase to bear a carcass. 
The company withheld the laborers wages until he had seen out his contract; if he 
deserted or terminated it, he forfeited his earnings. I am not too preoccupied with whether 
or not the system was (un)fair but, rather, how this early banking system enabled the 
arrival of the journey (work) by imposing institutional discipline on the laborer to save 
money that might be put to other purposes if paid out regularly, turning the journey into 
non-arrival.111 The wage of between £1.6 and £3 was a pittance. However these shaft 
boys, blacksmiths boys (strikers), police, and office and store boys, drill packers, engine 
cleaners, timber boys, and tram boys, measured the value of money in terms of purpose in 
the village, not just the size of the paycheck.112 
The magayisa (rich one) arrived in the village with much ceremony and fanfare 
(mutsindo). An arrival that reverberated throughout the village was something to expect 
from a magayisa trundling home along the path from Soekmakaar towards Pafuri, laden 
with goodies, including clothing, stylish hats, blankets, and cash to pay tax and purchases 
at the native store. He was not short of storiesand status.  
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Among many other urban and western artifacts the magayisa brought back, those 
associated with hunting game animals are the most fundamental to this chapter. Writing 
in a confidential report on 9 October 1914, the Native Commissioner in charge of the 
Hlengwe districts, Peter Forrestall, noted the massive numbers of firearms locals around 
Gonarezhou owned. Chief Mpapa and his people were the main culprits. Scarcity led 
these longtime users of muzzleloaders to innovate gunpowder from charcoal and 
solidified rock rabbit urine dug from the caves. They made bullets by running lead 
around pieces of iron manufactured by the local iron smiths. Some fitted into the 
muzzles, some did not. The Native Commissioner for Ndangaunder which the northern 
part of Gonarezhou fellnoted the art of making gunpowder out of a salty substance 
harvested from caves and mixed with ground charcoal of a sulfurous river plant called 
mungwakuku. They made gun caps by welting pieces of hide and drying them into the 
shape of the nipples of the guns and when dry the head of safety matches were put into 
them. The biggest problem with the caps was dampness.113  
It did not take long for locals to adopt technologies used in the mines to address 
the problem of ammunition at home. As the men used explosive charges to blast in the 
shafts and witnessed one dynamite-related accident after the next, African mine laborers 
learnt that dynamite could be useful gunpowder for their village muskets.114 Cases of 
dynamite (blasting gelatin) were sealed by Government officials in cartridge form and 
stored at 140-150°F.115 Yet incidents of explosive thefts were so high that on 8 October 
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1910, the Transvaal Chamber issued instructions that all natives returning home be 
thoroughly searched before leaving the mine premises.116 However, it was in the darkly-
lit mine-shaft that much of the fleecing took place.  
A vivid description of how the Hlengwe in particular mined dynamite from the 
cartridge cases and transported it home comes from the biography of Bvekenya: 
They went to the length of making crude guns of their own out of unrifled 
pipes, which fired pebbles, hard marula pips, and a variety of other 
objects: lethal if they hit the target, more lethal if they exploded in the 
hunters face. 
Ammunition was always scarce. Every returning migrant worker 
would try to smuggle home a supply of powder, filched from the mines by 
means of furtively unraveling fuses somewhere in the dark, thousands of 
feet down a shaft. 
They would secrete this powder about their persons: in the hair, 
concealed in their clothing, or hidden in hollowed-out cakes of soap. One 
man managed to fill up a whole calabash with gunpowder. It was a 
treasure, enough to buy him several wives. He had a second calabash full 
of water to sustain him on the journey. 
As he tramped along the Rhodesian border he encountered a police 
patrol, searching the mine labourers for gunpowder. They stopped him, 
along with his companions. He sat down miserably, waiting to be 
searched, while his companions were each forced to give up their small 
secretions of powder. 
The policemen were perspiring in the heat. 
Have some water, masters? asked the man, with a touch of 
genius. 
The policemen accepted readily. He gave them his calabash of 
water. They drained it. with his heart in his mouth, he offered the second 
calabash. 
No, said one of the policemen kindly. Keep that for yourself, 
youll need it on this path. 
They searched him and found nothing on his person. He picked up 
his precious calabash and went on along the path. It was a thirsty journey 
home, but he sang all the way.117 
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Whether this story is true or not is a debate that will go on. What we do know is that by 
1906, the theft of scrap metal, wire, brass and copper fittings from mines and public 
institutions had reached epidemic proportions. The Chamber, together with the Central 
South African Railways, the General Post Office, the Municipality and the Commercial 
Chambers appealed to the government for legal and police protection. 
This is an example of the journey enabled the movement of technology from the 
mines to the villages. In a sense, this deception encapsulates the hidden ways through 
which contraband travels from one place to another, even under the watchful gaze of the 
state. This secrecy represents the changing nature of not only securing instruments 
necessary to continue the hunt of wild animals in Gonarezhou, but also a different type of 
hunt in itself. Technology that could not be overtly transferred through the firewall of 
state policing still covertly found its way out through the elastic traditions of Africans.  
How could this happen?  
 
Epilogue: The Agency of Mobility  
Through their illicit movements, villagers and poachers called in the state to perform its 
duty to administer the colony. The argument is simply: if the state wished its presence to 
be felt, it had to be present in physical form. It had to commit bodies on the ground to 
move about and discipline its subjects. To commit bodies, it had to build permanent 
administrative structuresNative Commissioners offices, police stations, and roads. The 
state would be able to curtail the illicit movements of recruiters and villagers to and 





order to fully understand the steps the state took to do this, I will limit the narrative to a 
blow-by-blow account of Rhodesian developments.  
In 4 September 1919, W.A. Loades became the Assistant Native Commissioner 
and a Special Justice of the Peace for the Chibi District in charge of the proposed Native 
Department Station at Nuanetsi. The site for the post could not be selected before the 
onset of the rains, and nothing was erected, but survey work was begun. To that effect, 
the CNC requested the Administrator to authorize the NC Chibi to spend £200 in 
constructing an office and the ANCs quarters at the site. He wanted them completed 
before the onset of the rains.118 But no funds were immediately available and the CNCs 
advised the Administrators office to approach the BSA Company to request them to 
erect the office and rent them out to the state with the option to purchase as and when the 
budget allowed in the next fiscal year.119 
The station was established in 1921 by as late as May 1922, but the quarters and 
offices were still being contemplated. ANC Hulley resumed duties on 6 May 1922. In 
his first memo to his superior the NC Chibi, Hulley considered it his first obligation to 
make some comment relating to the site chosen for this station. From the onset he had 
serious reservations about the site where a Police Camp already neared its completion. 
Hulley felt the site had not been chosen with a view of general utility [and] future 
requirements. It was 500 acres in flat depressing mopani veld,  invariably too dry or 
too wet and where nothing can be grown. Besides this we are hemmed in by trees. No 
amount of clearing could even help because the stock routes passed through the eastern 
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leeward section of our reservoir, and when in use in the dry months will smother the 
place in dust.120 
In addition, some of the native staff relied solely on some of the land to grow 
food and supplemented their diet with any meat the ration allowances they draw in lieu 
of rations. While these rations could be purchased when living in the vicinity of 
natives, that was near difficult to do given the location of the station some 20 miles from 
the villages. Realistically, very little quantity of ration food could ever be grown in the 
entire flat mupani veld. For proper health, Europeans and even prisoners needed to 
have fresh vegetables. Where are these to be grown?121  
Hulley declared: The camp will never be a permanency. He proposed it to be 
re-sited either southwest on the watershed where the railway lines will more likely run: 
Or it has to be south east to get proper control of the lower portion of the 
district and an eye kept on the Portuguese boundary. It is a deterrent to 
permanent improvement to establish a station, the surroundings of which 
are uninteresting and where the camp is to be continually moved. The late 
Mr. Forrestall, I believe, recommended a site some 18 miles northwest of 
this, in the vicinity of Maplanks kraal. With his knowledge of the district 
such a locality cannot be easily condemned. Another site can be found on 
the uplands of the Mateke Range some 35 miles southeast of this.122  
Hulley objected to attempts by the big ranches to influences the location of the station in 
their vicinity to the exclusion of the requirements of the native inhabitants. The ANC 
concluded: I do not wish to pass as an authority after such a short residence but to bring 
to your notice matters which are fairly serious.123  
Outlining the functions of the ANC, the CNC reiterated that the NC was the 
office responsible for the administration of the whole district. A detached ANC was 
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responsible for administering a portion of the district as the CNC and NC decided upon, 
and the extent to which he exercised his own discretion and initiation would depend 
upon local conditions. There were no general rules.124  His office could be seasonal, 
closing during January-April, and opening only during winter. The magistrates court 
would close accordingly.125 
By the beginning of 1923, a man named Bibra had replaced Hulley as assistant 
NC of Nuanetsi. On 15th January 1923, the CNC advised the Supt of Natives Victoria to 
appoint Bibra as both Assistant Magistrate and ANC with carte blanche to go down to the 
Nuanetsi station when required and weather and rivers permitting. This would be 
preferable to holding a periodical court on a fixed date.126  
The CNC complained about the viability of Nuanetsi station on 21 February 1923, 
citing the Medical Directors condemnation of the station itself as unhealthythe very 
reason why for many years the district had been administered from Chibi. As he saw it, 
the only object of opening the sub-station was to facilitate administration in the dry 
season, because in the wet season it was quite clear that patrols and courts impossible to 
conduct. The foliage was thick, rivers impassable, while there was no accommodation for 
convicted persons: If convicted natives have to be taken to Chibi to undergo sentence, it 
appears to me that the unhealthiness of the journey would be very much the same as if the 
natives were under arrest on their way to be tried.127  
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On 28th February 1923, police headquarters consented with the Native 
Commissioner Nuanetsis opinion to make the best of what may be considered an 
unsatisfactory situation to use discretion in taking up cases, holding them over, or 
taking them to Chibi. The question of withdrawing the station in summer was to be 
reviewed in September.128  
By September 1923 the latest ANC Nuanetsi, B. Palmer, confirmed the 
completion of the quarters at Nuanetsi. They consisted of a 3-roomed building in green 
brick with thatched roof and verandah on three sides. The ANC occupied two rooms 
which he used as a dining- and bedroom respectively. The third room served as an office 
and courtroom. The first room could not lock securely, the doors were mosquito-proof, 
but not the windows. The second was similar but its window was entirely missing, while 
the third had two insecure doors that were mosquito-proof, but not the windows. The 
lighting was inadequate, making them popular with mosquitoes and ants, which were 
well settled in the floor and walls of the building. The roof was of native timber tied 
with bark for the most part. The rooms being so big, the spans required in native timber 
not being properly secured has resulted in parts of the roof being made of whifting. 
Palmer doubted if the roof would survive the coming rains, and would not be surprised if 
it collapsed and caused damage to contents and possibly inmates. Already the gaol that 
had been built in similar fashion at the same time as the quarters had collapsed.129   
Two years since its establishment on the justification that the lower portion of 
the district could not be administered satisfactorily from Chibi which is about a hundred 
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miles away, the CNC Herbert Taylor was convinced that Nuanetsi had office has since 
fully justified its establishment. However, he agreed that the stations removal to a 
more healthy and a more central position should receive attention as soon as more 
favourable conditions for viewing the district obtain. He wanted more suitable living 
and office accommodation to be provided, and suggested that provision be made for the 
next fiscal year. Meanwhile, it was crucial to consult the police themselves and find out 
where exactly they felt the new station would be most suitably located.130  
On 6 July 1924, the Assistant Police Commissioner BSA Police Victoria, Lt.-Col. 
J.W. Foulinsons, reported to police general headquarters of his trip on the 2nd with the 
Acting DSP Victoria District and the Supt of Natives Victoria Circle to the headquarters 
of Nuanetsi Ranch. There Foulinsons called the ranch manager M.P. Gilpin and together 
the party reconnoitered certain sites along the Nuanetsi River with the object of 
selecting one which would do for the Government officials camp on which suitable 
permanent buildings could be erected. Every member of the party was agreed that the 
best site was one about 2 ½ miles down the river south east of the ranch headquarters 
(where the river drift is). The site had a hilly spur running approximately at right angles 
to and approximately 500 yards from the river. A road ran parallel with the river from the 
Ranch Headquarters making the site accessible with good space for putting up two 
department buildings on the rising ground. The site would match the current ones 
strategic location in terms of undertaking police duties, beyond which the new site had no 
advantage. In all, the distance between the two camps would be ten miles. The BSA 
Company was anxious to pin the government to make a decision on a permanent site 
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close to them to the extent of offering to build the new camp at cost price if this would 
assist. The technical permutations were also discussed: 
The cost of this is approximately £365, a suitable stable (36` x 12`), brick 
with gig. peak roof was quoted at £ and an EC at £5. thus according to 
quotations the cost of the buildings for the Police would be about £550, 
this amount including a building for stores.131  
In August, the Chief Native Commissioner sent the Medical Director a report from the 
Assistant Commissioner, BSA Police, for comments, reminding him that the local 
medical officer at Victoria was in favor of this move in the interests of the health of the 
Camp. 132 The Medical Director, Andrew Fleming, had said: I have no knowledge of 
this, re. why it is proposed to remove the present camp at Nuanetsi. It would be difficult 
to find a really desirable site in this district, which was at the same time conveniently 
situated for Government purposes. 133  
Upon receiving a report from the Supt of Natives, the CNC expressed support for 
the establishment of the camp and urged steps be taken to ensure the buildings being put 
in hand at as early a date as possible, in view of the administrative staff of the district. It 
will be seen that the building staff on the BSA Companys Ranch can undertake the work 
that, if approved, will considerably expedite the completion of the buildings, and will 
probably result in considerable saving to the Government.134 Two tarpaulins each 15` x 
30` have been forwarded to you for putting over the defective thatched roof, one six light 
10`` x 12`` casement and frame is also being forwarded. Please let me know the size of 
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calico required for ceiling in the office and one living room.135 In further communication, 
the Under-Secretary for Mines and Works reminded the CNC it was agreed that the 
question of building new Asst Native Commissioners quarters at Nuanetsi should be 
held over until the permanent site of the camp is fixed. There is a possibility that the 
present site may be changed. 136  
By mid-1925, plans for the construction of the new station were in full gear and 
modalities for tendering the actual construction was attracting candidates from near and 
far within Rhodesia. None more-so than I. Whitfield James, the store owner at Chitanga. 
On 15 June, he wrote the latest ANC at Nuanetsi, H. Comberbach, having heard that the 
Police are pulling down and erecting new quarters at Nuanetsi this year. He therefore 
took the liberty to write and ask if such rumor was true, and the Native Department 
would be following suit in moving camp, Comberbach would be prepared to 
recommend me for such work, either on contract or otherwise: 
I am fully competent to undertake all such work, and would guarantee to 
get the work done certainly at cheaper rate than if special men had to be 
sent down. All the buildings here at Chitanga were personally built by 
myself and have been erected mostly for about 25 years. Anyway, if you 
should be able to put any such work into my hands, I should be very much 
obliged to you. The temporary job I am employed upon, as you are aware 
there is very little emolument attached to it.137  
There is nothing in the archives about what became of this tender. 
However, it turned out that Comberbach had settled on another candidate. The 
plans for construction had to be changed because the builder the BSA Company had 
chosen had pulled out. A local Dutchman named van Groenen had already experienced a 
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willingness to undertake the whole work, including the making of the bricks. He is a fair 
workman, but would require frequent expert supervision.138 Ranch manager Purcell 
Gilpin suggested that the building be put up by contract. The bricks could be made 
anywhere near the camp, while the poles would come from the mupani forests.139  
On 2 February 1927 Director of Public Works B.R. Barley formally requested the 
sum of £1,900 from treasury for materials and labor costs to cover the ANCs quarters 
and a similar figure for the police camp.140 The revised profile of buildings was as 
follows: NC Quarters and outbuildings, clerks quarters and outbuildings, police camp 
barracks, mess and kitchen, office, stable and store, ECs, and 2 cell prison (12 detention 
cells).141 The work did not begin until August 1928.142 
It is not wonder that the poaching of men took so long to stop. As the next chapter 
shows, this is also precisely why the poaching of game also escalated.
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Chapter 5 Poachers Of Game 
 
While in conservation, tourism, and state circles the poacher (pocha) is publicly seen as a 
criminal, in the villages of Gonarezhou the poacher is a hero. There is only one other 
person that rivals the poacher in the popularity stakes: the majoni-joni (those who work in 
Joni, as South Africa is called in Shona). How do we explain the popularity of people 
who break state laws governing boundaries?  
This chapter is not just about reasons why poaching took place but how the 
poachers went about doing it, and how the state went through the motions of anti-
poaching. It challenges Rosaleen Duffys attempt to separate subsistence poaching 
(village-based and using non-western devices) from commercial poaching 
(international or involving state officials and armed with guns), arguing that the two 
categories are inseparable. I make the case for a much more intricate picture of poaching 
beyond the political ecology-centric dimension she took.1 Moreover, subsistence and 
commercial are restrictive, often bifurcated categorizations of poaching that 
automatically exclude other technological, cultural, and environmental causes, processes 
                                                






and outcomes. There is more to be gained from an inclusive approach that explores the 
co-construction of people, technology, and nature through the mobilities of the animals, 
the poachers, and anti-poaching apparatuses. In addition, I suggest that the trends she 
attributes to postcolonial Zimbabwe have a much longer genealogy.  
To do this I will first sketch how poaching led to the protracted establishment of 
Gonarezhou National Park. Then I will use state anti-poaching records to examine 
village-based poachers transgressions of the game reserves fence. In the final section, I 
show how the failure to address local grievances against the state over Gonarezhou led to 
escalating poaching after independence. The section closes with an examination of the 
actual conduct of post-independence poaching and anti-poaching operations, emphasizing 
the interplay between hunting technology and mobility. 
 
African Villagers and White Poachers 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the states view of Barnard as a bandit is over-
simplistic. The state was not fabricating banditry as such, but deliberately created an 
impression that every villager was a victim. The point of this section is to show that 
locals co-produced this banditry that was directed against the state and its local informers. 
Positioned between the state and its nemesis (the poacher), villagers exercised a latitude 
to be loyal state subjects or to ally themselves with its nemeses. How did they do this? 
The village at large was a vital intelligence infrastructure for gathering, managing, 
disseminating, and withholding information. Village rumor was an important source of 
this information, not only for locating elephant but also to alert Bvekenya of approaching 





might pick up word in the village during their off-days and carry it to him. He often 
dispatched one or two of his hunters to verify the facts he was given, which were correct 
most of the time. Only a vigilant village intelligence prevented Bvekenya from being 
arrested on many occasions. They tipped him off well ahead of a police patrol and when 
police arrived, headed them off in the order direction.2  
The circumstances within which Cecil Barnard became Bvekenya illustrate how 
crucial it was for the poacher to establish alliance with local villagers quickly. That locals 
entered such partnerships to start with is an indication of their self-interests. Barnard told 
Bulpin that he got his name after a thorough beating from local highwaymen in the Save 
valley. As he trudged to Makuleke, the blisters on his feet were so painful that he was 
limping. Along the pathway he encountered a group of Shangane men returning from the 
Rand gold mines, who upon observing his unusual walking behavior called him Bvekenya 
(The-one-who-walks-with-a-swagger).3  
Not according to Chief Makuleke. The Shona of Gonarezhou gave him this 
notorious name. Barnard had acquired a bad reputation for having sexual liaison with 
local women not just in Gonarezhou, but also in Makuleke and the adjacent parts of 
Mozambique. Bvekenya does not mention this in his biography because it would invite 
shame on him from his white readership in a period when such interracial liaisons were 
frowned upon. As a fan of the poacher, Allan Wright exposes these liaisons with local 
women, but puts the positive spin that Bvekenya paid lobola (bride-wealth) for them 
according to local custom. To cement his relationship with local villagers, the poachers 
married local women under customary law. In Rhodesia, Bvekenya fathered children 
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with at least two known women. The senior one was Kami who lived in Chief Sengwes 
area very close to the Limpopo, in a village along the Dumela to Pafuri road; (a son 
named Samuel Pieter and a daughter named Maggie). His second was Chinengise of 
Chief Masuvameles area, with whom he had a son named John Piet.4 On recent 
fieldwork to Makuleke (South Africa), I was told Bvekenya had at least one child with a 
woman who lives in the chiefs area.5  
Bvekenyas sidekick, Diegel, lived with a local woman in Mupfichani area until 
his cook ran away with her.6 Practically every white man consorted with a local woman. 
There was nothing unusual about this: Forrestall himself had several African wives.7 
While the state actively discouraged these relationships, on the frontier those racial 
boundaries were fragile. In fact, they anchored the white man in the village. 
There was a distinct advantage in providing sexual and other services to men like 
Bvekenya: game meat was assured at a time when Africans were now banned from 
hunting legally. To carve out his own loyalties he mimicked the states use of violence (to 
colonize) and paternalism (to protect), and added a third dimension. This is what the state 
has already confirmed in the last previous chapter, without giving the villagers one ounce 
of agency! 
State archives also agree with Bvekenyas location of his camps along Rhodesias 
border inside Portuguese territory (because state security was virtually non-existent). 
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There he processed game products like leather and ivory; the camps also acted as 
collection points for labor recruits. One was at Mazimbe on the Guluene Chefu 
confluence; the other at Zambaredza some five miles from the Save River. The group had 
permanent camp, huts, lands and also a few cattle several horses, mules and donkeys 
there.8  
The meat from game hunting became a potent labor recruitment tool, not only for 
sell to the mine agents but also for his own hunting staff. The men whom he employed as 
trackers and porters also assisted him with building his own silos at semi-permanent 
camps along the Rhodesia-Portuguese border. A police patrol in August 1915 discovered 
near one village in Chitsa a quantity of grain and pumpkins and wire belonging to 
Barnard buried in an underground grain bin. The trooper in charge, J.M. Scallan, offered 
the grain to the villagers , but they refused, saying that Barnard and company would 
return and flog them as they had shown us where the stuff was. Bvekenya had 
apparently traded the grain from the natives under compulsion, the object being to resell 
it to the natives later on when grain would be scarce thereby making a large profit. He 
would be in a position to withhold food as he saw fit and to oil his village alliances.9  
While Bvekenya confirms the states portrayal of him as a violent man, he says 
such violence was necessary to set disciplinary standards that, once met, were good for 
the hunt. Moreover, violent means were either provoked or disciplinary means of last 
resort, otherwise his was an excellent relationship with locals to the extent that they 
opened up their spiritual world to benefit his hunting exploits. He was skeptical and 
downright contemptuous initially, but agreed to the services of a nanga after a long 
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barren spell. He underwent the same purification rites as we saw in Chapter 1, and 
confesses the return of his luck just hours later. He became a convert: from then on he 
traveled for two years with a nanga named Mgwazi to ensure that the enemies he had 
made through his violence would not bewitch (lock) his guns.10  
The police characterization of Bvekenya and his fellow outlaws as bandits 
belies the evidence of partnership between the poacher and village poachers. At 
Matombos village near Machindu Poolone of Bvekenyas favorite killing grounds
one patrol in late 1915 saw what amounted to a permanent poaching camp. The culprits 
had constructed pole and mud huts, around which were scattered bones of giraffe, eland, 
roan antelope, zebra etc. These men hunted with muzzle-loaders and tracked for 
Bvekenya.11 They were his mobile reference books on just about every part of wildlife in 
Gonarezhou. How do we explain this free-for-all?  
 
The Birth of a Game Reserve 
The first point is the uncertainty regarding which government department and state was 
responsible for Gonarezhou and Crooks Corner respectively. No wonder the area became 
a virtual no-mans land until the return of the tsetse fly in the 1930s. Only in 1921 was an 
assistant Native Commissioner (NC) stationed at Nuanetsi (Mwenezi) Sub-Office and 
Police Post (about 40 miles away from Malipati sub-office). Up until then, Native 
Commissioner Peter Forrestall was the chief authority in the area. His office was located 
at Chibi Station a hundred miles north to the north. The BSA Company was both the state 
                                                






and a private landholder until its concessionary powers expired in 1923 as agreed to in 
the royal charter.  
The responsible government that took over created different government 
departments to administer the border area. The BSA Police was responsible for policing 
the international border; it fell under the NC, who was also in charge of the Native 
Reserves. The Agriculture and Lands Department (DAL) was in charge of land-use in the 
Crown Land in a number of ways. Its Department had responsibility over all wild 
animals. The Entomology Department monitored the tsetse fly. The Lands Department 
was in charge of land tenure and use. Finally, DAL also had a Veterinary Department, in 
charge of enforcing strict boundaries between game and livestock. The convergence of 
these departments reflects the way elements of nature within Gonarezhou determined 
state administration.  
While the state officials were answerable to European settlers with interests in and 
around Gonarezhou because they could vote them out of office, Africans had no voting 
rights and therefore no such influence. The new but temporary police post at Nuanetsi 
operated only in winter, beating an early retreat before summer floods and malaria closed 
in. In 1924, the BSA Company Ranch at Nuanetsi offered the Native Department land 
and personnel to build new offices along the Mwenezi River to replace its ramshackle 
sub-office, built only after four years of fighting red tape.12 It was around this time that 
the Department of Commerce started considering the establishment of a game reserve in 
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the area. The BSA Company acceded because increased administrative presence would 
secure its cattle ranches.  
In 1925, the state established a commission under Morris Carter to formalize the 
veterinary-oriented divisions of land taking place in the area. The Native Reserves were 
designed in such a way that they formed a buffer between game (vermin)-infested 
Crown Lands and the European Land. Matibi I Reserve had 286,000 acres and Matibi II 
478,000; both came under Forrestalls Chibi District. In particular, the area between the 
Runde, Portuguese border, the Limpopo and Bubi Rivers, Nuanetsi Ranch, and Matibi II, 
totaling 1,783,000 acres, became Crown (State) Land or unalienated land.13 Any land 
that was in the hands of government and that which was unalienated was always open to 
re-designation as the state saw fit.  
The declaration of Kruger National Park in 1926 had a knock-on effect on the 
three neighboring states border enforcement. With the introduction of game laws in the 
south back, Gonarezhou became the nearest place for white South African men craving a 
shot. In Southern Rhodesia, Kruger had inspired the Wildlife Protection Society chapter 
and the Commerce Department into exploring the modalities of establishing a game 
reserve with the picturesque Chipinda Pools along the Runde as a nucleus. Backed by 
individual hoteliers and safari operators, the Department of Commerce, was specifically 
interested in Chipinda Pools along the Runde River as the centre of a game reserve. In 
June 1928, the Chief Entomologist recommended an even bigger sanctuary on condition 
that contiguous land not good for anything else was found.14 In the meantime, on the 
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Portuguese side a regime of game protection for safari hunting had taken shape along the 
common borders, cashing in on game wandering out of Kruger and Gonarezhou. 
Meanwhile, increasing incidents of foot and mouth disease made it imperative for 
Rhodesia and South Africa to clamp down on unregulated human and cattle traffic that 
might transmit the strain to cattle ranches. All this left little scope for people like 
Bvekenya. In 1929 he retired to the western Transvaal to commence life as a farmer. 
Early calls for the establishment of a game reserve in Gonarezhou resulted overwhelming 
from growing concerns about poaching. In 1934, some 7,000 Africans were living in 
Gonarezhou. Chief Chitsas people at the Save-Runde junction were experts with the 
bow and arrow and the setting of traps; they were killing large quantities of game. To 
the south of the Runde was a compound where natives collect for transportation by 
motor lorries to the Limpopo and Parfurie;  these people, in particular Ngwenyenyes, 
hunted entirely uncontrolled and showed no respect for a white man.15 Another 
culprit was Matombo and his people on the Mwenezi, who killed at least three big buck 
per week with snares, traps, dogs, and guns.16 
While both DAL and Commerce were calling for these villagers to be removed, 
the Native Department insisted on the allocation of alternative land to settle them. It 
would not promote overcrowding, soil erosion and overgrazing in the Native Reserves 
just to save wildlife. DAL and Commerce argued that the envisaged 50-100 mile fencing 
would keep away lions, hyenas, wild dogs, and leopards from these peoples 3,000 head 
of cattle. Native Department disagreed: the fence would render untenable the existence of 
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1,500 Africans within Crown Land now proclaimed to the game reserve. The department 
would be more than happy if these people were removed because it would not worry 
about policing these remote, unreachable localities. However, it made no sense unless 
DAL supplied the land first.17  
The proponents of the scheme needed a more powerful argument than just 
conserving nature for its own sake. Two developments took place from 1929 that 
changed the situation in favor of transforming Gonarezhou from unalienated land to 
game reserve. First, the Great Depression struck the world markets, severely reducing 
the demand on agricultural products like tobacco and beef. The government scampered 
for alternatives. Secondly, in 1930, Rhodesia introduced the Land Apportionment Act, 
which re-designated the Gonarezhou from unalienated land to unassigned area,  
neither African, European Area nor Forest Area. The move left Gonarezhou open for 
alternative land uses like conservation and tourism.18 Still, tourism in Gonarezhou would 
generate a fraction of the amount needed to combat the losses to agriculture.  
Things changed with plans to link the project to a bigger transfrontier 
conservancy in 1934. The project was essentially a South African attempt to extend 
Kruger into neighboring areas to absorb the overstocked game in the park. DAL hoped to 
cash in on this goodwill by offering the 2 million acre land between Save and Limpopo, 
between the border and the western fringes of the Mwenezi. The Gonarezhou game 
reserve was now composed of the triangle of land between the Limpopo and Pafuri 
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Rivers touching the Kruger.1920 The objective was to create a continuous transfrontier 
game corridor from Kruger right up to the east coast of Tanganyika.21 Gonarezhou would 
be developed for tourism.  
Kenyas success had already shown that game reserves and safari areas were 
about tourists paying to watch or hunt, to sleep, eat, and enjoy their holiday. Hoteliers 
and tour operators spotlighted Chipinda Pools as the core of their business interventions 
in the Gonarezhou idea.22 A Zimbabwe chevron-style country hotel  with mosquito-
proofed accommodation and a store would be established there.23 Proposals were put in 
place to station a warden with police experience at Chipinda given the often lawless 
nature of this border area.24 Reliable natives would look after visitors, giving them 
confidence to camp and explore the reserve.25 There was one problem: DAL could not 
agree to subsidize the incentives the Commerce Department was asking for. It was the 
view of veterinarians that the game reserve would become a reservoir of predators and 
veterinary diseases (principally foot and mouth disease and potential trypanosomiasis).26  
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This is exactly what happened. By 1937, the game reserve proposal had been 
completely abandoned because of veterinary disease implosion despite the persuasive 
arguments of the Department of Commerce and the Southern Rhodesian Wildlife 
Protection Society.27 Nuanetsi Ranch, the countrys premier beef producer, had declared 
losses of 600 head of cattle per annum to carnivores and tick-borne diseases spread from 
wild animals. It had struggled to cope with foot and mouth disease attacks since 1929; the 
1932 strain also had infected 800,000 head. After a respite in 1933, the disease broke out 
again in 1934.28  
Tsetse fly sealed the fate of the project. In 1935, the Department of Tsetse Control 
commenced operations to clear forest in the Melsetter District to check tsetse fly 
incursion from Espungabera (formerly Chipungumbira). Trypanosomiasis was claiming 
many cattle each year, and the Chief Entomologist warned of a menace not only to 
Rhodesia but possibly to the Union as well. He did not wish to create a highway for 
tsetse into South Africa.29 The proposal was dead in the water. For the next two decades 
the Rhodesian government battled tsetse fly, any game reserve being completely out of 
the question. 
A kind of free-for-all set in. It became customary for white visitors or government 
officials to live off the land whenever they were in Gonarezhou. A team of researchers 
called the Rhodesian Schools Exploration Society (RSES) visiting Gonarezhou in 1954 
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feasted on meals of impala and other steak.30 In fact, one local African passed with some 
elephant biltong from elephants which the Native Commissioner had shot some days 
back.31 The 1958 expedition to the Bubi River had an arrangement with the Native 
Commissioner M. Haglethorn to secure the right to shoot for the pot if absolutely 
necessary.32 Scientific expeditions like the RSES also had the liberty to shoot for 
laboratory specimens.33 So did local white ranchers, some of which kept displays of lion 
skins and elephant tusks in their houses.34 
Upon his appointment to Nuanetsi in 1958, District Commissioner Allan Wright 
put a stop to this nonsense of shooting for the pot in 1961. By then poaching had got 
completely out of hand. The states policy at the time was that the country had too many 
game reserves, and Wright knew any initiative would have to be personal. There were 
two basic types of poachers confronting him. First, the local villagers, with snare-lines 
lining every nook and cranny of the forest.35 Secondly, whites crossing from South Africa 
into the hunting grounds because no one enforced the laws. 
The first thing Wright had to do was to establish authority. He did this by 
establishing permanent administrative infrastructure and enhancing communication 
between his office and the outliers. In this way, Wright was learning from his 
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predecessors like Haglethorn, who did not know his way around places like Mateke 
Hills.36 First, he cut roads and built bridges that cost a lot of money and technology to 
upgrade and maintain. In many places, anybody traveling to Gonarezhou had to contend 
with getting out of his vehicle time and again to clear shrubs, trees, and stones from the 
footpaths, and to improvised drifts on the rivers for crossing.37 Second, he built sub-
offices all over the district, thereby ending the practice whereby Africans journeyed for 
days and tens of to see him, queued even more days, and sleeping over just to be served, 
often when the answer to their request was No. Third, he created an intelligence 
network, comprising his own staff of District Messengers (DMs, formerly Native 
Messengers) and villagers, as his eyes and ears.38  
Using roads, radios, road transport, and bicycles, he connected the various 
isolated sub-offices into one administrative circuit, with his station at Nuanetsi as a 
command center. Previously Wright had had to send a district messenger by bicycle to 
communicate directives to Chiefs and headmen. Now he gave the driver of the commuter 
omnibus servicing the tribal roads a locked dispatch case to drop off at the sub-office. 
Locally, the DM delivered the DCs instructions to chiefs and headmen on bicycle. 
Wright wanted even faster communication. Telephones were too expensive and 
vulnerable to falling trees in summer storms; locals poached the cables to make snarers. 
The DC opted for radioa technology not widely used then except in the police and 
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army. He purchased six World War II surplus No. 19 VHF/HF from Cape Town, each 
with a 400-mile reception range.39  
The technologies of communication also enabled him to collect tax more 
efficiently. Another member of the RSES, D. Swire-Griffiths, noted on 5 May 1958 that 
all villages we approached appeared to be deserted; either the inhabitants fled at our 
approach or were working in the fields.40 Another expeditioner, D. Sanderson, 
explained: We came upon some kraals, but the inhabitants were not at home, obviously 
thinking we were government officials, probably collecting taxes.41  
Whereas previous Native Commissioners had physically patrolled in order to 
increase the visibility of the state, Wright now had the remote tools to be in many places 
at once. Every DC had a Head District Messenger (HDM) and a team of District 
Messengers who acted as his eyes, ears, and mouthpieces. This was just the core of an 
intelligence infrastructure that kept informed Wright of what villagers were thinking. 
They included teachers, dip tank attendants, storekeepers, government agricultural 
employees, headmen, and so on.  
Unlike his predecessors, Wright was a more mobile DC. Every DC was allocated 
an official vehiclea Jeep, Ford, Chrysler, Chevrolet, or Anglia van or 4 x 4to enable 
him to cover the whole of his district. The downside was that some would simply zip 
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along in their cars from point A to point B with no stops in between.42 In the course of 
administering people, Wright discovered the need to protect nature. 
He personally put up the signpost at Makokwani Pool turn-off prohibiting 
shooting, hunting, or camping in the entire area bounded by these farms, the Mwenezi 
River, the railway and the Portuguese border.43 It read: NUANETSI GORGE AREA. 
This is a wild life sanctuary and hunting, camping and shooting are strictly prohibited. 
By order, District Commissioner, Nuanetsi.44 He then proceeded to moved further 
downstream to a pan on the western side of the Mwenezi called Manjinji.  
These signposts and instructions generally worked. When the RSES expedition 
arrived in Gonarezhou in 1962, things had changed. In the past the most attractive job on 
these expeditions was that of quartermaster; not anymore. By Wrights personal 
proclamation the camping site was now in game reserve and there could be no shooting 
for the pot.45 Wright gave the expedition a lot of help and advice, but the days of 
shooting for the pot were gone. 
Visitors confirmed that game numbers had dramatically increased. As the RSES 
expedition made its way by Land Rover from Nuanetsi Station down the Mwenezi river 
to set up its fieldwork camp at Malipati Sub-Office, Wright warned its leaders about 
elephant on a certain stretch of the road between Chikombedsi and Malapati (sic), where 
certain sanguinary minded pachyderms were likely to behave in an unfriendly manner.46 
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In the riverine forests of the Mwenezi and Runde, the RSES recorded in 1962 a 
sparsity of resident game, but there were countless game paths, many types of spoor of 
game coming down only to drink at the river, then return to returned to the more open 
country. Only the hippo, vervet monkey, bushbuck and smaller carnivores were resident 
in the riverine forest. In the flat, tall-tree mupani woodland from the edge of the riverine 
forest to the foothills of the escarpment, the expedition saw eland, kudu, impala, zebra 
and warthog. The spoor of elephant, buffalo, duiker, stembuck and lion was clearly 
visible. The researchers also saw in the mixed lowveld community numerous resident 
species like kudu, nyala, bushbuck, klipspringer, bush pig and baboon. The spoor of 
leopard, hyena, cheetah, giraffe, ostrich, and smaller carnivores like jackals was also in 
evidence.47 
By 1963, Gonarezhou was already popular as an area for viewing game and for 
fishing. The Runde River, especially the area around Chipinda and Chitove pools, was 
excellent for angling tiger fish. In the reed-beds, however, the elephant herds had shrunk 
from the hundreds they used to be in previous years to an average of five animals due to 
the erection of game fences and hunting operations to protect them. Along the 
Portuguese border, the protection of game and FMD fences between the Save-Runde 
junction and Pafuri was taking up most of the Department of National Parks and Wild 
Life Management (DNPWLM) staffs time. Then there was the protection of the cattle 
fence along the Matibi II TTL and the Lone Star Ranch, which had resulted into the 
destruction of 12 buffalo, 2 eland, 5 kudu, 8 impala, 5 hippo, and 38 elephant.48  
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The more the animals increased, the more they became a danger to peoples lives. 
In 1965, the DNPWLM dropped a bombshell on Wright: the drought conditions in 
Gonarezhou and the hunting pressure in the tsetse areas had caused heavy 
concentrations of game in Buffalo Bend. The riverine vegetation of the Mwenezi was in 
jeopardy: to correct the situation, the department deemed it necessary to reduce the 
numbers of elephant and buffalo in this area.49 This exponential refugee population of 
wild animals added to the natural increase of zebra, roan and lion. Nyala calves were also 
in evidence in December. That was not all: an elephant bull branded 12 on its near side 
rump and ear had also sauntered quietly into Buffalo Bend from Kruger National Park.50 
All these game concentrations were taking place at Wrights unimaginable pleasure, but 
at local villagers expense. 
To make an objective analysis of the game population density, in 1967 the 
DNPWLM conducted an aerial survey in the 500-square mile Buffalo Bend area. The 
1,248 elephant confirmed the departments suspicions: the sanctuary was overpopulated, 
the vegetation disproportion, and the game population in urgent need of reduction. The 
continued destruction of elephant and buffalo in the tsetse corridors was forcing heavy, 
unnatural concentrations of wild life along the Nuanetsi River.51  
Despite the slaughter of 600 elephant in 1971, the habitat deterioration continued. 
The ecological experts attributed the problem to imbalances precipitated by such factors 
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as past hunting, past settlement and the misuse of fire. They also cited the presence of 
numerous other species that tended to neutralize whatever gains made from culling 
elephant. A high proportion of trees had also succumbed to bush fires or been pushed 
over by elephants.52 
The animals became a serious threat to villagers. In the Chishinya area, elephants 
and buffalo began harassing Africans in the villages, destroying their crops. Lions were 
killing cattle and goats. Wright remained unsympathetic, accusing local people of 
provoking the animals so that they could get meat when DNPWLM shot them.53  
Wrights personalization of the problem animal issue does not articulate with 
the position of the DNPWLM. Throughout the 1960s, the department responded to 
distress calls from villagers losing cattle to predators and crops to elephants and buffalo. 
The primary responsibility of these scouts was supposed to be anti-poaching, but they 
ended up getting preoccupied with problem animals straying and causing mayhem in the 
villages.54 In 1969, one research officer had to be airlifted by helicopter to hospital after 
an elephant first gored then attempted to kneel on him, fracturing his pelvis.55 Also in 
the same year, staff at Mabalauta was preoccupied with calls from villagers and ranchers 
to drive off or destroy elephant damaging fences and irrigation installations.56  
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Making a Game Reserve a Tourism Space 
While kicking everybody else out, there were some Africans that Wright tried to keep 
inside Gonarezhou. He imagined them as part of a wildlife tourism package called wild 
Africans. Wright was not referring to local Africans knowledge about wildlife and 
places but African villagers as wildlife. To him, Ngwenyenye and his people were still as 
primitive, ultra-conservative, unspoiled Shanganes living as they had [been] a hundred 
years ago and were part and parcel of any national park scheme of the future. The 
overseas tourists, who had a surfeit of dams, towns, buildings or mountains at home, 
would seize the opportunity to study wild animals and wild Africans. If Ngwenyenye 
stayed, Gonarezhou would have a wonderful opportunity to combine the two great 
attractions in a unique and beautiful setting. Moreover, these people were just another 
species of predator, whose poaching was part of the ecosystems checks and balances. 
DNWPLM saw some sense there: their poaching activities would save the department 
the trouble of having to cull later when the area becomes over-stocked.57  
Wrights proposal on wild Africans was more an article of faith than reality. 
Writing on Ngwenyenyes relatives in Chitsa just across the Save River, an 
anthropologist, J. Philpot, had observed in 1954 that while the local inhabitants had 
generally retained much that is picturesque and primitive, they were rapidly being 
civilized. Their tribal society was in an advanced state of disintegration. Philpot 
also noted that observations should be recorded for posterity before their way of life is 
                                                





completely swamped with the new set of values which they must absorb from mine, farm 
and native store.58  
As pointed out in Chapter 2, this adoption of western repertoires of modernity was 
not an abandonment of indigenous innovations in preference to western modernity as 
such, but a sign that tradition was itself elastic and adaptive. Sometimes the ideology 
remained, but the material instruments for practicing it was changing; other times the 
ideology itself was changing in tandem with the materiality of instruments required to 
practice it; yet other times ideology changed but the instruments did not. The point is that 
if Wrights wild African was predicated on unchanging traditions (the primitive), 
such a species no longer existed. 
The DNPWLM did not allow Wrights fantasies to distract it from developing 
Gonarezhou for its dual purpose: tourism and conservation. In 1967, numerous South 
Africans tourists and a large number of local residents visited Chipinda Pools and 
Buffalo Bend for game-viewing and fishing. DNPWLM also started encouraging hunting 
safari tourism, the first of which was conducted in 1967. Most of the tourists were 
coming in via Chipinda Pools, an indication that the area had considerable potential. To 
further encourage this traffic, the warden had overseen the construction of an ablution 
block along the Runde River and earmarked two others for a couple other designated 
camping sites at Chilojo Cliffs and Chinguli.59 The department was doing something 
about raising staff morale. In 1965, two staff housesone a three-bedroom, the other 
two-bedroomedwere completed at Mabalauta, on the east bank of the Mwenezi, 
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another a two-bedroomed pre-fabricated cottage at Chipinda Pools.60 In 1970 two new 
houses were constructed at Chipinda Pools for European staff, while the wardens house 
underwent major renovations while the African housing area was relocated further from 
the riverbank.61  
That same year in April, the Swimuwini Tourist Camp was opened to the public. 
It was hoped that the unspoiled atmosphere at this station obviously appealed to a 
number of visitors who had grown tired of more sophisticated areas. The warden also 
supervised a number of touch-ups on the new administrative office block, especially the 
reception area and the gardens. Meanwhile, work on the road from Mabalauta to Nyala 
was proceeding well, while the access road from Mabalauta to Chikombedzi had been 
widened to eight meters for about ten miles. The four mile tourist drive inside the 
Buffalo Bend created with Wrights permission had become an instant hit with tourists.62 
Further improvements took place at Swimuwini in 1971, while the Lions Club of 
Chiredzi had generously equipped the game-viewing platform at Makwokwani Pool.63  
 
Making Villagers Poachers 
Wright could have succeeded with the co-existence of game and villagers if the land 
Ngwenyenye occupied was a Tribal Trust Land. This was not the case: DNPWLM was 
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firmly in charge and its opinion was that Ngwenyenyes cattle posed a veterinary threat. 
The headman and his people dug in: their great grandfathers had been born there, lived 
there and were buried there. Their roots were deep in this ground; to uproot them was to 
take the life out of them.64 However, the DNPWLM had already concluded that 
Ngwenyenye and his people were snaring game, that game and people cannot live 
satisfactorily side-by-side.65  
In the eyes of the DNPWLM, any African resident in areas reserved for wild 
animals was a squatter, regardless of whether that persons ancestors had owned or 
lived on such lands. Here are two insightful quotations from the Director himself. The 
first was in 1968, the year that the Buffalo Bend area of Gonarezhou was declared a game 
reserve: It is pleasing to record that the squatters in the Fitchanis area have been moved 
out. Squatters still remain in the area between the confluence of the Sabi and Lundi 
rivers.66 In the second, he was saying that the forced movement of Ngwenyenye and his 
people out of the park freed up space for the unfettered mobilities of wild animals. Hence 
at Marumbini where elephant herds were previously unknown, large herds were 
occupying the area only eight days after the squatters had moved out.67  
The escalation of poaching was a reflection of resistance against the forced 
removals from the area designated Gonarezhou Game Reserve in 1968. The following 
year, 63 Africans were arrested in the game reserve and adjacent areas for contravening 
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the Wild Life Conservation, Fish Conservation and Forestry Acts. However, the main 
headline was a serious case of assault on a game scout who was trying to a re-arrest one 
man for poaching: he suffered five axe wounds in the head, had his clothes removed and 
was left for dead. Regional Warden Douglas Newmarch noted in 1970 that snaring and 
poaching in Buffalo Bend was out of control because the Ngwenyenye people resettled 
there were an embittered lot; why, I dont know.68  
Ngwenyenyes people were an embittered lot with material reasons to poach. 
Just like the mines and burgeoning colonial towns, the forest was looked upon as a source 
of income, poaching a lucrative business. The village was the production line, the village 
the market. African butchers sold beef at between 18 and 25 cents per lb. On economic 
grounds alone, people preferred venison at 10 cents per lb. The skins had a ready market, 
with a zebra one attracting R$15. The penalty for a crime of poaching was too light, 
thereby encouraging repeat offenders. 80% of the offenders were not arrested.69  
The predominant weapon of poaching was the snare, were made either from cable 
or from high tensile wire. The numbers each poacher could set is staggering. On snarer 
was caught in 1966 in possession of 18 set snares and 33 ready for setting. He had 
already killed one eland, one buffalo, one nyala, one kudu, one zebra, one warthog, two 
waterbuck, one elephant and one crested guinea fowl.70  
Bows and poisoned arrows were still very much part of the arsenal. For example, 
in 1968, a hunter named Matsilele Yingwani Hlengani of Pahlela village, who operated in 
the Sengwe area near No. 4 Cattle Dipping Tank used bows and arrows together with a 
muzzle loader and snares. Dogs were used in tandem with bows and arrows as well as 
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guns, but they could not be used with traps. The reason is simple: they would be caught 
in the wire snare or trip the gin trap. It was common to chase anything from hares to 
antelopes with dogs, but not buffalo, both for the dogs safety and the size of the prey.71 
Most poachers worth their salt used snares in combination with guns. The data for 
the 1960s shows that different generations of unlicensed firearms were in use. The most 
surprising are the  18-19th century muzzle-loaders, with which locals normally shot 
buffalo and antelope. A man named Musengi of Musimeki village was suspected of 
owning either a muzzle-loader or Martini-Henry rifle. Some .410 breech-loading rifles 
were also in use. Another named Posheleni of Sengwe used a .303 rifle, which he 
normally kept in his house. Because of anti-poaching patrols in the Manjinji and Dumisa 
areas, he hid it in the forest.72 Posheleni was one of 21 poachers arrested in 1967 in a 
DNPWLM Anti-Poaching Unit (APU) operation which led to the recovery of one .303 
(his) and one .22 rifle.73 On 26 May 1971, the APU caught a poacher named Mahlava in 
the act of using his 9.3 Mauser rifle. In addition, he was also in possession of 57 wire and 
cable snares, and had sent his second gun, a muzzle-loader, for repairs. The record also 
shows the use of double-barreled 12-bore shotgun used to kill kudu and buffalo.74  
The data suggests that poachers had a very efficient weapon maintenance and 
production system in place. Some poachers were not just users of instruments but 
designer-users rolled in one. There is evidence that metallurgists (including poachers) 
were not only repairing guns, but also making home-made versions. In the Mafuku area, 
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in 1964 the APU arrested a man named Jasi in possession of a home-made gun, slugs 
and detonators.75 Men like Jasi were highly adaptive experts in practically all indigenous 
hunting technology, who adopted new raw materials to their design. Another was Toyola 
Pahlela of Sengwe, who is referred to in the APU reports as a master trap mechanic. 
Among instruments recovered from his person his homestead were muzzle-loader and 
cable snares, bits and pieces of 2-3 gin traps, four hammers and two chisels, and some 
bellows. In addition to repairing his own equipment, Toyola was the expert to whom 
other poachers deferred to purchase new or repair old instruments like gin-traps, bows, 
arrows, and (repairing) muzzle-loaders.76  
Just as we saw with Bvekenya, these poachers ran their own intelligence 
responsible for monitoring the whereabouts of park patrols as well as the animals. 
Because the scouts were locals, it was easy for uncles who were scouts to advise their 
nephews in the village when best to come in. In the absence of any kinship links between 
scouts and poachers, poaching was all about time management, which is why the fence 
and patrol were ineffective as a barrier. As an example, Frank Musisinyani of Mahinga 
village had been successful as a poacher was because he usually operated in the Malipati 
locality at month-ends when game scouts [we]re in for pay.77  
The poaching gangs were organized along village or kinship lines. It was rare to 
find a hunter who hunted alone, the idea being to pool resources, especially dog packs. 
Whereas in some cases the poachers were just ordinary villagers of no rank, in villages 








like Gezani/Pahlela south of Manjinji, the Headman Pahlela Mavindhlu himself was the 
chief culprit. It was a father and son combination.78  
The fences that the state meant as boundaries between villages and the game 
reserve became the hidden highways of poachers. For example in the Gonakudzingwa 
African Purchase Area in 1972, the APU discovered that some individuals were using 
Farm # 17 as a hidden butchery. They would enter the park, make a kill and carry the full 
carcass back onto the farm to avoid detection.79 One of the menChitayiwas the 
property owner. The other man was Elias Suzwani, who owned a large caliber muzzle-
loader kept on Chitayis farm. He admitted to arranging transport to remove carcasses 
from Gonarezhou, confessing that numerous game animals were butchered on his 
property and that meat was given to him. It was presumed that Suzwani received meat in 
payment for the rifle and transport.80 
There also kinship-related poaching connections across the border between 
Rhodesian Shanganes and Mozambican Shanganes. Take the case of Mambawu, a 
Portuguese African who lived in Tsvuku village in Malvernia, who in the 1960s used to 
cross into Gonarezhou with dogs and snares. Then there was Casimitu, arrested on 21 
March 1968 for possessing a rifle and hunting deep inside the park. Casimitu confessed 
his reliance on Shangane kin in Rhodesia for informants and a ready market for venison. 
In October 1968, a man named Dumazi who lived in Hayisa village on the Rhodesian 
side, was arrested for possessing three set snares and admitted to killing two nyala. In 








court, Dumazi admitted to operating with Thomas, a Portuguese African who lived in 
the adjacent Portuguese village called Gavumente (Government).81 
The case of Mahenye is well documented because a latter-day Bvekenya operated 
from the villages into northern Gonarezhou. It would be hard to find anyone in Mahenye 
who does not know Shadreck, arguably the most famous mupocha around Gonarezhou. 
The Portuguese African lived near the border in Mozambique, from where he made his 
forays into the park. Barring a period of two years spent on the South African mines, he 
had been poaching elephant since 1960. Puzi also revealed that Shadreck had operated 
with a muzzle-loader in Gonarezhou for fourteen years until the beginning of 1974 when 
he became more sophisticated. He got arms and ammunition from the same people he 
sold ivory to:  
As he was wounding so many elephant, two European Portuguese, who 
live[d] at the sawmills on the Save River, about six miles into 
Mozambique, gave Shadreck a .375 Parker Hale Magnum rifle. These two 
Europeans are the ones who buy his ivory. The name and number of this 
.375 rifle had been filed off. 82 
An informer confessed to the APU that he had lost count of the number of elephant 
Shadreck had shot, but it was a tremendous number and that now that he had a .375 rifle, 
he had collected enough money this year to buy himself a store.83  
In July 1976 Shadreck made another dramatic transition. Robert Mugabes 
Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) guerrillas had started their 
incursions through Gonarezhou from Mozambique. Running short of options, the 
Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) turned to clandestine measures. One of them was to use 
Shadreck, who was ideally placed to be an informer as he crossed and re-crossed the 








international border, mixed freely and was accepted as a friend by both ZANLA 
guerrillas and Frelimo soldiers. The Selous Scouts, a dirty tricks unit within the RSF, 
had found just the perfect cover for Operation Hunter, in which Shadi (as locals 
affectionately called him) would get carte blanche to poach elephant in the park in 
exchange for information on guerrilla movements.84  
Shadreck proved to be less reliable despite the amnesty the state gave him. The 
Selous Scouts attempt to turn Shadi into their spook was a distinct failure precisely 
because Shadi was a peripatetic, transboundary figure whose Rule # 1 was to disrespect 
boundaries whenever anyone might insist on them. His market and source of portable 
weaponry (guns and ammunition) was Mozambique, the rear base of ZANLA. His 
hunting grounds were in Rhodesia, deep inside areas the RSF controlled and those that 
were no-mans land. Unbeknown to the Selous Scouts, Shadreck was also passing the 
more valuable intelligence about the RSF operations to ZANLA and Frelimo.85  
After Independence Day, on 18 April 1980 and the triumph of ZANLAs parent 
party ZANU in the elections, the hunting grounds were clear again. Robert Gabriel 
Mugabe became the new prime minister. Villagers waited with confidence for the new 
head of government to signal their entry into their ancestral lands. Poachers readied their 
guns in anticipation of the bountiful meat. However, the same government Shadreck 
helped put in power through his back-and-forth across the border now saw him as a pest 
to game conservation. The new Zimbabwe Republic Police arrested him barely months 
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into independence. He was only saved from serving more time at Buffalo Range through 
a presidential amnesty in 1981. He died soon afterwards. 
 
The Fragility of Boundaries 
Shadrecks biography is not just an individuals story but a narrow path through a wider 
historical moment. In his movements we see how not just locals but even the state forged 
alliances with its own lesser nemeses in order to fight bigger ones. The state became 
complicit in breaking its own wildlife laws! I argue that transgression arises not just from 
the work of poachers but also the tensions within the state apparatus and modus operandi 
itself. This is not something peculiar to the colonial period, but a thread that ties 
together the colonial and postcolonial into a continuum.  
Situating this discussion in the 1980s-90s, I examine this fragility of boundaries at 
two levels. First, there is the paradox that the same institutions that were supposed to 
keep the law ended up being the very crevice through which poachers crept into the park. 
Second, I wish to emphasize that such boundary-crossing was so intensive during this 
period because the national park was a theater of war pitting the new Zimbabwe National 
Army and the Mozambican rebel movement, Renamo.  
I use Mobile Anti-Poaching Unit (MAPU, formerly APU) reports from Mabalauta 
Field Station to illustrate this point. MAPU was composed of the DNPWLM, Zimbabwe 
Republic Police (ZRP, formerly BSA Police) police, and the Zimbabwe National Army 
(ZNA, successor to the RSF), Gonarezhou was also a war theater under the jurisdiction of 





Gonarezhou was under the jurisdiction of two separate structures, which created 
problems over powers of arrest. 
 
The Law as Asset and Liability. There were two major problems between the prosecution 
and the magistrates. One was the changing nature of poaching which the justice system 
was not equipped to deal with poachers. In 1983, Warden Mabalauta, R.L. Murray, 
reported that cases of poaching involving juveniles within Mabalauta sub-region of the 
Gonarezhou and Malipati Safari Area were increasing at an alarming rate. Villagers 
realized that the police took no action against juveniles and accordingly encourage[d] 
their children to enter the Parks and Wildlife estate to poach. On 28 August  when Game 
Scouts apprehended six African children from nearby Pahlela area who had spent the 
entire day hunting inside the park with a pack of dogs. By the end of their adventure they 
had made an impressive harvest: two adult nyala cows worth Z$400, 1 adult warthog 
(Z$25), one clipspringer (Z$75), totaling Z$500 worth of wildlife.86 
Rangers Mackie and Evans arrested all six juveniles the same day at Nyamasikana 
Pool inside Gonarezhou, and took them to Mabalauta for questioning. Warden Murray 
however released four of the juveniles to be dealt with by their kraal heads. The other 
twothe oldest in the groupwere detained for prosecution on charges of Hunt[ing] in 
National Park Section 15 (1) (B) Parks and Wildlife General Regulations and killing 
game valued at Z$500. The two lads were taken to Mpakati for prosecution, but the case 
does not seem to have gone far.87  
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The question confronting MAPU was how to deal with under-age poachers who 
could not be given deterrent-enough sentences? Who would DNWPLM chargethe 
messenger or those who sent them? At the JOC meeting at Chiredzi on 24 February 1986, 
acting warden Mabalauta, Senior Ranger P.G.E. Westrop, expressed his disappointment 
that, six years since independence, the ZRP officer at Malipati had not tried to resolve 
the matter of juveniles released by Police Mwenezi on a local level. The Officer 
Commanding ZRP Chiredzi, Supt. Chingosho, took umbrage at Westrops allegations.88 
The substance of Westrops complaint derived from a report of his subordinate, 
Ranger Chimanga, which detailed how adults of the village had adopted a different 
strategy to avoid arrest and prosecution. Instead of going in themselves to poach, they 
were now sending their children in the full knowledge that juveniles were unpunishable 
under the law. Poaching was endemic during the school holidays, with juvenile poachers 
who are causing just as much damage to wildlife as adults. However Chimanga said 
unlike adults, these juveniles were seemingly above the law and gets (sic) off scot-free. 
Parents knew that even if their children were arrested, they would be released without 
charge by either the Police or the Court with a meaningless caution. Chimanga 
recommended that the offenders should instead be caned or given cuts as a deterrent, as 
several of them had been caught more than once to dissuade others.89 
Chimanga made it clear he was not necessarily attacking the police but the law as 
a statutory instrument for fighting poaching: it was simply blunt. He wanted an 
acknowledgment from ZRP that juvenile poaching in the area surrounding 
Gonarezhou/Malipati Safari Area was a problem. He wanted them to provide 
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documentary evidence of cases where juveniles have gone unpunished by the law. 
Westrop was sympathetic to his ranger: I dont believe that the motive was to criticize 
the Police Force, but rather to bring attention to the fact that juveniles go unpunished and 
that certain people are taking advantage of this situation.90 
Chimangas report listed one specific case involving eight persons his scouts had 
arrested in August 1985, six of them juveniles of school-going age. Four had apparently 
been sent to Mpakati Police Post on 25 August 1985. Of these, three were members of a 
juvenile gang of five hunting with dogs in the Malipati Safari Area. Their names were 
James Mbiza, Dhlayani Mapongo, and Chuma Dube. Only Mbizaaged 18had been 
arraigned at Beitbridge court on 27 August 1985. The magistrate simply cautioned and 
discharged him. The other two claimed to be under 16, and police at Mwenezi (formerly 
Nuanetsi) released [them] unconditionally. They never went to court.91  
Based on this evidence, Westrop challenged as not strictly correct Chingoshos 
statement at the Chiredzi meeting that ALL the persons released had been released by 
the Magistrate. He rejected the claim that the second juvenile Chimanga had forwarded 
to Mpakati the same day, Matambo Hlengani, charged with setting wire snares in 
Malipati Safari Area, had also appeared before the Magistrate at Beitbridge. While police 
claimed he was cautioned and released without sentence, the lad had in fact been 
released by police without consulting National Parks. When asked about it on 6 March 
1986, these juveniles admitted that they had hunted in the Safari Area with dogs prior to 







their arrest in August. The police at Mwenezi had decided to release them because of 
their tender agevillagers potent weapon against the law!92  
Therefore, Westrop felt his ranger was justified in saying that releasing juveniles 
without even canning (whipping) them or awarding them a similar punishment made 
no example to other potential juvenile poachers, nor their parents. As far as the 
warden was concerned, not only was deterrence removed; there was now an incentive to 
break the laws of the country by sending in under-age persons to commit the crime.93 
The juvenile was not only a proxy; as part of a collective of poachers (mapocha), they 
were a mobile workshop, trained and equipped by veteran poachers to hunt on their 
behalf. The juvenile poacher became a battle ground between state departments. 
The second legal problem concerned scouts and rangers powers of arrest, which 
the existing wildlife and police laws did not specify. The Director DNPWLM 
summarized the key dilemma between anti-poaching operations and prosecution: On the 
one hand the magistrates are under pressure to award fines rather than the imposition of 
prison sentences and, on the other, we know that fines are not having the desired 
effect.94 Under Section 6 (1) Parks and Wildlife General Regulations and Section 28 (1) 
Parks and Wildlife General Regulations 1981, the courts were only empowered to impose 
Z$10-Z$40 fines for removing meat of animals killed in a National Park.95  
The major question for Palmer was how to protect wildlife if his staff was not 
allowed to shoot to kill, if the law did not give them such power, and yet the poacher did 
not obey such laws. The police said: Dont shoot until they fire first. Palmer found this 
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ridiculous: How do you physically put handcuffs on a man with an AK? Palmer fumed, 
demanding from his superiors a directive to shoot, which he expected must come from 
the ministry to protect myself and my staff. The procedure was to only fire over 
poachers heads. They simply ran across the border into Mozambique.96 Moreover, 
Palmer explained the confusion surrounding the real identity of these mapocha: 
We are dealing with unknown armed persons often in camouflage kit. Are 
they FRELIMO? Mozambique militia? Zimbabwean dissidents? 
Alternatively, even Mozambican MRM dissidents?97  
The warden gave the example of an incident of an armed Mozambican militia caught 
hunting in the park after being wounded by a stray round from MAPU warning shots.98 
The DNPWLM Directorate advised Palmer that it had made submissions to the 
Attorney-General way back in 1976 asking him to define and clarify the powers of arrest 
and the manner in which arrests may be made. The result was Opinion No. 23 of 1976 
AGs Ref AG/18/11 (m) and Departmental Ref A/15 of 5th May 1976. Another legal 
opinion was requested on 24 February 1983 to deal with poaching and obtained on 3 May 
1983. It had little to add to the previous opinion. The two opinions could not explain 
how rangers and scouts could use firearms to protect wildlife and themselves if they 
risked prosecution for wounding or killing a person they saw poaching. What force was 
considered acceptable if it was also impossible to lay down hard and fast rules on the 
use of firearms? This lack of clarity explains Palmers agitation for a clear and 
unambiguous directive from Ministry on how to handle armed poachers. Until it arrived, 
                                                







the Directorate instructed Palmer to tell his staff to be most circumspect in their actions 
and abide by the requirements of Opinion No. 23 of 1976.99 
Technically, under Statutory Instrument 256 of 1984 and the Parks and Wildlife 
Act 1975, game rangers and scouts were Peace Officers endowed with capacity to 
maintain the Parks territorial integrity and to preserve the parks natural resources. 
Rangers and scouts were armed largely for personal protection, and if they injured or 
killed any trespassers into parks, their liabilities were determined under Section 101 (c) of 
the Parks and Wildlife Act No. 14 of 1975. The police would not effect instant arrest 
and detention of the authority responsible for the injury or death, but would open a 
docket and investigate the matter fully.100 
However, how would a Parks officer avoid arrest if they injured or killed a 
poacher in the process of trying to institute an arrest? The bits-and-pieces of statutory 
instruments and opinions only prevented the officer from being instantly arrested if he 
injured or killed a poacher or intruder. It also ensured there would certainly be an 
immediate arrest and detention where firearms were used wantonly and indiscriminately 
(my emphasis). However, who really determined wantonness if there was no witness to 
a contact with a poacher whom the scout had to kill?101 
Meanwhile, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe was clearly losing patience with 
poachers, and warned that government might have to account for them in other ways. 
But knowing the ambiguities of the law and the possibility of personal liability for 
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murder, acting Director DNPWLM, M.R. Drury, sent out an immediate order to all 
stations, cautioning that the PMs incendiary statement was not a license to operate in 
any other way other than that required by law.102 The constitution was supreme over the 
political willpower of the Prime Minister. 
 
The Police: Promoting and Defeating Justice 
As the chief law enforcement institution, the Zimbabwe Republic Police, now composed 
of and named after ZANLAs police force in the Mozambican rear bases, was a huge 
obstacle to the DNPWLM wardens all of whom were initially Europeans (whites) before 
being gradually replaced. Contrary to the wardens view of the ZRP as inept, the more 
fundamental point is the tug-of-war between historical/social justice (which they had 
promised as guerrillas) and legal justice (which they were now sworn to uphold as state 
police officers). They were expected to implement the very same laws they had fought 
the war to end! 
At the same time, there was generally uncertainty and downright lack of 
knowledge on the ZRP officers part that conflicted with the more seasoned view of 
experienced wardens and rangers (too) passionate about conservation. Some of the 
DNPWLM officials were retired BSA Police officers who knew the arrest and 
prosecution inside-out, and expressed their frustrations to the ZRP as if they were 
lecturing to subordinates. These sermons were not taken lying down. 
The major accusation was that the ZRPs local officers were illiterate and did not 
understand the law, hence they got less than deterrent sentences. These tensions played 
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out in a flurry of correspondences discussed in this section. An undated copy of a minute 
from Mabalauta Field Station complained of more and more reports where the ZRP 
were actually blocking cases from being successfully prosecuted. If this sad state of 
affairs was allowed to continue, the warden warned that the complete eradication of 
vast areas of Zimbabwes wildlife will be assured in the not-too-distant future. This 
statement is not conjecture, it is fact.103 
While Parks was convinced that heavy sentences would make a statement on just 
how serious the state was about anti-poaching, the ZRP was prosecuting cases for 
ridiculously low sentences. In The State vs. John Mbedzani, John Phinias Chauke and 
Francisco Mutula, for example, Westrop expected a serious charge of attempted murder 
and possession of arms of war. After all, at exactly 0800 hrs on 2 February 1985, the 
accuseds had fired two shots at a duiker. It is unclear where the attempted murder 
charge stemmed from, but Westrop was quite adamant on at least the alternative charge 
c/s 15 (1) (d) of the Parks and Wildlife Act: Convey weapon into Gonarezhou National 
Park being preferred against Mbedzani. Chauke and Mutula should have been charged 
of possession of arms of war while the other accomplices Samuel Karurushi and 
George Kandembewho had shot and killed animalsmust have been prosecuted for 
bringing weapons into a national park.104 The weapons in question were four SKS, one 
FN, and two AK-47 rifles. 
The outcome of this case would put a marker on what to expect should Parks 
apprehend Raphael Manjoma and Ngichi Sumbani, who had entered Gonarezhou from 
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Mozambique on two occasions to poach while in possession of arms of war. In another 
case, The State vs. Adam Chauke, Parks had recovered one head of a bullet from an 
elephant carcass, poached in the park which would hopefully tie in (ballistically) with 
the SKS no. 1717103 captured in this case. Westrop reiterated hope that these charges 
would attract heavy sentences so that our Mozambican neighbors understand that we 
mean business.105  
Not so for ZRP Mwenezi and Mpakati. They were simply poor communicators. 
For example, on 9 December 1984, an armed Mozambican poacher named Arimando 
Mkhuu Samu was captured in a MAPU operation after being shot and wounded in the 
knee in the Nyala area of Mabalauta. An SKS rifle (number 1780) and 20 rounds of 
ammunition were recovered. According to Westrop, the poacher should have been 
charged of illegal hunting in a national park and illegal possession of weapons of war, or 
alternatively conveying a weapon into a national park, but no feedback came from ZRP 
for months until Westrop made a complaint. Westrop says that this was not the exception: 
numerous cases had died at Mpakati.106 
To add insult to injury, after Parks had done impeccable and painstaking work to 
chase and apprehend poachers, the courts freed them for lack of sufficient evidence or 
simply because charges were poorly framed. The police did not bother to explain why 
sometimes culprits were released without charge. It enraged Westrop: 
If further evidence was required, why were National Parks not called? 
Many public prosecutors, usually police officers at district stations, are too 
eager to finalize a case no matter the result, which conflicts with our 
interest to achieve a deterrent sentence. If a case appears to be lacking 
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evidence, a prosecutor should ask for a remand and call further state 
witnesses.107 
It was now custom that whenever cases passed to Mpakati, Parks staff were told the case 
is cut and dried and there would be no need for our witnesses to appear in court. An 
accused often pleaded guilty at Mpakati then changed his story in court. Instead of asking 
for a remand and calling Park scouts as witnesses, the police proceeded with the case. 
Westrop was livid: The case is then lost and I blame the Police for this: there is too 
much emphasis on getting a case finalized, instead of achieving a satisfactory result and 
sentence.108 (My emphasis) 
The problem also resulted from the ignorance of certain Police Stations about 
changes in Parks and Wildlife legislation; many still used outdated copies. He therefore 
advised Superintendent Chingosho to ensure that stations have sufficient copies of the 
updated act, and that policemen preparing cases are made aware that changes have been 
made over the years.109 
Westrop conceded that the failure of clear liaison between ZRP and Parks over 
cases was also a problem of logistics. He hoped that DNPWLM would allocate more 
mileage to stations facing serious poaching and whose local police station is distant. 
The prevailing situation of mileage allocations and vehicle hire votes was pathetic, and a 
major cause of the current lack of liaison and communication with police. Ultimately, 
however, liaison was a two-sided matter, and Westrop invited police to visit Parks 
stations within [their] areas of responsibility, on a more regular basis.110 
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Finally, he recommended more regular attendance by National Parks witnesses 
of court cases. He blamed police for being sometimes at fault for not requesting 
attendance by our details, since they foresee no complications. Such attendance was also 
a budgetary matter requiring attention from those who hold the purse strings for higher 
allocations. While Westrop was optimistic that the opening of a new police post at 
Chikombedzi and more particularly, the holding of court cases there, would ease the 
problem significantly, he expressed concern that the station would not be opened for 
some considerable time.111 
 
The Army: Game Scouts and Poachers  
On 13 November 1984, Warden Palmer wrote an explosive letter to Major Kanganga, 
deputy commander of the Engineers Squadron, in which he accused some members of the 
army of poaching. Palmers case was that on Sunday, 11 November 1984, around 8.30 
am, the attendant of Swimuwini Rest Camp, Mark, had reported to him at Mabalauta 
field station that the previous evening around 7.40 pm, he had heard a burst of automatic 
gunfire in the direction of the Nyala Siding road in the Park. Around 7.45 pm Mark 
heard another two single shots, this time closer to the Rest Camp where Nyala Road 
joined the main road to Malipati. Minutes later he saw tail and head lights of a truck 
proceeding towards Malipati, without reporting first to the Nyala Army Camp.112  
Mark and Game Scout Sergeant Mafira and Scout II Standreck then proceeded 
down Nyala Road to check the scene of the shots. At around grid UL489723, they found 
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25 empty AK cases and a live AK round lying scattered next to the road. The spoor 
showed that the truck had stopped there and one personbased on the one set of plain 
boot tracksgot out. The sleuths also saw a number of ground strike marks angling off 
into the mopani scrub and a quantity of impala spoor in the vicinity, suggesting that the 
person had attempted to shoot the impala at close quarters to the road possibly from the 
back of the truck. Mark did not find any blood spoor or carcasses.113  
That Sunday morning after Marks report, Palmer proceeded to Nyala Army Base, 
the camp of 42 Battalions border patrol sub-unit under the command of a Captain 
Mabika. The units truck tire was different from the truck spoor, but Mabika admitted 
seeing an Engineer Squadron tipper truck and bowser leave Boli Shopping Center at 
about 7 pm. One of Mabikas warrant officers also reported hearing a truck approach 
from Twiza and turn into the Nyala road at approximately 7.30 pm.114  
From Nyala Siding Palmer and Mabika drove to the Engineers Squadron base at 
Samu village. Two warrant officers, Churu and Dekoko, informed them that tipper truck 
registration number 07HN83 had arrived at the base around 10 pm. Along the way, the 
driver had left the diesel bowser (registration number T318) at Malipati District 
Development Fund (DDF) station due to problems with a cracked chassis. There were 
three men on the truck, two of whom had returned to Malipati that Sunday morning to 
repair the bowser. They had not yet returned. The third member was Sapper Ndoita and 
upon being questioned, it was found that he had recently cleaned his rifle and had three 
full magazines. Dekoko was convinced that Ndoita was supposed to have four magazines 







as per orders issued before leaving Engineers headquarters in Pomona, north of Harare. 
The sapper admitted they had used Nyala Road but denied any shooting had occurred.115 
From Samu, Palmer and Mabika proceeded to Malipati DDF in one vehicle while 
Dekoko followed in another. At Malipati they questioned Ndoitas companions on the 
night truck, Corporal Majinjiwa and Sapper Joseph, and inspected their weapons and 
magazines. They were dirty from firing, and when asked, they pleaded: We [had] to 
shoot at ploughshear (sic) mines. Instead of the four magazines as per orders in Harare, 
each man had just one [magazine] full bar a couple of rounds. Majinjiwa and Joseph 
strenuously denied having any magazines left at Samu and claimed they had been issued 
only one in Harare. While Ndoita had admitted to using the Nyala Road, the two men 
contradicted him: they said they had used the Twiza-Mabalauta Road to Malipati! Like 
Ndoita they denied any shooting. Further, the tire pattern on the rear wheels of their truck 
(07HN83) matched the spoor.116 As far as Warrant Officer Dekoko was concerned, this 
was a closed and shut case if it an inspection at Samu camp unearthed the magazines and 
ammunition. Palmer was having none of it because he had no mileage to waste on a 
meaningless checkthe accused might swap magazines with friends or be in 
possession of additional rounds.  
At which point two non-commissioned officers (NCOs), Staff Sergeant Hove of 4 
Engineers Squadron and a Regimental Police detail, proved to be a hinderance (sic) and 
clearly supported the three accused. The two men tried to prevent Palmer from taking 
two test cases from each of the two weapons at Malipati for ballistic testing (weapon 
ZA10772 and ZA10742). They tried unsuccessfully to convince Mabika to withhold the 







weapon numbers on security grounds. Dekoko in particular was obstructing the ends of 
justice. When Palmer asked him to follow in his vehicle to check the truck spoor on 
Nyala Road, he gave the excuse that he was short of diesel and could only accompany 
him as a passenger and provided Palmer would return him to Samu. The warden refused 
on mileage shortage grounds.117 Then Dekoko and Hove tried an alibi: It could have 
been Mozambicans doing the shooting! In the end, Palmer decided that matters might 
get out of hand as the tensions built up, so he returned with Mabika in separate vehicles 
to Swimuwini turn-off before heading to Mabalauta.118 
As far as Palmer and Mabika could tell, the three accused were blatantly lying. 
Mabikas appreciation of the situation was that Nyala Road was used so that blame 
could be directed at his unit should an investigation have been made into the shooting. 
But the truck and bowsers tire spoor patterns, empty cartridges, timings, and direction of 
truck movement all pointed squarely to the three engineers. It did not make the case any 
less severe that no animals had been killed: this was the third known incident in the park 
involving army personnel in the last three months (my emphasis).119 As far as Palmer 
was concerned, this was an open and shut case: the army was poaching. 
After establishing his facts, Palmer made arrangements for [Provincial Warden 
Ngwarai] himself to personally come down with 4 Brigade staff to take the issue further. 
This however did not materialize. Nonetheless, the second-in-command at Samu, 
Lieutenant Sibanda, arrived that same day; Palmer gave him a full briefing and he was 
completely cooperative. Sibanda also questioned Scout Sergeant Mafira to get a first-
hand account of what exactly had happened at Nyala on the night in question. Sibanda 








told Palmer that the three soldiers had clearly disobeyed instructions on the route to be 
used when returning from Triangle with diesel. He promised to return with Ndoita and 
his weapon to Palmer for further questioning on Monday 12th. He never showed up.120  
The next day Captain Dzingai of 4 Engineers Squadron and Captain Erikias of 4 
Brigade Masvingo arrived at Mabalauta on their way to Samu on other business. 
Palmer briefed them on the suspected poaching incident. The two officers promised an 
investigation and the necessary disciplinary action and convinced Palmer to let the ZNA 
handle the matter through court-martial instead of the courts. The warden agreed because 
his present financial and mileage shortage did not permit long trips to police stations 
and court appearances.121 On the 26th the army arraigned the suspects but found no real 
evidence, so an alternative charge of firing weapons for no reason in a national park 
was preferred. Corporal Machinjiwa was fined Z$100 and demoted to Lance Corporal 
while Sapper Joseph escaped with a Z$100 fine for shooting at night in a park.122  
Despite attempts to portray the poaching as an isolated case of wayward other 
ranks from Engineers Squadron acting on their own initiative, more evidence emerged 
involving a junior officer of 4 Brigade in Chipinda Pools. The memo from the Provincial 
Warden to Warden Chipinda makes this clear: 
Following my meetings with the Deputy Commander 4 Brigade, I got a 
letter from him which I quote:  
1.  We inform you that disciplinary action will be taken against the 
member, i.e. Lieutenant Masandu. 
2.  For 42 Infantry Battalion, member 782051 Lt. J. Masandu should be 
charged for poaching while on operations.123 
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The archives do not allow me to trace whether these foot-soldiers were simply using 
their initiative or as agents of much bigger sharks getting rich quick. Duffy has made 
the latter case.  
 
Local People: Refugees and Poachers 
In 1975, as the Portuguese retreated in disarray, the forces of Samora Machels Frente de 
Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) declared independence. Alarmed that a Soviet-
aligned communist state was about to be established on their borders, Rhodesia and South 
bankrolled teamed up with disaffected elements in Mozambique to form the Resistëncia 
Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO). The leaders of the movement were Ndau, which is 
no surprise that its strongest support was from Chipinga, the northern fringe of 
Gonarezhou. After a slow start, from 1982 the movement was making significant inroads 
into the FRELIMO heartlands, retiring across the border to raid for food in newly 
independent Zimbabwe. Effectively, all the villages along the Save and the Zimbabwe 
border became frontline positions. 
As the war escalated in Mozambique, it pushed many villagers into refuge 
through and in Gonarezhou where they survived on poaching. The Mozambican 
government had embarked on a massive arming of villagers capable of fighting 
RENAMO from their own homes. As the insurgent movement intensified its attacks, 
some of the militia fled their villages with their AK-47 rifles and joined other unarmed 
civilians in settling inside or near Gonarezhou. Once inside the country they exchanged 





and mealie-meal. However, nobody (was) checking their movements,124 because they 
could always claim to be visiting relatives. These Mozambican villagers used all manner 
of transportpedestrians, bicycles, cattle, ox and donkey-drawn carts and sledges.  
On 11 April 1984, the new Warden Mabalauta, P. Palmer, directly linked refugee 
movement with the present armed poaching of elephant and many buffalo, kudu, giraffe 
and impala. Most were hunting on their return trips or loading up with previously 
cached meat, skins and ivory.125 The previous District Administrator of Chiredzi had 
allowed Mozambican nationals and that countrys army to use a borehole about 1 km 
inside Zimbabwe in the Park in the Chepfu area. Meanwhile, Mozambican cattle were 
now grazing well into the Park past the old 3 km fence. As countless stock was lost to 
the predators, the cattle owners resorted to  poisoning the vermin deep inside the park, 
and living of the harvests from kilometres of brush/snare lines. Patrols were crippled 
because of the shortage of transport, money and even numbers of scouts available.126 
Whereas the police and the army had been advised to apprehend these illegal 
entrants, neither the  game warden nor his staff had any such arresting powers. Palmer 
was deeply exercised: As a Parks Officer, can I destroy Mozambican cattle and donkeys 
and burn scotch carts etc. which I encounter in the middle of the park. Such action could 
even provoke an international incident. Will I have Home Office/Ministry support? He 
answered himself: It is totally impractical to expect me to impound livestock 
remembering the drought, shortage of staff and the tremendous distances involved. 
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Already, his officers had shot seven donkeys belonging to positively identified 
Mozambican poachersbut what of the rest of the traffic which could well be carting for 
poachers though they might deny it? In a tone showing no respect at all to his boss, the 
Provincial Warden Masvingo, Palmer said: I need answers and directives now, if we are 
to maintain any worthwhile wildlife populations in the park.127 
Palmer decided to try another tack that would grab governments attention: the 
potential of the breakdown of cattle-game separation to cause veterinary pestilences like 
foot and mouth disease (FMD) and anthrax, which would threaten the countrys strategic 
beef industry. At that time an FMD control fence was under construction, funded by the 
European Economic Community (EEC) as part of Zimbabwes beef export deal with 
them. Is the government going to stand by and allow disease ridden cattle from 
Mozambique to cross that fence and jeopardize the countrys export of beef? Here was 
his puzzle: Zimbabweans were arrested for breaking FMD regulations. So why must 
Mozambicans be allowed to escape prosecution for similar offences?... Or are 
Mozambicans immune?.128  
Had the Mozambicans ended with just herding their cattle, then the state would 
say this was a purely veterinary matter. But they had on three occasions traded gunfire 
with MAPU and Army patrols. Does this not worry Head Office? Palmer wondered. 
He was convinced the moment was long overdue for some very strong action and 
positive directives. Otherwise the park boundaries, status and whole reason for being in 
existence was in double jeopardy. Palmer noted that Gonarezhou was simply a by the 







way issue for Mozambicans and simply a hunting the ground for them.129 Report 
reached him daily of poaching activities along the 15-20 km stretch of the park from the 
international boundary to Malipati. So daring were the poachers that they opened fire on 
patrolling scouts, who had to return fire and on one occasion shot and seriously injured 
one poacher, who was flown to Harare Hospital for treatment. One can sense the 
frustration in Palmer that the state could afford VIP treatment to the very same pests that 
were causing harm to wildlife, at a time when anti-poaching operations were logistically 
crippled and heavily under-staffed.130  
Palmers remit was supposed to be wildlife management. But what happened 
when people now virtually lived inside the park? Apparently, Palmer had discussed the 
issue with the JOC when it met every Thursday at 4 Brigade Headquarters in Masvingo. 
The senior CIO officer advised Palmer that the arrangement to allow these Mozambicans 
to cross the park to purchase food in Zimbabwe  was no more than a privilege, and 
ways could be found to ensure that it was not abused. But not abolished: Mozambicans 
had died for Zimbabwes independenceand for ZANU (PF) to get into power. The JOC 
resolved that all people from Mozambique have to use border post at Sango, and from 
there pass through the ZNA post at Nyala and present the papers from the border. Still, 
Palmer was not convinced: the plan simply took care of people seeking food, but not 
cattle seeking pasture. The Wildlife Act and FMD regulations were very clear: any 
domestic animals introduced into the park must be shot on sight. What can be done to 







these cattle? Palmer asked, since that step appeared too drastic and the government was 
rather hesitant to sanction its enforcement.131 
Provincial Warden R.J. Ngwarai added a further dimension: the losses to 
commercial poaching turned the park from a refuge for animals to one for 
Mozambicans. Since September 1983 alone, up to 60 elephants and up to 12 black 
rhino were killed in the park. Each elephant was valued at Z$2,000, and the total loss 
was Z$120 000.00. One rhinoceros was worth Z$5,000, the total loss Z$60,000. One 10-
day MAPU patrol cost Z$3,000 in mileage alone.132 Mozambicans were killing for meat 
as much as they were for ivory, blurring the analytical boundaries between subsistence 
and commerce poaching some scholars have often insisted on.133 As Palmer noted in 
explanatory notes to the table, Numbers 1 and 2 can be attributed to Mozambicans but 
numbers 3 and 4 could be by Zimbabweans from Matibi Communal Lands, more likely 
Mozambican refugees living in Zimbabwe.134 
Refuge, therefore, was anything besides victimhood. On the border, among 
Shangane/Tsonga kin, to be in refuge was for Mozambicans an opportunity to poach. 
Short of thorough interrogation (torture), it was not easy to tell the difference between 
poachers, rebels, refugees, and relatives visiting their kin west of Gonarezhou.135 As the 
next section shows, the escalation of poaching in the 1980s owes to the confusion about 
mobility of social and spatial boundaries. Mobility and technology were central elements 
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of confusion-making; confusion was productive because only through it could poachers 
kill. 
 
Ivory Smuggling: What Was Local And What Was International? 
R.L. Murray was Warden Mabalauta in 1981 at a time of surging armed rhino horn and 
ivory poaching in Gonarezhou. The networks of poaching were far-flung, the quarry 
elusive; the only effective way at the time was to deploy park scouts and rangers as bait 
to trap the culprits.  
Early that year, one such park ranger was in a beer garden when a man named 
Jack approached him and said: I know that you work for National Parks and I should 
think you are earning very little and should think you want money for nothing. The 
black ranger appeared interested: How can I get the money for no work I have done for 
it (sic)? Get means and get some elephant tusks and give them to me and I will give 
you Z$200-00 for one pair of tusks. The ranger asked what purpose Jack wanted the 
tusks for. Whereupon the prospective buyer disclosed that there was one white man who 
could buy from him. This white man was the manager of Caribbea Bay Hotel in 
Kariba. Was this the first time he was giving or trying to give tusks to this man? The 
ranger asked Jack. No, he did the deal with the white man several times. The ranger 
told Jack to wait until the next day and left for Nyanyana Camping Site in Charara Game 
Reserve (Kariba).  
From there he placed a call to his superior in Mabalauta, Senior Ranger Derek 
Wesley, who reminded him how hard it was these days to trap a man by so giving you 





further investigation were done. Soon afterwards, the investigating ranger again met a 
different manwho gave him a name of a man who worked as a barman at Caribbea 
Bay. This man approached him and requested the same things as Jack did. The ranger 
concluded in his briefing: I gave myself a hard time and I discovered that this same, 
Jack, had send (sic) this man to try me if he could get the tusks from me.136 
On 2 February 1982, DNPWLM investigating officer G.M. Nott disclosed another 
casethe discovery of a 9 kg ivory tusk which was found on a Salisbury trophy dealers 
premises. This dealer had been under surveillance and was confirmed to be accepting 
illegal ivory. Initially the man refused to open the door, but a later search of the 
premises located the illegal tusk which was in the process of being cut up. The dealer 
tried to explain away the tusk against old Certificate of Ownership cards. It was a futile 
attempt: he was found guilty and his dealers license cancelled pending an appeal.137  
It was not long before National Parks realized the best way to defeat organized 
poaching was to hit at the receiver, the last chance before the products fed into the legal 
market. The most recent swoop on a large tannery that yielded a prosecutable case 
involving illegal receipt of 770 wildlife skins. Nott was upbeat on the chances of a 
conviction, because the DNPWLM had proof that a good proportion of the skins came 
from poachers, some of whom were operating on National Parks land. There was only 
one serious problem: poor sentences as the law allowed.138 
Ivory smuggling was a transnational business. On 9 July 1983, the national daily, 
The Herald, published a report quoting the Minister of Natural Resources as saying: 
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Ivory poaching was a serious problem particularly in the Gonarezhou area, where 
poaching was done by people flying in and out of the country illegally. It was the fifth 
report on the issue, and the fifth time Chief Warden of DNPWLM, F.A. Scammell, had 
rejected such claims. In a memo to Director DNPWLM, Scammell said: I certainly 
know of no aircraft flying illegal ivory out of the park and would very much like to know 
where this information came from so I can follow it up. He challenged the minister to 
make the facts available to support these allegations, otherwise he was in grave danger of 
misinforming the public. Scammell did not see any reason why the minister should add 
fuel to accusations leveled against the DNPWLM as the biggest poachers in the 
country by the senior civil servant in the area.139 
But why was ivory poaching and smuggling so severe in Zimbabwe and 
Gonarezhou in particular? Notts observation was that the illegal ivory and rhino horn 
trade had escalated in the past six years to a point where there is no longer any doubt 
that every elephant and rhino on the African continent is a poachers target. The 
countries north of the Zambezi had failed to take firm measures against poachers, so 
that animal populations there no longer constituted sufficient numbers to sustain any 
meaningful conservation program. This was the sole reason why Zimbabwe [was] being 
subjected to intense poaching pressure:  
The same dealers in other parts of the world who are responsible for the 
poaching escalating in other parts of Africa are prepared to finance 
poaching gangs to the point where not one elephant or rhino remains. 
Having exterminated populations elsewhere these dealers are now 
concentrating their total efforts on the one country still having viable 
populations (Zimbabwe).140 
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In recent months, the media had reported the DNPWLMs efforts to combat these rhino 
and elephant poachers in the field and to smash their smuggling rings. In addition to 
figures for Gonarezhou, 12 rhino poachers had been arrested in the Zambezi Valley over 
the same period while a further 10 had been shot deadfour in 1985, six in 1986.141 
It was a matter of public and DNPWLM record that out of an estimated national 
population of 2,500, Zimbabwe had lost 96 black rhinos to poaching in the Zambezi 
valley since 1984, in addition to those killed in Gonarezhou. Yet this figure was based on 
optimistic surveys; some scientific authorities put the population at well below 
2,000. Africa had 14-15,000 black rhinos when Zimbabwe became independent in 1980. 
By 1984 only 8-9,000 remained. The country contributed a quarter of the 1984 figure.142 
While Nott acknowledged the role of illegal dealers located in other parts of the 
world , he insisted they could not survive if it were not for the existence of illegal 
dealers in Zimbabwe and neighbouring countries. The dealers equipped and financed 
poaching gangs, and as long as these local actors existed, poaching flourished. As long as 
someone somewhere was prepared to pay for the trophies of the animals, poachers could 
always be recruited. Besides, Nott said, the proceeds from just one poached rhino can 
keep a gang operational for months. Here was the problem: 
Efforts to halt the receipt of illegal horn and ivory are paramount on the 
list of priorities of all government and private conservation agencies 
throughout the world; however, as there are highly placed officials in 
certain countries of the world, particularly in the Middle East, who have 
their own ulterior motives for not wishing to enforce prohibitions on 
importation, these efforts have met with little success in broad terms. It 
follows that any country wishing to protect its rhino and elephant 
populations must do so at source and only rely on the assistance of other 
states as a final back-up to the internal effort.143 








A good example was Mozambique, which had suffered heavy poaching activity because 
of the war. In 1978, the country had 250 rhinos; by 1984 they had been halved to 130. 
Since 1984, as a result of this depletion, poachers had begun crossing into Zimbabwe on 
an increasing scale using the help of their poacher-relatives on the Zimbabwean side.144  
To be effective, therefore, the anti-poaching effort had to target not only the 
poacher on the ground but also the middle figure who gave incentive for the poor rural 
people to go poaching. This would only leave the final consumer who was obviously 
outside the country and beyond the capabilities of the state. Ngwarai expressed gratitude 
for the cooperation of the Zimbabwe National Army and ZR Police in this province for 
their help in the curbing of poaching in the Gonarezhou National Park.145 Yet there is 
also evidence that individual soldiers were also poaching. 
 
Conclusion: Ndoiwanepi Nyanga Yenzou 
Throughout the 1980s, so prevalent was rhino and elephant poaching as a source of 
instant wealth among top government officials that in 1988, one of the countrys top 
musicians, Oliver Mtukudzi, composed a bestselling song entitled Nyanga Yenzou (Horn 
of an Elephant). In it the music icon lamented the vagaries of a poor young bachelor who 
has found his sweetheart and wants to marry her. Upon asking for her hand in marriage, 
the father demands an exorbitant bride-price: either the young paramour presents a rhino 
horn or an elephant tusk. But unlike the precolonial days, where he might have taken a 
spear and repaired to the forest, now only top politicians can get rhino horn and ivory. So 
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the young man asks: Ndoiwanepi nyanga yenzou? (Where do I get an elephants 
horn?)146  
An artist who retired to complicated and multiply interpretable depths of satire to 
protest against the political excesses of the day, Oliver Mtukudzi is the ultimate guitar 
guerrilla who fights with satire and sound. On this occasion, he was using marriage to get 
at poaching-gone-wild, with state officials heavily involvedor at least suspected. In 
1989, an army captain who tried to spill the beans on his superiors, whom he claimed 
were shoulder-deep in the ivory poaching and smuggling business, disappeared and his 
body was later found decomposed.147  
Captain Edwin Nleya had temporarily returned home from active duty in 
Mozambique when he was brutally assassinated outside his 12 Infantry Battalion 
barracks in Hwange. He has discovered that a syndicate of senior army officers were 
poaching and smuggling the horn of the endangered black rhinoceros and ivory. Nleya 
told his wife that suspicious people were trailing him and that his life was in danger. A 
few days later he went missing, and his decomposing body was found just outside his 
barracks. The army instituted a Board of Inquiry (BOI), which concluded that the captain 
had basically committed suicide by hanging. A subsequent inquest was however 
unambiguous that Nleya had been murdered. The case has never been reopened.148 
Nleya was murdered for a rhinoceross horn; through it we see how an elite that 
had blazed through Gonarezhou promising to unleash wildlife to the mercy of villagers 
now shut out the villagers and monopolized the poaching of big game. A get rich quick 
culture had set in on the nationalist project and the elephant and rhinoceross body was 
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just one other terrain where it was fought. In 1989, award-winning journalist Geoff 
Nyarota broke the story of cabinet ministers plundering a fund under which state officials 
bought Toyota Cressida sedans at hugely subsidized prices at the part state-owned 
Willowvale Motor Industries. Given a scheme for acquiring technology enabling them to 
perform their duty to the public, state officials not only used the Cressida to express their 
power and social status, but also as a commodity for resale at inflated prices. In that 
instance, the body of an automobile became a get rich quick site and an arena of 
contestation between a rapidly decaying African nationalism and the public. It prompted 
the late reggae musician Solomon Skuza to compose the song Love and Scandals, which 
chronicle the story of a man loses his girlfriend to a rival whose power derives from 
owning a Toyota Cressida. 
Together, the Toyota Cressida and the elephant tusk point to two hunting grounds 
for VVIP wealth. One is the urban environment, a place of fast deals and quick buck. 
There, the urban woman is hunting for men who can take care of her in life. The Cressida 
is the status marker of that nirvana, modernity on four wheels. Love alone becomes 
insufficient; the young man hunting a fiancéor a relationshipmust be rich. 
Meanwhile, out in the rural areas, news of poaching and smuggling of ivory has created a 
mystique about the elephant tusk and rhino horn. Mtukudzis song captures this very 
well: if the young man really loves my daughter so much, he must prove himself by 
going to treacherous lengths to get the precious tusk the father-in-law says. Yet 
Mtukudzis narrative is also about what is causing the poaching. The marriage story is 
a code for the increasing difficulties of getting a living in a post-independence era, a time 





who have high offices in town, who compel the powerless to engage in crime in order to 
make a living, crimes that also involve poaching. They are arrested, but because those 
who send them also control the law enforcement and legal system, the cases go nowhere.  
Read from the guitar, what we have seen as tension between departments, as the 
lethargy of the law, is in fact a reflection of the power of state officials to subvert the 
state and the power of villagers to exploit those crevices. The guitar is the microphone of 
society. When the state becomes a poacher, what then of villagers living on the park 












Chapter 6 Tsetse Allies 
 
In the last chapter I traced the role of poachers in the history of Gonarezhou from the 
1930s to the 1990s. It is important to emphasize that it took an individual state official
Allan Wrightfor Gonarezhou to be declared a game reserve because conservation was 
not a priority of the central government at all. The state had seen Bvekenya as a bandit 
not because he killed game illegally, but because he hunted scarce labor without a 
license. How do we explain the specific timing of the declaration of Gonarezhou as a 
game reserve, therefore?  
The answer lies in examining the key player in this interaction between the state, 
villagers, and wild animals: tsetse fly. After all, it was because of its decimation because 
of the rinderpest in 1896-7 that poachers like Bvekenya were able to use donkeys to hunt 
ivory inside Gonarezhou. In the 1930s, when tsetse started returning to its old habitat 
inside Gonarezhou, all plans to establish a game reserve and annex it to Kruger National 
Park were shelved. Indeed, it is not a coincidence that Gonarezhou became a national 
park in 1975 at exactly the time when vets and entomologists declared that tsetse fly had 





the park! It is only fair that tsetse fly deserves its own free-standing chapter in this 
dissertation.   
Tsetse was a tricky customer: a fly that carried portable pathogens in its tiny body 
and was itself portable enough and adept to catching a ride on any moving object, 
especially wild animals. How would the state deal with a tiny pest like that? In this 
chapter I present two arguments. First, how in the absence of any scientific (chemical or 
biological) methods of eradicating the pest, the state deployed the firearm as a pesticide 
to destroy big game animals upon whose blood and backs the tsetse fed and stole a ride 
respectively. But where would the massive work force required come from? This is my 
second argument: that tsetse opened up opportunities for local African hunters to not only 
use their skillsacquired both before and during colonial ruleto earn a monetary wage 
and acquire instruments to poach for their village kin and market. Those villagers who 
could not be hunters of big game became hunters of the tsetse fly itself and contributing 





they hunt tsetse fly? This is the third, penultimate aspect of this chapter: a focus on 
several patrols involving a tsetse fly ranger (and later the entomologist) and his African 
tsetse fly catchers. 
Overall these three narratives led me to two key generalizations. First, of tsetse fly 
as a portable, highly mobile transgressor of boundaries capable of forcing different actors 
to turn against or towards each other and interact. Secondly, of tsetse as not only 
something that people could actually designate a pest, but also an actor that determined 
the ways in which people defined good and bad nature and how to behave towards it. 
In the course of understanding fatalities in cattle, colonial veterinary experts found that 
they were caused by a pathogen called trypanosome. Tsetse fly became a pest because it 
carried this deadly protozoan. In turn, tsetse itself rode on anything bigger than it that 
moved, so its vector became a pest by virtue of carrying insects that transmitted deadly 
trypanosomes. As it turned out, the vectors were not just big game but also people, so the 
state ended up introducing strict curbs on human and animal movement. The success of 
such controls is what led to Gonarezhou being declared fit to become a game reserve in 
1968 and then for upgrading to a national park in 1975. The only way for us to pay 
homage to the tsetse flys agency in Gonarezhous history is to give it its own chapter. 
 
A Finger on the Trigger 
The Martini Henry Rifle as an Antidote for Tsetse Fly. Guns enabled some Africans to 
escape the label of pesthood and to become the vanguards of pest control. This is the case 
not only with the way African men transitioned from anti-colonial resistance in 1896-7 to 





pests, while too small to shoot at, were too numerous and too elusive to be effectively 
destroyed by poisoning. As a result, the only possible solution was to focus on destroying 
their food hosts, habitats, and carriers. Meanwhile, research would continue towards 
finding ways to destroy the pest itself. In this section I will discuss the tsetse fly and the 
multiple toolkit of trial-and-error the state used to contain and study it. The focus is 
primarily on the shooting of game animals that carried the tsetse from place to place, and 
that were also the flys source of foodblood. While the problem of vermin persisted 
in other areas, tsetse fly was clearly the most serious and deadliest veterinary problem 
facing Gonarezhou between 1937 and 1975.  
The practice of arming experienced native huntersas the state called them
with state guns to destroy tsetse fly might have been introduced to the Gonarezhou in the 
1950s, but it was already in session elsewhere in Rhodesia as the century began. As early 
as 1905, the Chief Native Commissioner suggested a policy to give white landholders 
permits to arm six or eight experienced native hunters with Martini Henry rifles and 
send then with a reliable messenger to hunt the hills for 3 or 4 months and kill or drive 
off as many buffalo as possible.1 The shooting operations would not spare any animal 
species suspected of harboring tsetse,2 even if the game-tsetse connection was still 
scientifically tenuous.3 
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Originally, game elimination had a triple purpose: 1) to test the relationship 
between tsetse and big game 2) to determine the practicability and cost of driving the 
game from a given area by organized hunting, and 3) to check the advance of the pest.4 
The experiment aimed to render an area at present infested with tsetse as completely as 
possible free of all known hosts with a view to the extermination of the fly.5 First, an 
entomologist inspected the area prior to the operations to investigate tsetse distribution 
and density. Second, white men and Africans were engaged, and provisions for them 
arranged: transportation of stores, supply of arms and ammunition, and payment. Third, 
elimination would start. Fourth, the borders of the cleared areas were thoroughly 
patrolled for a prolonged period after the conclusion of active operations to keep them 
free of tsetse hosts. Fifth, maintaining the area clear of game in the wet and dry season by 
means of a small cordon of native police. And finally, periodical inspection to ascertain 
presence and numbers of buck and fly.6 
The Tsetse Officer in the Department of Agriculture and Lands (DAL) was in 
charge of the tsetse fly operations and wildlife in general. In the inner or controlled area, 
the Tsetse Officer directed all hunting operations, prevented unauthorized hunting, 
disposed of hides, meat, bones, tusks, and so on.7 Under him were three European ex-
policemen, 20-30 African hunters armed with Martini-Henry and .303 rifles, and such 
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beaters and carriers as he can secure locally.8 They would maintain a small cordon of 
native police to regularly patrol the borders of the inner or controlled area during the 
wet season to prevent the re-entry of game. A Tsetse Officer or European policeman 
periodically visited the area to check on the hunters. Two troopers of the BSA Police 
were seconded to assist in the operations.9 
In Gonarezhou, despite the early scare in 1915-20, tsetse fly remained subdued 
until 1923, when the Chief Veterinary Surgeon reported mortalities in cattle in Ndanga 
East Reserve and immediately suspected it to be trypanosomiasis (tryps). A Dutchman 
had apparently seen the fly on the Save River in 1922 but said nothing about it at the 
time as he thought no one would believe him.10 Things were quiet until 1928, when the 
Chief Entomologist referred to fly presence on the Save River near Massangena.  
In 1932, the entomologist warned that the proposed Gonarezhou game reserve 
was too near the border for protection from the advance of fly and would be seriously 
jeopardized once invaded. A permanent game reserve would be a very short-sighted 
policy because thousands of ranch cattle that grazed annually on the Buffalo Grass 
north of Chipinda Pools along the Chiredzi River were far more important than game.11  
 In 1933, the Rhodesian government began issuing rifles to individual farmers for 
use in game slaughter in tsetse-infected areas to forestall a tsetse build-up in the 
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Chipungumbira (Espungabera) area inside Portuguese territory.12 A register was kept of 
all rifles issued to farmers and others in the infected district.13 In the specific case of 
native hunters, however, keeping a register was a security measure against guns 
disappearing and turning up in anti-state rebellion or poaching.14  
On 24 October 1934, the Chief Entomologist J.K. Chorley recalled all the Martini 
Henry rifles to the Ordnance Stores (Salisbury) and the unused ammunition to the district 
Rangers-in-Charge Tsetse Fly Operations.15 Chorley explained the first problem:  There 
are no spare ejectors to be obtained from the ordnance stores.16  
 
The Constraints of Ammunition. The second problem was ammunition scarcity: efforts 
to replenish ammunition stocks from overseas were tardy. DAL was now trying to 
identify a suitable rifle for native use which could supplant the present Martini Henry 
rifle17 (my emphasis) since its ammunition was no longer being manufactured.18 On 30 
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16 NAZ S3099/15 Martini-Henry Rifles for Tsetse Fly Operations 1933-40: J.K.C., Acting Chief 
Entomologist, Agricultural Laboratory, Salisbury, W.A. Aitken, Esq., Ranger i/c Tsetse Fly Operations, 
Gatooma, 21st December 1938: Supply of Ejectors. 
17 NAZ S3099/15 Martini-Henry Rifles for Tsetse Fly Operations 1933-40: E.E. Burt, For Secretary, 
Department of Agriculture and Lands, Salisbury, The Controller of Defence Forces, 25th October 1937. 
18 NAZ S3099/15 Martini-Henry Rifles for Tsetse Fly Operations 1933-40: Chief Entomologist to Mr. C. 
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October 1937, the army confirmed that inquiries were being made to replenish MH 
ammunition stocks and to replace the rifle itself.19  
The military maintained, however, that Agriculture had sufficient MH rifles 
available to meet requirements for some years, and I have no reason to think that spares 
for these rifles will not be obtainable.20 On 14 March 1938, Chorley confirmed that:  
The new supply of MH ammunition has been ordered, and unless a 
European war breaks out, delivery is expected within six months. The 
supply of ammunition to the native hunters can be increased, but for the 
time being should not exceed 10 per boy per month, except in the Wankie 
District where the total amount of ammunition expended per month should 
not exceed 1,000 rounds. It has been noticed that the average numbers of 
rounds per buck has improved and every endeavour should be made to 
maintain this average.21 
European hunters licensed to own rifles passed them on to Africans to hunt on their 
behalf without state approval or knowledge.22  
By October 1937, however, only a years supply of MH rounds was left.23 The 
government obtained quotations of ammunition from firms like Messrs Greenwood and 
Bartley Ltd. of £13 per 1,000 rounds. Old stock dating back to 1880 cost £10 per 1,000. 
Half a million rounds was worth nine years supply for use by DAL, the Native 
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20 NAZ S3099/15 Martini-Henry Rifles for Tsetse Fly Operations 1933-40: H.P. Tice, Controller, Defence 
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Department and the BSA Police. No further supplies of MH ammunition were available 
in South Africa. Few firms in Britain were supplying.24  
There were only two ammo serving options: reducing the number of native 
hunters, or restricting the number of rounds issued each month. Chorley chose the latter 
option and cut monthly allocation by 25%.25 He favored the Winchester rifle of .35 or 
larger bore now already used by the Prisons Department. No stocks were available in the 
country. Under normal condition it took nine months to get stocks out from America. 
Technically, the rifle broke easily at the stock, the magazine was easily dented, making 
loading impossible. In any case the rifle required constant oiling and attention.26  
Whatever decision Chorley made, the African and wild life were the central 
factors. On 18 October he noted: I do not consider it wise to issue our native hunters 
with a magazine rifle with only moderate hitting power, the consumption of ammunition 
may be doubled or trebled without any increase in the number of game destroyed. He 
suggested further enquiries be made in England to ascertain whether an order of 
Martini-Henry ammunition could be manufactured within a reasonable time and to 
approach the British War Office for surplus of old single loading .303 rifles.27 
 
How Tsetse Forced the State to Arm African Hunters. Through its mobility, tsetse 
forced the hand of the state in two ways. First, to pay attention to a place that it had 
neglected for a long time. Second, to arm Africans whom it had in fact earlier disarmed 
                                                
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 NAZ S3099/15 Martini-Henry Rifles for Tsetse Fly Operations 1933-40: J.K. Chorley, Entomologist, to 
The Chief Entomologist, Agricultural Laboratory,  Salisbury, 18th October 1937: Replacement of Martini-






because they were poaching. To prevent the spread of g. morsitans into Chibi (Chivi) and 
Ndanga, government extended game elimination operations into Gonarezhou Game 
Reserve and the areas north of Nyamasikana River. Initially, ten selected African hunters 
were posted along the Runde and Save to get the game away from the rivers.28  
Each hunter was permitted to go to his Native Commissioner to secure a gun and 
permits to shoot all classes of game at the Save-Runde junction south of the Mount 
Makosa. Unpaid European hunters kept the ivory, but Africans surrendered whatever 
tusks they obtained to the state. Both reported to the Tsetse Fly Ranger-in-Charge at Save 
Camp adjacent to Hippo Mine.29 
The general position of morsitans in Portuguese territory had been known for 
years, but in 1942 the fly began making incursions into Mahenye from near the Save-
Runde junction, killing over 500 head of cattle. At Honde Dip, five flies had been caught 
and some 387 cattle killed in 1942-5. At Muumbe Dip, two cases had been identified in 
1945 and ten head of cattle had died from tryps. The position was less severe than at 
Honde and Mahenye, even though about 1,000 head of cattle dipped at this tank. At 
Mwangazi Dip, heavy losses of stock were experienced in 1942 but the picture improved 
after a year. Then in 1944, nine cases of tryps and 34 deaths were reported among the 
1,320 head dipping at the tank. At Gwenzi Dip, located on a native purchase area near 
Jersey farm,  25 cases were recorded between 1942 and 1945. Any fly presence on the 
Portuguese side of the border spilled over into tryps cases at the dip tanks.30  
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African Villagers as Pests and Pesticides. Because of transport problems, the state was 
forced to make use of local manpower resources, not only to operate or use technologies 
against tsetse, but also to be the very instruments against the pests. The reasons for this 
mutation of roles was not just the transgressive movement of tsetse, but also of local 
villagers and their livestock crossing back and forth across the border, carrying tsetse fly 
or trypanosomiasis. 
For example, native messengers and native dip attendants gathered all the data 
on cattle numbers that became the states official census. The bad state of the roads in 
Native Areas made it impossible for European staff to undertake the job except in the 
dry winter when the roads were passable.31 On 8 August 1945, Chorley asked that the 
cattle at Mahenye and Honde be moved to Chisumbanje on the Save River. The Native 
Commissioner for Chipinga, B. du Plessis, expressed worry that these cattle would bring 
the trypanosome strain into Chisumbanje. He proposed that an area be created where the 
cattle would be kraaled and herded collectively  by Special Native Constables 
(SNC). The Ndebele had long practiced this system of livestock management: 
These natives are not accustomed to communal herding and the Matabele 
lagisa system is unknown to them, therefore, it is for the Government to 
make the initial arrangements. The cost of paying and feeding the Specials 
will be an infinitesimal share of what is being spent on fly control.32 
Part of the constabularys brief would be to ensure that the Mahenye and Honde lot 
would not be dipped with the Chisumbanje herds and act as a source of contagion.  
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Moreover, through movement to and from the dip tank, they were certain to carry 
fly on their bodies and deposit it into new areas. As for moving cattle from Muumbe to 
Chibuwe (Hot Springs), du Plessis dismissed the move outright. Over half of the 1,800 
cattle dipping at Rupisi watered at Chibuwe, and the trampling back and forth was 
already causing serious erosion. Large stretches of the Save Valley were unoccupied 
for want of water. If boreholes were drilled, however, Chiefs Garahwa and 
Mapungwanas people, who dipped their cattle at Honde, would be sustainably settled 
east of the Save and west of the Msaswe. The same applied to Africans around Muumbe 
and Mwangazi dip tanks.33  
Assistant Chief Native Commissioner E.T. Palmer disagreed with most of du 
Plessiss suggestions. He viewed the danger of mechanical infection as negligible and 
saw no need for a native constabulary given that Mahenye and his people were a small 
population that could easily accompany their own livestock. It was unlikely that the 
Veterinary Department would support any proposal of a dipping exemption.34 In advising 
Palmer, Chorley suggested that if the native people were moved, he would have to 
employ paid African hunters at stations throughout the area they had vacated. Contrary to 
Palmer who had ruled out mechanical transmission of tryps, Chorley listed certain 
peculiar circumstances where transmission might in fact occur, namely if considerable 
numbers of animals carried the trypanosome; if biting flies were abundant, and; if the 
cattle were herded, kraaled or worked together. The danger, however, was small so 
long as the herds did not mix. He described the constabulary idea as a dangerous one 
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to adopt because the removal was likely to be permanent unless the Portuguese took 
steps to eradicate the fly in their territorythe source of the problem. Public funding for 
it would also be permanent. Dipping was a veterinary matter and the water supplies for it 
enough; if difficulties arose, more dip tanks would have to be built and charged to the 
Tsetse Fly Operations account.35  That was unacceptable. 
These interdepartmental responsibilities over entomology and veterinary matters 
interfered with anti-vermin operations. In June 1945, the Chief Entomologist agreed to a 
request from the Chief Veterinary Surgeon (CVS) to temporarily withdraw African 
hunters from Ndanga District at the grave risk of the tsetse fly and animal 
trypanosomiasis (nagana) spreading into the district from Portuguese territory and 
Chipinga across the Save where Mahenyes cattle had suffered severely. The CVS 
wanted to prevent disturbed game from interfering with FMD control work further 
north.36 Two years later, the Chief Entomologist underscored the need to continue 
shooting in the area to stem the increasing cases of nagana at Chitsas village in the very 
area where operations had been halted. The CVS and Chief Entomologist then agreed on 
an area to be cleared. The latter had asked the Native Commissioner of Zaka to issue gun 
permits to our native hunters for game destruction, but the CVS told him not to issue 
them on account of the discovery of the spread of foot and mouth disease. The shooting 
had proved to work in preventing the spread of morsitans.37 
 
Feeling the Pulse of the Fly 
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In the south-east of Rhodesia, the border with Mozambique was an important factor in 
the interpretation of the occurrence of the fly; tsetse was thought to advance from 
Mozambique into Rhodesia. This was especially the case in the area of the Save-Runde 
junction, an area selected as the site of a game reserve, which is now Gonarezhou 
National Park. The creation of the game reserve faced fierce opposition from the 
Rhodesian Department of Native Affairs. In 1934 about 7,000 people were living in the 
Native Reserves in the area, and the Departments representatives considered the reserve 
a threat to them and the approximately 3,000 head of cattle they possessed. Declaring the 
border area a game reserve would increase the risk of an advance of the fly from 
Mozambique into Rhodesia, which would then easily move on to the commercial cattle 
ranches further east.  
The fly was allegedly re-establishing itself in Rhodesian territory following the 
rinderpest epizootic. In 1918, the respected tsetse fly researcher M.F.C. Swynnerton had 
found the southernmost limit of the fly belt to be 20° 20´ (33° 25´ W), on the Busi river 
area of Mozambique to the west of the Sitatonga Hills. In 1921 he warned of the 
disquieting fact that the tsetse glossina morsitans is slowly spreading west through the 
lowveld towards our border. There was now a distinct threat that the fly may at some 
future date invade the Sabi valley.38 The Rhodesian authorities had a fragmentary record 
of this advance, but by 1936 they viewed it as a serious threat to Save valley. As 
Swynnerton also found, glossina pallidipes occurred along the border north of 
Espungabera (Chipungumbira) while g. morsitans pushed southwest along the Busi. By 
1942 the latter species could be caught on the Rhodesian border and had invaded the 
Honde River valley. In the next three years it advanced rapidly: in 1943, two flies were 
                                                





caught at Mahenye on the Lower Rupembe, and by 1945, Chief Mahenyes herd had been 
decimated from 600 to just 94. In 1944, a single fly was caught west of the Save; Chief 
Chitsa reported four cases of nagana among his cattle the same year. From 1944 until 
1951/2, the situation remained fairly static; then a severe outbreak of nagana occurred 
among Chief Chitsas cattle that confirmed the authorities worst fears  the fly was now 
well established west of Save River, its pre-rinderpest precincts.39 
The flys presence and the threat it posed triggered government actions. Numbers 
of flies caught became the measure of risk. In 1949, the Entomologist H.E. Hornby 
undertook a survey of adjoining Portuguese territory east of the Save-Runde junction 
while two Tsetse Field Officers made cursory examinations of the Rhodesian side.40 In 
July 1950, Game Ranger Hooper caught 15 g. morsitans somewhere west of the 
border; exactly a year later g. morsitans were reported at the Shabani Mine recruiting 
station at Marumbini. In April 1954, the Director of Tsetse Fly Operations41 gave 
instructions to Entomologist K.E.W. Boyd to carry out a tsetse and ecological survey of 
the Saves west bank between the Mkwasine and Runde river junctions.42 In 1955, 
another survey was carried out, again on the Rhodesian side. The advance of the tsetse 
fly towards Chitsa necessitated further studies in 1956 to determine the nagana limit 
south of the Runde River.  
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The tsetse became an ominous presence especially because of the losses of 
African livestock on the Rhodesian side of the border. These sustained and extensive 
outbreaks of nagana prompted an increase in anti-tsetse fly operations to save the herds 
on the east bank of the Runde River where considerable losses had occurred already. 
Losses on the west bank were initially low, but were rising steadily. Interestingly enough, 
infections on each bank were treated as separate problems despite emanating from the 
same fly belt.43 Only three positive cases were confirmed to have occurred on the east 
bank at Muumbe Cattle Dip in January and February 1956. This was considered a great 
improvement given the much higher incidences of previous months.44 On the west bank 
cases were recorded at all cattle dips during April-August 1956. Nagana was present but 
rare in Sangwe Native Reserve while at the commercial cattle ranch Humani in Bikita 
District, only one case of nagana was recorded in May. The entomologist Mowbray ruled 
that there was little possibility of east-to-west bank infection, contrary to earlier fears.45  
 
Sending in the Experts. Fear of a tsetse invasion from Mozambique resulted in two 
surveys the Rhodesian Governments Department of Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis Control 
and Reclamation conducted on either side of the border with Mozambique. In the first, 
entomologist K.E.W. Boyd concentrated on areas west of Save between the Mkwasine 
and Runde Rivers before moving to the Saves eastern bank. Then in April and July 
1955, the Department deployed another entomologist, Robert M. Mowbray, to examine 
the Lower Save Valley and determine the extent and density of the tsetse populations. 
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After the survey, fieldwork was extended to other localities. In order to solve a continual 
lack of reliable quantitative data, Boyd proposed that a fly round on the Rupembe River, 
done monthly,  would be a useful finger on the pulse of the fly population as well as 
going some way towards filling this gap in future years.46 Through the surveys the 
entomologists tried to identify possible tsetse habitats, focusing on types of vegetation 
that were attractive to the fly. This included paying attention to human influences on 
vegetation and hence tsetse habitats.   
The Boyd survey used aerial photographs as a baseline for constructing a 
vegetation map. Boyd classified eight major plant communities; big tree alluvium, 
mupani on alluvium, mupani on stony ground, Brachystegia tamarindoides woodland, 
dense thicket, open vlei, Terminalia combretum woodland, and cultivation. He deemed 
tsetse unlikely to reside in the big tree and mupani alluvia. He also noticed the effects of 
cultivation tsetse distribution: the pest was completely absent along the vleis where 
Africans cultivated in this generally poor rainfall area.47  
Mowbray located the g. morsitans-infested area where the Save and Runde Rivers 
and their tributaries drained, mostly among the mupani and guibourtia.48 The most 
important element of his botanic survey was information on thicket formation and its 
suitability to tsetse habitation. Tsetse flies were discovered to favor shady patches in the 
undergrowth. To the more arid south of the Runde, thicket was limited, with only 
occasional patches of good shade from isolated clumps of evergreen shrubs and 
scramblers. The Androstachys johnsonii with its leathery leaves effectively excluded 
sunlight, thereby developing a canopy and enabling trees to grow with almost 
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plantation-like regularity only occasionally disturbed by elephant damage. The resultant 
absence of undergrowth suggested to Mowbray that Androstachys would seem to be 
poor fly habitat, the very uniformity being a drawback. He argued that this aspect should 
be investigated further since it might offer possibilities for intervention.49  
Mowbray discovered that some types of mupani forests hosted tsetse flies, 
whereas others not only were unattractive to tsetse flies, but could also form a barrier. 
The inhabitable characteristic of some forests resulted partly from past human 
avoidance, partly from the presence or absence of water. Near permanent pools the 
shade and game numbers are adequate for tsetse.50 Mowbray concluded that the 5 mile 
stretch to the west of Marumbini was, however, suitable tsetse habitat on account of 
human-induced damage to the mupani [that] had stunted tree growth, turning the area to 
scrubland. Africans burning wild fires in both Mozambique and Rhodesia had made it 
impossible to make out a concrete picture of the areas tsetse possibilities.51 
Further human distortions were noticeable to the west, where scrubby mupani 
filled nearly all the central plateau, growing on coarse sand amid sparse, spiky grass. 
Some relatively well developed trees and numerous large stumps cut or burnt flush with 
the ground punctuated the vegetation. These human distortions, according to Mowbray, 
complicated any theory of the tsetse habit. Was the tsetse advance a climatic or a human-
induced phenomenon? Bush fires were raging from Mozambique into Rhodesia as 
Mowbray conducted his survey, disturbing the normal behaviour of game and tsetse 
populations and driving them westward into Rhodesia. As Mowbray noted, the colonial 
authorities had been negotiating to solve the transboundary fire problem since 1950. At a 
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conference in the border town of Umtali (now Mutare), the Rhodesians proposed the 
establishment of direct lines of radio or telephone communication with border posts on 
the Mozambican side as an early warning and prevention system. The Portuguese 
rejected this costly measure on the grounds that the population was sparse, being 
inhabited by natives only and for this reason it would be extremely difficult for our 
Government to introduce any elaborate protection measure.52 Mowbray, however, 
argued that the fires and stunting, if controlled, could produce an effective fly barrier.53 
He proposed that government should make the stunting of mupani a controllable factor. 
The resultant barrier would further reinforce the dry storm drain watercourses flowing 
in a northerly direction, which supported thickets of Androstachys uninhabitable to 
tsetse. This area could be kept from developing into mupani woodland capable of 
supporting tsetse.54  
One of the things Mowbray failed to explain was the occurrence of peculiarly 
isolated pockets of Brachystegia woodlands in circular groves on the entire plateau.55 Yet 
from the accounts of Swynnerton (1921) and John Ford (1971), it is clear that the Gaza 
had brought captured livestock into the Espungabera Mountains and made several efforts 
to introduce them to the low-lying areas.  
As part of a strategy to protect livestock from disease, including nagana, their 
ruler Mzilawho ruled the Gaza between 1861 and 1884had sent an order to sondela 
enkosini (draw near to the king). Thereupon an immense compulsory movement of the 
population took place. On account of the concentration, the bush simply disappeared 
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and the country became bare, except for the numberless native villages and a continuity 
of native gardens.56  
Ford further describes how certain areas in the Gaza kingdom were left unsettled 
as game reserves, specifically an oblong area between the Sitatonga hills and the Busi 
river. Hunting took place anywhere outside this area. Such control was no longer 
guaranteed in the periods when the Gazaunder the new ruler Ngungunyanaretreated 
to Bilene in Southern Mozambique in 1889.57 The wooding was let loose and soon re-
established itself throughout the previously settled country.58 The isolated Brachystegia 
woodlands that Mowbray called natural habitats of tsetse were therefore not natural but 
human-modified.  
Water was, according to Mowbray, also important for determining tsetse habitat. 
He related it to the local African agricultural practices of seasonally planting crops along 
river valleys, retreating to the uplands during flooding and clearing strips of bush to plant 
crops that depended on rainfall. He found water scarcity to account for the sparse African 
settlement  a line of kraals  along the Lundi from its junction with the Sabi as far 
west as the Nyamasikana and an isolated group of kraals under the headman, Captain, in 
the southern tip of his operational area. Mowbray found that the drainage line 
vegetation was scarce because the rainfall was too low for any seepage bogs to form at 
the source of streams, leaving no shady patches for tsetse to breed. Larger river channels 
were irregular and dry 10 months a year; the low water-retention capacity of the sandy 
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soil caused rivers and streams to rise rapidly. This accounted for the absence of riverine 
fringing vegetation in those areas.59  
 
Tsetse Fly Catching Rides on People and Game. Water was also important because its 
availability and scarcity seasonally affected the movement of game. Boyd had found a 
very heavy concentration of impala, numerous zebra, eland, buffalo, and kudu, lion, 
leopard, and elephant, and a fair number of warthog and sable on the upper Mkwasine. 
On the Chionja plateau up to the alluvium of the Save and Runde, he spotted only kudu 
and elephant. The animals remained common despite the shooting operations that were 
in progress. South of the Runde game was abundant; here scattered herds of nyala shared 
common space with bushbuck and duiker among the river thickets and cultivated areas. 
Finally, he found that every large pool in the Sabi and Lundi ha(d) its quota of hippo and 
crocodiles.60 These species Boyd considered critical for the blood diet of the tsetse fly. 
Mowbray then drew connections between the water supplies and the patterns of game 
dispersals and concentrations, suggesting that practically the entire area was highly 
suitable for game in wet season when food and water was abundant. When the 
waterholes dried up, two major movements of game occurred in the arid central area. One 
was eastward towards the pans in Mozambique and the Rio Save; the other was 
westwards from the hinterland to the Runde and the semi-thickets of the Nyamasikana. 
Mowbray, however, concluded that the presence of vegetational barriers would render 
such movements highly unlikely to cause fly encroachments.61  
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Mowbrays report connects fire and water to the tsetse fly in interesting ways. 
Because of the fires raging in the border area between Mozambique and Rhodesia, most 
elephants east of the Runde escarpment had retreated well into Portuguese territory. 
Their destructive feeding habits had broken mupani trees, leaving extensive low scrub 
belts on their trails to and from waterholes, which were suitable to tsetse. Overall, the 
western area was a well-used dry season concentration area  most favoured by game 
owing to its permanent water and food supplies (many vegetations converged there); 
more importantly, game was largely undisturbed by humans as there [were] no 
settlements west of Chilojo (Mupfichani).62 As a spur to game movement, fire and water 
presented two possibilities: tsetse could spread on the trail to the watering holes or when 
animals fled forest fires from Mozambique into Rhodesia. This meant that the 
vegetational barriers and burning/stumping would be inadequate because tsetse could still 
catch a ride on moving game. Nevertheless, in closing his report, Mowbray was still 
hopeful that the vegetational barriers would put paid to any natural encroachments 
westward. He did, however, suggest additional modes of transport for the fly, arguing 
that tsetse could only move southward if it was carried there from Marumbini on the 
Portuguese timber companies lorries running to Malvernia or extensive human traffic 
across the Runde.63  
The Boyd survey had revealed a pattern of infection resembling the progressive 
journey of the trypanosome from Mozambique into Chiefs Chitsa and Mahenyes areas. 
Boyd noticed at Chitsa the considerable movement of transboundary labor migrants from 
Mozambique across and along the Save up the Runde through Nuanetsi (Mwenezi) to 
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South Africa. On their way back home to Mozambique, these African labor migrants 
reported having encountered heavy fly soon after crossing the Rhodesian border. Boyd 
was convinced that tsetse rode on these mens bodies and was deposited further and 
further along the route, inside Rhodesia. After all, this was also happening in Rhodesias 
northern districts with labor migrants coming from or returning home to Nyasaland and 
Northern Rhodesia. At the Commandants border camp, Boyd had caught two g. 
morsitans on the person of some westbound migrants; six miles further down the road, 
in Portuguese territory, he took 24 more flies on another group. On his own car, he 
caught 42 over an 11-mile stretch to the border. Finally, on the Honde River he bagged 
39 more in the first 11 miles of the road along the Rupembe to the Hippo Mine.64  
The connections between human mobility, transport systems and tsetse movement 
were also clear with respect to g. pallidipes. Boyd had caught four on his car along the 
Portuguese road as he drove north to the Honde River. His fears of a heavy concentration 
of the species inside a five-mile proximity of the Rhodesia border deepened when he 
caught two more on the Saves bank inside Rhodesia. This was the furthest southern 
point the insect had been recorded inside the country. With respect to g. morsitans the 
barrier of thickets to the west of the Rupembe had prevented any significant transmission 
across the Save. Curiously g. pallidipes was now well established in this thicket.65 A few 
months prior to Boyds survey the advancing morsitans belt had reached the mountain 
road just south of Mount Makosa.66 Mowbrays hypothesis was that tsetse fly must be 
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able to move large distances on vehicles as many of the (nagana) cases mentioned 
occurred up to 60 miles away from the nearest known fly.67 
As a result of this pattern of encroachment, the Rhodesian government had in 
November 1955 started controlling all northbound foot, scotch cart, and motor traffic 
from the tsetse belt on either bank of the Save. The pattern of nagana infected villages on 
the west bank and the paths leading from them to native stores and other places of 
gathering presented clear evidence of human vectors of the tsetse advance. 
Mowbray observed African mobility in a rural landscape and the networks between 
dwellings and other places of intereststores, veterinary dip tanks against tick-borne 
diseases, boreholes, schools, and churches.68 Between each of these, a tapestry of paths 
emerged that became the highways on which the tsetse caught a ride on travelers within 
Rhodesia or across into/from Mozambique. Since the delimitation of the Anglo-
Portuguese border in 1892, authorities had experienced great difficulties in controlling 
the movement of Africans across the border, a problem that bothers authorities till this 
day. In the mid-1950s, at the time the surveys were conducted, Rhodesia still welcomed 
labor migrants from Mozambique, even if they were illegal, much to the chagrin of the 
Portuguese authorities who regretted losing labor critical to the concession companies. To 
address the problem of carried fly, Boyd proposed that migrant laborers would have to be 
compulsorily de-flied before reaching the Rupembe.69   
 
Africans Making Alliances With Tsetse Fly. African hunters used the tsetse menace as 
an entry point into paid state employment; through it they also put their fingers on state 
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guns and used them for poaching. Although the Chief Entomologist had no idea who the 
culprits were, he strongly suspected the African hunters employed on tsetse operations 
because of slack and intermittent European supervision. He suggested to the Ranger-in-
Charge of Mt. Selinda, R.B. Hooper, to give your natives a pep-talk and, apart from new 
recruits, so that they would in future not exceed the 3-5 rounds of ammunition for every 
head quota.70 
The African hunters were in the habit of aiming well and killing more and staying 
within their quota, therefore creating a surplus of ammunition to poach with. In January 
1952, the new Ranger-in-Charge, W.R. Vaughanscott, alerted his superiors to the 
possibility that African hunters may have been hunting outside the designated Tsetse 
Corridor to tally the tails they submitted and cover up poaching. He wondered how our 
hunters here are to destroy so much game every month, if they shoot strictly in Southern 
Rhodesian territory.71 On 1 May 1953, his successor J.H. Mackeown wrote Chorley 
reporting alleged poaching of elephant and game in the Gonarezhou Game Reserve. The 
information he had heard gives us an idea of the possibility of .303s given for tsetse 
shooting being used for poaching: 
The only information I have been able to obtain is that at odd intervals a 
hunter comes through the Mkwasine and into the fly area, the man 
apparently shoots anything he finds, and according to one of the hunters 
he may be a native with a .303, he also shoots all he finds.72 
There is no doubt that African hunters transformation of tsetse operations into 
poaching was due to lack of state capacity to police Africans. Until 1950, no vehicles had 
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been allocated for the ranger-in-charge since most of the terrain was unsuitable for 
motor transport and the Sabi River cannot usually be crossed. Rangers were told very 
clearly before taking the job that the principal part of their job consisted of foot 
patrols.73 How could they monitor transgressive mobility when they were immobile? 
The natives had run amok! On 6 September 1954, for example, Provincial 
Native Commissioner D.G. Lewis complained that natives, by virtue of a permit issued 
by the Secretary for Mines, Lands and Surveys are permitted to destroy game (with a 
few exceptions) in the tsetse area between the Nyamasikana-Runde junction and 
Portuguese border. In addition, he had been told that a large number of Europeans were 
shooting in the described area (Native Purchase Area and Game Reserve) and no 
control of direction is exercised by anybody in authority. Lewis had written his 
subordinate the NC for Nuanetsi indicating his concern as to the omission in permits of 
any instruction as to the direction in which shooting operations should take place. 
Hunters should be made to shoot in the direction of the international boundary to drive 
animals out into Mozambique not in towards the farms, he said.74  
Pest control had become pest dispersal, the African hunter the pest, not pesticide. 
Lewis was saying that contrary to the hunters preventing tsetse movement, they were 
actually scattering it: If the Chief Entomologist and other experts consider that game 
spreads the tsetse fly (and they say foot-and-mouth), does he not realize that the game 
and fly are being driven northwards by all the hunters he employs? Lewis opinion was 
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based on the views of an African informant, Ndari, an expert on the fly by virtue of 
living in the infected area: 
Native Ndari who lives on the southern boundary of the Ndanga East 
reserve is of the opinion that elephant etc. being harassed on both sides of 
the Sabi River are traveling up this river to spread the fly in his area, 
whereas the driving of animals should be towards the international border, 
where the Portuguese, I presume, are destroying their game. Elephant, 
despite their size, are extremely nervous and will stampede for miles on 
being disturbed. I am not sure that the reason for the increase in the 
number of elephants so far north as the Lone Star Ranch and the eastern 
boundary of the Matibi Reserve cannot be attributed to the disorderly 
shooting. Elephant chased from the junction of the Runde and Sabi Rivers 
might easily, with their fly, join up with these animals further. I have the 
authority to say that the Veterinary Department is equally uneasy in regard 
to the methods of shooting. I do not think that it would be asking too much 
if the Native Commissioners of the districts concerned were given the 
names of the persons entering their areas armed with permits. I am sure 
you will agree this is very necessary if the interest of the officials in their 
districts is sustained. This policy of destruction is distasteful to us all but 
we are told it is the only way to get rid of the fly. Thousands of lbs. of 
elephant must go to eradicate ounces of fly. Fantastically put in this way is 
it not?75 (my own emphasis) 
As such, Lewis warned that if hunters were permitted to operate in the area in the 
present haphazard way, then the elephants are going to carry the fly up the Runde River 
and into Matibi II Reserve and up the Chiredzi River to the Ranches. All livestock and 
possibly humans would have to be evacuated from the southern areas of the province.76  
 
Catching Fly, Making Colonial Entomological Facts. Like these white rangers, 
therefore, entomologists Boyd and Mowbray could not personally beat the bushes and 
cast nets to actually catch the flies. Nor could the rangers spend months on end in malaria 
infested country, without horses or any hoofed transport (thanks to tsetse fly), chasing 
after and shooting at wild animals. Tsetse limited the European expert to the field camp 







at Save Valley, from where he made occasional monthly patrols. The day to day job of 
keeping a finger on the pulse of the fly therefore fell to Africans recruited in the 
villages. 
The Rhodesian manpower problem was at two levels. It was not a problem to 
recruit Africans for hunting with government-issued Martini Henry rifles77 at a time when 
only whites were allowed to own or use guns, let alone enter wildlife areas. Nor were 
European entomologists in short supply. The problem Boyd and Mowbray faced was in 
recruiting sufficient and sufficiently trained African personnel to catch flies:78 there was 
no extra incentive to catch flies compared to hunting game to destroy the tsetses diet.   
Fly catching was an arduous job whites could notor would notdo when there 
were colonial subjects who could be mobilized to do it. An interesting question here is: 
what kind of expertise did Africans bring to the production of tsetse science? How could 
one talk about their contribution to entomology when their voices are not included 
verbatim79 in the written reports? Does it mean that when the voice is muted the actions 
cannot be unearthed?  
The reports I use were written in English, while the people who caught flies  
spoke, according to Boyd a very attractive dialect of Zulu.80 I read the entomological 
report as an English compilation of knowledge produced out of different bodies of 
knowledge. The hunters and flycatchers brought to this knowledge production their own 
knowledge of the local terrain, of tracking and guiding. One could therefore argue that 
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Africans retreated to this indigenous library to read for clues to enable them to act upon 
their subalternity, and through their actions wrote an important part of colonial science. 
It is not that they did not write colonial science; it is rather that those who compiled the 
records used exclusionary technologiespen and paperAfricans were not competent in 
it.81  
Where the flycatchers and hunters do appear in the reports their contribution 
received mixed appreciation. Boyd described them as an unbearable mixture of Ndau 
and Shangane, and found the Ndau and Shangane to be in general uncommunicative and 
unreliable barring a few exceptions. However, he also agreed that without the aid of 
one of these, Mkwadze by name, a retired housebreaker with a criminal record a yard 
long, it would have been almost impossible to visit the upper Lundi area.82 Mowbray 
recounted how preliminary work for the survey was delayed because  labour was in 
extremely short supply, good fly boys could not be obtained and surveys had to be done 
with local natives, who no sooner learnt to catch than they left.83 For a region exposed to 
labour migration to the South African mines and considering that Shabanie Mine 
operated a recruiting deport at Marumbini run by a man called Blake Thompson, fly work 
was in competition with much more lucrative forms of wage labor.84 Mowbray stressed 
the great difficulty  experienced in recruiting the right type of native.85 Only through 
the incentive of paying a wage and the bounty of game meat could African men be 
enticed to join fly work. Mowbray conceded that paid hunters were the more useful, 
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especially if given fly nets and encourage(d)  to search for fly and retain any caught 
for further inspection.  
While Boyd and Mowbray approached tsetse operations as (based on) science, 
Africans used the game slaughters as a moment to reclaim their access to wildlife. Those 
who could use guns availed their skills and knowledge to the anti-tsetse operation as 
hunters. Five hunters were operating in the triangular area 6-7 miles from the Save-Runde 
confluence, while a sixth one operated a few miles further up the Runde. These African 
men were unpaid as are the rest of the hunters in this area. Primarily because of the 
difficulties of crossing the Save River, very little control was exercised on them such that, 
Boyd said, it is extremely doubtful if their activities are of any value.86 Boyd evaluated 
such independence as a weakness, fearing these African men would not do a thorough job 
and would leave residual game capable of supporting a large fly population, as [the 
hunting operations] are at present carried out, [they] will have little effect on the 
encroachment of the fly.87 Mowbray, however, understood how critical the role of 
African hunters was in controlling the fly. He agreed that because of the few hunters 
involved on the west bank, the situation was not found to promise good results. Once 
the white rangers-in-charge paid the one salaried African hunter his wage in January, the 
latter would go to the villages and the hunting operations would have to be temporarily 
suspended. The unpaid hunters on the east bank were continuing their work, but while 
they had considerably reduced the game density, they were not capable of tackling the 
remaining populations without reorganization and additional expenses: 
The mode of change was to give the redundant unpaid hunters the 
opportunity of remaining but on a paid, monthly basis. The Makossa block 
                                                






was then divided into limited areas and the new paid hunters were then 
camped at a density of one to every 10 sq. miles. Reorganization will be 
completed when the west bank operations begin next year [1957].88 
When I talk about how the subaltern speaks, therefore, I am referring to these moments 
when the scientific experiment could not go on if African hunters were unavailable. What 
brought the entire exercise within the orbit of western science was the white ranger or 
entomologist at whose orders game elimination proceeded.  
 
Buttressing Borders Against Tsetse Mobility. Following the completion of the surveys, 
Mowbray decided that the non-isolated mixed populations of tsetse in the Save Valley 
could be combated through a combination of bush clearing, game elimination and, after 
that process, through the resettling of Africans squeezed out of other areas of the 
Rhodesian hinterland. The idea was to establish a barrier against reinvasion. The 
strategy also involved rigorous traffic control mechanisms to prevent further 
encroachment of fly, an undertaking that called for a reorganization and boost in staff, 
transport and equipment.89 I argue that especially the latter method of keeping the fly 
under surveillance at the same time contributed to attempts to mark the territorial 
jurisdiction of the state and control over the African population.  
The tsetse fly spoke through the mobility of Africans, the Africans spoke through 
the mobility of the tsetse fly, and both movements were/caused pestilences to the state. 
Writing in 1956, Mowbray noted that the most important aspect of tsetse control work in 
that year had been the instigation of traffic control on both banks of the Sabi River. He 
was referring to the establishment of tsetse control gates (in November) on both banks 
involving a more flexible system of traffic control, where traffic was checked on fly 
                                                
88 NAZ S3106/11/1/9 Sabi Valley 1955-6 Mowbray, Lower Sabi Valley Report: 8. 





carriage. The initial gates had been intended to supplement survey work, but now that 
more was known about the fly, there was merit in relocating the gates at strategic 
positions where further removal was unnecessary.90 Already five gates and fences on the 
east bank had proved particularly successful, significantly reducing cases of nagana; they 
would act as a fortress against invasion. That Mowbray and his African team had caught 
no fly around and beyond the east bank gates meant that no fly had been carried inland, 
at least on road traffic (i.e. foot, carts, occasionally cars, etc.). At the same time the 
Makoho gate had allowed in alarming numbers of g. morsitans and g. pallidipes, 
presumably from the Ndanga River heading south. The fly had negotiated this human 
technology (the gate) by outflanking [it] only to be returned on southbound traffic. To 
address this problem, Mowbray moved the Mareya gate a few miles north of Makoho 
gate on the same road.91  
A crucial question became how to control human movement and enforce human-
designated borders, as well as to curtail tsetse and game movement. Mowbray sought to 
make traffic control more successful by calling on the state to erect a border fence 
between Southern Rhodesia and Mozambique to close the area between trigonometrical 
beacons 103 and 106. The reasoning was that as soon as the fence was complete, a 
system of daily maintenance patrols by local Africans would be put in place to prevent 
indiscriminate international movements and the resulting problem of carried fly. 
Mowbray argued that the Makaru gate had prevented the ingress of over 400 fly in 
one month and that far larger numbers must be carried over the border on pedestrians 
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coming to the Rhodesian [grocery] stores. He was advocating strict control of human 
movement as one of the strategies for controlling tsetse proliferation, warning: 
All movement in and out of the tsetse area must be strictly controlled. 
Besides the border movement other haphazard wanderings of pedestrians 
and livestock take place. In enforcing traffic control it will be possible, 
without defeating the object of the scheme, to exclude those areas to and 
from which large movements of cattle take place. It is strongly 
recommended that this absolute traffic control be enforced during the 
coming year.92 
Hence, the movement of human beings needed to be controlled in order to stem the 
movement of tsetse fly. The issue at stake, however, was also that Africans, like tsetse 
fly, were violating an international border designated by treaty. Since the late 1930s the 
state and Mahenyes people had been fighting a low intensity war over restrictions 
preventing the chiefs herd from grazing in Mozambique, and the gates and fences were 
solutions likely to be resented. 
Fences and gates functioned differently in different locations. On the west bank 
they acted as an adjunct to survey whereas on the east bank they were a primary 
method to quarantine already known tsetse habitats. Depending on where such gates were 
situated, they presented problems in some areas and solutions in others. One example is 
the hostile attitude of Chief Chitsa and his people to the control of carried fly, which 
had started when the first attempt to erect a border fence against FMD and East Coast 
Fever began in the late 1930s. The veterinary department had quarantined the entire 
village herd pending the completion of a border fence and other veterinary facilities such 
as the dip tanks.93 The science Mowbray said was working led to restrictions that 
Chief Chitsa and his people bitterly resented. Mwawa gate (opened June 1956) was 
meant to prove the extensions of G. morsitans and to record pallidipes populations on 
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the river, yet the fact that tsetse movement had stalled was simultaneously a sign of the 
restriction placed on the movement of its vectors, the people. While numbers of 
morsitans had been taken off westbound traffic, one, taken off an eastbound cyclist, may 
have been carried to a point west of the gate; those numbers also reported the movement 
of the natives to the state. The Machindu gate was set up in August on the suspicion 
of fly in southern Ndanga East Reserve, and although none had been caught since, the 
gate would be maintained. Mowbrays thinking was simple: the more fences the more 
rigid the traffic control in future. Everything, however, depended on suitable African staff 
being recruited.94  
Indirectly, the presence of tsetse fly held government to ransom: now it had to 
commit attention, equipment, and manpower to make its presence felt in a border area 
long neglected or risk a tsetse fly invasion of cattle ranches close by to the west, 
principally Nuanetsi Ranch. The tsetse fly was calling attention to the periphery, making 
it the centre in the scientific sense  that of a laboratory in situ. As control measures, 
gates and, more particularly, fences compartmentalized the landscape. They helped to 
classify space into wild and domesticated as a prerequisite for isolating tsetse flies. In 
order to combat the fly and further domesticate the landscape a strategy of game 
elimination was deployed.  
The gun and fence combined in the cordons sanitaire. As African hunters  using 
the age-old hunting traditions of their ancestorscleared game, the fencers erected a 
barrier to make such clearings permanent. Sometimes the fence came first and the 
shooting later, so as to canalize game into easier killing grounds and then having hunters 
patrol the cleared areas. This was especially so on the east bank of the Runde River. 






Hunting was scheduled to resume on the west bank in early 1957 with a planned and 
ruthless campaign whose baseline would be the new fence already under construction 
from Chilojo escarpment to Save just south of Masapos Ranch. Mowbray alerts us to two 
points of interest regarding the fence: 
Firstly its construction with high tensile, plain steel wire and secondly the 
numerous difficulties encountered in trying to obtain a sound erection job 
from the contractor. It is fortunate that a new field officer has arrived in 
the area, as his presence will perhaps prevent re-erection of the fence 
through bad workmanship, and shorten what promises to be a long and 
tedious task.95 
Erecting fences was by no means an easy task, requiring its own skills and the 
development of appropriate technology. In other words, the fence also mobilized 
different fields of expertise beyond just the entomologist and his African staff so that, as 
Latour has urged, when we look at science, the networks of heterogeneous actors that 
produce it go well beyond the laboratory.96 
Such non-laboratory labour or knowledge mobilization also calls attention to the 
role of African bush-clearers in creating cordons sanitaires. Even though Mowbray 
completed vegetational mapping and submitted bush-clearing schemes for the Rupembe 
watershed in March 1956, Africans were the critical mass. The scheme aimed at 
destroying concentration sites of both morsitans and pallidipes in a locality in which the 
woodland surrounding the drainage lines cannot support either tsetse. Mowbray noted 
that success or failure of this initial scheme will be largely judged on the fly figures of 
the local traffic gate, as tsetse carried in an easterly direction arise in the clearing area. 
Random catches have also been made in the locality.97 
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Here it is also crucial to stress the technological adjustments envisaged at the time 
to cut menial labor: a new feature recently  introduced into bush clearing 
operations, the two-man Dolman power saw, was expected to undergo extensive field 
trials  in the near future. Preliminary small-scale trials were showing the saw to be 
roughly eight times quicker than an axe team of five natives. It had posted encouraging 
figures in terms of output but presented the new problem of selecting and training 
African operators. This saw would, however, do little to solve the immediate problem of 
the rawness of labour gangs (i.e. inexperience) under charge of the field officer, a Mr. 
Janke, who was also new on the job.98 Africans remained indispensable. 
Another dimension to the bush-clearance strategy was the option of not 
employing African labor directly, but to offer Africans the infected land for resettlement 
and insist that they clear it. This option had not been considered in the Save valley where 
the nagana had first struck, but rumor was rife that large numbers of people who had 
been removed from Matibi II and Sengwe Native Reserves when parts of what is now 
Gonarezhou were declared Crown Land would be resettled in tsetse infected areas. They 
were to be joined by Africans from elsewhere who could afford to buy land in the newly 
declared native purchase areas in Gonakudzingwa. The Department of Agriculture had 
discussed the matter with the Native Commissioner for Chipinga, who favored the idea of 
creating a human shield against tsetse. Mowbray urged that the settlement should follow 
as rapidly as planning allows. If judiciously carried out the measure could preclude 
extension of the Chipinga border clearing and the high costs this work would entail. The 
funds so-saved could be reassigned for tsetse operations further south.99 
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Epilogue: The End of the Tsetse Fly in Gonarezhou 
Even amidst the euphoria of DDT and dieldrin, the state had by 1963 resolved to 
introduce selective game elimination to check the advance of the tsetse fly for the 
protection of the cattle industry. Consequently, from August 1964 shooting operations 
were yet again authorized in designated tsetse fly controlled hunting areas. In the 
Sabi/Lundi Controlled Hunting Area, total elimination was ordered in order to 
establish a cattle-free game-free area. Everywhere else (in the northern parts of the 
country), the elimination was limited to elephant, buffalo, kudu, bushbuck, bushpig and 
warthog, the favored host species of the tsetse fly.100  
There was one important change arising from the Boyd and Mowbray reports: the 
level of supervision and coordination between the vets and the tsetse fly people had 
improved dramatically. The newly reconstituted Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis Control 
Unit now fell under the Department of Veterinary Services (DVS), and it was tasked with 
the elimination of the specified species of game, other than elephant and buffalo, which 
were the responsibility of DNPWLM. For ease of executing its duties, DNPWLM created 
eleven new posts to accommodate the increased pace of elephant and buffalo 
destruction.101  
In 1965, the DNPWLM was generally upbeat about the progress of tsetse fly 
control operations. In the northern districts from Binga in the west to Mt. Darwin in the 
east, its role was primarily to remove elephant and buffalo and to supervise the hunting 
activities of DVS staff, which focused only on kudu, bushbuck, bushpig, and warthog. 
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The new approach was called the six species formula. At the end of that year, 
DNPWLM declared that the operations had progressed beyond all expectations. Major 
concentrations of elephant and buffalo had been cleared from everywhere in the northern 
districts except little pockets. Since the commencement of operations in October 1964, 
DNPWLM had killed 1,534 elephant and 253 buffalo. In the southern region, the 
department had thus far destroyed 297 elephant and 127 buffalo in the Sabi/Lundi 
Controlled Hunting Area. Only very small numbers of the species remained in the 
intended game-free cattle-free corridors.102  
In 1966, the DNPWLM and DVS anti-tsetse operations were concentrated mostly 
in the northern areas, with Gonarezhou receiving a rather token mention in the Directors 
report. He described the tsetse control position in the Sabi/Lundi Controlled Hunting 
Areas satisfactory. However, he cautioned that due to the tsetse threat to the south-
eastern Lowveld ranches from heavy fly concentrations located in the [Chivonja] Hills, 
the game-fences [had to be] realigned. The southern game fence was also being moved 
and repositioned to the south of the hills to enable controlled hunting of the selected 
species to take place. That same year, tsetse teams embarked on an extensive spraying 
of the entire area with residual sprays during winter.103 
The momentum of the tsetse operations changed dramatically in 1967. In previous 
years there had been pressure on the removal of elephant and buffalo in the shortest 
possible time; there was more emphasis on driving elephant and buffalo out of the 
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controlled hunting areas rather than shoot them. The elephant and buffalo counts in the 
northern districts along the Zambezi was showing a decrease that was ecologically 
unsustainable in the long term. In any case, the elimination of the two species was well 
in advance of the operation to remove kudu, bushbuck, warthog and wildpig by Tsetse 
and Trypanosomiasis Control Branch.104 In the Save-Runde area, most activity centered 
around driving elephant out of the Chivonja Hills, which were deemed to be the main 
breeding ground for tsetse fly. The exercise went hand in hand with ground-spraying 
operations during the winter. The elaborate road network for this purpose proved 
extremely useful to the DNPWLMs overall supervision of the anti-tsetse operations.105 
More radical changes in the tsetse control effort took place in 1968: the situation 
was so well in hand that it could be said that the primary object was virtually 
complete. The majority of the nine key tsetse control areas were now clear of elephant 
and buffalo. In the northern region, the number of animals destroyed for that year was 
the lowest since the start of operations in 1964. The Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) 
supplied the DNPWLM with redundant Army Land-Rovers, as well as ground-to-air 
radio sets which gave good communications between the Land-Rovers and the 
departments aircraft. This equipment was used to spot the elephant and guide the Land-
Rovers on to the scene: 
It continued to control the Land Rovers movements towards the game 
fence. On approaching the fence, which was cut at the last moment, the 
elephant almost invariably tried to break back through the Land-Rovers. 
At this stage, the elephant had to be stampeded and, more often than not, 
this could only be done by reckless driving, flying, the firing of shots, 
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thunderflashes and the sounding of the sirens with which the vehicles were 
equipped.106 
This latest technological innovation came a shade too late to be of any use in the Save-
Runde area. By the end of 1968, the tsetse corridors had virtually been completed. 22 
elephant had been shot in the last throes of the clearance operation and no buffalo was in 
sight. The Director the DNPWLM could declare: Staff have now, therefore, been 
withdrawn from active participation in this exercise.107 
I have often wondered why most areas of Mashonaland (except border areas) have 
no elephant and buffalo, or any wildlife for that matter barring that restocked on private 
ranches. The explanation is that they were all slaughtered during the tsetse control 
operations. In 1969, the whole of Mashonaland was virtually clear of elephant and 
buffalo.108 In Matabeleland, only a limited amount of control work was still going on 
in the Sebungwe area. In Victoria, the DNPWLM had effectively withdrawn from any 
active participation by the end of 1968; its staff assisted the DVS on elephant control on 
only a limited number of occasions.109 
With the game reserve now established and tsetse vanquished, the major focus 
shifted to questions of scientific management and research. In 1969, DNPWLM wasted 
little in establishing Chipinda Pools Research Station. The main purpose of the institution 
was to conduct general surveys of fauna and vegetation.110 Data collection on all major 
trees, shrubs, grasses and herbs was undertaken through out 1970. The behavior of 
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elephant was studied in detail with a view to understand vegetation degradation. Veld 
fires too were put under severe scrutiny as ecologists searched for elusive records of past 
burning. It was while the teams were studying this history of fire that the extensive 
fires swept through the Gonarezhou that year. The ecologists recorded them as closely 
as possible. Aerial and ground photography was extensively used to locate water holes, 
faunal concentrations and vegetational cover. Research teams gathered records of 
distribution, movement, feeding and population numbers and densities of elephant. They 
collected plant specimens for the Salisbury and Chipinda Pools herbariums. There was 
something even more significant: a darter and a barbell from the Lundi River were 
collected and analyzed for insecticides, and the results obtained showed a high degree of 
a breakdown product of DDT.111  
In February 1970, the new Land Tenure Act added some 129 square kilometers to 
the Gonarezhou Game Reserve comprising the Gonakudzingwa division between Tswiza 
and the APA. This land teemed with buffalo and elephant during winter. With the 
enlargement of the sanctuary,  another problem emerged: veld fires. In 1970 alone, 
several outbreaks destroyed half of the reserve, severely stretching the limits of the staff. 
The Rhodesia Railways chipped in with a fireguard from Vila Salazar to Chikombedzi 
siding, while the DC commandeered his own staff to grade a fireguard along the tsetse 
corridor.112 
                                                
111 NAZ SRG/3 Report 1970 Director of National Parks and Wild Life Management Rhodesia: Ministry of 
Lands: Reports of the National Parks Advisory Board and Director of National Parks and Wild Life 
Management for 1970: 25-6. 
112 NAZ SRG/3 Report 1973 Director of National Parks and Wild Life Management Rhodesia: Ministry of 
Lands: Reports of the National Parks Advisory Board and Director of National Parks and Wild Life 





Tsetse fly was now virtually a thing of the past not just in Gonarezhou but 
countrywide. In 1971, the Director of National Parks noted that minimal effort was 
required with respect to hunting of elephant and buffalo in relation to tsetse fly 
control.113 Research and management of terrestrial ecosystems became a catch phrase. 
It is not surprising that a number of wildlife research institutes sprang up at this time, 
including the Hostes Nicolle Institute of Wildlife Research the northern districts114 
The emphasis was shifting to conservation and serious scientific management 
of game reserve space. The boldest step was without doubt the departments translocation 
of two black rhinoceros cows from a place called Chipangayi (also called Chipangali) on 
the lower Save and its translocation to Gonarezhou. The giant animals were released at a 
place appropriately called Chipembere (Rhino) Pan in the Chivonja escarpment.115 In 
1970, 41 hook-lipped rhinoceros were translocated from the north of Rhodesia 650 
miles away and released into Gonarezhou.116 These animals were now facing threats from 
poaching and escalating guerrilla war in the Zambezi valley. The translocation continued 
in 1971.117  With the end of the tsetse fly, the state was so confident that in 1975 it 
designated Gonarezhou a national park. A year later, a new pest arrived. 
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Chapter 7 Pests Unto The State 
 
In a poignant illustration of the blurred linguistic boundaries between animal and human 
pests, a Rhodesian Commentary of November 1975 noted: 
While terrorists are dealing out death to innocent tribesmen in the north-
east border area, Government health teams are trying to protect people 
from killer diseasesrabies and measles. 
While a Government medical team was immunizing black children 
against measles recently, veterinary officers were busy inoculating dogs 
against rabies in the same area.1  
By that year, the nationalist guerrilla war that had started in the northern districts had at 
last arrived in the area, with the insurgents asking locals for logistic, intelligence, and 
other support. Since 1966, Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) had fought an initially 
lukewarm and then bitter war against two African nationalist guerrilla armies. The 
Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), operated from rear bases in 
Mozambique, while the Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) was invading 
from their Zambia. These two guerrilla forces were receiving guns and training support 
from China and the Soviet Union respectively.  
From 1974, as the Rhodesian state realized it was losing the war, it resorted to 
force multipliersbiological and chemical weapons designed to attenuate the 
numerical inferiority of the army against the terrorists. Directed indiscriminately against 
                                                





both guerrillas and villagers, force multipliers involved firebombing with napalm, nerve 
gas, crop defoliants, as well as anthrax, foot-and-mouth disease, and polio.  
Jim Parker, a former officer in the notorious dirty war unit in charge of the 
Rhodesian operations, has recently published a book Assignment Selous Scoutson 
Rhodesias own version of chemical and biological weapons. In it he says these new 
tactics were borrowed from the Portuguese and Americans in Vietnam and Africa 
respectively. It is easy to assume that this was an entirely new phenomenon generic to the 
1974-9 period. This chapter is an historical archaeology of the long tradition of pest 
control, with the 1970s guerrilla only the latest of pest control work that began with 
colonization itself. It is a moment for theorizing colonialism over the last one and half 
century, before the Rhodesian era and since. Such an archaeology of state power need not 
focus purely on human dissent but natures as well, lest we miss the connections between 
environmental and political governance.  
Let us recapture the discussion so far. In Chapter 1, I discussed the various ways 
in which the homestead and village related to each other through the mobility of the 
body. I also discussed the role of mobility in migrating out of reach of enemies human 
and nonhuman and the production of rightful ownership of the land. The process of 
becoming vene (owners) was a pest control process, of using technology to tame places 
into livable spaces. Chapters 3-5 elaborated on how the state became a pest unto local 
villagers through the alienation of forest hunting ground and land from its rightful 
owners. Mobility became a central weapon and means of resisting and asserting 
ownership and use of natural resources. Chapter 6 has been devoted to the attempts of the 





animals or terrorism) as an example of pestilence, this chapter ends with an intriguing 
transformation: of magandanga (people behaving like wild animals or terrorists) who 




Human Pests. Several notable transitions took place with the British and Portuguese 
partition of Gonarezhou. For the very reason that the Ndebele were pests to the newly 
established BSA Company administration in Mashonalandincluding Gonarezhou and 
its environments north of the Limpopo to a line agreed with the Portugueseit became 
desirable to remove their military threat and control them through force of arms. In 1893 
the Company marched into the Ndebele kingdom and, with the power of the Martini 
Henry rifle and the Maxim Gun, drove King Lobengula out. Matabeleland (formerly the 
Ndebele kingdom) became a province of the colony of Rhodesia. 
Three years later the Shona and Ndebele torched the fires of rebellion, as the full 
force of colonialism hit them. 1896 was the year the rinderpestthe deadly cattle 
plaguereached Rhodesia, as it swept along the wagon routes from East Africa to South 
Africa, where a combination of cordons sanitaire and inoculation prevented it from 
reaching the Cape coast. In its wake, the pest swept to death just about every beast 
Africans had; the state shot the rest. This incensed the Shona and Ndebele. 
There are two versions of why the rinderpest triggered the rebellion of 1896-7. 
The standard version is that the spirit mediums told the Shona and Ndebele that the 





vasina mabvi (people without knees) to invade their ancestral lands. They had to chase 
the white man away to cure the pestilence.2  
The second version is that the ancestors ire was directed at the deceit of people 
without knees. Had not the spirits, kings, and people of the land welcomed them in 
peace, friendship, and with such help, and pointed them to the treasures of the land? The 
men without knees had turned around and betrayed the trust; they became 
vapambipfumi (stealers of wealth). Among the Shona, long used to the destructive raids 
of the Ndebele, whom they called madzviti (people who terrorize others through armed 
violence), the men without knees had defeated madzviti. One would say that the hilltop 
houses we saw in Chapter 1 were strategies of weaponizing nature to counter hudzviti 
(the use of violence to terrorize others). In the belief that the British would protect them 
against Ndebele and Gaza madzviti, some chiefs had granted the Europeans concessions. 
Instead, they become the new mudzviti (singular). The new madzviti had also brought 
with them the pest that was now destroying their cattle. The cure was also obvious.3 
So the Shona and Ndebele rose up in arms. They fought a spirited fight, with a 
large arsenal of Martini Henry rifles and other firearms, many smuggled in from the 
Boers of the Transvaal. Those with no guns fought with their spears, knobkerries and 
bows and poisoned arrows. They maximized on the rocky outcrops, withdrawing to 
cover, ambushing their enemy. Only the Maxim machinegunwith its massive direct fire 
outputsaved the BSA Company.  
Animals Pests. The Shona-Ndebele and rinderpest plagues defeated, attention shifted to 
mammal, avian, and micro-pests that still plagued the process of settling. Rinderpest was 
                                                






a blessing in two respects. First, it impoverished the erstwhile pests (Africans) and turned 
them into cheap labor. Cattle supplied not just milk or meat, but also draught power and 
social capital. The rinderpestand the state fumigators wielding Martini-Henryshad 
made a clean sweep of the kraals.4 Secondly, the rinderpest killed not only livestock but 
wild animals, the vectors and dietary sources of tsetse fly. In Gonarezhou, those animals 
that survived migrated east beyond the epicenter of the strain: the Hunters Road ox-
wagon route. 
With African and tsetse no longer a threat, the European settlers cut crop farms, 
cattle ranches, and mineral concessions so arbitrarily in areas these pests once occupied. 
To remove the African from being a pest on the new premises, the colonial state 
dispossessed villagers to generally crowded, infertile, and arid native reserves. These 
pests now out of the way, the European settler brought in livestock, planted crops. The 
nocturnal and diurnal predators, carnivores and insects of the forest helped themselves to 
breakfast, lunch and dinner, each according to their sizes. Elephants, baboons and 
monkeys, warthogs, springhares and rodents vegetarian diet tender, while lions, hyenas, 
and wild dogs settled on beef, mutton, and lamb. When they were finished, they left 
pathogens like FMD, trypanosomes, and rabies, handing the bill to the farmer.5 The avian 
pests came in all sizes, shapes, and numbersfrom pied crows that savaged germinating 
seed or ripening grain, to hawks and eagles swooping down on chicks, to crowds of 
quelea birds and red locusts decimating entire fields of corn, wheat, and rice in its grain 
or green form respectively. The tsetse deadly to all livestock, and even more-so cattle 
ranching, the primary economic pursuits of settlers in the lowveld. Finally, there were 
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pests whose physical shape the naked eye could not see, but which made themselves 
visible through their deadly movement within the bodies of other animals, transforming 
them into pests. Micro-pests like the trypanosome, FMD virus, and rinderpest turned the 
tsetse fly, wild animals and livestock into vectors of disease. To destroy them, the state 
had to kill the carriers first. 
 
Conjuring Pesticides 
Guns. In subduing Africans with the Martini Henry and Maxim Gun in 1890-7, the 
British colonizers challenges to settling had just begun. In fact, the status of colonizer 
or settler was not a priori; it was emergent from the technological mediations involved in 
taming nature. We can only understand what colonizing and settling meant if we examine 
the movements it entailed. 
How was the newcomer going to step into the role of controlling wild life now 
that the African who had played that role could no longer do so? How was settling down 
to be conducted, homesteads built, new crops planted, livestock reared, and life lived in a 
place teeming with animals big and small that also found these human assets edible to 
them? What was to be the pesticide? Ants, flies, rodents, predators, herbivores, and 
reptiles became pests or vermin overnight.  
Elephants were among the very first.6 Farmers persistently complained of 
elephant damage to crops and timber plantations, as well as danger to people; an elephant 
not in its proper place behind a game fence was a dangerous pest.7 Shooting with 
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guns (Martini Henry rifles) was deemed the first line of defense against them. After a 
report was made, the police inspected the damages to crops with a view to paying 
compensation and to sanction the shooting.8 The government usually declined liability for 
the damage even if it was the one preserving the animals; all it could do was to send the 
police to chase away the elephants without destruction.9  
Some animals could not be simply driven away; they had to be killed. The 
governments policy towards such vermin in 1927 was that farmers would identify the 
animals traumatizing them and justify why they wanted them dead. Upon receipt of this 
information, it then advised on the type of method to be used.10 
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The state issued free ammunition for the destruction of baboons, monkeys and 
pigs. All unused ammunition was to be returned. Farmers requested ammunition 
quantities based on the size of the troops of baboons, monkeys, and pigs.11 The Defense 
Department then debited the charges to DALs Destruction of Vermin account.12 It cost 
the Government 15 rounds of ammunition to destroy four baboons, and the maximum 
supervision was needed to ensure that the number of rounds indicated as having been 
expended, have actually been utilized for the purpose supplied.13 
On 14 June 1933, the Assistant Native Commissioner for Melsetter suggested a 
reward of 10 rounds of ammunition for every two baboon tails surrendered. Agriculture 
refused: the move would lead participants in a hunt to create a surplus of ammunition 
from Government supplies. The best way was for Government to pay a reward for every 
tail surrendered, the farmers themselves providing the necessary ammunition.14  
After suffering heavy stock losses from wild dogs, some farmers in the 
Nyamandhlovu district of Matabeleland suggested that Government employ a few Cape 
boys under the police [because] it was useless to employ the ordinary native for this 
purpose as he had never known a native to kill a wild dog. This was in spite of having 
issued large numbers of rifles [to them] for this purpose from time to time.15 
In 1932, one wild dog skin fetched a reward of 50 cents when presented to DAL 
as proof of vermin. However, the application for the reward had to be made within three 
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months of the date on which the animals were killed.16 If not then the reward would 
expire.17 As predators damage to livestock increased, the government now worried it 
would incur a huge bill on rewards. The Secretary for Agriculture wrote his opposite 
number at Treasury to say that the reward be paid as a special case and not to create a 
precedent.18 The figures below show that Agriculture exceeded its budget for rewards 
and free ammunition in all but one year between 1929 and 1934: 
 
Yet the program was achieving sterling results. One farmer, B.B. Steyn, achieved a kill 
rate of 44 baboons for 100 rounds expended over two hunts.19 The hunt was not officially 
supervised.20 In another hunt, a farmer received 150 rounds of .303 ammunition and 
expended 120 of them. His team compromised 7 Europeans and 14 Africans, who 
destroyed 20 baboons.21  
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Poisons. Some animals were too small to aim a gun at. Some were too agile, so that even 
before the hunters could think of taking aim, they would have gapped. Others were too 
many, the demands on ammunition and scarce manpower too much, and the energy 
required to shoot them far too much. Something was needed to attenuate the problems of 
size, movement, and numbers: poison. 
Initially, individual landholders resorted to arsenic and strychnine. In the 1920s, 
the government departments issued individual white farmers poisons at a greatly 
reduced price for the purposes of exterminating vermin. The retail price of strychnine 
hydrochloride at the time was about 65 pence per oz., so poisoning was deemed very 
inexpensive.22 The manufacturers Mr. Roberts and Messrs Lennon Ltd. laid out the 
procedure for poisoning problem animals with strychnine as follows: 
Handle the carcass for skinning, etc., solely with an old paper pair of 
gloves. Aim to place this poison in about ten place in the case of an ox, 
inserting two grains in each wound. As the poison is very bitter care must 
be taken to avoid getting any on the outside of the flesh. Plunge a sheath 
knife about two inches into the flesh and give it a half turn. This will open 
the wound. Without withdrawing the knife slip the right amount of poison 
from a piece of paper into the wound, turn back the knife and withdraw it. 
Avoid using two much poison.23 
There were 437 grains in an ounce, and twenty grains were enough for an entire carcass 
and even less was needed for smaller ones.24 
Strychnine was also extended to problem birds. Crows caused considerable 
damage especially to the maize and groundnut crop.25 In a memo to his Chief Chemist, 
the Secretary for Agriculture asked: Would you give the inquirer a formula for 
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poisoning of maize or maize meal as a treat for crow?26 Another farmer pleaded: Will 
you kindly tell me how to treat maize for poisoning crows or otherwise destroy them. 
They have done so much damage that I have to replant.27 The chemist replied:  
Twelve pounds of maize is thoroughly damped with fresh milk so that the 
whole grain is wet, but not dripping with moisture. One ounce of 
powdered strychnine is then slowly distributed over the grains, the whole 
being kept constantly stirred. When all the poison is mixed in, the grain 
should be immediately scattered thinly over the ground. Strychnine 
being intensely poisonous, great care should be taken in handling it. One 
grain (1/437 of an ounce) is regarded as a lethal dose for an adult human. 
The poisoned birds should be carefully buried.28  
Avian pests were less suspicious; not so with baboons and monkeys.29 They were highly 
suspicious in nature [and] detect[ed] anything strange in the taste or smell of them.30  
Only firearms could do. Hear the Chief Entomologist: The only weapons I know of, at 
all effective against baboons on any considerable scale are firearms, a fact which 
practically excludes the kraal native as a wholesale baboon destroyer.31 
In November 1927, the Secretary for Agriculture announced his department was 
examining hydrocyanic avid capsules for efficacy against lion and other vermin.32 The 
chief chemist cautioned that hydrocyanic gas was far too dangerous a substance to be 
handled by anybody other people fully acquainted with its properties and poisonous 
effects. He suggested that sodium or potassium cyanide which were violent poisons 
but not as lethal as hydrocyanic acid could be put in ordinary gelatin capsules obtainable 
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from any drugstore. The capsule had to be dipped in paraffin wax to give it a fine coating 
before insertion into the flesh just like strychnine.33 
Springhares raided crops and left a trail of destruction. Wire netting was too 
expensive. Night shooting could only be effective if done continuously, but as one farmer 
admitted: To work all day and shoot ones lands at night is too big a strain on one.34 It 
was of very little use once a few had been shot: they became too wary. Pumping down 
arsenic fumes was useless; they closely sealed their burrows.35 The wariness of 
springhares to night shooting forced farmers to ask aroundamong friends and 
acquaintances with similar experiencesand were told to gas the burrows with Capex 
Mole and Vermin Fumigators. One hill had an entire colony of over eighty burrows, but 
the poison wiped them out. The manufacturers said that the cartridges also killed white 
ants, snakes, jackals and so on.36 They were designed specifically for eradicating 
burrowing pests like jackals, moles, rabbits, rats, snakes, and ants. The cartridges were 
ignited with a match or safety fuse and as they burned furiously they emitted poisonous 
fumes. They achieved the best results when hurled in this incandescent state into the hole 
housing the pest, and closing them up with clay or earth for maximum effect.37  
In 1933, the Chief Chemist suggested that the best method for eradicating 
springhares was to use calcium cyanide (flakes or dust) which gave off hydrocyanic acid 
gas when acted upon by the moisture in the air or soil. All that one needed to do was to 
gas the burrows and seal the potential exits; the animal would succumb to suffocation 
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before it could get out. The calcium cyanide was very poisonous, but its residue is 
harmless. The Chief Chemist caution users to at all times avoid inhalation and poison 
themselves, and insisted that the work should not be left entirely to natives.38 (my own 
emphasis) Poison gas worked well if the springhares were in colonies; all it took was to 
fumigate the burrows. Outside the burrows, however, results were poor.39 
 
Fences Make Good Neighbors? Mwenezi Ranch was the largest surveyed ranch in the 
world. In 1929 FMD broke out on the ranch and subsequently in the 1930s. Materially, 
the pathogen is highly portable and highly mobile from body to body through the medium 
of fluid secretions like saliva, semen, urine, vesicular fluid, and milk. Although it is not a 
threat to human health, people in contact with the strain can readily spread it to animals 
through clothing, footwear, and breathing. Wild animals are its primary reservoir.40  
The July 1934 outbreak at Mwenezi Ranch was especially virulent. Chief 
Veterinary Surgeon G.C. Hooper Sharpe immediately threw a cordon around a rough 
triangle along the Runde and Mwenezi Rivers and the Victoria-Beitbridge road. By 
then 150 oxen and 50 cows moved from Mwenezi Ranch had infected a herd of 700 
seven miles east of the Selous Road-Msano River junction south-east of West Nicholson. 
Sharpe ordered them to be slaughtered immediately. Since the ranch was close to South 
African and Portuguese territory, the two governments were promptly informed.41 
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Pretoria imposed quarantine restrictions on the whole of Southern Rhodesia, and 
deployed a Police Reserve recruited for the purpose to patrol the border cordon.42  
Meanwhile, Rhodesia created a patrolable cattle-free zone to prevent Chitsa, 
Mahenye and Ngwenyenye from removing their cattle into Massangena (Mozambique) to 
avoid compulsory dipping taxes. To detect such illegal movements, the Portuguese 
Police usually drove herds away from the border to Massangena, keeping the area clear. 
However the Portuguese had started to allow these cattle to graze in winter on the Saves 
western banks again. The veterinary risk when Mozambican and Rhodesian herds got 
mixed up was obvious.43  
If Agriculture did not quarantine cattle in Mahenyes Native Reserve, it was 
feared the beasts would bring new FMD strains, spreading them into ranches and African 
reserves south of the Runde River. In April 1934, Mahenyes 944 head of cattle were 
forcibly driven to a point on the Save River opposite Ndanga East Reserve. By 
September, the Save-Runde and parts of Matibi II were carved into a cattle-free belt, all 
beasts having been moved south of the Mwenezi River. However, after keeping 
Mahenyes herd under surveillance for six months, in December 147 were discovered 
missing. Police confirmed Mahenyes people had illegally moved them over the border 
into Mozambique. Agriculture banished the absentees from returning as they had possibly 
mixed up with Portuguese cattle on the border and contracted disease. As it turned out, on 
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14 December 1934, FMD was diagnosed in Ndanga Reserve and Ndanga East, right on 
the Save River. The Portuguese denied their territory was the source; Rhodesias top vet 
insisted the strain had crossed the border from there.44 
In January 1935, nine months after the outbreak, no efficient patrols to monitor 
cattle movement were yet in place. Only in March did the Chief Veterinary Surgeon 
propose a veterinary border fence stretching from Beacon 100 to Chivirira Falls on the 
Save and dry-season patrols and native posts at Mahenye to check wet-season cross-
border cattle movement. As and when Mahenyes cattle returned they would be branded. 
Any cattle found unbranded were to be shot. The Portuguese would be asked to remove 
their cattle from the border as they had done in 1925. Until all this was done, Mahenyes 
cattle would remain in quarantine.45 The governments expectations that Chiefs Mahenye 
and Mapunga would monitor this fence proved to be misplaced. As the Vets lamented in 
December 1936, the fence was now run down due to flooding and  useless in its 
present position. Three miles of the fence needed to be moved to higher ground, costing 
more money. After repairs, patrols reported many derelict stretches, fresh repairs having 
to wait for winter. In any case, the wire made good game snares.46  
The FMD outbreak and cattle movement cast the African as a huge impediment to 
veterinary disease control. The veterinary department was convinced that fences and 
patrols were the way to go, only if Africans were first relocated or pacified. Only then 
could the fence become a physical barrier to a continuous game corridor with 
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Mozambique. The governments 300-mile fence, started in 1937, was complete by March 
1939. It stretched 150 miles from the Mozambique border to Fort Victoria, turning south 
to the Limpopo River; 140 African constables patrolled it to ensure no cattle broke 
through, while the beasts in prohibited areas were examined every fortnight.47  
In the 1940s-50s, no less than a dozen FMD outbreaks hit areas contiguous to 
Gonarezhou. Five of them happened during Allan Wrights tenure as District 
Commissioner and he cooperated fully with the Veterinary Department to enforce 
quarantine orders were respected. However, there remained a tension with respect to the 
sources of infection. The vets said game; Wright defended the game and pointed to cattle 
as the source of transmission. He felt that the vets were too quick to blame the game.48  
The Malipati FMD outbreaks emanated from the introduction of infected cattle 
from Mozambique, not game movement. The arbitrary international boundary cut the 
Shangane tribe in two and the people affected certainly recognize(d) it only as an 
impediment to normal marriage and other transactions. Animal health inspectors did not 
issue permits for lobolo (bride-wealth) cattle being brought into Rhodesia, so they were 
illegally driven across at night. The new owners had little difficulty registering them on 
Rhodesian stock cards: a small bribe and any dipping tank attendant would agree to 
enter them as births and normally nobody bothered to check the ages of stock when 
bodies were all that counted.49 The Portuguese Africans crossed the border to sell their 
cattle because the government buyers there exploited them. The good, fat ox that might 
fetch R$100 could earn just R$20 just meters across the border! So owners slipped a few 
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head across the boundary line on sale days. These cattle were never dipped or kept under 
any veterinary control, even if some came from FMD country.50  
To combat FMD-causing migrations, the Vet Department contracted a 
Beitbridge farmer to construct a 10-strand, 7 ft. high steel wired game fence along the 
whole 130-mile border from Pafuri to the Runde, and deployed patrols for good measure. 
Very well, said the villagers. They simply drove them along the game fence to the last 
pole at Pafuri, then turned into Sengwe. The department extended the fence right across 
the dry riverbed. Whenever floods came in summer, the poles were swept away, but 
meanwhile the South African authorities committed themselves to make sure that no 
cattle were driven across via their territory into Rhodesia. The Portuguese Africans 
simply lifted the bottom strands of the border where they crossed a stream and got their 
stock in just in time for the cattle sale at Sengwe. The fence worked as long as the guards 
were constantly on patrol; at any rate they were relatives.51 
 
Formalizing Pesticide R & D 
Research Branch and Aerial Technologies. In 1963, a new Department of National 
Parks and Wildlife Management (hereafter DNPWLM or Parks) was created under the 
Agriculture Ministry. The Government now decided to establish a separate Research 
Branch, a professional body to advise on the proper application of scientific findings in 
the field of wild life conservation and utilizations. Its functions were, among others, to 
provide special knowledge and data required for the conservation and utilization of wild 
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life in Rhodesia.52 Barely a year on, the Branchs biological and extension services unit
with an all-white establishment of 11 professional officers and 6 technical officers
had become such an essential national service that it was expanded to many field stations. 
Because its importance was far bigger than its utterly insufficient white manpower, it 
engaged African staff in collecting basic field data and scientific samples. At that point 
it had four field stations: Kyle Dam Fish Research Station; Sengwa Research Station; 
Bulawayo Research Station; and Manyoli Eland Research Station.53  
There were two main extension services that the researchers developed that are 
critical to our discussion: aerial surveys and poison(ing). From 1964, demand for wild 
life surveys increased exponentially with the move from pure conservative preservation 
to active wild life management and to commercial utilization of the wild life resource. 
The wild life survey also had to establish, on a scientific basis, carrying capacities, 
population productivity and ecological trends under given local conditions, to measure 
biological changes over long periods.54  
Whereas in the 1950s such survey work had involved ground traversal, from the 
mid-1960s it went airborne. Aerial photographic surveys became the best way to 
determine the location and density of hippopotamus populations, particularly along the 
five big rivers of the lowveldthe Save, Runde, Mwenezi, Mkwasine, and Mutirikwi
in 1967. A biological reconnaissance followed in the Buffalo Bend area and part of the 
Gonarezhou targeting elephant and buffalo populations.55  
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In November 1969, Chipinda Pools Research Station was established with the 
specific mission of conducting general surveys and a vegetation study, especially the 
major vegetation types in border regions.56 In 1970, researchers at the station spent the 
year collecting data on the major tree, shrub, grass and herb species. They drew a map of 
the broad vegetation types of the area, and made a transparent slide for printing purposes. 
The research concentrated on areas of vegetation in the process of degradation by 
elephant. A 50-meter square exclosurefencing with emphasis on shutting out the 
pest (elephant destroying trees) rather than keeping them inwas constructed at 
Mupfichani, primarily to protect the vegetation within from elephant damage. And yet: 
A good series of fixed photo points was established, covering artificial 
water points and most of the representative vegetation types, some in the 
Gonarezhou Game Reserve and some in the Mabalauta area. Comparisons 
between recent photos and photos taken three to four years ago showed 
considerable degradation in alluvial woodland at Buffalo Bend. Records of 
distribution, movement, feeding and population numbers and densities of 
elephant were made.57  
The project also collected a total of 412 plant specimens for identification as well as 
records of feeding, distribution, habits, and mobilities. 
In 1970, an aerial photo stereo-interpretation course was held at Wankie Game 
Reserve. All available wildlife research officers attended and gained much useful 
training on vegetation and trend assessment. Increasingly, aerial photos took over from 
foot or drive-about surveys in determining vegetation patterns. This new technology was 
especially valuable in areas such as Wankie which suffered over-utilization by wildlife 
and damage by fire.58 The following year, the DNPWLM undertook aerial counts of 
elephants designed to provide a minimal population size and an index to changing trends 
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in numbers. The Police Reserve Air Wing supplied spotter aircraft, pilots, and 
information liaison for this exercise.59 It was also in this year that a technique for radio-
tagging animals in order to follow their movements was developed that would be 
applicable with other species in Rhodesia.60 
Coming at a time when Rhodesia was fighting African nationalist insurgents, 
Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smiths official opening of the new laboratory complex at 
Sengwa in the Chirisa Game Reserve becomes curious. The Director of National Parks 
did not mask the importance of security in this scientific project: 
This is a joint project with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and is to be 
known as the Hostes Nicolle Institute of Wildlife Research, in 
recognition of all that Mr. Nicolle did while Secretary of that Ministry, for 
Wildlife in general and this project, with its 3 885 km² exclusive research 
area, in particular.61 
The Ministry of Internal Affairs, formerly the Native Affairs Department, was in charge 
of African administration in the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs, formerly native reserves). 
As we have seen in Chapter 4, from the beginning of Rhodesia, Native Commissioners 
(now District Commissioners) were first and foremost security officers. More so in the 
1960s when a ground coverage intelligence gathering taskforce was set up in every 
district of the country in response to the rising African nationalist-led militancy. The 
intelligence gained was then filtered via the BSAP to central government. To ease the 
chain of command, Civil Defense Committees (CDCs)comprising local farmers union 
brancheswere established. As the guerrillas infiltrated into these areas, these CDCs 
assumed the role of coordinating protective works around isolated white farms. So we 
can see the intermediate role of Internal Affairs and Department of National Parks and 
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Wild Life Management (DNPWLM) in human-animal pest control R&D developed at the 
research stations and tested for efficacy on wild animals. With the police, the two bodies 
established the Agric-Alert radio security scheme in the farmer-organized Intensive 
Conservation Areas (ICAs) near game reserves.62  
The institute had completed research into radio-tagging and was going into the 
development phase of radio-tracking equipment was successful for warthog and kudu, 
and partially for elephant. Each of the animals was fitted with radio transmitters, and 
yielded valuable data when tracked.63 By 1972, the remit of aerial survey had extended 
to darting animals for laboratory experiment or capture-and-release. It worked this way: 
One team went airborne in helicopters, from where it pursued the herds on the ground as 
well as directed a vehicle-borne team. The airborne team would locate a spot accessible 
by road, with a good strip for landing and take-off, before swooping low and darting the 
selected target. A front-end loader had to be used to scoop up the drugged animals from 
amongst the herd and before they drowned under the influence of the immobilizing 
drugs.64 We will see shortly Rhodesias military application of these tactics against 
ZANLA guerrillas. 
 
The Vermin Control Unit and Poisons. Meanwhile, developments in the area of poisons 
were also yielding important multi-purpose applications. In 1964, DNPWLM established 
a Vermin Control Unit (VCU) to carry out experiments on captured baboons treated in 
cages with two poisons: sodium-mono-fluoroacetate (compound 1080) and thallium 
sulfate. It was decided that thallium sulfate was the most suitable poison to use. 
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Immediately after its establishment, the VCUwhich had one DNPWLM and one 
Internal Affairs unitsent some members to South Africas Predator Control Research 
Farm for specialized training in the use of thallium sulfate and cyanide pellets (coyote-
getters) for hyena and jackal control.65  
Thallium warfare against baboons initially targeted the Native Purchase Areas 
(NPA), beginning with the Zviyambe Division of Wedza, where the primates patrolled 
in droves. The poison did not take effect immediately and the baboons died 3-5 days after 
taking poison, such that it was difficult to find carcasses. However, of the 1,968 baits 
laid, an estimated 1,000 baboons died, constituting a kill rate of 50%. The demand for 
the service led to the increase of the VCUs from 3 to 5, two of them for Internal Affairs.66  
The toxicity of compound 1080 and thallium sulfate for baboon was tested on 
captive specimens and in a field trial at Victoria Falls. Compound 1080 was found to be 
much less toxic to baboons than rodents. The primates were willing to take thallium 
sulfate in bulk (when as little as 10 mg/kg bodyweight was sufficient to kill) because it 
was completely odorless and tasteless in nature. Its extreme insolubility meant that 2-3 
days elapsed before animals fell sick. By then, the primates would have repeatedly 
ingested non-toxic doses that, as they accumulated in the organism, rose above lethal 
level. Death occurs after three to five days.67  
In 1965, the five vermin units were deployed in Zviyambe, Makoni, Nyazvidzi 
and Wiltshire African Purchase Areas (formerly NPAs), surrounding TTLs, and 
European Areas along the Salisbury-Umtali road. Large numbers of baboons were 
destroyed and there was a marked reduction in certain areas. But they were not cleared. 
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The baboons were reluctant to take baits, as they were able to associate the bait with the 
poison. Bait was a problem in the dry months between June and November when only 
pumpkins were available, but in the summer months of December-May greens, including 
maize (corn) were plenty. In the course of destroying baboons, the thallium baits also 
proved useful against monkeys, springhares, hyena, hippo, crocodiles, and predators.68 
By 1966, VCUs were operating in Wedza, Zviyambe, Svosve, Wiltshire, 
Marandellas, Bromley, Inyazura, Macheke, Shangure, Mtoko, Mushawasha, right up to 
Melsetter. While the VCUs were busy waging chemical warfare against baboons, rabies 
outbreaks hit Macheke and Marandellas. District Commissioners, farmers, and police 
joined the VCUs to fight the terrorthe DCs and police to get Africans to take their 
dogs, kicking and screaming, for vaccination, the farmers enlisting farm-workers to hunt 
down and set thallium sulfate baits against the rabies vectors. Over 530 jackals were 
destroyed.69 
The units never deviated from their major preoccupation: baboon control in the 
NPAs. One unit was detached for surveying and aerial spraying quelea birds in May-
October, to save small grain crops under irrigation. It was in 1969 that all units were 
equipped and trained in the use of ground-spraying apparatuses. Selected white farmers 
in intensive conservation areas were trained under the Self-Help scheme established in 
conjunction with the Natural Resources Board.70 
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Meanwhile, the VCU deployed their newly acquired spraying expertise in combat 
against quelea birds devastating winter wheat crops. Farmers anticipated heavy losses of 
small grains. The VCU launched  a scheme to demonstrate the use of ground spraying 
equipment in intensive conservation areas and groups of farmers were encouraged to 
purchase the equipment for killing quelea on their farms.71 Financial assistance was given 
towards the cost of a poison called queleatox. Also known as Fenthion, queleatox was not 
just highly toxic to birds but nearly every other living organism. It killed through skin 
absorption, causing severe respiratory damage and then death.72 Aerial queleatox 
spraying commenced in July and lasted until October 1969 when early rains dispersed the 
quelea concentrations. In total, 13 sites were sprayed covering an area of 169 acres. 
Estimates showed a kill rate of 60-95%, or 93 million birds destroyed in total. The VCU 
kept close contact with the Quelea Subcommittee of the Southern African Regional 
                                                






Commission for the Conservation and Utilization of the Soil (SARCCUS) and regular 
reports were submitted to its headquarters in Pretoria, South Africa.73  
The aerial R&D we saw earlier being deployed to dart and count elephant worked 
well for spraying queleas. Here is how they did it. The pilot waited until darkness set in, 
when the queleas were brooding, then set out ordinary paraffin storm lanterns at specific 
intervals demarcating the airfield runway. These pickets enabled the pilot to take-off and 
land safely. Prior to take-off the ground team reconnoitered the quelea brooding site and 
attached two lanterns to long poles which, in turn, would have been tied to the top 
branches of trees at each end of the doomed colony. The pilot took off, his tanks packed 
with queleatox. He then lined up the planes nose on the two lanterns before homing in at 
tree top level and releasing a fine spray of poison at just the right moment to ensure that 
the tiny particles of moisture enveloped the whole nesting area. If required, the ground 
team supervisor would give the pilot instructions on a small radio for two or more runs to 
effect a maximum kill. The birds absorbed the contact poison through the skin into 
their bodies and died almost completely painlessly. Provided the spray was on target, 
several million queleas would be found deal the next morning, their bodies carpeting the 
ground under the trees to a depth of several inches.74 
In 1970, both VCU units operating in Mashonaland instructed the Intensive 
Conservation Area self-help units on the use of telodrex, a substance which worked just 
like queleatox. By the end of the year a total of 34 self-help units had been formed.75 One 
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of the VCUs was summoned down to the southeastern lowveld early in 1970 after reports 
of quelea concentrations gathering on the fringes of irrigated wheat.76  
In 1973, the DNPWLMs VCU (now renamed Problem Animal Control Units, or 
PACU) teams continued to operate effectively in African Purchase Areas (APAs, 
formerly Native Purchase Areas) while also training self-help units for ICAs. In the 
south of Matabeleland PACU destroyed an estimated 1,400 jackals to thwart a serious 
rabies outbreak. But the Department was unhappy with both the desirability and 
effectiveness of this type of exercise, especially as it [was] difficult to avoid poisoning a 
number of other small predators like civets and genets.77 As the Director put it, There 
would appear to be a need for further careful investigation of the epidemiology of this 
most unpleasant disease and the possible ecological factors influencing outbreaks.78  
What the Director perhaps did not know was that methods of poisoning and 
poisons like Thallium and cyanide pellets would, from 1974, become lethal weapons 
against the pest deadliest to Rhodesian state powerthe African nationalist guerrilla. 
 
Magandanga: A New Pest 
What made the African nationalist guerrilla a pest in the eyes of the state was not just the 
behavior of these insurgents but also the instruments the state used to control or eradicate 
them. As I showed in the opening citation to this chapter, there was slippage in public 
discourse between the terror of insects and animals armed with deadly germs, on one 
hand, and that of human enemies of the state armed with AK-47 rifles, on the other. Both 
had one thing in common: they were purveyors of death. This conflation of human and 
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nonhuman terrorists automatically re-defined the soldiers required to defend the state 
and reconfigured who could be called a combatant and a Rhodesian patriot. In other 
words, medical doctors immunized children against measles, the vets inoculated, while 
the Rhodesian army was busy vaccinating the countryside against communist terrorism.79 
How did the state exactly vaccinate the countryside against terrorism? Here I will 
start from an example that effectively connects state policy towards problem animals of 
both the human and nonhuman varieties. Writing in his memoir, Nkomo: The Story of My 
Life, Joshua Nkomoformer leader of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), 
noted in 1984. 
I am told that the idea of hiding prisoners away in the game reserves came 
from Sir Godfrey Huggins, the long-serving prime minister of Southern 
Rhodesia who later became Lord Malvern. He once met Dr. Salazar, the 
old Portuguese dictator, and began to explain his countrys native policy. 
Salazar was not much interested. Portugal, he said, did not have a native 
policy; the natives were just there, part of the African fauna like the 
elephants. Portugal did not have an elephant policy, so he did not see why 
it should have a native policy. Huggins answered that the British colonies 
did have an elephant policy, where they were herded into reserves for their 
own safety, and its policy for natives was much the same. So here the 
four of us were, the first natives to be hidden away in the elephant 
reserve.80  
On 16 April 1964, along with three colleagues, Nkomo had been arrested in a pre-dawn 
raid and flown to Gonakudzingwa following a crackdown on the nationalist movement 
under the draconian Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA). Gonakudzingwa was one 
of several restriction camps out in the jungle to which African nationalists were 
removed, including Sengwe, Marandellas, Nkai, Conemmara, Wha Wha, Chikurubi, and 
Gokwe to cool off.81  
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What was supposed to be a place of restriction became one of subversion. 
Restriction was not detention or imprisonment, where the inmate was locked up or in leg 
chains or handcuffs. Nkomo and his peers were restricted to the whole of Sengwe TTL 
and other adjacent parts of Nuanetsi and Ndanga Districts. They had the right to hold 
political rallies not only within the TTL but also in the actual restriction camp at 
Gonakudzingwa. However, after the tensions escalated to the point of insurrection in 
1965, all these rights were withdrawn and the restriction camp became a full-time prison. 
That is how it stayed until late 1975as a prison deep inside a game sanctuarywhen 
the state translocated the inmates to prisons in the Rhodesian hinterland. 
Earlier in the year, a coup had taken place in Lisbon which had forced the 
Portuguese to withdraw haphazardly from Mozambique in the face of an onslaught from 
FRELIMO, the ally of ZANLA. The new communist regime of Samora Machel 
immediately declared the intentions of an independent Mozambique: It is a fact that we 
have borders with South Africa. As for Rhodesia, we will be engaged in the combat.82 
Six months later he opened up the entire border with Rhodesia for ZANLA operations, 
enabling ZANLA to establish rear operational bases just across the border from the 
Zambezi to Limpopo.83 
Just as in the case of tsetse fly, the fact that the arbitrary Rhodesia-Mozambique 
border had been inserted in ways cutting against the grain of human, animal and plant 
ecologies automatically rendered inevitable insurgencies against it. It also facilitated such 
human and nonhuman insurgencies. The straight-line border cut through thick vegetation, 
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thereby automatically providing cover for the insurgents crossing it. It cut across 
Shangane kinship ties, such that all ZANLA needed to do was subvert relatives on the 
Mozambican side, who in turn communicated its good intentions to their folks on the 
other side. In any case, many Rhodesian African had escaped the curfews, torture, and 
other forms of repression to live with their Portuguese African relatives. In addition, the 
border sliced across centuries-old trade routes to the Indian Ocean leading straight into 
the villages of Sengwe, Chikombedzi, Chitsa and Mahenye. There could be no better 
infiltration routes than that.84  
When ZANLA guerrillas arrived, they found Chitsas people still bitter about 
their removal from Gonarezhou. They promised to return it to them when the country was 
free, if the villagers could back them. But the commanders realized quickly that the 
matter was more complex. If Gonarezhou was returned, who exactly would receive it 
given that the Shona had been here before Chitsas Hlengwe people even thought about 
migrating to settle there? The issue became divisive and threatened to torpedo guerrilla-
villager relations: the guerrillas banned any further discussion. When the local inhabitants 
protested, the insurgent who had come as a freedom fighter turned violent.85  
To try and press the case was tantamount to attracting a suicidal label: mutengesi 
(sellout). At the top of the list of sellout (mutengesi) were the chiefs, who in the 
guerrillas communist understanding of social hierarchy were feudal lords oppressing the 
peasants with the full backing of the imperialist state. It led some chiefs to characterize 
the insurgency as a grass fire [which] everyone should rally round to extinguish.86 In 
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the eyes of the state, hugandanga (terrorism) ran contrary to the spirit of racial 
partnership the chiefs endorsed as the representatives of the true views of the African 
people. The guerrillas dismissed these puppet chiefs as sellouts; the will of the African 
people could only be expressed through the barrel of the gun.87 Consequently, ZANLA 
tended to bypass the chiefs when making first contact with villagers. 
The first guerrillas arrived in Gonarezhou in January 1976 armed with the AK-47. 
The state called them magandanga (terrorists); everybody who saw these men was 
required to immediately report to the police because they were a danger not only to the 
state but citizens both black and white. So when villagers saw these strange-looking 
young men, they concluded they had to be magandanga. They appeared friendly but 
serious: their request for every villager to attend the night pungwe (all-night meeting) 
was more an order than a request. That was the story of magandanga everywhere. Locals 
here had also gone to Gonakudzingwa to get party cards from Nkomo, so they also knew 
what the AK-47 rifles were forwho they were against! Hence the state pronounced 
their intended consequences with finality: hugandanga.  
The gandanga (singular) was a merchant of death: to hammer this message home, 
the state adroitly deployed statistics of black civilian casualties.88 A terrorist was not a 
guerrilla. The latter was a soldier, one of a small band, a sort of advance party, who seek 
out to attack supplies and disrupt lines of communication while avoiding direct 
confrontation with the main forces. By contrast, a terrorist used subjugation as his main 
weapon, to strike fear into the minds of innocent people and (if intimidation fails) by 
                                                
87 Focus on Rhodesia, Vol. 1, No. 2, June 1976. For an interpretation that influenced my interpretation of 
such contestations, see John Lonsdale, Some Origins of Nationalism in East Africa, Journal of African 
History 9, 1 (1968). 
88 Facts and Reports 6th vol., no. 23, Nov 17, 1976: 2125. Rhodesians Fight in Mozambique, The Times 





burning his crops, killing his livestock, raping, torturing, looting and, finally, killing. As 
depicted in state propaganda, ZIPRA and ZANLA were no more than organized gangs 
of foreign-trained thugs, masterminded by leaders of sparring factions fighting for 
control.89  
Hugandanga was a paradox: in the eyes of ZANLA, liberation could only come 
through striking terror in the state and white minority who enjoyed unfair race-based 
privileges. According to the state, liberation was a cover for terrorism. This observation 
from Catholic missionary in 1978 suggests that guerrillas were not monolithic: 
First, the true guerrillas, numbering about 5,000, who maintain lines of 
communication back to their bases; second, groups of three or four 
guerrillas who, though still combatant, are under stress, having lost contact 
with their network. The third category are the wild guerrillas, even 
deserters, whose nerve has gone after spending too long alone in the bush. 
Finally there are the bandit guerrillas, who live like highwaymen.90 
The states designation of terrorism drew its salience from the targets of the guerrilla 
attacks. Besides attacking the spaces of the state, the guerrillas targeted white farms, 
whom the state saw as innocent women and children when, in fact, the farm had long 
become a self-contained, family garrison.91 Of course, it would have been understandable 
if the terrorists killed whites; but they were also murdering even their own people using 
dastardly methods too.92 The state, missionaries, and journalists said the atrocities were 
terrorist acts; ZANLA and ZIPRA blamed the Selous Scouts.  
These are the sort of magandanga that arrived to open a new front through 
Gonarezhou in early 1976. Their strategy was clearly to stretch the RSFs military 
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resources through extending the frontage and fighting from within the deep summer 
vegetational cover.93 They were to move stealthily through the national park to reach the 
villages, whereupon there was absolutely no way the RSF could tell who was civilian and 
who was gandanga, since the guerrilla wore civilian clothes. So besides the question 
Who was a combatant? magandangas strategy also raised another: What was a 
camouflage?94 
As I see it, the fact that magandanga were invading Rhodesia from 
Mozambique resembles the actions of one other pest that the state had just tamed: the 
tsetse fly. Like this insect, the gandanga was a returning resident and both were coming 
from across the border. Some of the guerrillas were locals like Vhumbululu who had 
crossed through Gonarezhou into Mozambique and were now simply coming back to 
reclaim their ancestral lands. Like trypanosomiasis (nagana), hugandanga was an 
outcome of the states intrusion in local peoples relationship to the land. Both were 
merely chickens coming home to roost: the straight-line border that the BSA Company 
and the Portuguese had drawn in the 1890s as a mark of their sovereignty was now in 
serious contention. Just as with the tsetse fly, locals found it beneficial to ally with 
magandanga as a way to challenge the state.95 
Upon reaching the villages, magandanga moved quickly to establish village 
networks of militias for gathering and disseminating information and organizing local 
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support and logistics. A mujibha (as the village-based militia were called) might also be 
trained to use a rifle or be simply handed one to fire.96  
In the end magandangas mission was to liberate the country from Rhodesian 
white minority rule through combat. Besides the more obvious battle with the AK-47 and 
other support instruments, combat was primarily a clash of two systems, with one trying 
to undermine and replaced the other. In the areas around Gonarezhou, this broader 
combat assumed the form of disrupting the African education system through abducting 
teachers and schoolchildren, forcing schools to close, burning schools down, and holding 
all-night rallies.97 It also involved disrupting tourism not just in Gonarezhou, but 
throughout the country to cripple the economy.98 While the tactics were to hit key 
economic infrastructure, the broader strategy was partly to dampen Rhodesia morale, 
thereby triggering mass emigration instead of immigration. The public panic forced the 
army to caution in July 1977 that the most important battle the terrorists could win 
would be if they broke Rhodesias will to resist or attack.99  
By Christmas 1976, the guerrillas had virtually disrupted civil administration. 
ZANLA targeted rural district councils, land extension services, schools, and health 
installations; they had destroyed the dipping of cattle in order to spread veterinary disease 
and destroy white commercial beef and dairy farming. Because locals were fully in 
support of the guerrilla incursions, the RSF conceded: we were reacting to incidents 
rather than initiating our own action. Next the guerrillas moved onto the white-owned 
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tea estates in the northern end of the valley, completely disrupting operations. They 
began to establish their own administration, operating clinics in the bush and opening 
Marxist indoctrination centres which they called schools.100  
Once the fish began to swim in water, they contaminated the countryside. Road 
that had been safe to drive on during night and day were mined. Even convoys came 
under attack. The highly irregular mobility of the guerrilla confused the RSF and the 
European public. Magandanga forbade villagers from paying fees, taxes, and other forms 
of acknowledgment of state authority over them.101 They struck clinics for medical 
supplies, visited African stores for supplies, and schools for recruits. By July 1977, 300 
primary and 9 secondary schools had closed countrywide, putting 1,200 teachers out of 
work.102 
In a sense, seven decades of divide and rule had created two landscapes that 
framed the tactics of the magandanga. The native reservesovercrowded, arid, and often 
infertilehad lost forest cover through overgrazing, deforestation, the clearing on new 
fields, and village creation. By contrast, the game reserves, farms, and gum-tree 
plantations had become clothed with leaf. It was no surprise that by mid-1978 these 
latter became the favored staging bases and armory sites for guerrillas.103 The guerrilla 
was a pest that could move in and out of the African villages, European farms, and game 
reserves, indeed between Rhodesia and Mozambique at will, transgressing the veterinary 
                                                
100 Harnish Peters (Outgoing District Commissioner for Honde Valley), Terrorists on the Run in Honde 
Valley, Focus on Rhodesia 2, 11 (November 1977): 8-9. 
101 Facts and Reports 8th vol., no. 15, July 26, 1978. 1389. James Wilkie, Rhodesian Internal Settlement in 
Parlous Condition: Vast Areas are Under Control of Guerrillas who Decide which Transport May Move, 
The Times (Br), July 24, `78. 
102 Facts and Reports 7th vol., no. 17/18, September 7, 1977: 1579, Smith Regime Closes 309 Schools, 
Daily News (Tanz), July 30, `77. 
103 Facts and Reports 8th vol., no. 11, June 2, 1978. 1174. Viability of Farming, Radio Reports, Salisbury 





boundaries the state insisted on. Stock and wire thefts increased in tandem; FMD, 
anthrax, and tick-borne diseases shot up.104 Magandanga threatened to collapse the entire 
agriculture industry and, since most of Rhodesias manufacturing  industry was agro-
based, the whole economy.105 
As pestilence, hugandanga is not merely the use of terror to achieve freedom or 
the use of freedom as a mask for terrorist actions. It is also specific to the way this battle 
was fought at one specific site: the white-owned commercial farmstead. Pests of any 
kind, unless brought under control or eradicated, have an extraordinary power to 
overwhelm the landowner even to the extent of chasing him from the farm. At the very 
least they threaten the profitability of staying. At most they threaten not just the 
livelihood but the life of the landowner as well. Magandanga did both. Guerrillas thrived 
on water: the rains lashed the landscape into thick green cover around October-
November. As the white farmers set about planting crops, the guerrillas struck, forcing 
many into flight. Over 200 farms had fallen vacant by September 1978. The 
overstretched army was urging the owners of the remaining 6,400 farms in hot districts 
like Melsetter to consolidate themselves into more easily defendable points. Of late the 
pest had changed tack: no longer blasting the well-protected white farmsteads with 
bazookas and rifle fire in nighttime hit-and-run raids, but actually driving off the farm 
laborand cattle. Without them there was no farmjust a piece of land.106 Farm 
compounds became cesspools of subversion; the fish had found water even on the white 
farmland.  
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Ultimately, the attacks on white farms were means to an end. The objective of 
hugandanga was not so much the destruction of material infrastructures like roads, shops, 
and schools themselves, but rather to send the message that nowhere and no-one was 
safe. Such attacks triggered the state into throwing cordons sanitaires, mounting 
roadblocks, searching vehicles, traveling in convoys, and guarding places and people. 
The more the white population panicked, the more it fled the countryside and 
concentrated in the towns. As the farms, schools and hospitals lay abandoned, 
magandanga took control, transforming the capitalist structures into collectivized and 
communist-oriented centers designed to decolonize the mindset. As the productive 
sectors of the economy fell into enemy hands, the state became economically weaker and 
weaker. The battle of the gun became the battle of the economy. Waging war was an 
investment of moneyto buy weapons, pay troops, repair damaged or destroyed 
infrastructure and invest in destroying it.107 
 
Pest Control 
Force Multiplication. In 1974, the generals in the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) told 
Prime Minister Ian Smith what he was not prepared to hear: the war could not be won 
by purely military means and he must settle politically. The army was overstretched, 
the terrorists literally swarming everywhere across the northern borders. The villagers 
were supporting them; the RSF had lost the hearts and minds war. It was time to settle. 
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The prime minister was not taking that advice. His strategy was to fight the new 
pest as all others had been in Rhodesias history: by whatever means. He turned to force 
multipliersan assemblage of unorthodox instruments designed to counter ZANLAs 
irregular tactics. We have seen in preceding chapters the use of reserves to separate the 
good nature from bad nature. Africans were consigned to native reserves, wild 
animals in game reserves, nationalists to restriction camps. Then, as I have started 
showing in this chapter, remote wild spaces were deemed the most ideal to dump wild 
Africans trying to incite peace-loving natives to rebel against their caring 
government. These wild Africans literally became game animals.108  
Smith was not content with prisons which stopped at control; eradication was a 
much better word. First, in 1974 he created a pseudo-guerrilla unit called the Selous 
Scouts, which masqueraded as real guerrillas, imitating the usual ZANLA code of 
operations, and committing the worst atrocities of the war.109 Next, he authorized this unit 
to deploy any and all tactics and weapons that had been tried, tested, and proven effective 
against vermin. This included spraying terrorist hideouts with deadly poisons and 
biological agents, contaminating water sources, and using regular food products as baits 
to poison terrorists and their civilian hosts. The Portuguese had already used these 
methods in Angola since 1972.110 
In order to make such tactics more effective, Smith instituted the capture-and-
release of villagers into a new kind of reserve: the protected villages. This facility was 
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fenced and patrolled; at specific periods of the day, the areas outside it becamejust as 
in the case of tsetse corridorskilling grounds for anything that moved.  
The aerial photography, cartography, and darting operations that had worked so 
well during the wildlife research and extension of the 1960s differed little from the new 
concept of Fire Forcea helicopter-borne operation to locate, pursue, and strafe 
terrorist hideouts and attempted escapes from the air while coordinating mobile ground 
troops to cut them off. Terrorists were not humans; they were not even good animals 
and had to be hunted as such.111 
Shutting Out The Fish. Like the border game fence in the 1960s, the minefield was 
meant to curtail the influx of pests. In Chapter 6 we saw how the Vet Department had 
decided to construct the game fence along the border to curtail both FMD- and tsetse-
carrying cattle and wild animals from crossing in from Mozambique. We saw how locals 
breached this obstacle by lifting the strands where the fence crossed streams, or 
alternatively drove their herds south to the last pole at Pafuri.  
Dealing with guerrillas was no different. Like the tsetse, whose colony was 
anchored just east of the border, guerrilla staging bases were just across the border. Just 
as the state feared that tsetse-carrying animals would lead to the spread of 
trypanosomiasis, so too was the fear that guerrillas carrying communist ideology and 
guns would carry germs of anti-state rebellion to the innocent villagers. The distance 
between the bases and the villagers was only a few hours. By laying minefields across 
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these crossing points, the RSF forced magandanga to use the more arid areas, where 
ambushes were waiting.112  
The guerrillas always found innovative ways of breaching the minefield. The first 
method was to use shovels to delicately lift the mines and create safe passages. The 
process was led by the point man, the seguranza (security). After clearing, everyone else 
was expected to step exactly where he had stepped. Sometimes some areas had no mines, 
in others there were too many of them, but the seguranza could not take any chances. A 
mine rejects being stepped on but gladly accepts being lifted. If you step on it and it 
produces a click sound, you better not lift your foot from it. You had better start telling 
your colleagues how you want your will to be shared. The second was to simply roll a  
tractor tire across and follow it. Finally, the guerrillas simply stampeded game animals or 
cattle through.113 The guerrillas did more than just create passages through these 
minefields: they actually dug up the mines and planted them to kill RSF troops!114  
Empting Out the Water. As a cordons sanitaire, the Chikwarakwara-Sango minefield 
was a resounding failure. Next the state sought to empty out the pools (villages) of water: 
with wire and fire the RSF force-marched villagers into PVs. Instead of incendiaries, the 
RSF now fought war through population control.  
It started in Honde Valley, scene of similar rearguard action against tsetse fly 
discussed in Chapter 6. Its dense vegetation and scattered population were the perfect 
conditions for classical guerrilla warfare.115 In 1976, PVs or Keeps (Africans called 
                                                
112 Zimbabwe Fieldwork: Interview with Solomon Bvekenya and Vhumbululu Ndhlovu. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Martin R. Rupiah, A Historical Study of Land-Mines in Zimbabwe, 1963-1995, Zambezia xxii, I 
(1995): 67. 
115 Facts and Reports 7th vol., no. 20, October 5, 1977: 1775. Security Achievements in Honde Valley, 





them makipi, singular kipi) were rapidly established and the landscape virtually emptied 
of villagers. Next the state embarked on a propaganda bonanza, establishing schools, 
clinics, drilling boreholes inside makipi, and allotting small agricultural plots within a 3 
mile radius of kipi. Madhomeni (land development officers, or LDOs) to teach the 
incarcerated villagers to grow tea, coffee, cotton and ground nuts. It set up mastoro 
(grocery stores) nearly, cleared commuter bus routes and vigorous advertised 
(compelled) black bus owners to ply them. In the state and aligned publications, the PV 
provided villagers with such stability and security that they became demanded to have 
them. When the state did not construct them in time, many locals had fled to towns or 
sought refuge among their kin across the border in Mozambique. The biting hunger and 
draught, disease, and lack of schools in Mozambique were now driving them back to the 
food, clinics, schools and 24-hour security of the PVs.116 How blurred the boundaries 
between prison and humanitarian sanctuary! 
PVs were nothing new or generic to Rhodesia or Gonarezhou. The US Army used 
the strategic-hamlet for similar purposes against the Vietcong. The Portuguese had 
used aldeamentos (fortified villages) in both Angola and Mozambique to forcibly group-
settle villagers and cut them off as a logistic resource to the guerrillas.117 It was a weapon 
to prevent subversion and for protection, an armed space. In both countries the 
aldeamentos failed: the guerrillas attacked the camps on a nightly basis, freeing the 
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hundreds of thousands of quarantined villagers. At independence in 1975, the FRELIMO 
government of Samora Machel turned the aldeamentos into peasant communes.118  
In 1972, after a stubborn ZANLA onslaught in the northeastern district of Mount 
Darwin, Smith also began to quarantine villagers. There is little argument that the 
Portuguese and Vietnamese applications then underway influenced Smith. However, 
Rhodesia was not short of experience in quarantining its own pests. Game reserves, 
native reserves, foot and mouth control fences, tsetse control fences, restriction camps
pest control were written all over the Rhodesian landscapes. The white farmsteads and 
games reserves testified to eight decades of successful battles against multiple pests.  
By 1976 when the war at last reached Gonarezhou, the cordons sanitaire was well 
past its 80th Rhodesian birthday. Just as in Mt. Darwin, the terrorist had forced the state 
to mount a major development operation in borders abandoned since 1890. As armored 
cars engaged the guerrillas, bulldozers ploughed through thick forest, leaving in their 
wake excellent gravel and sometimes tarred roads.119   
A Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace report in 1977 estimated that about 
580,000 Africans (double the official figure) were being held in 203 PVs, most of them in 
the northeastern and southeastern parts of Rhodesia, where RSF operations were hottest. 
Where villagers refused to move into makipi, the RSF burned down their homes and 
crops. No compensation was paid for livestock, homesteads, crops lost.120 
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Materially, socially, culturally and psychologically the kipiwhich most 
international media called concentration campwas one of the most dehumanizing 
aspects of the war in Rhodesia. The makipi, including the one at Malipati, were 
overcrowded and unsanitary conditions. Generally, a 15 yard square patch was provided 
for each family to build a shelter, dig a pit latrine, and accommodate chicken and small 
livestock. The toilets soon overflowed, unleashing widespread typhoid and diarrhea.121 
Peoples bodies were being eaten by pests as they walked. Hospitals were few. 
People lived like pestsdusk-to-dawn curfews, armed guards conducting gate 
checks on inmates going and returning, searching their bundles for evidence of 
assistance to the guerrillas in the bush. Along the fences, more armed guards on patrol, 
others on towers, peering into every nook and cranny with binoculars, and yet others 
escorting inmates to and from their fields. Security lights (the notorious search lights) 
and trip flares turned night into broad daylight, while loudspeakers thundered orders and 
music to inmates. The White Keep Commander and Administrator, the Guard Force, the 
District Assistants (DAs, formerly DMs), the Police Support Unit, the CID special branch 
and intelligence, and the psychological war unit of the armed forces ran the PV. It was a 
structure designed to rule the inmates not with just physical but also social, psychic 
violence [and] pervasive, calculated insecurity.122  
Still, just like in Mozambique, the guerrillas moved in and out of makipi. Between 
January and June 1977, the guerrillas killed 114 guards, abducted 25, and wounded 243. 
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In the first five months of 1977 alone, they attacked the makipi seventy times.123 By 1978 
most of the PVs were abandoned, many of the inmates having returned to their ruined 
homes to start afresh in the now liberated zones.  
 
Pest Eradication 
Poisoning. On 3 May 1978, ZANLAs official radio station, the Voice of Zimbabwe 
(VOZ), reported that the RSF was poisoning rivers, streams, dams, wells, and boreholes 
in the areas around Gonarezhou (Chiredzi district). One source told the station that the 
RSF had forced 115 African civilians to drink poisoned water in retaliation for 19 troops 
gunned down by ZANLA guerrillas. All of them died and were buried in a mass 
grave.124Jim Parker was one of the Selous Scouts operatives in the district when this 
campaign began in 1976. He admits there could be no better conditions to use poisons to 
kill the terrorists than Chiredzi. Especially in 1976! The scorching drought severely 
limited water-holes for guerrillas leaving Mozambican rear bases with neither water nor 
food packs. The Selous Scouts had destroyed road and rail tracks on all Mozambican 
areas abutting Rhodesias border. These roads led directly from ZANLAs main base at 
Mapai and the state garrisons at Madulo Pan and Pafuri.125 In good years, the many small 
pans in the national park would contain water. Not in 1976. Many infiltrators died of 
thirst. Often it came down to drinking ones own urine for survival; until that too could 
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not come out of the dehydrated body. At that point, the guerrillas took their chances and 
ploughed through the enemys killing grounds.126 
RSF sappers poisoned seasonal pans on guerrilla infiltration routes with Supermix 
DFF (an organophosphate) cattle dip. The water became unfit for human and animal 
consumptionin fact it was toxic enough to kill man or beast. Long before the war, in 
the time of Hostes Nicolle and Allan Wright, a network of boreholes had been drilled 
throughout Matibi II and equipped with diesel pumps and motors. The shortage of ground 
water and the distance people there had traveled to access the running waters of the 
Runde and Mwenezi was gone. Hydro-dependency on the boreholes became total. That is 
precisely the weapon the Selous Scouts were looking for: they sabotaged the boreholes to 
force magandanga to use the few poisoned waterholes.127 However, as the VCU and later 
PACU had found, such anti-vermin measures worked only seasonally, becoming 
practically useless in the rainy season. During summer the guerrillas simply picked and 
chose where to cross.  
Baiting. On 11 January 1978, the pro-nationalist Tanzanian paper, The Daily News, 
carried three news items suggesting that Rhodesias poison warfare had switched into 
new gear. Four months earlier, 12 school children had died in the Shabani area of south-
central Rhodesia after eating poisoned wild fruits called matohwe which the RSF had 
laced with poison for guerrillas. In the same month, four school children died in Selukwe 
after eating poisoned tinned foods which they had picked by the roadside on the way 
home from school. On 29 December 1977, the Voice of Zimbabwe reported that 57 
African civiliansmost of them childrendied and 17 others were admitted in 
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hospital after eating poisoned tinned food set as bait for guerrillas just outside the 
northern town of Shamva.128 
When the rains finally fell in November-December 1976, they washed away the 
poison downstream, again exposing the 600-mile border to the Red Terror invading 
from Mozambique. Defense Minister P.K. van der Byl contacted University of Rhodesia 
scientist, Bob Symington. The professor had a well-equipped private laboratory at the 
rear of his Borrowdale home, and he compiled five pages of poisons, toxins and venoms 
commercially available and purchasable without difficulty from organizations. Among 
the list were barium salts, sodium salts, fluorophosphates and monofluoracitric acids.129  
Van der Byl and Central Intelligence Organization Director Ken Flower liked 
what they were told and authorized the project. It started as a Police Special Branch 
operation under the command of Chief Superintendent Mark J.P. McGuiness, who 
appointed a civilian lab technician codenamed Vic to take daily charge. Originally 
designated for Inkomo Barracks, the project ended up starting as a one-roomed 
manufacturing unit in Bindura. It initially involved impregnating bait (clothing) with 
organophosphates, but was soon expanded into doctoring assorted tinned foods, packaged 
foods, medicines in liquid and tablet form, tobacco, cigarettes and bottled cold drinks. 
The chemicals and toxins were collected from 7-Medical Battalion, South African 
Special Forces, in Pretoria, and couriered to Bindura. Sigma of London, Munich, and St. 
Louis Montana, USA, were listed as other suppliers for monofluroacetic acid, 
Diisopropyl Fluorophosphate, and Alloxan. An organophosphate, parathion, was used for 
impregnating clothing. The liquid was poured onto tin sheets and left in the sun to 
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crystallize, the crystal being ground into a powder brushed into clothing in the crotch and 
armpit areas. The clothing was purchased from a store in Bindura and passed on to the 
army fabrication unit in Darwendale for impregnation. Underwear, T-shirts and denim 
jeansthe favored attire of ZANLA guerrillasmade the best baits. The unsuspecting 
guerrilla recipient put on the attire and immediately fell ill, as we saw quelea birds do 
with Queleatox. Upon contact with the skin, the guerrilla started scratching, fell ill, and 
had nowhere to go for treatment. Comrades left him to die a painful and lonely death out 
in the bush.130  
Having worked so lethally in the VCUs efforts, thalliums pedigree was proven. 
The Selous Scouts now used it to lace canned beef, cold drinks, beer, sweets, medical 
supplies, mealie meal, biscuits, tinned jam, tinned peas, bottles of brandy and toothpaste. 
Thallium was injected into sealed tins, through bottle tops and into packets with a micro 
needle. One died simply by licking ones fingers after handling it. The victim started 
vomiting violently and defecating uncontrollably, followed by complete paralysis and 
death within four or five days. Nationalist guerrillas and villagers died mysterious deaths 
after bleeding from their noses and mouths and developing very high temperatures. They 
complained of suspected malaria, and violent short illness. Of the five copies of 
original documents marked Top Secret that Parker publishes, one in particular from 
McGuiness to Flower dated 28th November 1977 catches the readers attention. In it 
McGuiness listed items distributed for this dirty operation and the casualty list.131 
The operation involved local white farmers who gained guerrilla trust, through 
whom the SB and Selous Scout worked to poison the guerrillas. The guerrillas had 
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approached one such farmer Parker calls B in 1977 upon being told by locals about 
their good relations with him. They asked if he could supply them with clothing and food. 
B reported the matter to Police Special Branch Chiredzithat is, to Parker and his 
colleagues, who advised him to continue his relations with the guerrillas as if nothing was 
happening. Exactly the same timea Friday the next weekthe guerrillas made contact 
again, gave B a list of their requirementsdenims, transistor radios, biscuits, Cokes, 
and tinned meat. Says Parker: We gave him money to buy the stuff. We also reminded 
him that the men were dangerous killers, but he should continue his assistance because 
they trusted him.132 The guerrillas became friendly and relaxed. The Selous Scouts 
then supplied B with poisoned clothing and thallium-laced food. Because the poison 
took several days to take effect, the guerrillas would never trace them to B. Again, we 
have seen how this delayed action worked well against suspicious baboons. The thallium-
laced food worked faster than impregnated jeans but still took several days. The 
deployment of poisoned food continued right into 1979 on a need-to rather than across-
the-board basis. While some of the handlers are known to have died of cancer, research 
on the effects on guerrillas and civilians has barely begun. 
On a visit to Durham, NC, USA, on 25 June 1978, ZANUs Secretary for Health, 
Dr. Herbert Ushewokunzea medical doctor by trainingdisclosed the effects of 
pesticides on ZANLA and its civilian sympathizers: 
The most important department in our situation is the department of war 
medicine to treat gunshot wounds, punctures, shrapnel in wrists, napalm 
burns, and poisoning. Imagine the poisoning. In the classical clinical case 
we have the patient goes into epileptic fits and dies within thirty minutes. 
There is also a sub-department of germ warfarethe enemy pollutes the 
wells and water supplies with cholera and typhoid. He then rushes back to 
vaccinate the whites in case the thing boomerangs. Fourteen days ago 
                                                





typhoid fever came from such a poisoning and claimed seven lives. At that 
time I didnt even have a single capsule of the drug for treatment of 
typhoid. Finally there is the department of disaster medicine. This is 
episodic in nature. The first such disaster occurred in August 1976, what is 
popularly called the Nyazonia massacre, when over 700 comrades died in 
their refugee camp, following a murderous attack by the Ian Smith forces. 
To this day we live with men, women, children with all four limbs gone, 
two gone, one gone. Some people are just vegetating. I am looking for 
prosthesis, artificial limbs. As if that were not enough, on the 23rd of 
November, 1977, there was a second massacrethe Chimoio massacre. 
Women were caught unawares in their fields. One of our biggest 
schools is in Chimoio. Many children were there with their exercise books 
and pencils. They died. One of our biggest medical centers was at 
Chimoio, a hundred bed hospital. In it 25 were incinerated, including 15 
nurses who were trying to evacuate patients. Our whole health transport 
system was disrupted, the self-reliance trucks and cars sent to us by 
support committees, the only mobile clinic we had. Our operating theater 
on wheels which was on its way to a nearby town and carrying big red 
crosses on it, with eight patients inside, was bombed by the enemy. The 
eight patients died plus three nurses who were accompanying them. All 
our libraries, both medical and educational were completely destroyed.133  
Nyadzonia and Chimoio were ZANLAs biggest bases, and were located in the Manica 
province to the northeast of Gonarezhou. The Chimoio attack was one of hundreds of 
sorties undertaken with fragmentation bombs and napalm.134  
Ushewokunze showed pictures of effects of chemicals and napalm porridge and 
of a truck of poisoned beans with the following commentary:  
This is wood covered by napalm porridge! Imagine somebody dipping his 
arm in a jar of sulfuric acidthe pain, the agony, the disintegration of 
tissue, the death. If that porridge lands on you and you try to wipe it away, 
youre in troubleyour hand falls off, gets eaten away. This van is 
carrying a load of beans, one of the most important kinds of relish in our 
camps. This van was attacked by the enemy. They only destroyed the 
engine section. This load of beans had been poisoned. How did I discover 
that? Life around was dying, the pigeons, the ducks. The monkey 
population in the area is quite big so I grabbed one little monkey and 
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threw it on to the back of the van. It nibbled a few of the bean seeds. 
Within ten minutes it developed a fit and died.135 
Clearly, when the death that is often reserved for pests is deployed to kill human beings, 
even people become pests. 
 
Making Pests Weaponry 
Human Pests Turned Pesticides. To counter guerrilla activities in Rhodesias rural 
countryside, the RSF created various pseudo-guerrilla groups to infiltrate and destroy 
magandanga. The most potent of these units was the Selous Scouts and it was established 
in 1975. It was named after the nineteenth century British big game hunter and tracker, 
Frederick Courtney Selous for a purpose: its task was to hunt wild human beings or 
terrorists (magandanga).136 The Scouts were composed of black and white members who 
lived in the wild bush, tracking down terrorists, working in terrible conditions, living off 
the land. The unit had few problems killing the terrorists  if they found them, 
something which the unit hoped to do with speed, stealth and efficiency.137This was a 
strategy to transform magandanga into weapons against magandanga. A New York Times 
reporter described the new modus operandi as follows: first, groups of scouts comprising 
black and white leaders moved through the bush collecting information on guerrilla 
movements from villagers using threats and intimidation. After locating magandanga, 
they radioed the sighting to a regional joint operation command, which then sent in 
helicopters and winged aircraft to drop fire teams to try and kill the guerrillas. The 
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aircraft was equipped with bombs containing napalm of the fantan variety. It was used 
to burn guerrillas out of the cover of high elephant grass.138 
The Selous Scouts also went into the operational zone disguised as freedom 
fighters to kill villagers and leave evidence incriminating magandanga. They deployed 
chigandanga (the ways of the gandanga) to fight magandanga139: mimicry became a 
potent weapon.140 Who could doubt that the man in denims and Super-Pro snickers 
totting an AK-47 was not a genuine gandanga? Even white soldiers disguised themselves 
as blacks,141 what Luise White calls the masquerade. Upon uncovering this 
masquerade, White finds guns, bombs, and other instruments that embody the political 
imaginary of violence. Through strategic veilings and unveilings, the body moves 
through different social categories and identitiesgandanga here, RSF there, black 
civilian here, white civilian there, a man here, a woman there.142 After killing civilians 
(especially white missionaries, and black women and children) they radioed the pro-
government media houses, who arrived to report the gruesome murder of black civilians 
by the terrorists. In this way the Selous Scouts played a key role in fashioning a negative 
public perception of hugandanga as cowardly terror antithetical to liberation.143 
Just as magandanga used rural Rhodesian villagers to gather intelligence on the 
whereabouts of the RSF, the latter also deployed Mozambican villagers living close to 
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ZANLAs rear bases to spy on and sabotage the guerrilla movement. Dressed in civilian 
clothes and using Mozambican money, the spy would wander about the roads and 
railways alone, getting close enough to Mozambican and ZANLA military camps to 
ascertain troop strength and the types of weapons used. He roamed on trains and buses 
between towns to ascertain the positions of bridges and villages, all the while taking 
notes on his notebook.144 After a successful reconnaissance, this spy would guide the 
RSF attack formations into Mozambique.  
A variant of these pseudo-guerrilla gangs was one comprising local Rhodesian 
Africans spying on their fellow villagers inside the country. It is not surprising that Jim 
Parker, the man who founded the Shangane Army in 1976, was himself a Selous Scout 
operative. In essence this village militia was a militarily-trained intelligence unit to spy 
both on what their next door neighbors were up do and the movements of the guerrillas. 
The Shangane Army was one of the most serious threats to ZANLA because they used 
to arrive just like comrades with the aim of looking for bases. To avoid easy recognition 
by villagers, the operatives were deployed far away from their homes. However this 
unfamiliarity with locals and terrain gave them away. Unaware of the whereabouts of the 
guerrillas, the Shangane Army operatives would arrive in a village and enquire about the 
whereabouts of mapuruvheya (as the RSF was derogatorily called). But your colleagues 
were here asking the same questions a few hours ago! the villagers would say. At that 
stage they would be totally exposed as masquerades.145 The dangerthe weaponryof 
the Shangane Army lay in its being both a network crossing the boundaries between 
friendly force and foe and the difficulty of knowing that. That is why it made its 
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notorious name around Gonarezhou: it created confusion and uncertainty, and betrayed 
peoples political affiliation to the wrong audience. 
 
Matsanga: Postcolonial Insurgency in Gonarezhou 
For all its sophistry, the Rhodesian apparatus of counterinsurgency failed do prevent the 
ascendancy of magandanga into power. By 1978, the protected villages had virtually been 
abandoned and the area around Gonarezhou was a liberated zone. In 1979, the mounting 
guerrilla pressure forced the Rhodesian government to the negotiating table. By the end 
of the year, a timetable for the holding of elections had been hammered out. On 18 April 
1980, Robert Mugabe was sworn in as Prime Minister after winning the elections. By 
then an insurgency was already underway along the Mozambican border. 
Matsanga is shortcut for Matsangaidze, the surname of the founder of the 
Mozambican rebel movement RENAMO. Matsangaidze means the disruptive one or 
the pest. Whereas elsewhere Matsanga has received more favorable treatment from 
revisionist scholarship,146 in and around Gonarezhou people summarize the rebels, in one 
word: a menace. Matsangaidze was the new madzviti. 
There are so many reasons for this. For a start, the cause for which Matsanga was 
fighting was germane to Mozambique. Zimbabwe came into the rebel plan for logistic 
and tactical reasons: as a hunting ground for food and to hit Zimbabwe at the rear and 
force Mugabe to withdraw from Mozambique. RENAMOs training and funding was 
largely South African, just as another rebel movement, Super-ZAPU, trained at 
Phalaborwa and infiltrated via Matabeleland. Both RENAMO and Super-ZAPU were 
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intended to hit Mozambique and Zimbabwe at the rear and force them to expel and 
disown the Umkontho weSizwe. Gonarezhou was strategic to RENAMO because of ivory: 
the elephant could actually fund the war against Frelimo.147  
The use of Gonarezhou as a hunting ground for ivory and local villages as 
arbitrary granaries commenced soon after the war. When the Rhodesian war ended in 
1980, ZANLA closed its bases and its troops quartered into UN-supervised assembly 
points. By 1981, most of the former combatants had been integrated into the Zimbabwe 
National Army (ZNA) together with the RSF and ZIPRA. Their bases were now far 
away; a military vacuum commenced. RENAMO filled the void. In 1983 the rebel 
movement started coming in to ask for food, disguised as refugees proceeding to look 
for work as cattle herders and farmhands.148  
Primarily, if conceived of as a hunt, the Matsanga carcass was the shops and 
village, the ivory food, porters-cum-soldiers, and concubines for their chefs. It was 
when the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), composed of an overwhelming number of 
ex-ZANLA troops, intervened in Mozambique in 1987 that Matsanga became violent. 
Mugabe gave two reasons for going into Mozambique: first, to aid the people of 
Mozambique who had fought alongside Zimbabweans to deal with what he perceived to 
be a counterrevolutionary South African sponsored bandit movement. Second, to 
protect Zimbabwes import-export lifeline, the Beira Corridor, the countrys only route to 
the sea. In 1987, Matsanga raided the villages of Chibwedziva, capturing men women 
and children and taking them into Mozambique.149 Subsequently, started killing villagers. 
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The following month Matsanga returned. This time they meant business, Bvekenya 
said.  
Amidst these scenes of victimization, heroes always emerged from within, 
spurred by the desire to live. The state could not be counted on to come to anybodys 
assistance and often arrived when Matsanga had already hit and ran into Mozambique. 
The most illustrative case is that of Sergeant Pahlela, a DNPWLM ranger based at 
Mabalauta whom I interviewed in 2000. Following the Matsangas capture of his mother, 
Pahlela resolved to combine forces with the army and made a follow up. When the army 
patrol got tired and decided to rendezvous, Pahlela continued tracking. The captors 
decided to rest for the night in the musimbiti woodland in the red-earth upland area of 
Mabalauta. Luckily his mother spotted him first before Matsanga did, and he signaled his 
mother to lie down. Sergeant Pahlela opened fire with his AK-47 automatic. Matsanga 
fled, dragging a few of their captives. It is not clear how many casualties Matsanga 
sustained, but Pahlela had managed to rescue his mother.150 
Why were the soldiers only told of these incidents and why did they always 
come so late, when Matsanga would have already left? Here, age-old problems of 
communication and terrain plagued the possibilities of follow-up. Matsangas ability to 
cause mayhem rested on an efficient manipulation of the effects of time on security force 
operations. They came at night knowing that Air Force of Zimbabwe aircraft, especially 
choppers, had no night visibility capabilities. Since follow-up relied on visibility to track 
the spoor of the rebels, even if villagers made reports the very same night, the soldiers 
always advised that they would attend to the scene in the morning. In addition, the 
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soldiers advised locals that they could not launch a night follow-up patrol because they 
were guarding the township.151 
Just as in Rwanda in the 1994 genocide, Matsangas weapon of mass butchery 
was the machete, not the AK-47. This was because the machete killed silently and 
cheaply. After the kill, the rebels destroyed the homes of those they had killed. Only 
when Matsanga came into contact with the ZNA did they use their rifles. They did it to 
save ammunition and to catch their victims by surprise. No doubt the most obvious 
reason for Matsangas brutality was that these were, in the main, child soldiers. While 
abduction (force) was certainly a new way of recruiting labor, the use of locals as guides 
was, as we have seen, an old practice. In the out-journey to Mozambique, captured locals 
were used as porters to carry goods looted in local villages and shops. In Matsangas 
infiltrations, these same locals were used as guidesand duressto take Matsanga back 
to the local villages to loot, kill, rape and abduct. Bvekenya referred me to talk to quite a 
number of people who had either escaped, had lost relatives to abductions, or had their 
homes torched.152  
The biggest problem villagers faced with Matsanga was how to separate a rebel 
from a genuine refugee or Mozambican village militia. The bulk of those fleeing 
Mozambique were the village-based militias the Frelimo government had trained for 
collective security since the 1970s to combat Rhodesias hot pursuit operations. 
Matsanga pursued them into Zimbabwe. They hid their AK-47 rifles in caves and melted 
into the villages; after all many were Shangane relatives.153 
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Conclusion: Margins of Difference 
In Chapters 2-3 we saw the way locals cashed in on the influx of Europeans in search of 
ivory, concessions and labor. In Chapters 6 we saw them becoming fly-catchers and 
poachers. This chapter shows how villagers joined guerrillas in becoming pests unto the 
state and harnessing the portable lethal power of the AK-47 to contest state power over 
Gonarezhou and themselves. Yet Matsanga was different, its violence both a cause and a 
sign of disjunction. Instead of challenging the Zimbabwean state in a way beneficial to 
locals, it punished locals in ways that served to bring state and villagers together against 
it.  
This wide margin of difference between Matsanga and magandanga is not just 
analytical; it explains why the ZANLA guerrilla is generally seen in a national light of 
political liberation (but certainly not the local one of liberating Gonarezhou) and 
Matsanga as destructiveness personified. This consciousness of the benefits of the passer-
by stems primarily from the fact of the villagers being itinerants themselves, who know 
the etiquette of traveling through other peoples lands. This sense of journeys as 
producing usable value explains why only the border-jumper (illegal immigrants seeking 
work in South Africa) rivals the poacher as the most popular figure in village circles. The 
poachers popularity stems from his bringing back game meat from his illegal mobility 
within the parks armed with his portable weaponry. The border-jumper, known locally as 
Majonijoni or those who are from Johannesburg (Jonny), defies international laws by 





money and goodies to support families in the village.154 Mapocha and Majonijoni deliver 
where Magandanga failed. 
The ways in which villagers have from time to time manipulated the movement of 
bodiesof people carrying technologies, or animals carrying either meat, ivory, or even 
pathogens takes us to the threshold of concluding this dissertation. With an eye on the 
current crisis in Zimbabwe, the only question worth asking is: why care about pests, after 
all? Why even worry to historically treat human and nonhuman pests together in the same 
narrative? I will conclude with that question.  
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Conclusion: The State As A Pest In Peoples Lives 
 
Witnessing a Landscape of Broken Promises 
One sunny June afternoon in 2001 as I wound out of the town of Chiredzi on a Zimbabwe 
United Passenger Company (Zupco) bus to Malipati, 250 winding miles away, I 
embarked on a journey to see for myself how far the politicians who had sent their 
ZANLA units through Gonarezhou wielding AK-47 rifles in the 1970s had kept their 
word once in office. I carried with me a checklist of all the promisesland, roads, 
schools, clinics, boreholes, dams, electricity, telephones, and roads. These were only the 
major ones. People had been promised also that once the white man had been chased 
from his farmhouse, they would be resettled in it. The hunting grounds of Gonarezhou 
would be open again. 
By the time I got to my destination at 0.35 am, eight hours since I had started my 
journey, I was not just caked with dusk. I was the dust itself, the result of a bumpy dirt 
track recognizable only by the tire-tracks the bus and other vehicles made through it. The 
road the guerrillas, and later the new Zimbabwean government, had promised had clearly 





mired term as we have seen in Chapter 1the government reneged on the promise. It 
kept the national park intact and continued the policies of the colonial state. The promise 
that had been made in the heat of a populist moment now encountered the realities of a 
conservancy whose existence as a pest control structure, a money-spinning tourist resort, 
and a conservancy whose existence the government had guaranteed under international 
law. Gonarezhou could not be touched; during the peace agreement with the Rhodesians 
and the British Government at Lancaster House, England, the nationalist leadership had 
pledged to honor the integrity of just such real estate. But the rightful owners were not 
consulted. 
In any case, the willpower to satisfy the promises to and needs of the rural masses 
that had, through persuasion or coercion, assisted the guerrillas to win the war was 
distracted. No sooner had the Zimbabwean flag been hoisted and the Union Jack lowered 
on 18th April 1980 than the new government have to deal with two insurgencies on its 
eastern and western borders. In the East was RENAMO, whose crossborder forays and 
atrocities against villagers inside eastern Zimbabwe would force the government to send 
the ZNA into Mozambique in 1987. Initially the mission was to secure the Beira to 
Mutare oil pipeline. Soon it became a hot pursuit operation against RENAMO as the 
ZANLA-dominated army came to the aid of its wartime ally Frelimo (now the new 
Mozambican army). In the west, a new situation developed which is still mired in 
controversy. In 1981, South African-trained insurgent elements calling themselves Super-
ZAPU and purporting to be backing Joshua Nkomo, whose party ZAPU had lost the 
independence election to Robert Mugabe, began committing atrocities mostly against 





moment of madness, the president sent in the dreaded North Korean-trained Five 
Brigade to wipe out Nkomos supporters. According to ethnographic investigations 
commissioned by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), about 20,000 
Ndebele people were slaughtered in an operation that resembled the pest eradication 
tactics of the Rhodesian government. Nkomo could not bear it; in 1987 he agreed to a 
Unity Accord with Mugabe. ZANU (PF) swallowed up ZAPU. The hostilities ended. 
Subsequently, Mugabe set up two commissions, but suppressed their findings, which 
have not been published to-date.  
The RENAMO menace to Gonarezhou only ended in 1992 with the signing of the 
Rome Accord. Two years later, South Africa became an independent republic. In 1998, 
conservationists and tourism entrepreneurs renewed the transfrontier conservancy ideas 
abandoned in the 1930s. Two years later, the environment ministers of South Africa, 
Mozambique, and Zimbabwe signed a provisional memorandum to establish the 
sanctuary. The presidents then signed the conservancy into being on 9 December 2002.  
While Mugabe could say he was distracted by these events, in 1999, as power 
began to slip from him to the newly formed MDC, he made land a weapon. Mugabe 
inserted a clause to possess white-owned land and redistribute it to blacks into a 
constitutional draft he knew that people would reject in a referendum based on its flawed 
and self-serving provisions. When Zimbabweans rejected it, he blamed the white farmers 
for inciting the population and unleashed his former guerrillas. Mugabe strategically 
deployed land as a force multiplier in his endeavor to silence the opposition: with it he 
could reassert his nationalist, pan-African, and humanist credentials, turn all his 





But first he had to find the weapons to get the land from white farmers. Three 
years earlier, Mugabe had regained the support of his ZANLA veterans when he awarded 
them Z$50,000 gratuities for their role in the independence struggle. At his command, the 
veterans invaded and occupied white farms. When former colonial power Britain 
raised alarm at the treatment of the white farmers, Mugabe gave the veterans and rural 
party faithful carte blanche to invade conservancies. 
On every farm, cattle ranch, and game reserve, the telltale signs of invasions and 
occupation were clear. Right on the sugar plantations at Triangle and Mkwasine, in the 
middle of the fields, pole and rough-thatch huts screamed through the window for 
attention. In Mabalauta, the Acting Warden later informed me that these people had come 
from Chief Chitangas to reclaim their ancestral lands, but the lions and leopards had 
eaten many of their livestock. After all, was this not also their ancestral land? The human 
invaders beat a hasty retreat back to their villages to save their stock, which cannot claim 
indigeneity to the park because the ancestors of tsetse fly had prevented it. The warden 
also told me that Chitsas people had invaded Gonarezhous eastern part to reclaim their 
ancestral lands. After all, had the guerrillas not promised?  
Today the occupations continue. These land invaders have refused to leave and 
have promised to defend their sovereignty over their ancestral lands. In 2007, 150 
villagers from Sengwe joined 700 families from Chitsa and Chitanga already resident in 
Gonarezhou since 2000. Keen to retain a crumbling rural stronghold of support from 
the groundswell of popular support for the opposition Movement for Democratic Change 
(formed after the constitutional referendum in 2000), the ZANU (PF) government first 





not leaving the land that had belonged to them since time immemorial.1 As we saw, 
they arrived there in the early 1800s. In the latest invasions in October 2007, Sengwe 
villagers also insisted that their ancestors had lived in southern Gonarezhou before the 
Rhodesian government unjustly removed them when establishing the national park. Said 
one of the settlers, Moses Murawu: We are just emulating the Chitsa people who stood 
their ground and we also feel we have the right to get our land back. Latest estimates put 
the total figure of people who have claimed their ancestral lands at 3,000.2 
Gonarezhou has become a war zone in ZANU (PF)s battle against the opposition, 
with the ruling party dangling land as a weapon to secure the hearts and minds of local 
villagers. Just like in both the 1970s and 1980s-90s war, whenever Gonarezhou has 
become a war theater, the wild animals have paid the price. In November 2007, poachers 
strongly suspected to be senior government officials and serving members of the army 
used the political turf war as a smokescreen to shoot dead two black rhinos. This came at 
a time when the state had started to slaughter wild animals for party celebrations during 
national holidays, amidst a critical shortage of beef as a result of the farm disruptions.3  
In this particular case, the poachers were clearly after the horns, which they gave 
up and fled after an exchange of gunfire with game scouts. Two firearmsa .303 and an 
AK-47 assault rifle suspected to have come from the national armys armorywere 
recovered. Said one police source: We are investigating how the rifles, believed to be 
from the ZNA, were used in the shootout. We strongly believe that either the guns 
were stolen from the ZNA armoury by the thieves or that some senior army officers were 
                                                
1 Owen Chikari, More Villagers Invade Gonarezhou Game Park, The Zimbabwe Times 
www.thezimbabwetimes.com October 27, 2007 
2 Ibid. 






involved.4 This poaching incident is only the latest of many incidents independent 
researchers say involved senior government officials and army officers in Gonarezhou 
National Park. Police have continually claimed they are investigating, but the level of 
corruption suggests that, just as in the 1980s-90s, they are also likely complicit. Any 
members who try to raise alarm will be victimized as MDC supporter, a sellout who, 
just as in the 1970s guerrilla war, must be severely punished.5  
 
Making People Pests 
The historical trajectory of Zimbabwe leads one to pose the same overarching question 
Edmund Russell posed for US environmental and war history. Namely, why do 
governments transition from containment (control) to total war (eradication)? Where I 
differ with Russell is his emphasis on the high tech chemical industry and the military. In 
the transLimpopo, and indeed much of Africa, the subtleties of design and laboratory 
practice has very little effect on the way the designed artifact is used. The people who use 
Mitsubishi 4 x 4s, AK-47 rifles and Paraquat might take a cursory glance at the 
manufacturers label, ingredients, and location of the factory, but only in so far as they 
are looking for user instructions. These user instructions depend on whether the 
commander of the violent operations allows them, or whether he has a formula that hurts 
more, kills more slowly, and so on. Here, the designer who is more important is the user 
who might himself be taking orders from above, and who turns a herbicide into an 
instrument to kill human weeds. What seems more important, therefore, is to follow the 
                                                






marauding gangs so that one does not miss the subtle transformations and interactions 
between the user, the weapon, the victim and the environment.  
Like most western scholars of science and technology, Russells focus is firmly 
located within the designer or practitioner world of industrial experts, military forces, and 
other policy institutions in charge of Total War. These are the institutions that 
popularized the use of two specific chemical toxins discussed in Chapters 6 and 7: DDT 
and dieldrin. This dissertation confirms Russells finding that pesticides were extended to 
the control and eradication of human enemies. But it is also on this point that we 
substantially differ. 
Unlike Russell, I retain an active interest in the response of the pest to the 
ecological violence of the state. It seems that, just like Cèsaire when talking of 
thingification, Russell privileges (elite) human actors and institutions at the expense of 
their human and animal enemies (the dignified entities). Even as the states use of 
violence has become more overpowering, the opposition in Zimbabwe is getting stronger 
and fearless, upping the ante as the violence increases. When people have suffered from 
state terror, they have retreated to a sophisticated repertoire of resistance that has made 
the state even more desperate. Professionals have migrated out of the country, thereby 
denying an unappreciative government their skills. The economy has suffered. In the face 
of state patronagefree food, free tractors, and free fertilizersthe rural population has 
seen through the states masquerade to buy their votes. They have taken the food and 
gone to the polls on full stomachsto vote ZANU (PF) out! In the rage of rejection, 
ZANU (PF) has turned to violence, forcing people to attend its rallies. Mugabe is 





This dissertation is not interested in the effects of chemical weapons on the 
environment itselfa critique that has often been extended to Russells workbecause 
that was never the purpose of this project. Rather, its ambition had more to do with the 
continuing tendency of the statewhether precolonial, colonial or postcolonialto 
extent weapons intended for animals to humans as well. I needed to go there because 
scholars like Césaire have claimed that the exceptionalism of colonialism lies in its 
pathological and dehumanizing violence.  
I have located this discussion in Africa not merely because I must give the STS 
audience long used to western case studies a me-too nonwestern version of Bruno 
Latour and Michel Callon. Rather, it is because of my position as an African scholar of 
science and technology and an STS scholar of Africa concerned with the tendency to 
make colonial violence and exception while readily excusing postcolonial pathologies of 
violence.6 This dissertation could have been different were it not for the persistence of 
this tendency of the postcolonial state to render citizens not just things but also 
pathogenic and deserving of urgent destruction. The problem with Césaire was that he did 
not widen the scope of things to include actual things and to investigate actual links 
between the colonial states treatment of nonhuman things and humans as nonhuman 
things. Ed Russell seems to fall into the same trap that Africanists have fallen into: a 
failure to consider seriously the role of nature and technology in the behavior of humans. 
Instead, technology and nature have remain subaltern to humans, when in fact they are 
what makes humans people. 
Back to Africa, the situation in Zimbabwe today challenges and dismisses claims 
to the exceptionalism of colonial violence, not so much because colonialism was better, 
                                                





but merely that African nationalism as used in Zimbabwe as a tool to oppress has 
disgraced itself. In fact, it is not a question of successional but cumulative pathologies of 
violence towards nature and people before and after colonialism.  
Here is Zimbabwe today. In the eyes of the state, citizens who offer an opinion 
different from the ZANU (PF) party line are no longer just pests of the human or animal 
variety but weeds as well. The notion of weeding out traitors has always been a 
hallmark of Mugabes political life since the 1970s when he ascended to the ZANU 
presidency through execution, incarceration and torture of his opponents in Mozambican 
guerrilla camps. In the 1980s, Mugabe first caricatured his political rival Joshua Nkomo 
as a traitor conspiring with first the Soviet Union and then South Africa to organize 
dissident groups for the purpose of destabilizing the country and finally to overthrow 
[me].  
To add credibility to these stories, the state discovered large arms caches on 
farms owned by NITRAM, a business consortium that former ZIPRA guerrillas had 
formed to help themselves reintegrate into society. It was the speed with which the state-
run press got to the sites of discovery that shocked the country. While addressing a rally 
in the eastern city of Marondera in February 1982, Mugabe declared: ZAPU and its 
leader, Dr. Joshua Nkomo, are like a cobra in a house. The only way to deal effectively 
with a snake is to strike and destroy its head.7 20,000 ZAPU supporters were massacred, 
and Nkomo wrote the letter cited here from exile in London because he had been 
declared persona non grata in the country he had fought for as a nationalist. The 
government used the same Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA) and Unlawful 
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Organizations Act the Rhodesians had passed to deal with nationalism to now hunt down 
the snake and confiscate the Nitram farms.  
Mobs of ZANU (PF) youths prowl the rural countryside and streets, chanting 
war songs, dragging people out of their homes and beating them up with sticks, iron rods 
and axes. In May 2005 Mugabe authorized Operation Murambatsvina. Murambatsvina 
is someone who refuses dirt: Mugabe himself. The operation was meant to clean out 
the dirt (slum dwellings, tuck-shops, and backyard shacks) that carried pathogens (the 
MDC) that were now making Mugabe unpopular. The dirt was not so much in the 
materiality of the dwelling structures but that which dwelleth in them: urbanites, the 
bedrock of MDC support and organization. This operation was sold as an urban clean-up 
campaign toas Mugabe put itcreate salubrious spaces and bring the city back to 
what it used to be in the colonial period. Hundreds of thousands of urban dwellers 
watched helplessly as their houses were torn down by bulldozers. Those rendered 
homeless were bundled into trucks and dumped at remote farms with no shelter as the 
winter cold closed in. These farms were typical of the Protected Villages that we saw the 
Rhodesians using in Chapter 7. But there was another communist-inspired dimension: 
many others were displaced to the rural areas, which at the time ZANU (PF) claimed to 
be its strongholds. There they would be re-educated and rehabilitated back to the 
nationalist project. At that stage, ZANU (PF) was still at the level of pest control. 
Murambatsvina was a mild case of internal displacement in contrast to Operation 
Makavhotera Papi (Where Did You Put Your Vote?), in reference to the electoral 
majority the people delivered to the MDC in the March 29 2008 plebiscite. After 





majority and therefore necessitate a run-off, the state launched a Gukurahundi-style 
campaign to destroy the MDC before the next election set for June 27. The ZNA and 
ZANU (PF) militia went on the rampage. The choice was clear: Your choice is your 
bullet.8  
Then as now, the party gangs act like real hunters and their prey (people whose 
only crime was to exercise their right to choose who must govern them) experience their 
menacing mobilities as such. Said one woman about his assailants: They hunt the 
opposition. They said they ate human liver and drank urine during the war and so they 
were prepared for war again.9 Truethe guerrillas had endured the latter experience 
when the RSF poisoned all waterholes in the 1970s. At the time, however, the guerrillas 
were saying they were fighting to free the people from the oppression of the whites. 
Now the liberators are using the RSF methods to deny people the freedom they 
promised. They now behave as RENAMO had done in the 1980sfrom just beatings, the 
army and militias are waging a full-blown military campaign of abductions, killings, 
rape, arson, and thefts. What becomes the status of being human when, for example, 
women have wooden poles thrust into their vaginas? What is the difference between 
the death of a person and that of an animal when the killers murder their targets, put the 
body on the back of the Mitsubishi 4 x 4 trucks and drive around the townships shouting: 
We have killed the dog?10  
The instruments they use to hunt down their prey span generations and 
geographies. They expose the nature of the pest as something to be destroyed but that 
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may not be edible; the tools for the job should be seen as pesticides. What are these? First 
there are the less obvious ones that analytically fit the overall purpose of going after the 
pest. The gangs move in sleek Mitsubishi 4 x 4 trucks, carrying sticks, spears and knives, 
tear gas canisters from Israel imported via South Africa by sea, Chinese AK-47 rifles, 
RPG-7 and mortar bombs. They go door to door, beating and killing anybody associated 
with the opposition. These are the instruments for the mobile workshop of violence. The 
vehicles take the assailants to their victims and enables the use of the killing 
instruments.11  
The trucks are instruments of abduction in areas where there are roads or drivable 
tracks. Otherwise the feet are the main mode of the chase: gangs arrive in numbers at 
the home of the suspected MDC supporter or official, seize them, their wives and their 
children and take them to their camp. The modus operandi resembles the hunt as 
described throughout the chapters: the outsiders used such local human resources to 
create village intelligence and other networks. ZANU (PF) anchors in the local village 
through local collaboratorsthe chief, councilors, headmen, and youth. These locals 
become the nucleus of village intelligence cells which prepare hit lists. While the party 
uses the local people and hit lists as instruments to control and eradicate its opponents, 
some locals are using this affiliation to ZANU (PF) to settle their own family or local 
scores and loot wealth for themselves.  
At the bush camps the hunters mete out punishment that transforms the human 
body to a mere carcassa piece of flesh without the dignity of humanity. Like hunters 
skinning a carcass, four menand womenhold down the victims two legs and two 
arms apart. A fifth grabs the head and shuts the victims mouth with either palms or a 






cloth tied to the back of the neck so that the victim cannot scream. Then one or more 
other assailants armed with heavy wooden poles take turns to thrash the victim on the 
buttocks for hours. When they are through, they leave a mess of raw flesh, the buttocks 
virtually gone. Husbands, wives, children, mothers, fathersthe whole villageare 
made to watch as the victim is beaten, kicked, burnt, and sliced to death. Slowly. The 
assailants chant songs against and spit insults at the MDC, a way of pacing their rhythm 
as they work on the prostrate body. The victims are told they are getting treatment 
befitting animals because they belong to or voted for a party of animals. Afterwards the 
victims are thrown own out into the hot sun without food or water: If we asked for 
water, they said: Get your water from Tsvangirai.12 
When ZANU (PF) leaves its victims alive, it is a deliberate move to control by 
traumatizing themand every one of their kininto fleeing their homes and 
constituencies. Because one can only vote in the constituency where they are registered, 
the strategy is to prevent them from casting their vote at all. However, the militias have 
now switched into eradication mode, from village to village. People now dread the night 
and early morning, the best time for the hunter to pounce on his sleeping prey. Some on 
the hit list are designated targets of fatal torture: boiling plastic mixed with paraffin is 
poured on their backs and private parts. The goal is to extract the identities of MDC 
members and their hideouts.13 
Some MDC victims crack under torture and are then turned, Selous Scouts-style. 
It becomes difficult to trust anybody because nobody knows who the next person really 
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is. Like animals pursued with gunfire, so too do people live in a state of permanent fear 
and suspicion. The phones are wire-tapped, they are being watched, and, as the late 
reggae singer Bob Marley once said, Your best friend might be your worst enemy.14 
Like in the 1970s, the knock on the door strikes fear among those inside the house.  
Some of the methods have gone beyond the sadistic. There are cases where beaten 
victims are forced to climb a tree with a rope round their neck and being told to jump so 
that they commit suicide. It closely resembles the trap gun we saw in Chapter 1, 
where an animal trips the bait and shoots itself. The sadistic part is that local villagers 
are being compelled to feed their tormenters who will kill them at a time of their 
choosing. The tormenters live off the land and kill for the pot. Every family is required 
to contribute food to the militias because they are protecting villagers from MDC 
violence! Those who do not will have revealed their true colors: they are sellouts, and just 
like in the 1970s, the penalty is death.15  
The villagers each have a ration card for receiving food from non-governmental 
organizations. ZANU (PF) has long used food as a weapon to bribe rural people to vote 
for it; not anymore. It is now depriving people of food to starve them to death; that way, 
the enemy is eliminated. The NGOs have been banned; all food is distributed by ZANU 
(PF) officials, using a checklist of names, and rewarding or punishing based on political 
loyalties.16  
The rhetorics fueling the violence are reminiscent of other regions of the world. In 
Rwanda, the Hutu leadership and militia were inciting their followers to kill Tutsi 
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Cockroaches.17 The philosophy of violence was first to reduce the humanity of the 
enemy to the level of a pest that must be squashed. Besides the language of cobras and 
weeds, the rhetorics of wild Africans, who just cannot be thankful that the state is 
sparing their lives when they must surely die, is strong. The government has gone further 
to render the pathology of opposition to it more grotesque. Says the police chief, 
Augustine Chihuri: We must clean the country of the crawling maggots bent on 
destroying the economy.18  
In his latest threats, which are very reminiscent of his tough-guy rhetoric of the 
1970s which passed for heroic and dogged resistance against colonialism, Robert 
Mugabe has gone a step even further than Ian Smith was prepared to. The election 
campaign in Zimbabwe has turned out to be a military campaign. A few days prior to 
the run-off before MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai, Mugabe declared he would lead 
his war veterans back to the bush to fight another war if people voted his rival into 
power: We fought for this country, and a lot of blood was shed. We are not going to give 
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up our country because of a mere X. How can a ballpoint fight with a gun? We are ready 
to go to war. In reality, Mugabe has always been at war, even when he seems to be 
practising peace. These are the exact words Mugabe has uttered consistently since his 
ascendancy to ZANU (PF) leadership in 1976:  
- Our votes must go together with our guns. After all, any votes we 
shall have, shall have been the product of the gun. The gun which 
produces the vote should remain its security officerits guarantor 
(1976).  
- Our party must continue to strike fear in the heart of the white man, 
our real enemy! (December 2000). 
- We are no longer going to ask for the land but we are going to take it 
without negotiating (2000).  
- We have degrees in violence (2000). 
- When they criticize the Government ... we take the position that they 
can go hang (2007).  
- Let the peoples voice thunder across the whole country on 29 March, 
rejecting and damning once and for all the bootlicking British stooges, 
the traitors and sellouts, the political witches and political prostitutes, 
political charlatans and the two-headed political creatures (2008).19 
As pests, people no longer deserve the dignity of size: through violence and 
rhetoric, they are reduced to smaller nonhuman entities. In such small social sizes 
(importance), the pathogens can be squashed to death in their numbers without arousing 
the conscience of Africa and the world. The cultural weight that normally clothes the 
body into something whose life and death is meaningful and important is removed; the 
pathogens can now be eradicated without trace, without care for the feelings of their 
loved ones. Maggots have no relatives. The relatives and friends must watch, so that they 
realize that if they genuinely love their kin that much, the power is in them to keep them 
alive and not have the same fate befall them. They can vote properly next time.20 
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Then there are the traditional pesticides or herbicides. On 18 June 2008, 
Zimbabwes respected online newspaper, The Zimbabwe Times, carried a report 
confirming that Mugabes militias had unleashed chemical warfare on supporters of the 
MDC. The assailants were allegedly applying highly toxic herbicides to the injuries of 
their victims, particularly those on buttocks, to exacerbate pain as well as increase the 
chances of fatality. At that point, the use of the chemicals had not yet come to light 
because doctors have only been content with treating the injuries instead of investigating 
the causes of their extent, particularly the peeling of the outer skin, blistering, ulceration 
and cell death in skin tissues.21 
The gangs were using Paraquata highly toxic herbicide which is fatal if it enters 
the bloodstream or when swallowed by accident even in small measures. It is a quick-
acting, non-selective herbicide, which destroys green plant tissue on contact, which is 
why farmers use it widely to kill any green weeds in the fields. Said a government source 
sympathetic to the MDC:  
When they beat up perceived MDC supporters they then proceed to pour 
cold water laced with Paraquat on the injuries. Apart from increasing the 
pain, this inflames the injuries and prolongs the healing process. If you 
carefully look at the injuries sustained by some of the opposition victims, 
especially those sustained in the buttocks through beating, you can see that 
they are unusual and not consistent with beating. Bones in buttocks are left 
exposed and grisly. The herbicide eats through the tissues, hence the 
horrific sight of the injuries. 
Paraquat is a widely used herbicide first produced for commercial purposes in 1961 and 
is banned in thirteen countries for its acute oral toxicity and ill-health associated with its 
operations particularly on the farms and plantations.  
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The word Black Smith has become common parlance in Zimbabwean public 
discourse as a way of saying that the postcolonial regime has failed to differentiate itself 
from the colonial (Ian Smith). The strong pretence Mugabe makes towards Pan-
Africanism (black solidarity) and African nationalism has revealed itself to be no more 
than a convenient shield to camouflage state terror. In the streets and villages of 
Zimbabwe people are now drawing comparisons between the colonial and postcolonial 
oppressors. What if Mugabe was white and Smith was a black man; would Africa have 
confronted Smith the way it did, and would it have treated Mugabe so leniently while he 
terrorizes his own people? people ask.  
I do not think so. In 1980, people were promised that the era when they were 
treated like animals was gone. The liberation war had been waged to guarantee one 
man, one vote (a very chauvinistic framing!). The barrel of the gun had been used so that 
every adult would have the right to exercise their will through the barrel of the pen. Yet, 
twenty eight years later, pesticides are being used again to add salt to injury and render 
the wounds of the sellouts fatal. Their only crime is to exercise the right for which the 
gun was fired and spilled blood: voting. The very same president who declared that the 
gun barrel would empower the majority in Zimbabwe to vote for the leaders they like 
now says the bullet is mightier than the ballot.  
At 84 years old, Robert Mugabe has become a self-annointed King of Zimbabwe. 
He yearns for and invokes the absolute powers precolonial monarchs enjoyed, deploys 
Rhodesian methods of controlling rebellious movements (mass action, grassroots 
mobilization, rallies, and so on), while wearing the postcolonial camouflage that every 





among scholars of Africa seems to suggest that Pan-Africanism (with Mugabe as one of 
its major icons) has reduced itself to a scandal, a veritable cloak with which privileged 
political elites cover their bulging stomachs, even as their people are starving to death, 
dying of AIDS, and wallowing in poverty. Pan-Africanism has become just another nice 
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